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Turkey vii th one of the fastest grovTing economies in the world but a 
per capita income only about one seventh of that for the industrialised 
world has allocated approximately 5 per cent of her gross domestic 
product to defence since 1952. There is evidence that the level and 
form of military expenditure has been determined not only by internal 
and external security factors but also by the ideological function of 
the military which is closely related to its integration into the 
sphere of production" There is no evidence of military expendi tUl~e 
having been used as a tool of economic policy to control inflation 
or unemployment. Turkish military expenditure also needs to be 
understood in relation to U.S. foreign policy, and in particular 
through the conditions attached to the flows of military and economic 
aid. Militarism has been instrulDental in shaping the form of 
industri21isation in Turkey and helped maintain the free lmregulatod 
conditions under which forei.gn capital could operate. One of tbe 
consequences of the Turkish path to development has been to create 
a long term dependency on imports of capital goods and raw materials 
which ultimately constrained growth in the- mid-1970s. Arms production 
in Turkey cannot be a vehicle for industrialisation since domestic 
linkages would be limited and one form of dependency would be 
replaced by another.· The links between military expenditure and 
economic growth are "Gheorised in terms of resource mobilisation a.nd 
resource diversion which are then estimated by two-stage least 
squares in a series of equations in which the rate of growth is 
treated as a function of both exogenous and endogenous variables in 
a dynamic simultaneous system. The results indicate that the impact 
of military expenditure is transmitte~ to the economic structure 
through both direct and indirect chalh~els and that over the period 
., 
1952-76 increases in the military burden have been associated with 
a lower r~te nf economic gro~th. 
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CRAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the 
relationship between defence and the grovlth of the Turkish 
economy in the period 1952 to 1980. Before Vie rio so, it is 
instructive to examine the general literature on the rela-cion-
ship between war, arms production and economic developillent. 
Before 1962 most of 1rlhat had been vrri tten on this Ivas 
characterised by partial analysis and was based on purely 
casu.::!. empiricis!11. Adam Smith (1776)1 101as one of the first 
to analyse defence "V'lhen in Book V of the vleal th of Na tioEs 
he presented a treatise on public finance and developed his 
ideas on what he regarded as the legitimate forms of }')ublic 
-, 
expenditure. "The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting 
the society from the violence and invasion of other independent 
societies, can be perforIned oIlly by means of a military force." 
Adam 3mi th argued that iI! the more advanced and civilj,sed. 
societies a standing army bec2me neces3ary and this needed to 
be financed by public funds. As vIars became more elrawn" out 
it was impossible for ~oldie~s tc cont~ibutc to civil activity 
and as the tart of wart grew to be a very lIintricate and 
complicated science" specialisation and divtsion of labour 
made a permanent army more effective. Smith stressed that the 
cost of defending a country became more expensive as more 
advanc8d arms were deve~oped, and this gave a clear advantage 
- 1 -
to those nations that cu·,) lrl affol~d the expense. The wEin 
criticism of Smith's treatri'ent of u-Jfence is that he does not 
question the need for a. permanent army and as a consequence 
there is no analysis of the economic effects of military spending. 
The influential German historian Sombu.rt (1913)2 deliberat81~T 
~gnored the destructive aspects of modern Vlar on the grouIlds 
tha t these wex"e obvious and. had already received much a tten tion , 
and instead set out to emphasise the I constructive I side of imr. 
His argument was that the growth in the size of armies and the 
cost of providing arms, particularly after the glLn came to 
'\ 
dominate war, made it necessary to organise production in 
large scale enterprises and played a prominent role ill the 
rise )-f' mod.ern capitalism. 1-1ar promoted large-scale industry 
both directly and indirectly. Not only were the new armaments 
produced on a large scale, but the demand for supplies of o!'e 
and metal stimulated the metallurgicai industries, which wer9 
also more efficient in larger and more expensive establishments 
employing a large number of workmen. 
Sombart's thesis that war and development are lirLked 
through the rise of capitalism is incomplete and prejudiced. 
His views ~Tere coloured by the fact that durint; his lifetime 
G3rmany had ahmys been the aggressor invadirLg other terri tory 
and. had not had to suffe:r the havoc of war on German soil.  . 
There is no attempt to consider the importance of other non-
military demands for the changing forms of industrial orgtinis-
utiol1 and the progress of capi talistJ_c mining and manufacturing. 
More importantly it is not possible to consider the economic 
00nsequences of arms production in isolation from the consequences 
- 2 -
of wa-.:'. Furthermore, in terms of historics.l acc-c.rr'acy ;3o:.1bart 
may have been vlroD...g in dating the origins of large-scale 
production with the general use of firearms and explosives. 
The American economj.c :historian Nef (1950)3 in his stucly 
of war and human progress argued that peace contributed rat' 
more than war to the development of large-scale capitalism, 
but he ~TaS against using this as the onlJ' explanation of 
economic advance. Nevertheless in periods of limited warfare 
when tension between states was lessened. Nef ob3e~t'ved a speeding 
up of industria 1 isatione This Ivas partly because the mark'~ts 
for many products expanded in peace time and partly because 
international peace and stability facilitated the growth of 
foreign tradec 
The distinguished British economic historian, Sir .John 
4 Clapham, writing in the 1930 f S reaches a similar (:olloJ.usion 
to Nef, namely that in the period of the 'long peace' (1815-
1914) it was precisely because of the absence of devastating 
wars that economic development vlaS able to take rlace .. War 
held back industrialisation as great industries were crippled 
• 
or d.estroyed, populous cities completely ruined and wide st!'etches 
of land deprived of' cultivatio!l. The end of war generally 
brought about an Wlloosing of econo!f.Qc forces 9 wh:i..:;:n along 
wi th other factors f res'lll ted in economic develoI;ci,:=:nt. 
,Einzig, a widely read economist-cum-jour-nalist, was 
concerned with a different problem, namely rearmament in the 
5 
context of mass unemployment .. In TallY ways his analysis 
l:as more adva.ncer). tL?YJ ec..rlier writc2:'3 since 1).e recoGnised that 
~ 3 -
mili tary expenditure was on the one hand 'vTasteful' bu-s on the 
. 
other :b.and it created employment, although the full effects 
of rearmament needed to take into aCC01)nt how it was financ~d. 
the monetary repercussions and the consequences'for trade. On 
balance Einzig came down in favour of rearmament as a short-run 
solution to unemploynent and pointed to the experience of 
Germany and Japan who had based their economic recovery on 
increased armaments expenditure. He was fully aware of the 
waste of labour and natural resources that this policy entailed 
but he believed that there was an element of truth in Stalin.'s 
view that capitalist countries could on.ly achieve economic 
recovery by rearmament, as long as governments were unwilling 
to go against economic orthodoxy and expand public vJorks. 
Keynes (1936)6 took a similar theoretical line to 
Einzig when he argued that the costs of- 'involuntary'unemploy-
ment might mean that 'wasteful! loan expen.diture could enrich 
the community on balance. "Pyramid-builc:!1<:, earthquakes, 
even wars may SReve to increase wealth if the education of 
our statesmen on the principles of the classical economics 
stands in the way of anything better. 'I Wars have often been 
the only form 01' large-scale loan expenditure which stateslJlen 
have thoueht justifiable, yet "this has playeJ. its part in 
progress in the absence of something better". Keynes recognised 
that it would be more "sensible to build houses and the like, 
but if there were practical difficulties in the \"lay of this" 
then war and rearmament II Tllould be better than nothing. 11 
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In 1962· -the United Nations Report 0::1 the 'Economic and 
Social Consequences of Disarmament,7 marked the beginning of 
a period during which the economic consequences of war, 
military expen~iture and disarmament have been studied more 
systematically_ The 1962 Report was mainly concerned with 
the consequences of disarmement and concluded that it 1!2S 
desirable, since it reduced the dan~er of w&r, released 
resources that could be used in the development effort a.nd 
made economic management easier. The Report also considered 
the burden of military expenditure and recognised that it 
absorbed manpowe~, foreign exchange, education, training, 
ra.w rna terials and fuel, "which cOtlld ha.ve been used for economic 
progress. It was also emphasised that disarmement would permit 
/ 
the developed countries to transfer more resources to the less 
developed countries CLoD.C.s) in the form of economic aid 
and it was implicitly assumed that this would s timula te gro'i..,rth. 
In 1970 the United Nations (U.N.) took up the issue 
of arms once again when it adopted a resoluti~n which asked 
the Secretary General to prepare a report on the economic and 
social consequences of the arms race and military expendituree 
8 The Report was presented in 1972 and argued that disarm'::Hnent 
would contribute to oco~omic and social development through 
the~promo~ion of peace and a relaxation of internatio!~l tensions 
as well as through t~e release of resources for peaceful 
pttrposes. It was stressed that international exchange would 
be encouraged - trade, capital, knowledge, technology -" c:nd. 
- 5 -
once again that the giving of economic aid CO-"UJl be made (::asier 
and help to close the gap between the :cich and poor nations. 
Another report9 followed in 1977 which also stressed 
the enormous volume of men and resources devoted to military 
purposes and thus wi thhe1d from civilian prod.uction. This report 
also distinguished between conditions of fL1Il employment alld 
lUlder-full employment and emphasised that even in the latter 
case military expenditure could aggravate inflation and the 
trade balance thus making economic management more difficult. 
It was argued that the arms trade had opposite effects on the 
economies of importing and exporting countries and resulted 
in unequal exchange which was detrimental to the development 
effort of L.DoC.s since it represented a pure "waste of economic 
surplus. In conclusion the report emphasised the multiplicity 
of adverse consequences in all aspects ,of social life for those' 
countI'ies participating in the arms race. 
In spite of the fact that disarmament and development 
have been major i.ssues that have occupied the international 
community since the Second World War it was not until after the 
1962 U.N. Report that the two were treated as if they ~~d 
anything in common. 10 Yet for many L.D.C.s military expenditure 
has been large and growing and inevitably has had. repercussions 
t 
on the process of developmento 
Notwithstanding the secrecy and distortion surrounding 
much of the data on military activity it see!!lS important to 
I 
analyse the consequences of military expenditure ::or economic 
- 6 -
growth and development. This study will exaffiine the T8la~ion-
ship between defence expenciture and the economic growth 0: 
Turkey in the period 1952 to 1980, although for estimation 
purposes the shorter period 1952 to 1976 will be considered, 
since the latter date was the latest year that complete data 
was available when the :regression analysis was carr'ied out .. 
There are two reasons for selecting 1952 as the starting point 
for the study. Firstly, data on military expenditure and 
related mili.tary variables are not so readily available and are 
less reliable before the early 1950s. Secondly: 1952 was the 
year that Turkey formally acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty, 
so that by taking this as the starting point the study con-
centl':ttes on the period during which Turkey has been a full 
member of N.A.T.O. Nevertheless it is impossible to understand· 
the period 1952-80 in isolation from earlier periods and 
frequent reference is made to economic, social, political and 
military developments between 1923-52 • 
. There are several good reasons for singling out Turkey 
for studying the effects of military expenditure on economic 
growth. Firstly, the military authorities in Turkey have 
taken over government on three oc~asions sinc0 1952 - 1960 to 
1961, 1971 to 1973 and 1980 to present - and the total influence 
. 
of the military in economic, social, industrial, political and 
it 
ideological matters has been far reaching. Secondly, Turkish 
military spending has been substantial since the end of the 
Second World War, and aftel' 1960 she consistently allocated 
a larger proportio1l of gross domestic product (G.DoP.) to 
- 7 -
defence than all NoA.T.O. countries apart from tt.E: U.K., the 
U.S.A. and Portugal in spite of the fact of having the Im!8st 
per capita income. Turkish military spending cOii_bled bet-ween 
1960 and 1974 and then doubled again by 1976 due to thE ir,-,;asion 
of Cyprus and the threat of war with Greece. In 1977 military 
expenditure was nearly twice the level of spending on education 
and eight times the spending on health and social welfare. 
Thirdly, Turkey's growth performance has been impr-e8~~i ve 
in terms of G.D.Po/GoN.P. although in terms of per capita 
income less so. There has always been a foreign e:;.:change 
problem and in the 1970s after the U.S. arms embargo and increased 
mili tary expen~i ture the ext~rp.al debt posi tion d~terio:!:'a ted 
rapidly and growth declined. Not only was there an economic 
crisis in the 1970s but also a political crisis as the country 
headed towards civil war. 
Fourthly-, the question of the role of the military in 
Turkey and its contribution to the economic Qr.!ve10pment of tbat-
country has w-ider implica tions given the str& iegic importance 
of Turkey -within N.A .. T.Oo, particularly since the Iranian 
revolution in 1979 and the events in Afghanistan more recently. 
Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe, O.EgC,D., G.A .. T.T., 
an associate member of ;the E.E. C., as well as being a member of 
N • .i.'r.o., so what goes on within Turkey is of vital interest 
to Western cOtL'Yltries c Moreover, recent moves to limit the 
growth of strategic arms raises once again the issue of the 
enormous cost of m.i.li tary expendi-s-I.l.re, rwt only for Turkey, but 
for Rll countries. 
- 8 -
Clearly it is important to consider what contributions 
the military makes to the development of a countr'Y, and it may 
be many, since military acti vi ty cover's a diverse set of tasks. 
It is n~cessary to examine the linkages between military 
expenditure and other sectors of the economy and to determine 
whether, or to what extent, military activity can be considered 
a leading sector and a force for modernisation. Pye (1962) 
and Janowitz (1964) have argued for soveral reasons that the 
mili tary as a ffi0::lern institution possesses crlar-acterisi tic::: 
which make it the organisation most likely to be an agent for 
modernisation. However, given resource limitation there is 
an opportunity cost of military spAnding. Resources devoted 
to defence cannot be used for consumption or investment. 
Furthermore, the need to pay for military requirements may 
revolutionise governmental finances, generate inflation, 
affect the balance of payments, increase international 
indebtedness a~_~'_ make economic control more difficult. A 
vital qUAstion is whether military expenditure hinders or 
generates economic growth on balance. In spite of the 
conclusions reached in the various U.N. reports a study of the 
literature reveals that the relationship between military 
expenditure and economic growth is not so clear cut and. it is 
difficult to make generalisations, since the military as an 
organisation needs to be analysed in terms of the particular 
society in which it operates and military expendi tm'e can only 
be fully understood with reference to the international arms 
economy. Given The interven:ion of the military in Turkish 
politics it is also important to consider the role of the 
- 9 -
mili tary in sruping and influencing the struct'..lre of pov.'er 
withir! the country and how this relates to the particular form 
of development. 
Much of the earlier work on tne relationship between 
mili tary expenditure and economic grmlTth, including the very 
influential study of 44 1.DoC.s by Benoit (1973), has b3en 
based on c:ross section analysis 0 ~'he main criticism of this 
approach is that a dynamic relationship (behleen lIlilitar;y 
expenditure and economic growth) is estimated by using a static 
analysis, and. although the evidence may be interesting and 
important, great care m~st be taken in drawing conclusions. 
There is 'need therefore to analyse the relationship bet\-Jeen 
the burden of defence spending and the rate of growth of output 
for particular countries using time series an~lysis, and this 
is done for Turkey in this study. Berioi t ~ s most important 
finding was a positive relationship between the share of G.D.P. 
allocated to defence and the rate of growth of non-defence 
output or ci'vilian G.D.P. The 1'ela tionships ~peci:fied.. in 
Benoit's study were estimated 'with ordiIlE.ry leClst squares, 
yet when the rate of growth is assumed to be a function cf 
both exogenous and endogenous variables in a dynamic simultaneous 
syt)tem, as it is in his. study, then ordinary least squares are 
no +longer legitimate. In this study of Turkey the links betw'een 
military expenditure and economic growth are estimated by two-
of equations 
stage least squares in a seriesin v1hich the rate of gro"Hth is 
""-
treated as a function of hoth exogenous anel. endogenous varia~lese 
The results indicate that increases in the proportion of ~.D.P. 
- 10 -
allocated to defence have been associ2.ted with .'1 lOVIer rate of 
economic growth~ 
. The present study begins with an outli'.le of the gro"l'lth and 
development of the Turkish economy in the post-w'ar period, 
which is given in Chapter 2. In spite of considerable economic 
gro'vlth up to the mid 19708 Turkey haG suffered from a parmB.:tlGnt 
foreign exchange problem, high levels of unenlployment and rising 
inflation which eve:i.1.tually imposed constraints on econom..i.c groilth. 
The chapter ends by considering wider spects of development 
and r'elates them to the economic performance of the country $ 
Chapter 3 initially looks at the sources of military data 
and asses~es its reliability, and then goes on to detail the 
growth of Turkish military expenditure which is considered in 
relation to the allocation of domestic r-eRources and world 
military expenditure. Chapter 4 looks'at expla.nations of the 
growth of military expenditure and tries t-J aSS€F3s the validity 
of the various theories examined. 
Chapter 5 outlines the dimensions of Turki.sh arms production 
and considers the likely economic conssquences of the country 
purcuing a policy of military self-sufficiency. In particul8.r 
an attempt is made to determine the extent to 'iT~lich arms nroduction 
as ~ form of imnort substituting industrialisation would 
~ -
gene2'ate backward liI1..kages and help unemployment. Chapter 6 
accounts for the growth of the arms trade and considers the 
consequ~nces for the Turkish balance of payments. Economic 
and mili tary assistance are vie'wed as complementary and analysed 
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as instruments of U oS 0 leverage. The chapter concludes ,d th 
an assessment of the links between military aid and trade, 
external finance of the Turkish economy and the pattern and 
form of development* 
Chapter 7 reviews the literature on the relationship 
betw'een military expenditure and economic growth and development ~ 
equations 
and thE'll proposes certain which are used to estimate the effect 
'" of military e:z:pendi tur'e on economic gro·wth" FiIlP.lly, Cha.pter 8 
tenders some concluding Gommentson the issues raised. by military 
expendi ture and, how this affected Turkey in recent years. 
- 12 -, 
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CHAPTL}l 2 
GROWTH AnD DEVELO·P:'.'~-,~NT OJ? 
TURKI rfH -r,,,o-,,r",· 'y ~ ... _';,,,-, 1. I.,)J ... ~_ 
Introduction 
During the nineteenth century while Western Europe 
was undergoing an industrial revolution, Turkey remained 
economically backward, became known as the 'sJck ma11' 
of Europe, end suffered from the malao~iDistration of 
the decaying Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman rulers did 
not accept responsibility for the state of health of the 
economy, but through the system of 'capitulations~ 
conferred special pri vj.leges on foreigners which permitted 
them to dominate economic activity. Foreigners were 
given the right to be tried in special courts unde.T 
foreign jurisdiction, and either paid vers low or zero 
tax and import duties. }!'urthermore ~ ..=-0reign ba:r..ks, th8 
most important of' which was the Franco--Bri tish owned 
Ottoman Bank, opera.ted within. the Turkish Empire under 
the laws of their own country, and coritrol1ed Turktsh 
fina-no E: • 
Wh tb mur·kl·~!.l·· R~p'11'Jl'C UT~a ~ou~~P~ l'n J.9?3 +h~ If en J.e -'- . u _ _ e ..... , v . H (;;I.u..l _ .... C,l _ v_ _ _ v I;;.;
economy was backward and the potentj~al of its natural 
wealth was barely touched~ The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 
imposed certain I"E;strictioYu} un Tl.lrkey, one of which 
required thE government tc 110ld tariffs con~t~nt for a 
period of six years, 'thus leaving the T;l:;.'}·~ish eco~"orriy 
open to foreign trade just as -jt ha~ been prior to 19140 
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Foreign trade 'was still largely under the control of 
foreign firms, mainly British, German, French and 
Italian, and finance was still dominated by foreign 
capital. The first few years of the Republic were 
devoted to modernising Turkish life, which included 
establishing secular authority, the emancipation of 
women and the replacement of the luabic with a modified 
Latin alphabet. 1 After a few years of economic :!:'~con-
struction during which time the transport system was 
nationalised but per capita income balely chang2d 
. (Hershlag, 1968),2 the Turkish economy was hit by the 
world economic crisis, which saw agricultural prices 
plummet. "The trade balance deteriorated sharply in 
1928-29 and foreign capital flows virtually ceased. which 
led Turkey to impose import tariffs and exchange control, 
but a bad harvest in 1932 gave a 'clear indication that 
fundamental changes were required if Tu:r~ey was to 
speed up development. 
Etatism3 
From 1933 the Turkish response to the world depressio 
was to become protectionist and from behind the tariff 
barr}.er to institute a plan for industrialisation that 
would pave the way for ~~ independent national capitalism. 
Foreign trade was to be strictly controlled and imports 
of intermediate and manufactured goods were to be replaced 
• by domestic production. J.. five year plan for iudustrial-
isation was introduced undeT the cbarge of 2. state 
contro12ed Central Bank, and i- prime role was given to 
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state enterprise. The plan envisaged the establishment 
of several industries utilising domestic raw materials$ 
In this period of industrialisation there were clear 
elements of a non-capitalist path to development but the 
underlying ideology was Western (Keyder, 1979).4 
The period of state enterprise and pla.111ling led. 
to an increase in industrial pIoducticl1 of 80 per cent 
between 1929 and 1938 (EIdem, 1947-48),5 largely as a 
result of a concentration of fixed investment in the 
state sector and industry. EIdem (1946-·47)6 haC' 
calculated that 40 per cent of all fixed investment 
in the period 1933-40 was in the state sector (including 
rail transport and road construction) and a further 
23 per cent in industry (including state enterprises 
an.d electrlcity);while only 11 per cent went into 
agriculture .. 
During the War period the Turkish economy became' 
closely geared to Germany througl1 tradE; t but nevertheless 
it was still dominated by state planning. Agriculture, 
which had been largely ignored by the state in the 19308, 
continued to stagnate and after mobilisation agricultural 
prodl.:ction 8..l""1.d j.ncome.s fell, which left the vast mass of 
the population impoverished. In the immediate post-war 
period the economic controls were relaxed, but one of 
the consequences wa~ that the balance of trade, which 
had been in surplus for fifteen years, began to 
deteriorate and this led the government to devalue the 
lir~, although this had the effect of fuelling domestic 
. 
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inflation.? National income was almost 22 per cent 
higher in 1948 than in 1938, but the rise in population 
meant that per capita income was only 4.2 per cent 
higher,8 and still extremely low by Europefu~ standards. 
Moreover tncome was still very unequally distributed with 
the average rural income only half of the average urban 
income. 
One very important development in the post-war 
period was that the ruling Republican Peoples Party 
(R.P.F.) allowed an opposition party, the Democratic 
Party (n.po) to be formed, and it was this rival party 
. under Adrian Menderes that was elected to power in 1950. 
Political developments since 1950 have had an enormous 
influence on economic growth and the period breaks up 
into three distinct phases separated by the military 
interventions of 1960 and 1971. 
Liberal Pha~~950-60 
The D.P. was elected to power in 1950 on a programme 
which promised to halt the expansion of state enterprise, 
to reverse the decline of the agricultural sector a~d 
to encourage private -enterprise within a free market. 
't 
The expected decline in the public sector did not ta$e 
place. Land (1970)9 shows that the share of value added 
in Turkish industry originating in state economic 
enterprises (Sees) increased from 37 ner cent in 1950 
to 48 per cent in 1960. This was partly because no 
private interests wanted to buy the unprofitable Sees 
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whereas there was considerable political pressure exerted 
against selling profitable ones. 
Beginning in 1950 the Turkish economy experienced 
a boom which continued until 1953 and was based on an 
enormous expansion of agricultural production. Agricultura: 
lJrices were ri.sing, partly because of the boom created by 
the Korean War, but also because of deliberate government 
policy in Turkey of assuring hj_gh prices to farmers 
through state purchases. As agricultural prices went 
up, more land was brought under cultivation, with the 
area expanding by more than 50 per cent between 1950 and 
1954. Production of cereals alone increased by nearly 
50 per cent between 1948-53 mainly because of the 
extension of area, but there was also the influence of 
unusually good weather and the productivity effect of 
35,000 new tractors in use in the period 1950-53, many 
of them financp-d by U.S. aid and sold to farme~s on 
1 . b 1 ~ . t te 10 1 era creal rms. Land reform made hardly any 
contribution to the increased production and the industry 
remained dominated by many small to medium sized firms. 
In the space of four years, 1948-52, national incorre 
rose by 32.7 per cent and per capita income by 21.1 per 
cent~ The boom in agriculture was vital to the growth 
of the Turkish economy and the agricultural export 
surplus provided much of the foreign exchange for the 
substantial imports of machinery, equipment and raw 
materials tha t fed th.e infant industries. Nevertheless 
imports still exceeded exports in this period although 
-- 17 -
the trade deficits did not create in@ediate pro bIens 
owing to the ease with which foreign creciits could be 
obtained. After 1953, however, the agricultural boom 
came to an end as a series of crop f,~ilures caused 
production to fall, as is shown in Table 2.1. It was 
not until 1957 that agricultural production reached the 
level of 1953~ In spite of the fact that industrial 
output rose by 9.2 per cent in 1954 G.D.P. declined by 
2.9 per cent that year because the share of agricultur~ 
in G.D.P. was approximately 50 per cent. 
The end of the agricultural boom had several 
conse<luences. In the ve--::y short run there was the 
danger of food ohortage in Turkey as the export surplus 
disappeared but this was avoided by U.S. economic 
assl.stance to Turkey under Public Law 480. Under this 
arrangement the U.S. sold agricultural commodities, 
mainly grains and oilseeds, to Turkey and agreed. to be 
paid in local currency for the bulk of the shipments. 
The deal, which was to become a permanent feature of 
u.s. - Turkish relations right through to the 19708, 
suited the U.S. since part of its vast agricultural 
surplus was disposed of, but alse alleviated the Turkish 
demand for precious foreign exchange. More long term 
t 
the failure of agriculture and the world wide decline in 
primary product prices led to a change of direction in 
domestic investment. In the period 1951-53 34 per cent 
of total gro3s fixed investment was in agricuiture, but 
this lL'..ci declined to 23 per cent by 1955. The expanded 
industrial investDent after 1953 lar~ely went into 
- 18 ~ 
TABLE 2.1 
The Growth Performance of the 
Turk!sh Economy, 1950-78 
1968 prices, yearly percentage chang~s 
Year ,Miriculture .Industry G.D.F. 
1950 10.9 9~3 9.4 
(. 
1951 19.8 2.6 12.8 
1952 ,9.5 1009 12.0 
1953 8.7 19.2 11.2 
1954 -13.9 9.2 -,2.9 
'1955 9.8 11.3 8.1 
1956 5.0 9.6 3.3 
1957 6.5 10.7 7 a . .; 
1958 9.2 5.6 4.6 
1959 0.3 3.6 4.6 
1960 2.3 0 .. 4 2e9 
1961 -4.9 .11.7 1.7 
1962 5.0 3.5 6.1 
1963 9.0 12 .. 0 9.4 
1964 -0.4 11.2 4.1 
1965 -3.9 9.5 2.6 
1966 10.7 15.2 11.7 
1967 0.1 8.2 4.5 
1968 1.5 11.1 6.7 
1969 1.2 12.0 5.3 
1970 2.3 0.4 4.9 
1911 13.2 9.0 9 .. 1 
" 
-0.5 10.3 6.6 1972 
.1973 -10.0 12.1 4.4 
1914 10.3 7.7 8.8 
1975 10.4 9.0 7.8 
1976 3~9 10.7 8.1 
1917 -1.2 -1.0 4.0 
1918 3.4 2.4 3.1 
Source: 1950-'76 . Industrialists Turkish 
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and Businessmen's Association, Turkey: 
An'Bconomic Survey, 1977, Table 39. 
1977-78 International Fin~~cial Statistics, 
No.9, 1980. 
::. 
Note: for 1977 and 1978 the third column 
gives G.N$P. not GoD.P. 
l. 
sectors like textiles and food that were processing 
domestically produced primary productR. 
The decline in agriculture and the deterioration of 
the terms of trade also had repercussions through the 
effect on the balance of payments. After 1954 short-
term foreign credits Vlere difficult to obtain and reserves 
of foreign currency were inadequate, yet Turkey required 
. 
essential imports of machinery, intermediate goods and 
industrial raw materials. \'lith the trade'balance 
permanently in deficits as is shown in Table 2.2, the 
government introduced' strict import licensing and foreign 
exchange control to limit imp6rts to necessary industri~l 
goods. As a result machtnery a..'Yld raw materials accounted 
for 83 per cent of impcirts in 1960, up from 67.3 per cent 
in 1955. 11 The domestic counterpart to the restriction 
of imports was the import s~bstitution policy, such as 
the manufacture of cotton textiles directed mainly 
towards the home ma:rket., which was facilitated by the 
road. building programme of the ear1y 1950s. 7 • ~ • ,i'Dereas In 
1952 imports were 11.6 pel' c(;nt of G.N.P. they were only 
3_8 per cent in 1957, but expo~~s declined in a similar 
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Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
.1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
~ 
TABLE 2.2 
Turkish Imports and Exports 1950-78 
T.L. million, current prices 
and as Eercentage of G.N.P. 
Imports1 
967 
1,129 
1,557 
1,491 
1,339 
1,393 
1,141 
1,112 . 
882 
1,316 
2,214 
4,585 
5,600 
6,212 
4,878 
5,193 
6,522 
6,217 
.6,934 
6,786 
10,348 
17,725 
22,346 
29,977 
53,362 
68,987 
82,941 
104,882 
113,290 
Percentage 
9.3 
9.2 
11.6 
9.6 
8.4 
7.3 
5.2 
3.8 
2.5 
3.0 
4.7 
9 .. 3 
9.7 
9.3 
6.8 
6.8 
7.1 
6.1 
6.2 
5.4 
7.0 
9.3 
9.7 
12.5 
12.9 
12.8 
12.1 
8.8 
Exports2 
853 
883 
1,016 
1,109 
938 
877 
854 
967 
692 
991 
1,721 
3,121 
3,-431 
3,313 
3,.697 
4,147 
4,415 
4,701 
4,468 
4,832 
6,408 " 
9,090 
11,876 
18,038 
21,197 
20,075 
30,768 
31,338 
55 5 358 
Notes: • 
'"2 F.O.B. 
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Percentage 
8.2 
7.2 
7.6 
7.1 
5.9 
4.6 . 
3.9 
3.3 
2.0 
2.3 
3.7 
6 .. 3 
6.0 
5.0 
5.2 
5.4 
4.8 
4.6 
4.0 
3.9 
4.4 
4.7 
4.9 
5.8 
5.0 
3.7 
4.7 
3.6 
4.3 
Sources: 
Ministry 
Yearbook 
Monthly EconoEic Indi~ators, 
of Finance, Ankara; Statistical 
of Turkey 1973, Ankara., 1974; 
U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Stati8tics, 
1979, New York, 1980. 
manner, so that the trade balance, was in deficit 
throughout the 1950s and Turkey had to rely on forejgn 
aid and borrowing to finance the gap. In the period 
1950-53 G.D.P. had grown at an average rate of over 
11 per cent but for the rest of the decade it was nearer 
4 per cent. 
1958 was a crisis year for tile Turkish economy. 
The currency was over-valued, inflation had reached 
40 per cent, with exports declining the external payments 
position was extremely grave and the problem of servicing 
and repaying foreign loans was proving impossi.ble. The 
Turkish government responded by devaluing the lira, from 
2.8 T.L. to 9.0 T.L. to the U.S. dollar between 1958 arlU 
1960! and introducing a stabilisation programme. In 
the short run the econo~ic package achieved some success 
as inflation fell and exports showed an initial jump, 
.. 
while imports of machinery and raw materials were able 
to rise as new grants and trade credits were made available 
by O.E.S.C. countries. In 1959 agricultural production 
stagnated and exports failed to keep pace with imports 
. 
so the trade gap began to widen again. Even industrial 
t t d d . -.L9'S 9 and 1960 o::>nd per capi ta production s agna e urlng ~ ~ 
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income barely changed. The economic crisis led -co 
increasing social unrest and the D.P. resorted to 
repressive measures, until the military intervened in 
May 1960 and suspended constitutional governmentw 
On the whole the pace and pattern of economic growth 
in Turkey in the period 1950-60 was di3appointi~g after 
the early boom years. Significantly during thts period 
neither U~S. nor European capital was attracted to 
Turkey on a large scale, even though the Menderes 
government passed legislation in the early 1950s to 
encourage the inflow of foreign capital. The re3sons 
for this were partly external to Turkey 9 since }~lJ.ropean 
capital was being used mainly to build up their domestic 
economies and American capital had more profitable 
opportunities nearer home. 12 However factors within 
Turkey may well have discouraged foreign capital such 
as the continued strength of the bureaucracy and. the 
extent of state involvement in the prodl'_cti vesphere o·? 
the economy, as well as the ever present political 
instability •. Linked to the absence of foreign capital 
in 11urkey 1.S the rela ti ve stabili ty of the pattern and 
comnosition of Turkish trade in the decade. Although 
... 
Turk~y's foreign trade was mainly with O.E.C.D. counties, 
whieh. accounted for about 75 per cent of both exports 
a.."I1d. imports, there was a small increase in bilateral tro.de 
with the U,S.S.R. which occurred. at the time when '/iestern 
foreign crcrlits were most difficult to obtain. I~ terms 
of the composition of Turkey's trade agricultural prcducts 
accounted for over go per ceni-of exports in 1950 ru~ 
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only slightly less in 1960, whereas investmeilt goods 
and raw materials accounted for over 80 per cent of 
imports in 1950 and more than 90 per cent in 1960. 
These trade figures indicate cle~E1y the dependence 
of the Turkish economy on agriculture. Lacking a broad 
industrial base the Turkish economy was vulnerable to 
sharp harvest fluctuations: Althou~h there was increas..:.ng 
internal migration to the towns, with the urban population 
13 rising from 18.5 per cent to 26.3 per cent during the 
decade, Turkey~ along with Portugal, were the only 
countries in Europe to have experienced ax! absolute 
.. 
increase in the agricultural population in the period. 
It proved impossible for Turkey to absorb the incre~se 
in the active population into non-agricultural occupations, 
since population growth was so rapid that it arT1.ounted to 
over 10 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force 
each year. Total popUlation rose from 20.9 million in 
1950 to 27.8 million in 1960, and it W8·f' largely because 
of this very rapid rise that Turkey's growth of output 
per capita was lower than for any other country of 
Southern Europe. Menderes' i~ability to pursue a 
consistent and co-ordinated economic policy and particul~1.rly 
. 
his rejection of economic planning also had an adveI'se 
t 
effect on economic performance (Krueger, 1974)~4 
Rl.anned 3-rowt41 12.§0-71 
For a minority o~ the officers within the Committee 
of National Unity, set up after the milit~ry coup, the 
only way that economic· development could be ensured was 
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through a planned, state directed economy, with a 
permanent involvement of the bureaucracy, including the 
military, in Turkish politics (Keyder, 1979).15 The 
majority, however, wanted to see power handed back to a 
democratically elected government, even though this 
might have been incompatible with a regeneration of 
Kemalism. In 1961 a new Constitution guaranteeing 
democratic freedoms emerged from the period of military 
rule, and in October 1961 the R.P.P. returned to pO'Ner 
in. a coalition government ~ 
During the period of army rule the economy stagnated 
and real incomes declined •. The 1L"Ylcertainty generated by 
the coup caused investment in both tbe private and state 
sectors to .fall, and in 1961 although industrial production 
rose by 11.7 per cent, agricultural production fell by 
4.9 per cent, as Table 2.1 shows. With the return to 
civilie.n rule, and as a consequ8nce of the mj.litary 
intervention, there was a change of direction in terms 
of economic policy. Whereas the 1950s had been character--
ised by a lack of state economic plaXL~ing the 1960s was 
a period when government was committed to co-ordinating 
ecotiomic policy. The 1961 Constitution gave expliciit 
, 
recogni tj.on to the role and duty of the state in pla~ninG 
i' 
for economic development. Article 41 read: 
"Economic and social life shall be regulated in 
a manner consistent with justice ~YJ.d the' principle 
of full employment, with the o~~ective cf assuring 
. 
for everyone a standard of Ii vi.ng befi tting human dignity. 
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It is the duty of the state to encourage econo~ic, 
social and cultural developmen~ by democratic processes 
and for this purpose to enhance national savings, to 
give priority to those investments which promote public 
welfare and to draw up development proj e.:!ts. ,,16 
The Constitution also established the state Planning 
Organisation (S.P.O.) which was expected to design, dir~ct 
and control the economy through an economic plan. The 
First Five Year Plan17 (FGF.Y.P.) drawn up by S.P.O. 
covered the period 1963--67 and was followed by a Second 
Five Year Plan18 (S.F.Y.P.) for 1968-72. In addition 
S.P.o. was also responsible for drawing up an Annual 
Programme which reviewed the progress of the economy and 
gave more detailed information on short run objectives. 
Both Plans set a target rate of growth for national 
output of 7 per cent per annum. Investment was a key 
variable in the Plans and the aim was that a..."'1. increasi.ng 
share of net output would go to it, while consumption 
would grow more slowly& Emphasis was placed on greater 
efficiency in the use of existing resources and on 
improving the productivity of state economic enterprises. 
Each of the Plans laid great stress on the development 
of new industries producing import substitution goods. 
It was also recognised that a rapid rate of growth and 
indust~ialisation would place great strains on the balance 
of payments and tf this was not to interfere "vi th growth 
then export promoticn -Nould be a vi tal instrument in 
a.chieving the Plans' targets. 
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B~tv;een 1963 and 1971 G.N.P. grew at an ave!'age 
rulnual rate of 6.8 per cent, with per capita national 
product riSing more slowly at 4.3 per cent, both just 
about in line with the Plan targets. As can be seen from 
Table 2.1 the growth of the Turkish economy was uneven 
over this period and can be largely accounted for by the 
fluctuations in agriculture. After a big spurt in 
activity in 1963 the following two years saw below 
average performance largely because of the negative rate 
of growth in egriculture. During the period 1963-71 
agriculture grew at only 3~7 per cent per annlm on 
average whereas industry grew at 9.8 per cent on average, 
and, apart from 1970) was alw2.Ys above 8.0 per cent. By 
1970 agriculture had become completely commerctalised 
but there had been no significant increase in concentratjon. 
In the 1960s improvements in production methods and 
irrigation were introduced, fertilisers were increasingly 
being used allu by the end of the decade nearly 50 per. 
cent of the lani was cultivated with the aid of tractors 
(Keyder, 1979),19 yet sti'll agricul ture failed to achieve 
targets. The lower growth rate in agriculture is 
reflected in the declining share in national income, dO\Vll 
from over 40 per cen~ in 1963 to 30.5 per cent in 1971, 
as given in Table 2.3. Industry over the same period 
increased its share from 16.5 per cent in 1963 to 20.0 
per cent in 1971. 
By 1971 the major proportion of the labo~r force 
was still employed in agriculture although its share of 
the active population was dowrf.from 77 per cent in 1962 
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TABLE 2.3 
The Share of Agriculture and Industry i:q 
Na-yiona:.l Income, 1960-78, per centages 
Year 
--
1960 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
,,1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974-
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
ABri2.E.1 ture Industry 1 _, I. 
'- 44.3 10,,8 
40.6 16.5 
38.9 17$0 
36.1 17.7 
36 .. 4 17.9 
34.7 19.0 
33.1 19,,4 
31.2 20.1 
30.0 19.6 
30.6 20.0 
30 .. 1 20 .. 9 
28.5 21.8 
26.3 22.3 
26.8 21.6 
27.3 21.1 
26.0 20.8 
24.2' 20.8 
Note: 1 Mining, Manufacturing, Electricity~ 
Gas and ·Vater. 
Sources: National Income, 1938, 1948-70, 
Pub. No~ 625, state Institute of 
Statistics, Ankara, 1971; S.P.o. 
}~conomic Planning Diviston; International 
Financial Statistics, Sept. 1980; . 
Statistical Yearbook of iu~key 1979, 
Pub. 
No. 8g0" A1:'Jtara, 1979. 
to 65 per cent in 1971. Employment within industry 
grew by approximately 5C per cent bet'.'ieen 1962 and 1971 
stimulated by import substitution which increased 
industry's share of the active population from 8&3 per 
cent to 11 per cent. Corresponding to the growth of 
industrial and service employment there was conti.nued 
urbanisation in Turkey in the period 1960-70. Total 
populatj_on grew at an ar'",-l1ualrate of nearly 2.5 per cent, 
the most rapid in Europe, to reach 35.7 million in 1970, 
but urban population was growing more rapidly than rural, 
even though the a~solute rural population was still 
rising in this periode 
As both Plans had envisaged investment increased 
more rapidly than G.N.P. during the period 1963-71, 
while private consumption increa~ed more slowly. In 1963 
investment accounted for 15~4 per cent of G.N.P. and 
private consumption 74.9 per cent, but by 1970 the 
corresponding ftgures were 20" 1 a.-'1d 68. n per cent. 20 
Gross domestic fixed capital formation was the most 
rapidly growing component of G.N.P. in this period, and 
a substantial part of it, in fac·t about 50 per cent, 
was carried out by the public sector, as is indj.cated in 
Tabl~ 2.4. Of private investment less than 1.0 per cent 
came from private foreign capital, and the bulk of it, 
over 90 per cent, was internally fin~~ced.21 Foreign 
aid and credits had been important in financine investment 
. 
for a time after 1959, but their significance fell during 
the F.F.Y.P. ruld particularly after 1965. 
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TABL~ 2.4 
.Comp"?si tion of Gross Domestic. Fixed Ca:ei tal Formation, 
.. percentage distribution, 1960-75 
1960 1963 1966 1962, 1971 1972 }.973 1974 1975 
-
---
I. Residential Buildings 
:2 l' -L v 8. t e Sec tor 20 .. 6 16.1 18.1 21.2 18.9 ) 
l?ublic Sector 0.3 2.1 1.9 0.7 0.,6 )18.8 18.6 18.6 12.3 ) 
2 .. Oth(~r Buildings 
\..~~ Pri i,';?te 6 .. 5 8.0 7 .. 1 7 .. 2 4 ~ ) () , .. ", 
j:J bl' 11.4 12.9 11.5 13.0 12.9 )16 .. 8 11.4 19 .. 1 24,,4 .... u .le ., 
J 
3. other Construction 
:eri vate 0.6 1.1 0 .. 6 0 .. 5 0.4 ) 
Pnblic 24.8 2:.4 27 .. 9 26~3 22.7 )23~7 2~.9 20.5 18 .. 3 ) 
4. l,;:achinery and 
Eoutument 
... .L 
Private 22.3 24.4 20 .. 4 15 .. 6 26.0 ) 
)40~7 47.0 41 p 45.0 Pu.blic 13.6 11.9 12.5 15 "L~ 14.4 . . ,,-) ) 
5. Total Private 50.0 49.7 46.1 44.2 49.5 
6. 'ro t.ell Public 50.0 50,,3 57.' () :; .. ./ ~f) ~ "'. . 50.5 
Sources: National. Income, 1938, 1948-70, OPe cit.; 
National Income and Expenditure, 1962-73, 
'Pub. No. 712, S.I.S., Ankara, 1974; 
Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1979, 
op. ci t. 
T~e details of the composition of gross domestic 
fixed capital formation are given in Table 2.4 and show 
a rising share for the public sector until 1971, the 
year of the second military intervention. Public 
investment was mainly in construction (roads, railways, 
ports; etc.) but a large part was in machinery' and. 
equipment within the state economic enterprises. In 
spite of the rapid growth of investment in Turkey during 
the first two Plan periods the proportion of investment 
going into Ihachinery and equipment was declining until 
22 1970, and as Krueger (1974) points out the figure 
was much lower than for many other countries at a 
similar stage in development: Greece 40 per cent; Chile 
45 per oent; Spair- 49 per cent; Israel 41 per cent; 
Taiwan 53.2 pel" cent and Argentina. 45 per cent. While 
investment in machinery and equipment was relatively 
. 
low in Turkey, investment in buildings was high, partly 
. t 
because of the rapid rate of population growth but also 
a result of tax exemptions on building. 
Foreign trade was extremely iLlportant for Tur~=ey 
during the perioQ 1963-71 because of the emphasis in the 
two Plans on developing the industTial sector. 
. 
By 1971 
_. 3:1. -
95 per cent of imports were capital goods, intermediate 
. 
inputs or industrial raw materials v/hich were all essentiaJ 
for import substi~uting industrialisation. 23 Nevertheless, 
as Table 2.2 shows, after 1963 imports stabilised at 
'between 6 and 7 per cent of G.N .P. and this was 
achieved with a considerable tightening up of the controls 
on non-essential imports. Agricultural products 
continued to account for betvieen 85 a.Yld go per cent 
of exports after 1963, with cotton, tobacco, nuts and 
dried fruit being the main export earners. The F.F.Y.P. 
had assumed that there would be an expansion in exports 
of fresh fruit, live animals, fish and forestry products, 
but they"fell short of expectations, however, because 
the traditional exports did better than expected)total 
exports exceeded the Pla.Yl tareet" There was no 
reduction in the degree of conce~tration of exports 
(on a handful ofagricul tural commodities) j.n this 
period so the country remained open to the danger of 
fluctuations in export earnings. 
One important development in this period was the 
Ass0ciation Ag~eement with the E.E.C. which was signed 
in December 1964, whereby Turkey would eventually 
become a member Ol the Community after having gone 
through preparatory, transitional ~~d final stages. 
As a result of the Agreement an increasing share of 
Turkey! s exports went to the Common l.;arket, rising from 
, 
33.5 per cent in 1960 to 40.7 per cent in 1970, while 
the importance of the U.S.L. and Canuda as export 
markets declined. E.F.ll.A. IS share of Turkey's exports 
remai.lled constant between 1960 and 1970 at just over 
17 per cent, but by 1970 the E.E.C .. was a more important 
customer than E.]\. T. A., the U. S. A. and Canada c o;ftbined. 
There was also a big expansion of trade wi th ~':iddle Ea.st 
countries during the 1960s so that by the end of the 
decade they were taking 11~6 per cent of Turkey's 
exports and supplying 6.7 per cent of her imports. 
The geographical distribution of TUTkey's imports did 
not change very much between 1960 ancl 1970 wi th the 
E.E.C~ continuing to be the main trading partner. 
The·ri~ing deficit o~ externaJ. trade.in the period 
1961-71 did not cause Turkey to, abandon its growth 
target, as had happened in the 1950s, m.ainly because 
of the high level of foreign aid ruld the rising level 
of remi ttances from Turkish workers i.n Western Europe. 
Turkey continued to be highly dependent ·on foreign aid 
and· between 1963 and 1971 the Consortium for Aid "to 
Turkey, formed within the O.E.C.D., gave about 
$2,350 mi11ionso 24 Labour migration from Turkey was 
increasing after 1960, and between 1965 and 1971 the 
number of Turkish workers in 7;Tes tel'n Europe rosE': from 
180,000 to 526,000. The details of the flow of 
remittances to Turkey, whlch were considerable, are 
gj.ven in Table 2 .. 5 • 
Not only did the Turki3h workers abroad provide 
valuable foreign exchange but the level of remittances 
was sufficient to cover an inc~'easing propo~tion of the 
trade deficit, ~~ti1 by 1971 they were almost equal to 
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1964 
9 
1970 
273 
197.§. 
983 
TABLE 2.5 
Turkish Worker Remit~ances, 
~964-79, g million 
1965 1966 1.967 1968 1969 
--
70 115.3 93 107 140.6 
1971 197~ 1973 1974 1975 
471 740.1 1183 1426 1310 
1977 1978 1979 
1086 974 1694 
Sources: Turkey: An Economic Survey, 1977, 
OPe cit., Tables 104 and 130; Turkiye 
Is Bankasi: Review of Economic Conditions, 
1979, Ankara, 1978; O.E.C.D., Economic 
Surveys: Turkey, 1980. 
the trade deficit. 25 
" While growth through import substitution was 
sustained many underlying social and political problems 
were kept under control. Inflation, which had been 
such a problem in the second half of the 1950s, was 
historically very low during the 1960s, although it 
did accelerate rapidly in 1971. The 19608 was a 
period of rapid industrialisation (e.g. the consumption 
of steel per capi ta increased-.by 260 per cent between 
7<1 
1961 and 1971 and energy consumption per capita by 
221 per c.ent), large scale urbanisation and groYling 
unionisation (membership up from 296~OOO in 1963 to 
1,200,000 in 1971, which represented 30 per cent of 
wage earners), which placed great strains on a~ already 
fragile political system. In 1970 industrial productio~ 
stagnated, agriculture had another bad year on top of 
several bad years) unemployment was over 10 per cent 
and the external sector went into even greater deficit. 
The economic crisis of 1970, which was mild compared 
with what occurred later in the decade! caused the 
government to devalue the lira frpm 9 T.L •. to 14085 
to the dollar, and to introduce a set of ntabilisation 
measures to deal with the external 1mbalance. The 
summer of 1970 also saw a massive demonstration by 
, 
workers which led the Demire1 government, in power slnce 
1965, to introduce Martial Law, but this measure did 
not contain the social, political and economic di.scontent, 
and the military decided to intervene i.n March 1971. 
Mounting Crisi..§.., 1971-80 
1970 had been a crisis year for the Turkish 
eco~omy but 1971 showed a considerable improvement. 
Agricultural production rose by 13.2 per cent, which 
was the biggest annual increase since 1951, and 
industrial prodtlction also improved on the poor 
performance of 1970, so that G.D.P. grew by 9.1 per 
cent. In 1972 G.D.P. grew by 6.~ per cent, in spite 
. 
of a decline in agricultural ~roduction, largely due 
to the continued expansion of industry. At the end 
of the S.F.Y.P. the mai~ macroeconomic targets had been 
broadly achieved, although within that total performance 
industry and construction, and to a smaller degree 
agriculture had below target growth rates, while services, 
housing and- transport above target. 
1971 and 1972 were sup8rficially years of recovery 
for the Turkish economy but the underlying economic 
position was not so healthy. Inflation which had 
averaged just over 5 per cent for the 1960s jumped to 
15.9 per cent in 1971 and 18.0 per cent in 1972. The 
main reasons for the increase in inflation were the 
devaluation of 1970 and the growth in the money supply 
which the military authorities sanctioned when they 
took power. During this period pf rising inflation the 
army rulers made strikes illegal, real wages fell, and 
in 1972 there were 1,575,000 people un.employed, 
representing lJ_ per cent of the workir.c population. 
I 
The increased rate of activity in 1971 and 1972 meant 
a rise in imports, but because exports incre;j,sed only 
modestly there was a widening trade deficit (see Table 
;. 
2e2). ]' 0 rtuna t ely for Turkey remittances from 
exp~.tria te workers were increasing and these became 
extremely valuable as the Turkish lira was devalued. 
In 1972 Central Bank reserves of foreign exchange 
reached record levels but the continued failure of 
exports to expand in line with imports led the Turkish 
authorities to devalue the lira ~Y a further 10 per 
- \ 
- 36 -
cent in February 1972. 
In 1973 the Third Five Year Pl_an (T 11' Y P ) b 
• .1.:. •• egan 
which was expected to restructure the economy, with 
31 per cent of total investment going into manufacturing 
industry and a further 13 per cent into the industrial 
mining and power sectors. At the end of the S.F.YcP. 
65 per cent of Turkey's ma.npower was employed in 
agriculture which accounted for 28.2 per cent of G.D.P. 
in comparison with 11 per cent in industry providing 
22~6 per cent of G.D.P. By the end of the T.F.Y.P. 
it was anticipated that manpower in industry would 
rise to 14 per cent and account for 27 per cent of 
G.D.P. while the agricultural share of manpo',ver would 
26 fall to 58 per cent and provide 23 per cent of G.D.P. 
G.N. P'. was expected to rise at an annual rate of 7.9 per 
. 
cento The Plan also placed greater emphasis on foreign 
i.nvestment by reverting to the principles of thG 1954 
Ac·t for the Encouragement of Foreign C:'pital Investments. 
It was hoped that foreign capital would playa vital 
role in development during the T.F.Y.P. by introducing 
locally unavailable technology, particularly for the 
export sector. 11nother important landmark was passed 
on lst January 1973 wnen Turkey entered into the second 
and tran.sitional sta.ge of association with the B.E.C., 
which increased the range and reduced the tariff on 
goods a~')le to enter the Common lvlarket. The other major 
event of 1973 was the restoration of constitutional 
government after the elections in October. 
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./ 
During the first four years of the T.F.Y.P. the 
. 
economy expanded. broadlJ in line with the targe: fer 
G. D. P. , although there was a consj_derable t3 ecline in 
earnings from the rest of the world after 1974. Then 
in 1977 expansion came to an end as both agricultural 
and i.ndustrial production declined. Unemployment was 
15 per cent in 1976 and rose even higher during 1977. 
Inflation too was much higher on average during the 
TI)]'. Y .F. than in the two previous ones 8,..."'1d it accelerated 
. rapidly in 1977 to reach 24.1 per cent. The balance of 
payments was in deficit and deteriorating during the 
T.F.Y.P. .With the quadrupling of world oil prices in 
late .:...r;73 and early 1974 nearly 62 per cent of Turkey's 
imports in 1974 were for raw materials. The deficit 
OTJ the bala.nce of trade reached 7.5 'per cent 0i' G.N.P .. 
in 1974 and 9.2 per cent the fol'lowing year. One of the 
consequences of the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 was to 
create uncertainty which reduced the flow of earnings 
from tourism in 1975 and 1976 well below target levels. 
The recession in the Western World, including the 
Germa..Yl construction and motor industry, also reduced the 
flow of workers' . remi ttances in 1975 and 1976 ~ so there 
was strong pressure .building up on the external account 
" fo:r several years. In 1977, which was a particularly 
severe year for the Turkish balance of payments, imports 
rose by 26 per cent and exports by a mere 2 per cent, 
but ~_n terms of dollar values imports rose by about 20 per 
cent 2nd exports fell by a similar proportion. 27 Worker 
remittances showed only a 6 p.er c·ent recovery in 1977 
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over 1976, ~nd the deficit on trade represented 8.5 
per cent of G.N.P. Most of the increased imnorts in 
-.; 
1977 were for raw materials, which increased by over 
30 per cent while the decline in exports was largely 
due to the reduced earnings from cotton and tobacco. 
In the short run Turkey was able to borrow from 
abroad to cover the mounting aefie-its, but within a very 
short time the rising debt and debt-servicing began to 
create further problems on the external account. In 
1977 amortisation of external debt amounted to .3214 
million with a further ,336b million being paid in 
interest on earlier debt. 28 The total foreign debt of 
. Turkey which stood at $2.2 billion in 1970 had reached 
%3.5 billion by 1975, %12.5 billion by 1977 and .315 
billion by 1979. 29 In Septembe~ 1977 the Turkish 
government introduced certain policy me&sures to restore 
internal and external balance: tigh.+'~l' monetary control, 
, higher prices for state enterprise goods, devaluation 
of the Turkish lira and a rise in import deposit guarantees. 
After 1977 the Tur~ish economy was in a very sick 
condition. The rate of growth 0:: the economy stagnated 
during 1978 and 1979. Industry in particular was 
+ 
su£fering from import restrictions and the deflationary 
measures of September 1977. The 1977 measures also 
caused a rapid in.crease in import prices which was soon 
reflected in domestic prices, In 1979 the wholesale 
price index went up by 63.9 per cent and by the end of 
· .... 1 
1979 it had reached 80 per ce,nl.; on a year to yero" basis."' 
- ")q -
Unemployment too continued to rise ~~d according to 
the State Institute of Statistics it reached 13.9 ner 
cent of the labour force in 1978, although unofficial 
estimates put it nearer 20 per cent. One of the 
favourable consequences of the recession, and a further 
devaluation of the lira in March 1978, was the decline 
in the deficit on the current account in 1978, down to 
4.5 per cent of G.N.P. 
The enormous economic gfowth that took place in 
Turkey between 1950 and the mid 19708, with G.N.P. 
rising some 250 per cent and per capita income about 
100 per cent, was based to a large extent on the expansion 
of the industrial sectorc The balance of payments was 
permanently in deficit on the current account throughout 
the post-war period but it was not until after the 1973 
oil crisis that it imposed constraints on domestic growth. 
Prior to 1973 it had always been possible for Turkey to 
finance the trade deficit through short term capital 
movements, foreign aid and worker remi·c tances, because 
import controls and export subsid.ies kept the deficit 
. . 
wi thin bounds. Unfortunately Turkey V1S.S unable to break 
• 
its dependence on a small range of commodities for 
export, and even in 1976 three products (cotton, hazlenuts 
and tobacco) accounted foI' over 45 per cent of export 
. ~~2 earnings.~ Although Turkey's industrial exports 
increased from 18.1 per cent of the total in 1950 to 
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35.9 per ce~t in 1975, a close look at them reveals 
that 16 per cent of them in value terms in 1976 were 
agriculture based, being processed primary products, 
and a further 44 per cent of them were textiles. 
During the 19608 rapid growth based on import 
substitution was possible because there was a ready 
protected market in Turkey which was large and growing 
and the level of imports was. rising less rapidly tha.."1 
the rate of industrial expansion. A major difficulty 
emerged iti the 1970s due to the high propensity to 
import. Over 90 per cent of Turkey's imp~rts in the 
mid 1970s were investment goods an.d raw materials, a.l1d, 
with the terms of trade deteriorating, import spending 
waS increasing as rapidly as national product which 
caused the trade deficit to grow, alarmingly. In the 
1970s, too, domestic demand was not sufficient to 
maintain the ~Tevious rate of industrialisation, so 
that external markets needed to be found for domestic 
products. The problem was that after 1974 there was a 
world recession ~ld many of Turkey's industrial products 
were not internationally competitive because of the 
protectionist barrier erected in the 19603. Atte~pts 
to ~olve the balance of payments disequilibrium through 
massive devaluations failed to provide the answer and 
fuelled domestic inflation. 
Between 1974 and 1977 Turkey's reserves ,of gold 
and foreign currency' declined b;r over .3950 million and 
at the beginning of 1978 were at an all· t:i me low 0 The 
foreign exchange gap had. to be finan0ed through I.i.I.F. 
Special Drawing Rights, private foreign suppliers' 
. 
credits and as a stop-gap measure the Convertible Lira 
Deposit system was reinstituted in 1975. These measures 
genera ted fore'ign exchange in the short run but as the 
balance of payments deteriorated year by year it 
became increasingly difficult to pay the interest let 
alone the principal of the debts. 
Financial help for Turkey was announced in principle 
at the Guadaloupe summit meeting in tTanuary 1979 to 
prevent the country falling into complete economic and 
political collapse. The external position of Turkey was 
so serious that even after the foreign debt was 
rescheduled it would still require 40 per cent of export 
earnings each year just to service the debt. 33 The 
rescue operation, which was to b~ undertaken by the 
I.M.F., Western commercial bru1ks ana O.E.C~D. governments 
was conditional on Turkey acceptin~ a~ austerity package 
which included further devaluation, a wage freeze, 
higher consumer prices, low~r economic growth and a 
shift of resources from the public to the private sector. 
But in 1979 the Turkish economy was in its deepest ever 
crisis with unemployment standing at 20 per cent; 
ind~stry working at only 50 per cent capaci ty, ba11kruptcies 
rife, particularly a~ongst small firms, and inflation 
accelerating. Bulent Ecevit, the Prime Minister, would 
not agree to the austerity package immediately, but 
eventually was forced to re8.ch a comprolliise~ Devalu3.tior. 
took place in June and larg2 price iI:crcascs r:2re 
announced. 
In the mid-term elections of October 1979 there was 
a lanQslide victory for DemiTel's Justice Party and 
Ecevit promptly resigned. The I.M.F. visited the 
country j.n December, and in early 1980 Demirel announced 
a further devaluation and enormous price increases for 
basic necessities: coal 100 per cent, electricity 163 
per cent and transport between 135-300 per cent. 34 
The agreement on loans and aid. for Turkey, re::lched 
between Demirel's coalitlon government ana. the I.l.1.Fft 
and the O.}';.C.D. in 1980, came too 15.Ge to prevent the 
crisis intensifying, which led to the m3.1i tary coup in 
September 1980. 
Turkish ])evelo}2ment: .A Wider C9l~~'p"! 
It has been showil,how the three military coups 
since 1950 were preceded by economic problems, but it 
is impossible to understand the mountlng crisis that 
occurred in TUY'key in the late 1970s, which brcugb.t the 
country close to collapse, in terms of the economic 
performance of the country a1on~. Just as on the two 
previous cccaLions when the military assumed power 
the country was in the midst of a political crisis 
which stemmed from ieft wing demands for eco!'lomic, 
" 
social and political ch~nge. The first part of this 
chapter looked at the growth of the Turkish economy, 
but it is important to broaden the analysis al'J.d 
consider what happened to development and to see how 
this related to the periodic crises of the country • 
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First of all it is neces8ary to define the concept 
of de~elopment. It is a term which is used widely in 
the Social Sc1ences and it means different things to 
different people. Development is a normative concept 
and its definition ultimately depends on the values 
and goals of the individuals assessing development. 
Subjectivity is not confined to the study of development 
but is inevitable within all branches of the Social 
Sciences. 35 For the purposes of this study development 
will be taken to be a process of impr0vement that 
involves multidimensional change (Easter, 1972)~6 
-Economic growth can be an important dimension of 
development, but it would be misleading to use 'it as 
the onl~ proxy for development, since it is not a 
sufficient condition for development (streeten, 1972):7,38 
Furthermore economic growth is caloulated- from. c:b.anges 
in G.N.P. or G.D.P. estimates and there are a number 
of sources of bias in this procedure. 1g ,40 
Even though development is a normative concept 
there is a fair degree of agreement in the literature 
on development objectives, in which the dimensions are 
economic, social, poli tical 8....11d cuI tur8.1 (Colman a'ld 
N " ) 41 lxson • One consequence of this is that there is no 
~ 
adequate single index of development that C~~ be derYed, 
partly because many aspects of development cannot be 
directly measured and for each aspect there are several 
possible indirect indicators that CQuld be employed, 
but also because there is no way of knowing the correct 
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weights to use nor of reducing the ind.ica tOl'S to a common 
. 
uni t of measurement $ 42 For the Puy'poses of this study 
it will be assumed that development can be measured by 
five themes or dimensions: 
1. Rate of economic growth. 
2. Distribution and minimum income levels .. 
3. Productive capacity and teclmological change. 
4. Social and institutional change and political 
participation. 
5. Dependency and international relations. 
As 1 and 3 have been dealt with at length earlier 
in the c~apter and 5 has been touched on and will be 
considered in greater detail in chapter 6, further comnent 
will be limited to 2 and 4. 
Distribution and l~inimum Income Levels 
.An important objective of development is t·:') raise 
the ·level of living and. one of the :J.n~ ica tors of this 
can be changes in per capita 'consumption. Between 1963 
and 1972 consQ~ption pe~ capita grew at an average rate 
of 3.5 per cent per annum which was somewhat slowe~ 
tha.n the growth of G.l{.P~ per capita at 4.3 per cent. 
'" In years when G.N.P. grew less than planned it was 
generally consumption that bore the brunt of the burden. 
Thus in 1964 when G.N.P. grew at a mere 4.1 per cent, 
consumption per capita declined by 0.4 per cent, the~ 
again in 1970, a. year of economic cri2is~ COn3'}:':'~Hion 
once aga-Ln declined, this time by 0.6 per cent. ~he 
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lower rate of growth of consumption per capita is 
reflected in the changing structure of resource use 
with a declining proportion of G~N.P. going to 
consumption (and a larger share going to investment). 
Between 1950 and 1976 the share of G.N.P. going to 
consumption declined from 90.8 per cent to 81.3 per 
cent, with private consumption accounting for all of 
the fall. 43 Yurukoglu (1978)44 presents estimates of 
* the increasing rate of exploitation that occurred in 
manufacturing industry in Turkey between 1970 and 1973, 
and details the rising gap bet'vveen minimum wages and the 
required level of wages up to 1977. Real wages were 
. . 
more or less maintained between 1973 and 1977, but 
during 1978 and 1979 fell substantially and even ffiore 
rapidly after the introduction of a wage freeze and 
higher prices in late 1979 and 1'980~45 Unemployment 
which stood at 11 per cent tn 1972 had reached 20 per 
cent by 1979 and was a direct cause of povert,yfor 
millions of people. Some groups have oeen made much 
worse off by the spread of mechanisation. Kiray and 
Hinderil'1..k (1968)46 give details of share croppers who 
were dispossessed by farm machinery and reduced to 
sea>Jonal employment .as farm labourers and. as a 
con~equence suffered material decline. There were also 
* The calculation of the rate of exploitation is prob1em-
atic since national income categories do not cor~espond 
with Marxist categories. 
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an increasing number of urban under-employed, as ':Iell 
as tne unemployed, who were forced to live in appallj.n:::; 
conditions in the shanty tovms and squatter areas that 
spr'ang up round the main cities. 47 
The first available information on income 
distribution is for 1963 when S.P.O. undertook a stud.y 
using data from the demographic survey of that year. 
Further surveys were carried out in 1968 and 1973 with 
the latter study being the most reliable but not 
comparable with the earlier surveys because of different 
calculation methods. The overall picture revealed by 
the .1973 study was of a high degr~e of inequality~At 
the lower end of the distribution 12.2 per cent of 
households received only 1.5 per cent of nationa~ income, 
while' at the higher end 2.5 per cent of households 
received 21.0 per cent of national ::n.come c 48 When the 
findings are compared internationally~ Turkey is 
revealed to have a more inequitable distribution than 
most countries. 49 The World Bank (1980)50 revealed that 
the percentage share of household income received by the 
low~st 20 per cent of households was 3.4 for Turkey 
which was lO'.ver than for all countries a,part fro~l 
Honduras, Peru, rJlala:ysia, Mexico, Coste. Rico., Br2zil 
" 
Venezuela. The highest 10 per cent of households took 
.40.7 per cent ~f household income~ a degree of inequality 
at the upper end onl~! exceeded by Honduras, Peru and 
Turkey has made consic1el'c;,hle e conoulic progress since 
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1950 yet at the sa.me time some ine~u2.1ities have 
remained which have hctc;_ the effec t of ge~-'lera ti:r\~ soci al 
and political unrest, particularly in times of economtc 
crisis when disparities bet·'Reen different groups in 
society have been increased. 
Some of the indicdtors that could be used to measure 
social change and pa.rticipation, e.g .. participatJ_on rates 
in schools, the Ij. ~cracy rate, etc ~, show a heal thy 
modernisation trend.. In two areas of participation, 
however~ progress has be~n only partiel and 
namely in labour relations an.d j.n poli tics. 
U Y\ O"ne'" -.!J. '- V J.~ , 
1950 the Labour Law of 1936 operated which permitted 
individual labour contracts~ but prohibited collective 
agreements, strikes and lockouts. F·rom 1950 it became 
legal to fOI'm trade Ul1ions and emp10vsT associat5_ons 
-but collective barga.ining and s trikes were still illega.l. 
The Constitution of 1961-brought a new attitude towards 
collective bargaining and in 1963 Law 275 gave it legal 
rec0gni tion arJ.(~ also permitted strikes and lockouts. 
Since 1963 Law 275 has regulated industrial relations 
. 
b-llt in peyi ods of:Martial Lar;; the right to strike was 
.,. 
suspended and even under civilian rule strikes could be 
halted by government decree that it was necessary and in 
the national interest, as happened frequently during 1979 
In l~~O multi-p:1.rty ,lemoc:racy r:aG establisr.ed in 
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Turkey for the first time, and it gave the mass of the 
popu~ation an active voice in the political system. 
In 1961 the Labour Party of Turkey was founded and its 
programme stressed the desire to follow-democratic 
ways in gaining political power. The ~urkish Co~nunist 
Party was permanently banned throughout the post-Second 
World War period, but in 1971 the Turkish Constitutional 
Court also outlawed the L.P.T. and the entire leadership 
of the Party were arrested. In the two years that 
followed, while the military were in power, thousands 
of left wing activists were imprisoned because of their 
political beliefs and many were tortured. 51 The two 
Articles' of the 'l'urkish Penal Code most frequently us':~_ 
to punish political activists were Articles 141 and 142 
which had been copied from the fascist penal code of 
Mussolini's Italy.52 (See Appendix 1). 
Article 141 was used to impri30n me-mbers of left 
wing orgenisattons, and Article 142 was used to imprison 
. journalists, publishers, writers, translators, academics 
8.J."1.d anyone else involved in the dissemination of material 
that the authcrities deemed to be left wing~ The 
Articles have received a great deal of criticism both 
. 
within and outside Turkey and the application of the 
.; 
Articles led Amnesty International to declare that they 
were generally incompatible with Articles 18, 19 and 20 
of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights a..l1d 
Articles 9, 10 &."1d 11 of the European Ccnvention on 
Human Rights, v;hich guarant8es freedom of thoLJ.~;ht, 
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conscience and religion; freedo!il of opinion and 
expressj.on and freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association. 53 
Between 1971 and 1973 a:uendments to more than 
40 different Articles from the Constitution were drafted 
which greatly limited the freedoms gained in 1961. 
Nevertheless the divisions in Turkish society along 
class, religio 14S a..YJ.d etrmic lines Vlere so great ln the 
1970s that successive governments were unable to put 
an end in mounting violence. Harassment and imprisonment 
of socialists and trade unionists failed to stem the 
growing ~ass protests, 54,55 particu-larly after 1975 and 
eventually basic freedoms-were eroded even furtheFwhen 
Martial Law was declared in December 1978. 
Conclusion 
Economic planning was introduced in 1963 in order 
to improve on the poor economic perfol'mance of the 1950s. 
Planning was regarded as a tool that would ensure 'social 
justice' for all, which was to be a major objective in 
the series of five year plans. .In other words great 
em~lasis was attached not only to the achievement of 
eco~omic growth but also to improvements in a more 
widely conceived economic development 0 It was stressed 
that there was a need for a more equitable distribution 
of income and wider p&rti~ipation in the fruits of 
economic progress througb extended. educational oPiJort -
uni ties, better housing, heal-;th and welfare facili tie~~, 
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improvements in the quality of urban and rural life 
and m0re favourable employment prospects. 
In practice although G.N.Pe grew impressively 
between 1963 ~nd 1976 and at a higher rate than for many 
L.D.C.s, there were many deep rooted structural and 
insti tutional problems tilat had not been overcome by 
1976. These problems were: (1) high and rising levels 
of unemployment, reaching 20 per cent in the latE: 
1970s, with a marginal unemployment rate, i.e. of new 
entrants, far in excess of this,56 (2) very high rates 
of population growth, still averaging 2.5 per cent per 
annum~ . (3) a very inequitable· and unjust income . 
distribution, (4) low per capita. incomes, (5) insufficient 
domestic savings, (6) dependency on imports for 
technology, capital-goods and raw materials, (7) dominance 
of exports by agricultural and agriculture based 
products, (D) an inadequate education8l ·system for all 
industrialSmg 00untry, particularly in secondary and 
higher education, (9) low levels of provision in health 
~~d welfare services, (10) an archaic public administration 
sys+em57 and r·estricted participation in and access to 
poli tiC::'11 insti tutions and processes, (11) riGid sexual 
. 
and racial divisions. 
t 
These problems were essentially the same as had 
been recognised at the start of the first five year 
plan. Economic progress failed to resolve the institutional 
and structural problems and did little to eliminate the 
social and economic imbalances in the countr.y. In sh0rt 
• 
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little progress had been made by the late 1970s 
towards achieving social justice. 
/ 
/ 
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CH,A..PTER 3 
THE GROfNTH OF IITII!~T X3 .. Y YX?ENDITURS 
~~D THE AL~OCATION O§ RESOU~CES 
Sources of IJata 
Before looking in detail at the growth of Turkish 
military expendi turei.t is importa-Ylt to consider the 
sources of data and the reliability of the figures. 
Mili t8.J..~y expe:'J.di ture by its very nature has a strategj.c 
signifioance which may require that full information on 
its level and content is not made public.. The need to 
ille:l.ntain national securl ty lc.'l.o s many governments to 
publish on.ly partial informat:i.on on military expenditure, 
or genuine military expenditure may be included within 
different categories of government expenditure. 
There are five main sources of data on military 
expenditure as follows: 
1. The International Institute for strategic 
Studies, London (r.I.S.S.). 
2. The International Peace Research Institute 
of stockholm (S.I~P.R.I.). 
3. The U. s. Arms Control End Disarmament J\gency 
(.A.C.D .. A.). 
4. The U.N. in the Statistical Yearbook and the 
I.M.F. Government Fina..'YJ.ce Statistics Yearbook. 
c 
5. · World ~,;ili tU.l'J ~'YJ.d Social .Expe!"ldi tt;.res. 
Not surprisingly it is found that these sources 
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estimate military expenditure according to different 
defiIl.itions and "therefore discrepancies are found 
between them. S.l.P.R.I. (1973)1 listed 11 military 
expenditure categories as follows: 
1. Pay and allowances of military personnel. 
2. Pay of civilian personnel. 
3. Operations and maintenance. 
4. Procurement. 
5. Research and development. 
6. Construction. 
7. Pensions to retired military personnel. 
8. Military aid. 
9 •. Civil defence. 
10. Paramilitary forcese 
11. Military aspects of activities that are 
acknowledged as having 'a joint civil-military 
function; for example space or atomic energy. 
Yet S.I.P.R.I. estimates of military expenditure 
for N.A.T.O. countries are based on estimates made by 
N.A.T.O. to correspond to a com~on definition, which 
does not inclvde all eleven categorie~ .. The N.A.T.O. 
estimates "i.nelude mili tary research and development; 
include military aid in the budget of the donor 
• 
country and exclude it from the budget of the recipient 
country; include costs of retirement pensions, costs of 
para-military forces and police when judged to be 
trained · and equipped for mili tal'J Opp.T~-ttions; 21lC. 
exclude civil defence, war pensions and ps.yrr.ents on 
2 
war debts." 
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The U"S. A.C.D.A* on the· other hand has a differellt 
defini tion which includes "cturent and ca.pi tal expendi turE 
to meet the needs of the armed furces; expenditures of 
national defence agencies for military programmes; 
expenditures for the military components of such mixed 
activities as atomic energy; space, and research and 
development; military assistance to foreign countries; 
military stockpiling; retirement pensions of career 
personnel; and expenditure on certain para-military 
forces ••• excluded a~e veterans benefits, civil defence, 
civilian space, strategic industrial stockpiling and 
public debt service.«3 
These differences in definition are not the main 
cause of uncertainty in estimates of military expenditure. 
]'or non-communist countries all the major estimates of 
military expenditure are based rin open sources of 
information, which simply means that they. are derived 
from published national budgets. In some countries 
defence estimates appear in a Defence White Paper with 
other supporting material. For other countries there 
may be just one figure inclvded in the 'budget st3..tement 
. ~ 
although there is always the possibility that there may 
be further military "expenditure in supplementary or 
t 
emergency budget's, or that actual expenditure may 
differ from the amount allocated in the budget. 4 
Another problem is that different countries categorise 
mili.tary expenditure in different ways so that for some 
countries certain forms of military expenditure may be 
included in the budgets of other ministries; for 
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example the cost of para-T.ilitary forces may be 
included in the budget for the Ministry of the Interior; 
defence-related research and development ill that for 
Industry and Technology; military pensions in the budget 
for Social Security; and some military infrastructure 
costs in the Ministry of Transport and Com2~J_l1icatioTis. 
There are also problems relating to the cost of military 
manpower, since conscripts will almost certainly be paid 
less than their economic opportunity cost - the difference 
being a hidden cost of defence. Fortunately the N.A.T.O. 
definition and estimate includes military expenditure 
carried out by other ministries and agenci.es, but it 
does :-':'Jt make allowance for cheap mlli tary manpower. 
For international comparisons it is preferable that 
military expenditure figures are corrected for inflation 
and converted into a common currency, yet both of these 
adjustments ca..'1 give rise to bias C' Nevertheless S. I. P. R. I. 
found that for N.A.T.O. countries the d::fferent sources 
gave fairly close estimates for military expenditurec 
It was assumed that if the different sources gave widely 
differing estimates for a particular co\)ntry then that 
" indicated a Vlide margin of error fLYJ.d gave a guide to th~ 
. 
reliability of the figures. From the various estimates 
.. 
of military expenditure fer each country a 'standard 
error' was calculated, which was used as a measure of 
the extent of the divergence of the estimates. In the 
case of 1l urkey the standard error was 7.6 for those 
estimates using the i.A.T.O. defi~ition of militRry 
exp,:;ndi ture. Thus if the aver'age of the estimates Vi8.S 
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100 the correct figure probably lies somewhere in 
the range 92.4 - 107.6. It is reasonable to aS3ume 
that the estimates maQ~e by TIS S q I P RId ~. • · .,)...; . .•.• an 
A.C.D.A. are fairly reliable although it is questionable 
whether they are valid. 6 
For many developing countries, and Turkey is no 
except~on, ar~s transfers from abroad are particularly 
difficult to estimate. The level of military imports 
is often a sensitive issue and its true level may be 
deliberately disguised by governments who simply 
categorise arms j.mpor~s as commercial transactions. 
There are also differe1'Jces i.n S.r.p.R.I. and A.C.D.A .. 
da~a on arms imports due to different definitions 
employed. S.I"P.R.I. j_ncludes only "major weapons", 
like aircraft, ships, armoured vehicles and missiles, 
whereas A.C.D.A. also includes small arms, ammunition 
support equipm~nt a~d spare parts. 7 ,s It is also 
extremely difficult trying to obtain information on 
arms transfers from the supplier .side since, for example, 
1n the U,S.A. it is dispersed among the various sections 
of the State and Defence departments. 9 
The implication. is clear. Great care has to be' 
tak~n when using military expenditure figures for 
estimation purposes. In the case of N.A.T.O. countries 
where the estimates (according to S.I.P.R.I. standa.rd 
error calculations) seem fairly reliable then stutisticel 
estimation and regression. ana.lysis car.. ·be worthwhile but 
for countries outside the O.E:C.D. the uncerta.inty 
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about the figures is too great to ma~~e a:'-cjl such exercj.se 
very meaningful. In spite of these difficulties and 
bearing in mind the uncertain validity of the data the 
growth of military expenditure in Turkey will now be 
considered. 
Plilitary Expenditure 
After the founding of the Republic in 1923 external 
threats to the independence of Turkey receded and the 
major objective became economic and SOC} p.l moderni.sation. 
In 1926 'approximately 40 p~r cent of the general budget 
was allocated to defence but this had decl.ined to about. 
10 28 per cent in the early 1930s, as more governm.ent 
resources were put into state economic activitiesc 
Nevertheless defence was not ignored and in 1924-
. 
conscription for a11so1diers, apart from officsrs and 
certain non-commtssioned officers, was introduced, which 
required young males to do a period of 18-24 months 
military service. 11 As a result of the conscription it 
has been estimated that by 1932 the total armed forces 
stood at 110,000 which was about 30,000 more than j.n 1922. 
As the 19308 decade drew to a close !Jil i tary expendi ture 
began to increase and a much larger military force was 
'" . 
mobilised - 210,000 by 1938 and probably in the region 
lr; 
of 800,000 in 19400· L By 1939 46 per cent of the general 
budget Ras being turned over to defence and thjs rose to 
56 per cent in 194-0 and stayed at that level lor the 
d- YO.~ t·· 1 ' t~ . lL.r... '. d.O:L l/ •.. tl~€ 7lar. The end ')f the We,"':.' saw mili tary 
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expenditure fall to about 33 per cent of the general 
budget in 1946. 
Since 1948 when the first U.S. military and 
economic aid began to flow into Turkey there have been 
two main sources of military expenditure. One part has 
come from domestic resources which have been allocated 
to military activtty through tne budgetary process and 
the other part represents the flow of ~rms and military 
equipment given as aid by the U.S. government to the 
Turkish government. Between 1948 and 1974 (that lS 
. before the U.S .. arms embargo) Western military aid to 
Turkey was approximately half ·the level of domestic 
resources ~_located to defence, although in some years, 
for example 1957 and 1958, the military aid was greater. 
There are two possible estimates of the domestic 
flow of resources into defence, one based on the budget 
of the ministry of defence and the other the N~A.T.O. 
estimate, or a corrected version of it~ For reasons 
previously outlined the N.A.T~O. estimate can be regarded 
as the most accurate and reliable and this is given in 
column 1 of Table 3.1 .• · The N. A. T. o. e8 timate does not, 
however, include the· flow of military aid from the Western 
~ Powers, mainly in the form of grants and. loans which are 
used to buy arms. Most of the military aid was received 
through the U.S. Military Assistance Program O·l.A.P.) 
although Western GerillB.ny also provided assistance on a 
smaller scale. Information on the flow of U.S. mllitary 
assistanoe to Tur~ey has to CQllie from the Statistics ruld 
_ ~o _ 
, J 
Year 
1952 
195:5 
1954 
1955 
1956· 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
.1961 
1965 
1968 
1973 
1975 
1976 
TABLE 3.1 
Turkish )'.Tili tary Expend..l!ure 1952.-76 
i~~.So $ ~illjop, at 1960 prices 
and exchange rate 
Domestic 
Mi},-itary' 
Expenditure 
JAJ!·Ee 2 
191 
211 
217 
228 
215 
211 
218 
251 
266 
289 
343 
363 
487 
883 
1082 
1'1'1' t . .:~:l. l ary Total 
Assistanc.:: Iti1i tars. 
"138.6 
202,,1 
202.1 
202.1 
202.1 
232.4 
243.2 
168.6 
104.2 
126.2 
131.2 
77.7 
86 .. 1 
65.8 
63.8 
Expenditure 
---(T 71' E" ) 
• J.\l • • .. 
321.6 
413.1 
419.1 
430.1 
417.1 
443.4 
461.2 
419.6 
310.2 
415.2 
474.2 
440.7 
573.1 
948c8 
1145.8 
D ":f E • l'i~. l. 
as %.. of 
G.N.P. 
~. .., 
6.0 
6 h c>j 
5,,8 
5*5 
5.1 
4.7 
6.1 
6.9 
T.M.E . 
as 7~ of 
G.N.r. 
10.1 
11.5 
12.6 
11.9 
11~3 
9.9 
9 .. 7 
9.0 
7.9 
8.6 
7.6 
6.2 
5.6 
6.6 
Source: 1952-68 S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook, 1910, 
2 ':-'>6 .... pp. 0 -f • other years derived 
. from S ~ I • P . R. I., 1980 8..L"1.cl =;1i1i tary 
Assistance and Sales Facts, Department 
of Defence, various years. 
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Reports Division of the AI6ncy for International 
Development (A.I.D.) and Military Assistance and Sales 
Facts, Department of Defence, and in Western Germany 
from the Defence Estim~tes, since there ~s no record of 
these transactions in the U.N. National Accounts or the 
I.M.F. Balance of Payments Yearbook. The rule adopted 
by the U.N. and its agencies, mid indeed by the U.S., 
West German and Turkish governments, is that the military 
assistance is government consumption in the donor 
country. As Shorter (1967)13 points uut the I.l.1oF. 
Balance of Payments Maj'1.uall4 proposes a theoretically 
consistent treatme:q.t of "mili tary end-i terns.", namely 
that they should be treated "in the same way as other 
goods and services", however, "for pragmatic rease-ns" 
they are treated as "final government expenditure in the 
granting country.tf By including'military'end-items in 
the total resources of the recipient coup.try, mili tal'Y 
aid would be treated in the same way as economic aid. 
This procedure does not deny that U.S. military assistance 
is beneficial to the U.S. but it does help to show the 
total level of resources used in def2nce in Turkey. 
The estimates for military assistance given in 
Table 3.1 do not include U.S. or G8rman economic assistancE 
.~ . 
to Turkey. It could be argued15 that economic aid may 
release domestic resources which can then be used for 
military purposes. but then this would be included in 
the domestic military expenditure estimate, S0 co include 
~oreign economic assistance as part of total ~i1itary 
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expenditure would amount to double eounting. 
Table 3.1 gives details of Turkish military 
expenditure between 1952-76, and it is quite clear ~hat 
military assistance has been substantial ~n relation to 
total military expenditure. For the period covered in 
Ta.ble 3.1 the average dCi:llestic burden of mj.li tary 
expenditure was just over 5 pe~ cent, while the average 
total burden was over 8 per cent. U.S o military 
assistance reached a peak in 1958 and then declined 
steadily both in real terms and as a percentage of 
( 
Turkish military spending during the 1960s and "19708. 
It is certain, however, that these estima~es of military 
expenditure do not state the full cost cf defence. 
( . )1 6 . Shorter 1967 - points out that many military resources 
have been procured at below their market va.lue. Thu.s 
"troops have been transported on the state railways at 
a loss to the carrier. Also, a.t one time in the mid·-
1950s cereals were 'purchased~ from the state -crading 
organisation by the army but not paid for." Even more 
important, allowance needs to bE: made for the fact that 
about two third.s of the total armed forces in Turkey 
have been conscripts, and therefore p~id a wage less than 
what they might have' earned in the productive sector • 
• 
The Allocation of Domestic Resources 
The preceding section has shown that the resources 
allocated to defence in Turkey have bedn considerable, 
both in absolute terma and also as a propol"tion of G~N .P. 
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To show more clear1y the significance of military 
expenditure it has been put alungside three other 
components of G.N.P .. , namely investment, the total 
budget and eduation, which is presented in Table 3.2. 
The data in Table 3.2 are expressed in current prices, 
which have the disadvantage of being infl1JE;rLced by 
the rate of inflation (wholesale prices rose by over 
700 per cent in the period 1952-76). On the other 
hand adjusting the current price figures by the G.N.P. 
deflator makes no allow8)1ce for differentlal rates of 
. 
inflation between resources, whereas the current price 
. . 
figures fully reflect the different rates of price 
incr€,:;ses that have occurred in the J..nputs used in 
e8,ch sectortl ./ 
In order to draw attention to the absorption of 
resources by each sector the estimates in Table 3.2 
1l;::.!,VG been expressed as ratios of G.N.P. and are 
presented along with indices of real G~1i.P., real 
~ilitary expenditure and·real military expenditure per 
capita in Table 303. Over the period 1952-74 military 
expenditure as a proportion of G.N.P. (the military 
burden) declined, but then the Turkish invasion of 
. 
0':"[")'"""1"-' in 1 0 74 caused the burden to rise sharply in ~. .1- -' ~: l ~~. - . . -:' 
19'15 and 1976. The real level of military expenditure 
st00d at 566.7 in 1976 (1952 = 100), but the rate of 
growth varied over the period. Between 1952 and 1960 
l'l'<~li;~_~_li tary expenditure grew at an averaGe annual 
ra.tc of 6.1 per cent, from 1961 to 1970 at 3.8 per cent., 
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TABLE 3.2 
£1.!.Eenditure on DeJence, Investment! 
~otql Budget and Education, 
~952-76 at current prjces, T.L. million. 
Year 
--
1952 
195:5 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
19 '-.· r. , .lb 
1959 
1 0 hO, :;J " 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973" 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Defence 
(1) 
725 
827 
934-
1,077 
1,159 
1,266 
1 s 470 
2,153 
2,410 
2,718 
2,980 
3,157 
3,443 
3,821 
3,996 
4s 596 
5,159 
5,395 
6,237 
8,,487 
9~961 
12,192 
15,831 
32,830 
4 ft, 700 
Investment 
-_ ... ""-
(2) 
1,800 
2,040 
2,470 
3,040 
3,370 
3,910 
4,900 
6,910 
7,520 
7,840 
8,7~0 
9,660 
10,440 
11,140 
14,440 
16,550 
19,450 
21,710 
27,000 
31,700 
40,400 
52,800 
73,000 
100,700 
145 1 000 
Total 
Budget 
(3) 
2,325 
2 f 394 
2,654 
3,421 
3,525 
4,001 
4,752 
6,217 
8,616 
9,039 
11,489 . 
12,763 
14,218 
16,475 
18,4,<)4 
21,083 
24,893 
31,653 
46,2'rO 
50,921 
51,968 
62,709 
83,860 
109,252 
156,210 
Education 
(, 
222 
264 
318 
372 
401 
479 
505 
769 
1,241 
1,331 
1,713 
1,925 
2,045 
2,464 
2,734 
3,144 
3,040 
3,914 
6,210 
6,739 
7,069 
8,922 
12,775 
14,511 
21,662 
Ho~es: The defence estimate is according to 
the N.A.T.O. definition, but for 1975 
and 197G l'~-d,tiona<l er:timates from the 
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Budget expenditure a~loca.tions were USEe.. 
Investment 'is taken as gross domestic 
fixed capital formation. 
Sources: Column 1 S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook, 1970 and 
1978. 
Columns 2, 3, 4 U.Nc Statistical Yearbook, 
various dates. 
2J1G from 1971 -to 1976 at 21 per Gent, although t:tis 
latter period was dominated by the enormous increases 
of 1975 and 1976. Because of Turkey I s rapid r'3te of 
popul::~tion growth military ex:p8ndi ture per capita 
ex})a:tlded more slowly standing at 30901 in 1976 (1952 
:::: 100) and most of this increase also occurred in 1975 
Indeed military expenditure per capita only 
. l' y, Cl'n ,~,:::I ea~ 
• ...,J-" vL .... ~) by 25 per cent between 1952 and 1970, and 
then increaseJ. by another 147 per cent in the next six 
years. 
Comparing the Total Central Budget estimates and 
t}:e milita.l'y expendi ture estimates it can be seen that 
t.be latter have been very large ih central government 
spc:nding, :3.1though tne ratio declined from over '"30 per 
Ct-'r.t in the 1950s to less than 20 per cent in the 1970s 
until the invasion of Cyprus pushed it up to 30 per 
C'c'nt again .. Table 3 .. 3 also shows that military expendii:ure. 
iJb,"-;CI~bed' almo~~t t·Ni.cs as many economic reSOLlrces as di,d 
tdu.c"tion over the TNll'ole period 1952-76, but while the 
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The f-~location of resources to Defence, 
Investment, the Total Budget and 
~duc~tion as_a Eer cent&ge of G.N.P. 
Ii 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
5.4 
5.9 
5.6 
5.3 
4.3 
4.2 
4.9 
5.2 
5 .. 5 
5.2 
4.7 
4.8 
5.0 
4.4 
4 .. 5 
4.6 
4.3 
4·.4 
4.1 
3.9 
3.7 
6.1 
6.9 
"Jcurrent prices) 
IH 
~ 
< CD 
UJ 
c+ 
S 
CD 
::f 
,,+ 
13.4 
1).1 
15.5 
15.9 
15.3 
13.3 
14.0 
15,,3 
16.1 
15.S 
15.2 
14.5 
1A .. 6 
111.5 
1508 
16~3 
17.3 
17.4 
18 .. 4 
16.7 
17.1 
17 .. 2 
17t.l 
19.9 
22.3 
16~1 
17.4 
15.3 
16.7 
17.9 
16.0 
13.7 
13.6 
14.2 
lS.5 
18.2 
19.9 
19.1 
19.9 
21.5 
20.2' 
20.8 
22.1 
25 .• 3 
31.5 
'26.4 
21.6 . 
20.2 
19.6 
20.4 
24.1 
19,,8 
1.7 100 
1.7 111.2 
2.0 107,,9 
1.9 116.4 
1.8 120.1 
1 .. 6 129.5 
1.4 135.3 
1~8 140.9 
2.7 145.6 
2.7 ,148.5 
3 .. 0 157.7 
2.9 173.0 
2.9 180.1 
3.2 185.7 
3.0 208.0 
3.1 216.7 
2.7 231.2 
3.1 243.7 
4.2 257.9 
3.5 284.2 
2.9 305.2 
2.9 321.7 
3.0 345.5 
2.7 372.8 
3,3 399,6 
2.6 
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100 
110.5 
113.6 
119.5 
112.6 
110.5 
114 .. 2 
131.5 
139·3 
151Q4 
160.3 
158.7 
169.2 
179.7 
173.9 
174.4 
190.2 
186.5 
199.6 
233.6 
243.1 
255.1 
279.2 
462.5 
566 .. 7 
100 
106.9 
106.9 
110.3 
101.2 
96.6 
96.6 
10S.1 
111.5 
117.2 
121.8 
117.2 
121.8 
125.2 
119.5 
117.2 
124.1 
119.5 
125.2 
143.6 
147.0 
149.3 
159.7 
25805 
309.1 
Note: IG.N.F. index based on 1968 prices. 
Sources: a·s for Table 2, in addi tion the 
index of real. G.N.P. derived from 
Turkey: An Economic Survey, 1977, 
OPe cit. Table 39. The index of 
real military expenditure derived 
from various S.I~P.R.I. Yearbooks. 
( 
\ 
The index of real military expenditure 
per capita is based on military 
expenditure figures from S.I.P.R.I. 
and population figures from I .1LF. 
Financial Stati3tics, Sept. 1980. 
militsyy burden was declining~ until 1975, the share of 
od"c~JG~on l'n n ·N ~ 
..... v. ,-:J.. . _,_ Ij ~ 1 e.- • was rising. In so far as expenditure 
on defence was at the expense of education there could 
have been a heavy price to pay i11 terms of economic 
growth. It 18 widely ~ecognised that the contribution 
of labour t,~ ';lowth TIlay b8 greatly increased when education 
is taken into account. Dennison (1967) studied the growth 
peri'ormance of nine Western countries in the post-war 
period and observed that education made varying contributio 
to the growth of individual countries, but was particularly 
"i 1-'-' "IO-'-'..L 0-:>"'1.1.. for ..I ~ u·.:::<.~ 1 7 
..L. L!- _. I".~.l. v lJll e • u •. li .• Maddison (1970) also found 
tha [; 8(iucation (and heal th) had a posi ti"V e effect on the 
glo\\'tb. rate through the I effective' labour supply for 
<.levelu:~)ing countries, although Nadiri (1971) found that 
the ccr~tribution of edu(!a,tion to growth was relatively 
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Most of the empirical studies ca!ried out on the 
im.portance of factor inputs in the growth achiev=ment 
of developing countries find a positive influence for 
capital.18,1~ 11addison (1970) estimated that for Turkey 
over the period 1950-65 out of an annual growth rate of 
5.2 per cent, 2 .. 5 per cent came from the contribution 
of non-residential capital. It is interesting, therefore, 
to compare the allocation of resources to defence and 
investment, which can be seen in Table 3.3. On the face 
of it Turkey has not neglected investment in pursuing a 
policy of mi1itary strength, since an average of 16.1 
per cent of G.NP. has been allocated to investment 
between 1952 and 1976, which W3,':'o more than three times 
the level of resources put into defence. When the 
investment component is disaggregated, however s the 
Tur};~is:!:l achievement was not so impressi vee see chapter 
2, Table 2~4). Up to 1970'it was normal for' about 20 per 
cent of all investment to go into residential building, 
a..l1d only about ')0-35 pel' cent into machinery and equipment, 
which was no more than the defence allocation and was 
lo~er than other countries, at a si~ilar stage of 
development, were putting into this vital element of 
, , t lYJ.VE:S-Cmen'- <> It is csrtainly plaus~Lble that mill tary 
" expenditure was partly at the expensB of investment, 
although this needs to be established using regression 
n' '1 ','1 co lO 8- . .3-"-.j .... ). S, and is considered in chapter 7. 
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Intern~!ional Comparison 
In the period 1950 to 1977 world military expendit~re 
increased by approximately 200 per cent, and by 1979 
stood at $480 billion. This figure was equivalent to 
about 5 per cent of total world income and was approx-
i!1ately of the same magnitude of resources that were 
devoted to health and education. Military expenditure 
within N .. A.T.O. in 1977 is summarised in Table 3.4, 
which shows that Turkey with the lowest per capita 
income had the high8st defe.nce burden. The average 
(unv/eighted) per capita income within N.A.T.O. in 1977 
was ,06452, whiC?h was' nearly six' times higher thatl the 
Turkish per capita income, yet the· average burden of 
defence was only 3.4 per cent compared with 6.6 per 
cent for r:f'urkey • 
. Between 1970 and 1976 while world mili tary . 
expendi ture ilJ.c:'eased by almost 6 per cent in real 
terms ~ 2.l'ld N ~ A. ~. o. mill tary expenditure actually declined 
by 7.5 per cent, Turkey increased its defence expenditure 
by D staggering 184 per cent.. This is shown tn Table 
3.5. Bven though real .G.N.P. increased by 55 per cent 
l!J. Turl:ey between 197,0 a.."Yld 1976 the military burden 
incr(:-ased much lUore rapidly and occurred at a time 
when the economy of the country was descending into 
the worst orisis of the post Second World War period. 
c 
Over the lon~er period 1950-76 an increasing 
shurE of ~orld military expenditure has been carried 
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TABLE 3 .. tlr 
N. A. T .. o. Defence T~xJ2~c!..i ture .in 1977, 
~t. current ~rices and exchange rates, % 
Defence Defence as Per Capita Population 
... 
-
ExpendituL~ ~I~~~ Income Jmilli'ons ~ 
.Q.o uE t.!:iL imi11ion~1 of G.N.P. 
----
i (1) (2 ) (3) (4) \ 
Belgium 1,820 207 7,590 9.8 
Canad;:-;;. 3,610 2.1 8,460 23.3 
Denmark 1,080 3.2 8,04-0 5.1 
France 11~720 3 7-.,) 7,290 53.1 
]P.R. Germany 13,760 3.1 8,160 61.4 
Greece .' 1,100 4.8 2,810 902 
Italy 4,640 2.9 3~440 56.) 
Luxembourg 25 1.0 7,560 0.4 
Netherlands 3,360 3.9 7,150 13.9 
Norwa.y· 
Portugal 
. Turkey 
U.K. 
u . S •. lto 
1,120 3 .. 6 8,550 4.0 
461 2.9 1,890 9.6 
2,650 6.6 1,110 41.9 
10,880 4.8 4~420 55.9 
109,700 ,. r· 8,520 220.0 Oc.:J 
Sources: Columns 1.and 2 from I.I.S.S., 
The Mi1i tary Balance, q.uoted in 
D.K. Whyne3 (1979);20 Columns 3 
and 4 from \Vorld Development Report, 
1.979, The World Bank, Tablt 1. 
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T !tn-··'F' 7. 5 _lUJJ)J.'J ). 
Military Expenditure in 1970~and 1976 
in U.S. % millions, at 1973 Erices 
and exchange rates 
Percentage 
ch.ange 
i ___ 1970 1976 1970-76 
N.A.T.O. 
World Total 
Turkey 
127,446 117,873 
256,007 270,746 
675 1,916 
Source: Derived from I.I.S.S., The 
Military Balance, 1977. 
, .. 
-7.5 
5.8 
183.9 
out by less developed countries, 'al though the pattern 
of expansion has not been. uniform, a.s Table 3.6 
indicates. The expansion of military expenditure was. 
greater in thE: J..ess developed world thaJl in N. A. T. o. , 
W.T.O. or the world as a ~lole, but the greatest 
increase occurred in Africa a,..".d the Middle East, two 
areas where military expenditur~ was very low 1n 1950. 
. . . 
As for 11urkey it can be seen that the expansion of 
mili tary expenditure up to 1970 was below aver.age,. but 
by 1976 it was greater than for all regions of the 
world apart from Africa and the Middle East. 
In eO'Jlparison with developing countries Turkey's 
d " eIonr;e bUI'cicn in 1977 was greater than all apart from 
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the M:iddle }~ast countries plus China (8.4), l!:'geria 
(9.9)~ Somalia (8.3), Zambia (12.4), Pakistan (8.1), 
N. Korea (11.2), S. Korea (9.8), Laos (12.8) and 
Chile (6.8). 21 
TABLE 3.6 
Q£gyltl'!.., q! Military: E~penditure 
for Selected Years 1950-76 2 .'?x Region --. ,... -
1350:=100; constant 1960 _pric.ell 
and exchange rates 
1.2.5.2 1955 ;Ly6.Q 1965 - 070 . ;!-..~L _. 1.97§. 
N~A.T.O~ 100 221 230 252 292 270 
. 
W.T.O. 100 126 115 157 224 228 
gOddl 1.\:]._8 East 100 167 297 522 1343 4681 
South Asla 100 114 125 767 271 374-
}!. a 1" 
. , - East 100 141 204 249 363 463 
China 100 ·91 102 200 302 283 
Oceania 100 160 ·145 215 "'9'1 t:.. ~ 298 
Africa 100 180 640 1'760 3377 8169 
Cent:-al Ame:ricd J_OO 100 122 154 204 308 
o •. , America 100 123 147 189- '?~3 376 ,lOU-Gn ~/ 
\':or1d 100 171 174 "] " c.. _L 273 289 
:I1U P "/FY 
...... L L l'.._J 100 138 161 208 226 641 
Source: Derived from S.I.P.R.I. Yearbooks, 
various dates. 
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CH t. p,',T,lP 4 .. ~~ _ ........ ;J..l 
rrHE j)ETEIt!,iINANTS OF MILIT.i\RY .i:~XPE11DITURE 
. r-
. . 
Turkish military expenditure increased in real 
terms from ~191 million in 1952 to $1082 million in 
1976 (see Table 3.1), 8.1 thou~th the annual changes in 
rnili tary expendi ture varied considerably, ranging 
between a fall of 5.7 per cent in 1956 to an increase 
of 65.7 per cent in 1975. This variation in the 
growth of military. expenditure, which is shown in 
Table 4.1, can be related to the changi~g demands.made 
on the military in TurkeT in carrying out its specific 
functions .. 
These functions can be summarised as follows: 
1.. National security. 
2. Internal law and order. 
3~ Ideology, nationalism and modernisation. 
4. Imperialism. 
ID addition military expenditure in Turkey may 
also have been influenced by: 
~) 
5 q ?'conomic a.nd power intere-sts of the mili t'::.!'y 
. 
establisbment. 
60 Economic Policy. 
Each of these factors will be considered in detail 
jn order to analyse th2ir significance faT the growth 
of military expenditure in Turkey. 
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TABLE 4.1 
The Annual Percentage ChangA in the 
Level of Turkish Military Expenditure, 
1952-76,_in 1960 prices 
-1.9 
0.3 
4.0 
1953. 1954 1955 
10.5 2.8 5.1 
,1958 1959 
15.1 6.0 
1963 .1964 
-1.0 6.6 6.2 
1968 1969 197Q 
9.0 -1.9 7.0 
1973 
--
1974 1975 
5.0 9.4 65.7 
Source: Derived from I.I.S.S., Military 
Balance, 1977. 
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1956 
-5.7 
1961 
8.0 
1 0 7--
-..J 1. 
17.1 
1976 
2" c:::: c. • ..J 
T:b.e growth of the milt tary in modern tiTIl8s (say 
since 1800) has been very closely related to conflic~s 
over designating the territorial limits of a nation 
state. Attempts to define a nation state in terms of 
ethnicity, culture, religion or langue.ge are bound to 
ovsrlap (Zubaida, 1977),1 and where d:'acrepancies occur 
between the actual territorial limits of a country and 
its claimed· space, perhaps based on histoTical possession 
by ancestors, then confli0t can arise. This does not 
mean, hOT,vever, that states only fight over terri tory, 
where a corllpromise is -always. possiqle, but sometimes 
it is a goal which cannot be shared, like autonomy or 
glory. Karl yon Clausewitz2 made an important contribution 
to understanding the growth of the military in his study 
of w8.~cfare and mj_li tary strategy, wh.i.ch took as a basic 
assumption the independence of the nat;.on. Clausewitz 
stressed that :relations between states are cuntinuous 
and determined by political considerations. In peace-
time pollticians make use C?f diplomatic channels to 
cond~ct their relations with other states, 8~though 
this does not preclude the use of arms if conflict arises 
. 
Oi" ','r1!en the state is being threatened. Violent conflicts 
.:..' 
bet'-lf eel1 states are endemic which can only be constrained 
by ~3r, although war itself does not exclude diplomacy • 
. Th-:; con\luct of military operations can be called 
stra.te,~:;y but both dj.pl C'm;..),('y- and s·~I'ategy are subordinate 
As Cl:~lUS (;'\\'i tz stated: 
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tlWar is not merely a political act but also a 
real poli tj_cal instrument, a continuation of pol i tical 
commerce, a carrying out of the s?...m.e by other means. ,,3 
What is clear from this statement is that war is 
seen as one phase in the continuity of relations between 
scates. Furthermore, "war is an act of violence intended 
to com~81 our opponents to fulfill our will ••• physical 
force ••• is therefore the means; the compulsory 
submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate 
object" n 4 In a -si tuation where conflict exists Clausev/i tz 
deduced th~t war would escalate, because of the 
'dialectics "of the conte$t.' 5" 'War is an act of viole:n,ce 
pushed to its utTtlost bounds; as one side dictates the 
l&.w -to the other thEre arises a sort of reciprocal action 
6 
which :Logically must 18ad to an extreme. ti The enemy 
must be defeated, otherwise there is always the danger 
that relations between states will be reversed. 
One fundamental criticism of Clausewitz's 'dialectics 
of the contest' is that it does not permit a compromise 
solution to conflict, which can only be understood in 
'~. ~. t ' 1 tt' u speCl~lC IJlS orlca se lng. Nevertheless his general 
:In:':1,lysi:::; of -~7d.r, which is seen as an instrLlIllent of 
poli~ical action, wld is likely to escalate, although 
not necessarily to the point of destruction, seems to 
be relevant to understanding the arms build up that 
h,':81~!Jlcen 1'l2.ce in recent years s Even in the < second 
tl~:~lL of the twentieth century 'I'ihen many' countries 
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P088880 the means of mass destruction, war remains the 
. 
ultimate constraint to conflict. Some states are 
impelled by hunger~ adventure or the pressure of other 
I barbGlrians' to "reproduce the basic pattern, which is 
repeated again a.lJ.d again, throughout history •• " peoples 
clash on a stretch of earth which the stronger takes 
possession of." (Aron, 1958).7 Aron argues that the 
object of war is "the hegemony of' one over others u ,8 
and it occurs when settlements by negotiation or 
cOInpromise are impossible. The soci.eties of today are 
no different from those of the past as regards the 
apparent causes of war, whether "it is a question of 
. cY'eatj.ilg a state ,'or spreadin~ an idea or fighting over 
an empire the tY/eniieth century is the same as always", 9 
even though the instruments of wax are different. In 
spite of the widespread availability of nuclear weapons~ 
80untries continue to hold arms, some in order to defend 
themselves, ot~ers to assert their rights or conquer 
living space .. 
Since the Second World War international and 
bilateral attempts at disarmament have largely fa.iled) 
partly~ perhaps, because politicians and the cO'mtries 
th2Y represent feel they have something to gain from a 
pusition of military strength, but also because the 
!ileans of controlling the production and possession of 
arDS lS imperfect. It is always possible that decisive 
':~'ea:norJs could. be ilidden and l'81:-!.ain undetected, and, 
therefore, stutes prefer an uneasy sec:Jrity offered by 
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the capacity for reprisal to international agreement 
. 
whicti i·s unreliable. In any case the existence of 
nuclear y{eapons does not rule out the need for conventional 
alternatives •. Precisely because a thermonuclear war is 
'insane', politicians need the alternatives in order to 
make it unnecessary to use the nuclear weapons. Yet 
the logic of deterence leads to the possession of both 
nuclear and conventional weapons and technological 
progress in military hardware merely brings about 8Xl 
escalation of military spending. Mor~over the belief 
that mankind might survive a 'thermonu.clear apocalypse,lO 
provides a rationale for holdi.ng nu.clear weapons, and 
once ther-eis· a: basis for 'minimum deterence I there i~, 
some rationality for believing peace can be maintained 
by increasing the f bala..Y!.ce of terror' which therefore 
leads to a proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
It is clear that countries possess arms for botb 
offensive and defensive objectives, and will continue 
to do so while there is no international law or supra-
national body that can enforce peace between nations"ll 
A large part 0: the growth in military expenditure 
observed j_n Turkey in the period 1952-76 would seem to 
be explajned by straiegic considerations. The major 
'" thr~at to Turkey's territorial integrity has been 
defined bv the West as emanating from Soviet expansionism, 
t. 
which l~d to Turkey becoming a full member of N.A.T.O. 
The rel<':Lti_ons between Turkey and the Soviet Union will 
be cOTI3jdured in chapter 6 but it does seem plausible 
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that the Tuy'kish nili tary commitment and the growth 
of def~nce eip~nditure were a response to the Soviet 
threat.. There was also the conflict between Greece 
and Turkey whi,ch flared up on severa~ occasions before 
the invasion of Cyprus and the dispute over the Aegean 
in the 19708 brought the two countries to the brink of 
war.. There is no doubt that the two traditional enemies 
viewed each other with suspicion but it remains to be 
established whether their mili.tary buiJ..~:l.-ups were in 
any way relatedo 
An Arms Race Model 
The explanation of the level of military expendi tu,ce 
of one country as a response to potential threats to 
national security by 8.-'l1other can be formulated in terms 
f "t t b t ~. t 'Th R" 'h - 12 0' '111 erac ions e ween nav1ons. e 1C ard,son 
arms race model has been the basis of attempts13 to 
analyse the motives that lead a nation in time of peace 
to increase or decrease its military expenditure. He 
listed. the following motives: 
II ••• revenge or dissatisfaction with the ~esults 
of treatjes; these motives are ~ndependent of existing 
a.rmaments. Then there is the very strong mottve of 
fear which moves each group to increase its armaments 
because of the existence of those of the opposing group. 
jlj.so thc:r'e is rivalry which, more than fear, attends 
to thl2 difference between the armaments of t~e t"vo 
,'TOUpB i'a ther than to' the magni tude of those of the 
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other group. Lastly there is al~ays a tendency for 
each g.coup to reduce i tsarmaments in order to economise 
expenditure and effort. n14 
The simplest representation of the interaction 
between two nations that Richardson took was: 
dx/dt == ky (1 ) 
where t is time, x represents :lis own defences, y 
represents the menace of the other nation, and k is 
a, positive constant which Hichardson'called a 'defence 
f f" . t' COG .. _lClen ., .The other nation 'has a similar function: 
dy/dt = k-x: (2 ) 
The system described by these equations is unsta.i.;l~, 
yet it would be false to assume tha.t the international 
system would inevitably be unstable. Richardson argues 
that what is left out of the system is th~ cost of 
armaments which would have a restraining effect. If 
the equations Dre changed to allow for the effect of 
one f S OVlr11. mlli tary expendi ture:r then the arms race 
model becomes a set of linear· differential equations, 
as follows: 
dx/dt .- ley - -ax (3) 
dy/dt - lx.- by (4) 
where a and b are positive constants representing the 
fatigue and expense of keeping up defences, ~~d k ~1d 1 
are po~·li.ti ve defence or reaction coefficients, which 
1.11 tJll.C latter fO-'_"L'l'U.l.':ttlon are possibly uffilual . 
. 
1_:;;.ic 1lards0:n nlso reco2.:nised that by introducir..g 
--'0 
- b -
" , 
constants into the equations account could be t~cen of 
exogenous militarism or 0rievance factors; 
dx/dt = ky ax+ g (5 ) 
dy/dt 
- Ix by + h (6) 
where g and hare the grievance terms. Thls model can 
be used to analyse certain problems of foreign policy.15 
If g, h, x and y are all made zero simultaneously the 
equations (5) and (6) show that x and y remain zero. 
rn} • • L1lS, In a sense~ is the ideal solution since it gives 
permanent peace with disarmament and satisfaction. If 
there is mutual disarmament without satisfaction then 
d.isarmament will not be permanent, since dx/dt = g and 
dy/dt ~h. This model also predicts that unilateral 
disarmament is not permanent, since if y=o then the 
equations become: 
dx/dt = -ax + g 
dy/dt - Ix + h 
The second of these equations impl~es that y will 
not remain zero if the g~ievance term h is positive, so 
th2t when y tncreases the term ky will cause x to grow 
too ,~ 
.' 
Using mul tiple r.egression analysis a..'1.d annual data 
from the period 1952-76 we have tried to find out to 
what extent the Hichardson model is able to explain 
cbanges in rpili tary expendi ture for Turkey. It was 
1~1c;cicled to usr:-; a two country model and to t2ke Greece, 
the U.~).S.H. and the Warsaw Pact countries as the 'other' 
- Bl -
country. The following results were obtained: 
. 
l~ DX = -84.035 + 0.454X - 0.176Y 
(1 .. 0) 
s _ .
.17 1 ,:;. ME = 37.1 DW = 2.4 
The fi.gures in brackets give the t statistic, where: 
DX - the change in military expenditure in Turkey 
i.e. X-z - Xo 
x = 'furkish mili tary expendi ture 
Y - Greek military ex~enditure 
1\11 mili tary expendi ture measured. at constant, 1960, prices. 
2. DX == -15.068 + Oe39X O.003V 
(2.1 ) (0 .. 4) (7 .2) 
2 R = 0.7f. S == 40.3 ME == 37 .. 1 DW = 2.6 
== U~~.~.R. military expenditure. 
3 .. DX == -20.831 + O.4X - O.002W 
(0.6) (7.0) (2.1) 
H2 ~- 0.76 S -- 40.2 Tl.,trp .' = 37.1 D17 = 2.6 .J.i.......!...J I. 
where W - Warsaw Pact military expenditure. 
The rcs1Alt:3 do not support the existence of an arms 
I'i: ce between Turkey En l } her main rivals and indeed are 
11 y;, -'Tery me;-;llingf'-.;.].. In each of the three formulations 
the ~o~stant or criev~nce term is negative~ which suggests 
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no rivalry. The other coefficients in each formul8.tion 
are tI.L8 reverse of wha.-i.; one would expect, that is the 
fatigue coefficients are positive and the defence or 
're3ction c~efficient~ are nega ti ve 0 Af3 .the R2 is no 
more than 0.76 and S/~j~~ is large it suggests that the 
equations may be misspecified, or that an important 
variable explaining military expenditure has been omitted~ 
As the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 led to a large increase 
in military expenditure it was decided ,to include this 
effect by introducing a dummy variable. Once again 
with :OX the dependent variable the following results 
were obtained: 
4. DX::: 20w582 - 0.125X + O.145Y + 272.417D 
(0 .. 8) (0.8) (1.1) (5.0) 
Will ::: 37 .. 1 Dw - ') 0 h - '-_ 
where D ::: dummy variable, takes 'values of 1 for 1975 
and 1976 ancl 0 elsewhere. 
5 " DX ._- -17.519 - 0.156X + O.003V + 337 .. 143D 
(0.7) (1e>3) (1.7) (4.7) 
:12 0.89 S 2~~5 hIE 37.1 D"T = 1.8 ::: -- = .1 
~ 
6. DX - -13 .. 768 - O .. 192X + OoOO2W + 351.468D 
(0.6) (1.5) (1.9) (4.8) 
".,2 
-( \ ;:::'0.,89 S ::: 28.1 ME ::: 7.'7 1 ') I .,- DW ::: 1.8 
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These are better' results and do provide some 
evidence for the Richardson model although the S/~~ 
value is still high. It was also found that if equations 
(5) and (6) were respecified to include military expenditure 
for the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact lagged one year to 
allow time for reaction then the results improved further. 
(N.B. it,made no difference if Greek military expenditure 
was lagged). 
7" nx -- -20.561 0.177X ...I.. O.003V-l + 344.465D . 
(0.8) (1.5) (1.9) (4.9) 
'R2 _. 0.89 s 
- 28.0 ME := 37.1 DW = 1.9 
. 
where v-1 = U.S.S.R$ military expenditure lagged one year. 
8. nx = -16.217 O.212X + O.OO~W-l + 357.804D 
(0.7) (1.6) (2.1) (5.0) 
R2 
- 0.89 s = 27.7 ME = 37.1 DW == 1.9 
where W-I - Warsaw Pact military expenditure lagged one 
year. 
Fo:cL1ulations (4-) (8) result in plausible values 
for ~he coefficients of the model, apart from the 
grievance term~ which once again comes out negative, 
except in equation (4), although it remains statistically 
insignilicant. I.f the militarism or grievance term is 
t~tkt;ll to be zero then it illiplies that unilateral 
rLLsarmcJJI1ent on Turkey f s part would be stable and perma..Y).ent, 
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althou~h this does not seem to accc~d with Turkey's 
history or present day reality, and in any case, as 
will be apparent later, there are other factors accounting 
for the presence of the mili tary in -Turkey. The fatigue 
coefficients are negative and. th d f' t· e .e_ence or reac lon 
coefficients are positive, as Richardson suggested they. 
should be. There is little to choose between taking 
Greece,- the U.S.S.R. or the Warsaw Pact countries as a 
whole in determining Turkish military expenditure, the. 
results being ::ilmost identical. A possible explanation 
of this i~ that the military reaction between Greece, 
Turkey and the U.S.SeR. is interrelated, so that each 
country recicts posl ti vely to ~change i~ military 
expenditure that occurs in either of the other two 
COillltries. 
. 
While the Richardson arms race model has produced 
what'appears to be plausible results it is' important 
·to recognise the limitations of the model. Firstly, the 
model is only as good as tpe data, and there i~ 
uncertainty over the degree of reliability of the data 
for thi.s kind of analysis. Secondly, and perhaps moet 
importantly, the model looks at the arms race from 
outside, that is without havj_ng inside knowledge of 
~ 
decisions that are b0ingmade by military planners. 
~lherefore, while the model may provide a useful descriptive 
fram2work for militcll'.Y expendi ture fit is a mechanistic 
J!lO:j81 wbich gives Ii t tIe insight into the real cietcI'T!.inant3 
O -F' '" '1i +.-, .. • 4 l.~l _~ l:<,.L,Y expendj_ ture • . In ord-er to' understand mili t:-~ry 
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expenditu~e more fully, it would be necessary to 
derive the parameters of the reaction functions in 
terms of the principles on which the state acts,16 
but this requires a theory of the state to be 
incorporated into the model and is beyond the purpose 
of the present study, although we shall consider the 
role of the state in determining military expenditure 
as part of economic policy later itr the chapter. 
2.. Interna.l L~w and Order 
The previous section has analysed the growth of 
military expendi.ture in terms of interactions between 
nations. It .is the state that determines the level of 
military expenditure ruld the 'orthodox' analysts 
implicitly assumes that the state is neutral and is 
concerned to ~aximise some national interest function 
by equating opportunity costs and secu~ity benefits 
at the margin. To be operational the orthodox maximising 
an.alysis assumes that the-state has knowledge of a well 
defined Yl.ational interest, where the nation is threa tened 
by attack from other nations and must therefore arm i~ 
order to discourage the agg~essors~ since maint2ining 
. 
a balance of power helps preserve peace.. Because 
~ 
military expenditure involves problems of social choice 
and inevitable conflict of interests within society 
the orthodox analysis must assume that democratic 
< 
pluralist oyatems are neutral, able to achieve a 
conE)':.nsus and then able to carry out the appropriate 
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measures. As Smith (1977)17 points out: "This e1L.pha~is 
on consensus may explain why much c •• writing 
• • • (on 
the subject) ••• ignores the internal role of the 
military~ regarding the potential enemy as external 
to society. The existence of potential enemies is 
taken for granted, since war is aSS1.lmed to be endemic 
to human society, because of the nature of man, or of 
the state, or of the international svstem. " .., 
This view that the state and, furthermore, the 
military, as a servant of the state, are neutral and 
free from ideological inclinations is not universally 
accepted. lVIiliband (1973 )18 a:r'gu.es· that the. pluralist 
vi.ew of society whieh assumes that power is competi ti ve, 
fragmented and difused is essentially wrong. The state 
and the military "constitute a deeply conservative 
and even reaetionary element ••• in society generally" 
&."YJ.d the usocial origin, class si tuation and professional 
iilterest" ,of the serva..l1ts of the state ~ including the 
military, means that the "national interest is conceived 
in acutely conservative terms ~ •• which entails an 
unswerv'ing hostili.ty to radical ideas, movements and 
parties." 
.. Baran (1967)19 also analyses the role of the 
military in terms of its internal function as part of 
the repressive state apparatus. "The conclusion is 
inesc:::!pnble that the prodtL,;ious waste of the u.ndcr-
developed countries I ,resources on vast inili tary 
est~bliphwsnts is not dictated by the existence of 
. 
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an external danger. ·The atmosphere of such a danger is 
" 
merely created and recreated in order to facilit~te the 
existence of comprador regimes in these countries, and 
the armed forces that they maintain are needed primarily, 
if not exclusively, for the suppression of tnternal 
popular movements for national and social liberation." 
The growtll of mili tary expenditure that Baran 
refers to can only be fully understood in terms of his 
analysis of neo-imperialism, which will be considered 
later. In the case of Turkey there seems little doubt 
that the military has been employed to maintain law and 
order and to repress 'popular movements for social 
liberation.' Three times in the post-war period the 
military have been required to suspend government and 
to establish military rule. In May 1960 there was a 
bloodless C01..Lp when the army overthrew the government 
of Adnan MenneY'8s. The country had been in the midst 
of an economic crisis since the devaluation of 1958 
and a highly politicised electorate were making demands 
that couJd not be meto Mounting opposition to the 
governifient from the press, intellectuals, and student.) 
led to tncreasing repression and finally the declaration 
of T-.l8.rtial Law. This was followed by the military coup 
.\ 
b . t IJ . .L' 20 which had been openly solicited by the ur an In e _lgenusla. 
After introducing a new constitution the army allowed 
elections to be held in October 1961 and power was 
h;'-J.nded back to civil iaJl govern1J:ieilt. 
- 8B 
11he second coup, again bloodless, was in March 1971 
which led to the government of Suleyrrr.:ul Demirel being 
overth~own. 1970 was a year of widespread popular 
opposition to the government which culminated in a 
massive workers demonstration in June. Demirel was 
forced to introduce Martial Law in order to give breathing 
space for the government to change the 1961 Constitution 
so as to limit some of the political freedoms gained at 
that time.. Instead of bringing the crisis under control 
the introduc-tion of martial law led to even greater 
violence and social unrest which caused the military to 
take povrer. "in order· to safeguard· the ·Republic _ ,,21 This 
time the armed forces retaineo. ?)ower for more than two 
years and during this period concentrated on suppressing 
the activities of the Turkish Labour Party and the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Tr'ade Unions (Devrimci 
18ci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu or D.I.S.K.). 
The restoration of civilian government in 1973 
marked a new period of trade union activity which 
escalated as the decade progressed, and went beyond 
economic struggle into demands for political change. 
At th e c en tre 0 f the workers f raovemen twas D. I • S . K • 
which had increased its power with the rise in union 
" 
membership in the 19708. In the period 1975 to 1977 
a large number of political murders took place, mainly 
carrled out by right wing commando groups, known as the 
c 
'Grey ~lolves,,22 yet, as A~nesty Intern~tional point 
ont} tlthere does not appear to have been any re3.1 attempt 
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by the poliee (the army) or the government to end the 
violen0e or to prevent killings.,,23 The official 
tolerance of the murders committed by the Grey Wolves 
is explained by Berberoglu, (1981)24 a~ refiecting the 
growing political influence of the :'Jational Action 
Party, which was able to obtain key positions within 
the state apparatus, espe~ially in the secret service, 
police and armed forces. 
During the period leading up to the third military 
coup i.n September 1980, and particularly after the 
massacre of over 100 people at Kahramanmeras in December 
1978~. whicn precipitated the introduction of martiaJ. 
law, the military forces were employed to smash the 
radical movement. While martial law was operating the 
army and the gendarmerie were used to search out 
'progressive' people and imprison them, to close dovm 
'progressive' organisations, to take P0ssessicll of 
publicatj.ons tbat were banned and to put d01fTll riots a..l1d 
demonstrations. Following the exai'Ilple of Atatu.rk mili tary 
leaders have been reluctant to wield political power, 
yet ~n times 01 crisis they have become the ultimate 
guarantors of soci~;.l stabili tJ, \vhich j,n pr2ctice has 
. 
meant a. commit~!:~ent to the West and apposi tion to communists 
-. 
and mE-lEbers of the Turkish Labour Party. This support 
for the Ylest and the free market system on the part of 
the ~j.l~tary has been reinforced in recent years since 
the r::ilj tary t'ecam2 (\',vl.lers of largc-. sections of ]Jri vate 
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Fund. These vested interests of the military are 
OJ 
consiUered later in the chapter. 
Examination of the composition of Turkey's armed. 
forces shows that they are very well suited to dealing 
with internal unrest whether in the form of demonstrations, 
riots or attacks by armed groups. Out of total armed 
forces of 480,000 in 1976,25 375,000 ~2re in the ~rmy 
and there were another 75,000 Para-military forces in 
the form of the Gendarmerie which could easily and 
quickly be manoevred into action in times of nat:Lona.l 
emergency, Within the army there was in 1976 1 armoured 
division, ,,2 me,chanised infantry diyisions, .14 in.fantry 
dtvi,sions, 6 armoured brigades, 4 mechanised infB-~try 
brigades, 5 infantry brigades, 1 parachute brigade and 
1 commando brigade, and all of these units were suitable 
for dealing wi th internal unrest. Tlle Turkish military, 
in 1976, possessed the full range of gllided missiles, 
which were vital for external conflict, but it also 
possessed very large numbers of tanks, armoured personnel 
carriers, rifles~ helicopters and ground attack fighters 
whic:b.. were equb.lly, if not more, appropriate for dealing 
with outbreaks of civil ~nrest. 
·It has been argued in this section that the mili~ary 
in Turkey has been used, or it has taken independent 
action, to maintain law and order. This suggests that 
the level of military spendi.ng may have been a function 
of internal conflict,. and it is this hypothesis that 
we wish to test.. Tbe first pr.o'blem is hew to measure 
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the l(~vt.:l of internal conflict or unrest 0 'Several 
variables would seem to be appropriate measures of social 
and political conflict, for exanple the number of 
political demonstrations per time period., the number 
of political killings, the number of political arrests 
or convictions, bu.t unfortunately it is impossible to 
obtain a complete set of figures for any of these 
variables over the period being considered. It is 
neC8fjSary t "therefore, to proxy internal conflict with 
varj_ables that a.re available. It wili. be assumed that 
pe:ciods of poli tical instabili ty aYld unrest are made 
worse by poor economic performance, so that when the 
-
econoniy has· been in crisis this has been reflected in 
political crisis, which has required the intervention 
of the military and may ha.ve stimulated military spencline. 
The variables selected 8,8 proxies for economic crisis 
are as.folloV1S: 
1. G.D.P. per capita, where it is assumed that low 
2. 
'7. 
..Je 
levels of this variable will result; in social unrest. 
The inflation rate. 
The balance of trade gap - as this gap widens then 
the excess of imports ove~ exports incr~ases, which 
may require u...l1plea,sant economic policies CI 
4-. Total working days lost through strikes and lockouts. 
Using multiple regref;sion analysis and annual data 
fI'orn the! period 1952--76 we have tried to find out to 
wlla~~ (;xtent these proxies for civil l.mrest Gxplatn the 
level of military expenditure. The following results 
were obtctined: 
1. X 
-- -148.19 + O.132G.D.P.C. 
- 1.056P 
. (3.8) (9.7) (0.9) 
+ 5.74B.O.1? + 387.0D 
(0.9) (9~6) 
2 0.979 S 32.6 R "- - W.E. = 37607 D.W. = 202 
2. X 
- 316.8 + 0 .. 0002 ''I D L ~.. . '. + 577.2 D 
(7.7) (2.3), (10.7) 
-)2 0.926 S 69.6 ME 486.6 DW 2.0 11. - - = = 
'iNhere' 
x - Turkish military expenditure at constant, 1960, 
priGes~ 
G.D.P.C. = G.D.P o per capita: 
P = Inflation rate. 
B.O.P. = Surplus of imports over exports. 
D = Dum.my variable, taj{:ing values of 1 for 1975 and 
.1976 and zero elsewhere. 
\v.D.L. := 'l/orkj_ng days lost through strikes and lockouts .. 
Th2 results a.re not very conclusive and nerhaps at ~ -, 
firs~ sight contradictory. In equation (1) the coefficient 
G, T\ D C on J. • ...; • ..l.. • is posi ti ve and significfu"1t whereas a negative 
co€fficicnt would have been expected if low levels of 
G.D" p. C. are taken to indJ_cate an economic crisis 
illl' 1-; ~. -',' exp"'''' Q~; +ure J. .J.. L·cl....L .i \...:;1J. ...... ~. • , and high levels of G.D.:C.C. to 
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indicat~ prosperity and social harmony requiring less 
mili ti~J.ry expendi ture. The most likely explanation is 
that G.D.P.C. (and changes in G.D.P.C. which was also 
. tested but not reported) are not nece3sarily good 
measures of economic wellbeing, since they tell us 
nothing about the distribution of income. It is quite 
possible that a rising G.D.P.C. could have coincided 
with periods of increasing inequality in the distribution 
of income,26 which would then be consistent with a 
positive coefficient._ As there is no a.dequate data on 
the distribution of income or wealth for Turkey over 
the period being considered the validity of G.D.P.C. as 
, a proxy f·or internal conflj_ct' must remai'n uncertain. 
In any case a positive coefficient on G.D.P.C. may 
simply confirm that the richer a country is the more it 
will spend on the military, other things remaining 
constant. 
The' coefficient on P is also opposi te in sign to 
that expected, but the t statistic indicates that the 
coe.:fficient is not statistically significant GO The sign 
on the BOP variable is positive as might be expected, 
but this too is not statistically significant. 
'Equation (2) appears to be more in line with the 
general hypothesis being considered. First, however, 
it should be pointed out that this was run as a separate 
reg~I"e8sion because data on W'DL was only available from 
19C:5 y which means only 14 observations we:::-e used, and 
the re~ults, therefore, have to be treated with more 
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Nevertheless there is a positive coerficie~t 
on V{])L and the t-value indicates significance a1 th~~-'-Eil 
the S/ME value is high. k3 WDL is probably the best 
proxy for social and political unrest equation (2) lends 
support to the hypothesis that military expenditure is 
at least partly determined by internal political and 
social unrest, al thou.gh because of the short per:Lod that 
the data covers care must be'taken not to exaggerate the 
effect.. lY:oreover it Yllay well be that "the very large 
Turkish military, which is required for national security, 
permi ts :1.t8 use in times of internal unrest without 
requtring any signiiicaIlt increase in military expendi ture 
in the absence of external thr-'=ats. 
3. Ideolg..rq ~ Nationalism and Modernisation 
For ID8UY developing countries the military has been 
at the centre of the struggle for political independence. 
l'.lustafa Kemal was a general in the Ottoman army who 
undertook the leadership -of the nationalist struggle, 
and wi th tIle help and support of the newly emerging 
~lurkish bourgeoisj_e was able to remobilise the army. 
r't '~r-"q -i'}1;::, 1;1'uy>1r ; Q"1 aT'l,,-;T llJ1U· e-:' ,:,".tLturl: tllat 2.chieved ."e .. ,..-' ... '~~.J J .J1..\.....L~J.. -."~J ..... __ 
Sl)ccess in tJlG independence struggle of 1919-23, ar..d 
< 
Ataturk l.dmself' who became President of the new Republi~~ 
Th(~ /'01e of the mili ta!'y does not have to stop with 
politic/'ll j:i:,depe.,Jdcnco.. Rostov/ (1971)27 emphasised. the 
in generatint nationalism 
"Soldiers often emerge as T:'aj or actors in the draI.'la 
of the preconditions (for take off) for multiple reasons: 
they are evoked or come forward to deal with external 
intrusion or civil vvar; they are among the first to 
become acquainted with modern concepts of administration, 
through training abroa~ or foreign advisors; they move 
by profession more easily than other groups towards 
loyal ty to nati'on and sentiment::~ of nationhood; and in 
,inherently turbulent times, vvhen the legitimacy of 
traditionel rUJ..e is shaken they have access to raw 
28 pov/er. If 
It must be clearly understood that the military are 
not necessary for nationalism to exist nor is nationalism 
necessary for modernisation. 29 Furthermore it is not at 
~.l obvious that the military are, always a force for 
moe)ernisa tion. 
Pye (1962)30 makes a number of points to show that 
military_institutions are most likely to induce 
modernisation. At one level military organisations are 
very C10S8 to "the idea.l type fOT an industrialised CLnd 
secularised enterprise'" in a non-industrial country. 
The military is seen as a modern institution. It 
provides a "training in citizenship" and introduces 
the conscript to modern ideas as well as giving an 
" "1" 31,32 education which is relevant to the ClVl lan economy. 
'Z "5 As Guttcridce (1965))' emphasises: II.!W effective army, 
G)1d eventually a ~3.vy· ax.d airforce, may be one way of 
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creati:ng a national image of a ' moder-I: I state. tI 
, r7l 
more, as Hurewitz) argues, the military stresses 
professionalism and discipline and the officers are 
dedicated, to public service. 
A second reason why the 11lilitary js unique in the 
process of modernisation according to Pye is that it 
is 'emotionally secure' which permits it to take from the 
West the ideas and technology that will enhance 
modernisationc This point is also made by Daalder (1962)34 
who adds that the milltary being a modern institution 
, 
is more likely to introduce economic reforms and in times 
of crisis the mili tary" :can prov'ide the neces3ary lead.ership. 
A third explanation is that the 'process of 
acculturation' within the army permits a more secure 
transition to modern lifec Levy '(1956)35 also argues 
that the mili tary have the advantage of being a force £Ol"' 
modernisation and social change while mai.ntaining stability 
and con t:i"'ol • 
Janowitz (1964)36 has argued that because the 
military owes no allegiance to "ati integrated upper 
class" it is le83 likely to haVe 8 "pervasive co~serv~ti-ve 
. 
outlook" ,: Moreoyer when polj_tical insti tuti.ons are weak 
t 
military officers "develop a sense of public service 
and national guardianship as a result of their military 
training and experience." 
37 Halpern (1~63) ',has studied the military in Middle 
Eantern countries and has argu.ed that the officers are 
. 
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part of a new middle class that aim for status, power 
and prosperity and are committed to nationalism, social 
reform and modern technology. Spier (1967)38 also 
emphasises the middle class position of military officers 
who possess administrative and technological skills, 
stand for social change and a break with tradItion, but 
are also strongly anti-communist. The fact that a 
strong military ensures 8. non-communist developm.ent path 
is also emphasised by Bienen (1971)39 and Sloan (1963).40 
The modernisation arguments have been criticised by 
Nordlinger·(1970) who argues that military values stress 
nationalism, d=Ls'cipltne, custom and ritual which are 
likely to hinder economic progress. Nationalism can also 
be an ideological tool used by the state, the bureaucracy 
and the mili tary to divert atten~ion away from domesti.c 
problems and conflicts. Eleazu (1973)42 has criticised 
the idea of the military organisation being the most 
rrwdern insti tut~1.on wi thin Africa, and c·~_ tes the example 
of West Africa where the ·civil administrations have 
longer 8xperience and a more modern outlook. The point 
is that it is impossible to generalise ubout the 
o 
contribution of the Dilitary organis2tion to economic 
prog;res~~ since different countries are influenced in 
different ways. 
In the case of Turkey the military as the oldest 
socjc11 ~.nsti tutiOl1 tradi tionally performed an j.mportant 
role i.n the rule of the country, but wi th independence 
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]~r.l 1-023 .. ~tDturKl" epa~oted ""1 d "l"t 
- ~ '. ~ - s ~ ClVl an ml_l ary powers, 
wi th the result that the II1:Lli tary came to take up a 
position outside politics. Hurewitz (1969) has argued 
that the drive for modernisation in Turkey was present 
before Ataturk and that the military have only had an 
indirect effect on modernis8.tion. Janovri tz (1964) 
stressed that the military could have a special role 
in inducing modernisation, but in the case of Turkey 
while intervention in domestic politics has been easy 
the military have found it mol'e diffi.cult to govern. 
This pO.int is reinforced by the study of Lerner and 
Robinson (1960)43 who argue that the military have been 
i~portant in nation building b·l1~ it was clvilian 
government that was instrumental in generating economic 
~~d social progress. 
In conclusion it seems unlikely that variations in 
the level of ~"';.,,;~·kish military expendi ture can be directly 
explained by the ideological, nation bu:i.lding and 
modernisation roles of the military, although this is 
not m8ant to deny their import~~ce in the Turkish case. 
It is more likely that this flli~ction of the military, 
p8.rtic~_~I~;.rly th~ ideological component, which can be 
vie'l!ed as the long-run counterpart "to the 'repressive' 
has influenced the level of resources devoted 
L.c- t" t' t1.-.J.an accounted for short-~o de~8nce over -lIDe, ra ner IJ 
run vari;:,.tions. 
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4. 
According to rarxist theory, the 'capitalist ~ode 
of production' is not a static concept, but, rather, 
the clyn2,lYJic of capi ta1ism produces mu-+:;ations. !.cprx 
distinguished the move from the competitive stage of 
c~pitalism to the monopoly stage, but it was Lenin who 
j.n 1916 distinsuished the transi tj.on to imperinli.sm, as 
~he highest stage of capitalism. 44 Lenin's definition 
of imperialism embraced the following five essential 
features: 45 
1. The concentration of production and capital 
~eveloped to ~uch acitage that it creates 
monopolies which play a decisive role in 
economic life. 
2 ~ 11he merging of b~..nk capi tal wlth industrial 
capital and the creation, on the basis of 
!finan0.e capital' of a financial oligarchy .. 
3& The export of capital, which has become extremely 
important, as distinguished from the export of 
commodities. 
4~ The formation of international capitalist 
5. The territorial division of the WhO~2 vorld 
~Irl~l'~ tl'~e g:t'e~t cApl"t~ll"st I_,lowers is cOillP_leted. 
,-;I, ,l..J ~,~; J. .• C,'. ~ ..... 
Betwee~ 1815 and 1914 Britain was the unchallenged 
nc' '.' i ')'l' . ''', \",;,.~ J" ')1 rl 'J" '..L; ne 
.' .' .... ) ." l, \..! l . V ... ",,.r _ J ..... \ _....... ...&.,. .. ,. ~fter 1945 the. U.S. emerged 
. 
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as the undisputed leader nation of the capitalist world, 
in as cOlilmanding a posi tion as Bri tain had been after 
1815. 
Thts dominant position of the U.S. required her to 
maintain extremely high levels of military expenditure, 
even after the peace of 1945. With a growing number of 
former, mainly European, colonies obtaining political 
independence after 1.945, the DoS. has used its enormous 
military and financial power to keep as much of the 
world as possible open for capitalist penetration. As 
Magdoff (1972)46 put it: 
lIA substantial portion of the huge military machine, 
including that of the Western Et~rope8..L'1. nations, is the 
price being paid to maintain the imperialist network of 
trade and investment in the absenpe of colonialism .. 
The achievement of political independence by former 
colonies has stimulated internal class.struggles in the 
new states for e~onomic as well as poli+ical independence. 
Continuing the economic d~pendence of these nations on 
the nwtropoli tan centres wi thin the framework of poli tical 
independence calls for, among other thint?;s, the "world-
o 
vfide· dispersion of U. s. military forces and the direct 
.. 
military support of the local ruling classes." 
If Magdoif is right then it would be wrong to 
assume th2.t a theol'Y of imperialism is only relevant to 
explaining the leve]. of metropolitan country military 
d " 1l.7 expen r l ture •.. In the case of Turkey not only has it 
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received supplies of armaments and lllili tary aid from the 
. 
U.S.A~ but it has also been compelled to contribute a 
large part of its own G.N.P. to military purposes .. 
Kelll"ledy (1975)48 gives data on military expeYlditure in 
the Third World which shows that the countries with the 
highest defence burdens (mi,li tary expenditure as a 
percentage of G.N.P.) all received substantial military 
aid either from the U~S.A. or the U.S.S.R~ 
On March 12th 1947 President Tru:man told Congress: 
lilt must be the policy of the United states of 
America to suppurt free peoples who are resjsting 
attempted subjugation by armed mtnorities,or by outside 
pressure .. II 
This beCaIDp. known as the Trvmarl doctri_ne and led 
to Congress authorising .3400 milllon of aid to Greece 
and Turkey in the period to June 1948. Tbe Truman doctrine 
was designed to deal with the specific threat to Greece 
and Turkey and paved the way for their absorption into 
N.A.T .. O~ in 1952. The North Atlantic Treaty was seen 
as pr(~s t:nting a framework for wide co-operation 2,[iong 
by providing 'joint actio~ in ~he politicril, 
. d "J f"""'d ' eCOnOInlC an SOCla __ -le.L s .. PJ'ticle 1;hree of the Treaty 
~ 
deals 'with VH1..VS and means of maintaining and increasing 
.. 
the individual and collective capacity of members to 
resist ormed attack. The Treaty also covered the problem 
of q '\.1 ':, 'J" 'i ~', n' 
.... ...I.._,~l",. - 0-4.. J.J·t::J The stated principle ~as 
that the burden of defendi~g the ~est should be shared 
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eClnJ tabJ.y araong the member countries , so that the countries 
finding it economically difficult to meet their military 
COIIl!.."1i tments would be helped under the Mutual Defence 
:B~quipment Programme. Nevertheless there, was to be a 
continuing process of appraising defence programmes in 
the light of economic and political developments, through 
the Annu.al Review of the defence effort undertaken by 
member countries, and the level of aid given would be 
conditional upon this being satisfactory. 
Membership of N .).4. T. O. meant that Turkey t s mili tary 
expenditure was to a large extent determined by the U.S. 
through the N.A.T'.O. Military Authorities., nrn determining 
the size and nature of their eontributio!J. to the common 
defence, member countries have full independence of 
action'. All the same, the collective nature of N. A. T. o. 's 
defences demands that in reaching their decisions govern-
ments take account of the force str~.lctl're recommended by 
the N. A .. T. o. mj,li tary authori ties and the long term 
Llilitary plans of their partners. u49 The same document 
goes on to say: uThe pro"lision oj' adeCluate forces for 
, 
implementing ttt? agreed strategic concept involves inter-
rel-:;:te'd quest:1-ons of strategy, force requirenents and the 
. 
resources available to meet them ••• the:!."'e must be 
.t, 
adequate resources applied to the fulfillment of the agreed 
defence programines.,,50 
mhe 1J 0 b s used ~~",e Sovl'et 'military menace' as 
.L • OJ. _a v.',l. - _ 
its justification for. its foreign p6licYt thus disguising 
it::, i,:r'ue aim of maintaining AmeY'ica.'1 world h~gemony. r't. 
. 
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88ems qui te plausible that U.3. and Soviet idp:::)rialism, 
through various treatiee and bl18.teral agreements, has 
been instrumental in maintaining and increasing the level 
of military expenditure of certain less developed countries 
of which Turkey is one. 
Two separate issues will be considered empirically~ 
]1irst of all, the hypothesis that Turkish military 
spending is a function of J\merican foreign policy will 
be tested. Secondly, Turkeyts ah~re of N.A.T.O.'s defence 
expenditure will be examined in order to determine whether 
it lS consistent with the concept of ability to pay. 
!!ill .. Ltar,y: Expen(li ture and U.S. Aid 
Since N~A.T.O. must take account of the ability of 
each member state to take on the >militaryburden it would 
be unlikely that a simple positive relationship would be 
found between U.S. and Turkish military expenditure. 
When Turkish military expenditure is regressed on 
American-military expenditure· the coefficient on the 
independent variable is negative, so we can dismiss the 
hypothesis that 'every,time the U.S. spends more on the 
milj, tary so will Turkey.' Mili tary and economic aid 
are ~two variables that might be considered to exert some 
influence on Turkish military expenditure. Foreign aid 
is ~~een by SOllie wri ters51 as an instrument through which 
the developed countries maintain their sphere of 
in11uence throughout the world. Chenery (1972)52 has 
Hru.~-~c(i, some might say admi tte.d, that If economic assistar..ce 
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jE) one of the instrumey'ts of foreign policy that is used 
to prevent poll tical and econolrJic condi tions from 
deteriorating in countries where we value the preservation 
of the present governr.'18nt .. " Aid, whether economic or 
military, is only given se long as the recipient 
government pursues policies that are acceptable to the 
donor. In 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus, a serious 
crisis in Greek-Turkish relations threatened the very 
E~tructure of the N.A.T.O~ a.lliance and caused the U.S. 
Congress to cut off aid to Turkey. Clearly U.S. aid is 
given on the condition that Turkey pursues policies that 
are a~vantageous to the DeS.,- which may mean, the spendin~ 
of certain sums on defence. It is assumed,that military 
Rid is given to Turkey in order to provi~e hardware 
vihieh is not available domestically, and that economic 
aid is designed to release domestic resources which can 
tr.l.en be put into defence. 53 Using regression analysis 
. 
and annua.l data, over the period 1952-76 we have tried· 
to determj_ne to what extent Turkish lliili tary expenditure 
is determined by U.S. economic aid. The following result 
was obtained: 
x -- ·-63 .. 47 0.509 u.S. AID + 1.265 X-I 
(1 t 9) . (14 ~ 4 ) 
+ 0.576 u.s~ AID-I 
(1.9) 
f) 
He __ 0.935 s -- 57.1 r:J~ =:: 376.7 DIiJ == 2.3 
1960, pri c e :3 • • 
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u.s. AID::: U.S. economic aid to Turkey. 
X-, = Turkish military expenditure lagged one year • 
..... 
u.s. AID-1 = U.S. aid lagged one year. 
The evidence is not entirely convincing either for 
or against the hypothesis. There is a negative coefficient 
on U.S. AID indicating that U.S. economic aid is a 
substitute for Turkish milit3ry expenditure, but the 
coefficient on U.S. JJD-l is positive, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis, if it is assumed that there is a 
lacged response of Turkish military expenditure to U.S. 
economic aid~ On the whole the latter explanation seems 
most likely as the negative coefficient OE U.S. AID is 
probably unduly influenced by the years 1975 and 1976, 
when in spite of a large Turkish military build-up 
after the invasion of Cyprus the~e was a big fall in U.S. 
aiel to 1'urkey. The bigh value of S/T:IE also indic[-1tes B 
large unexplained variation in X. 
This is confirmed when the regression is re-run and 
X made a function of U.S. AID with a dummy variable 
included to allow for the military build-up of 1975 and 
1976. The result was: 
~x ::: 220e77 + 0.08 U.S.AID + G95.95 D 
(6.8) (3.8) (1202) 
R2 ::: 0 .. 88 S::: 7506 ME::: 376 .. 7 DW::: 1.6 
This r8sult shows that Tur~ish militury expenditure 
W:-1S l)ositively related to U.S. All) and is consistent "',ith 
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the hypothef.i8 that U.S. foreign policy was an important 
determinant of Tv.rkish military spending, a.l though once 
again there is a htgh value for S/EE. 
Jurkey's Share Qf N.A.T.O.'~ Military Burde~ 
N.A.T.O& is primarily an alliance for communal 
defence which gives explicit recognition of mutual 
commttment. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
states that "an armed attack against one or more of 
(the members) ••• shall. be considered an attack against 
them all, and consequently they agree that " •• each of 
them ••• will assist the party oi p~rtie~ so attacked 
"by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with 
the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
5r:: including the use of armed force." J Furthermore 'I an 
allied command structure was created which ensured that 
member states military forces became highly integrated 
into a unified force. 
On the question of finance for the military alliance 
two principles were regarded as being imp()rtant~ One 
\vas to relate defence programmes to available ;economic 
resources and the other was ·vo divide the cost equi tably 
among its member nattons. This implied that each member's 
share of the costs of the military alliance would be 
b~:.~;ed on its abili ty to pay, but it leaves open the 
:llJesi-ion of what indicators would be used to estimate 
~ I 
it." This section of ~he chapter will examine the concept 
of ability to pay and relate two interpretations of the 
• 
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concept to the Turkish share of N.A.T.O.'s defence 
expend). ture .. 
Defence as a Public Good 
Defence is frequently considered to be a prime 
c:i~ample of a public good56 because it satisfies two 
essenti al req'uirements: 57 
1. non-excludability 
2. non-rivalry in consumption58 
National defence which is provided for some members 
of sociRty is simultaneously provided for others since 
th t ' 1 1 d d f . + b .p • t. '"Q 0 h - ey c anno" )e exc tl. e rom::i.. "s ene ..... l u. l! ur"t ermore, 
if defence is consumed by one person it does not prevent 
it being consumed by other people. Defence is not only 
available to more than one user, 'but "everyone receives 
a full share of protection from the mili tary machine H 
(Margolis, 19~~).59 The characteristics possessed by 
defence prevent it being subdivided in order to allow 
each part to be sold separately to different individuals, 
&nd therefore it is impossible to provide defence through 
the market mechanism. Apart from pacifists, who are 
opposed to defence ex.pendi ture, there would. be Diany 
people wbo would opt out of paying for defence in the 
m~rket place since they could benefit from its provision 
by other p~ople, therefore, it becomes necessary for the 
state to provide d~fence as a collective good., 
. 
In the case of j-!rA.T.O., taken to be amilj.tary 
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alliance, defence, which is provjded in part by each of 
the members> can still be reg;"}yded as a 'pure' rublic 
good, so long as the commitment to mutual assistru1ce is 
{)O t' absolute.' If here is any uncertainty over the meaning 
of Article 5, or the way it Vlould be interpreted i.n 
practice, then defence would need to be treated as a 
61 partial public good. 
The N~A.T.O. military alliance is best seen as a 
small group providing a public good. 62 Inevitably within 
any group some members will value the public good more' 
highly than others, and it then opens up the possibility 
that those members with a high valuation of the benefits 
can be 'coerced' into paying more, or even all of the 
defence costs, although if the public good is only 
paI'tial, then all members will need to make some 
d ot °t 63 expen lure un l '. Olson and Zeckauser (1968) present 
some evidence ~hich they claim shows that the bigger 
countries (in terms of G.N.P.) contribute a larger share 
of the N*A.T.O. defence burden, and they take this as 
indica.ting that those countries value defence more highly_ 
The problem with this model is that the level of G.N.P. 
does TIL'). -l~ y,c'ceC'<c.,r,Y,"; lIT 'I"eas"Y'e e'-'c 1, >Y'eTnber' 3 YDl1.l.3tion of ... 1. ,_, ~ ,;:> ............ : :_ -L ~) ... J.. ;.....l........ r-.J......u..J......... ~. 
defep.cc, and in any case Kennedy (1979)64 presents 
evidence to show that after 1967 the positive correlation 
betvreen G.N .. P .. and defence burdens (military expenditure 
as a percentage of G.N.P.) for N.A.T.O. countries was 
no t sOC'; t-ron C! 
'- .• .1.. ~""u. 
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}:rinciples of Taxation 
The theory of taxation has occupied the minds of 
philosophers, economists and political theorists since 
at least the I~1iddle Ages and two major approaches can 
be distinguished. The first is often referred to as 
t:ne benefi t approach Blld the second as the abili ty to 
pay ap,p ...... oach. 
Under the benefit approach individuals are required 
to paY' taxatioll in relation to the services rendered by 
the public good. For Sir William Petty65 and Adam Smith66 
there was no necessary contra.diction between the benefit 
approach arid the abili ty to pa~' approach. "The subj ects 
of every state ought to contribute towards the support 
of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion 
to their respective abilities; th~t is in proportion to 
the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the 
protection of tne state.,,67 In some cases Smith 
recognised that the individual benefit could not be 
measured, and therefore the a.bility to pay approach 
became necessary. The benefit approach was emphasised 
in the work of Pantaleoni, Mazzola, Wicksell and Sax68 
who regarded the equality of tax and benefit as an 
esse11tia.l condi tionfor efficient allocation. For these 
writers the determination of the level ro~ distribution 
of taxation had to be left to the government which would 
represent the wishes of tte group. 
Later on, in the '.vork of Lindahl, 69 a different 
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pri.nciple of pricing public goods emerged, through 
. 70 
volunta:ry exchange. This moael has been criticised 
since in order to reach equilibrium it is necessary 
that the demand for public goods can be deterL1ined, but 
because these goods are non-excludable, preferences will 
not be revealed, or if they are will be understated. 
In the case of two individuals the solution therefore 
will depend on the bargaining skills of the two voters 
and in the case of large numbers because preferences 
are not revealed the assumption of voluntary contribution 
will break down. 
SQt11uelson (1954) 71. has also pointed to a second 
flaw in the voluntary-payment mod el. This model assu_mes 
that the initial diitribution of income is ideal, but 
when the problem is restated in general equilibrium 
terms, even if preferences are known, then it turns out 
that there lS no single best solution in the Pareto 
sense, but an infj_ni te number of Pareto optimuJll points, 
which differ in terms of income distribution. If one 
accepts Samuelson's argument then a~location and distri-
bution are determined simult~'1eously wi ~.hin the general 
" 
equilibrium and it is impossible to separate lithe 
. 
determination of socie~ wants by the allocation br8,i'1.ch 
.. 
from the determination of the distribution of income 
availahle for private use by the distritution branch.,,72 
Because of the problems of tryine; to apply the 
beneftts approach to taxation, the second approach, the 
t.bi l:ity to pay, will be used to ex-a..mine the share of 
. 
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defence experidi ture wi thin n. J... T. 0 g The aoili ty to pay 
approach has its origins in an essay by GUicciardini, 
in the early sixteenth century,73 who argued for 
progressive taxation based on faculty or compete~ce. 
J. S. Mill re j ected the benefit rule completely, &'1d 
argued that everyone should be treated equally under the 
law, and therefore his particular formulation of ability 
to pay became equality of sacrifice. This raised the 
question of the preci.se meaning of equality of sacrif:i.ce 
and how this wo·u.ld be measured in terms of income surrendered. 
Three distinct concepts of equal sacrifice emerged from 
the early literature74 which are still considered to be 
relevant today - equal absolu"c2 ~ equal proportional and 
equal marginal. 
Wi th eq:u.al absolute sacrifice each individual is 
required to currender income through taxation, so that 
the los's of tot'al utility: u(y) - U(Y-T) is the S8L'le for 
everyone. Under equal proportional sacri,fice each 
individual loses income so that the ratio of lost utility 
to total utility~ u(y) - U(Y-T)/U(Y) is the same for all. 
Vvith equal marginal sacrifice, which Edgevforth took t::> 
be the littimpte nrinci DIe of tax2tion. each i nd :."',r:l.dual 
_..,.L...... .. 
pays tax such that in the post tax situation the marginal 
~ 
utility of income: dU(Y-T)/d(Y-T) is the same for e~l. 
This last concept is sometimes referred to as the least 
aggregate sacrifice and leads towards equal. absolute 
PODt-tCDr' in.comes. 
In order to apply any of these conc.epts to a system 
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of tax collE;ction it is necessary to kno:;,T the i:o.cor:18-
utility schedules of everyone and be able to mak3 
interpersonal utility comparisonso If it is further 
assumed that the marginal utility of income declines 
then it is possible to make some tentative generalisations 
about the degree of tax progression required to satisfy 
the various concepts of equal sacrifice. 75 Equal marginal 
sncrifice requires the most progressive tax system, that 
is the higher income,groups surrender a larger proportion 
of their income than the lower income groups. In the 
case of eq1.;,(~J absolute sacrifice the degree of tax 
progression required depends upon the rate at which the 
marginal tJ.tili ty of' income dec~_;_hes. Where the mfn'ginal 
utility of income declines at the same proportional rate 
8.3 income increases then eaual absolute sacrifice reouires _ 4 
a proportional tax. If, however; the marg'inal utility of 
:Lncome declines .at a lower proportional rate than income 
increases then a regressive tax is required and vice-' 
76 versa. ,PinalJ.y, ill the case of equal proportional 
sacrifice, as long as the marginal utility of income 
c:eclines more rapidly than average utility then a 
progressive tax is required. 
,Since in practice the income-utility schedule is 
unknown, it j.s impossible to make inter-personal 
comparisons or to demonstrate that the marginal utility 
of iucome declines, so that no specific schedule of tax 
r'.~'ctGs c~'.:n ~_'e deri '.'·::,d from &Y}.y of the concepts 01 equ:::~,l 
sacrifice.. jl"or thc p'urpose in hand, that is to deternline 
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an equi t[1.ble distribution of H. A. T. o. defence expendi ture 
, . 
between member states, perhaps the best solution would 
be to follow Robbins' formula and treat all individuals 
as if they wer~ equal. 7? 
E!J;ying for)T. A. T. 0 .. 's ,;Defence 
The object of this section is to test whether 
Turkey's contribution to N.A.T.O.'s defence expenditure 
carl be justified in terms of equality of sacrificec It 
will be assumed that defence is a pure pttblic good wi thin 
the N.A.T.O. 8~liance and that the burden of the defence 
expendi tu~e for' each country can be meas'UY'ed by' the 
ratio of defence expenditure 78 to G.N.P. Next, if we 
accept the principle of ability to pay, how should the 
defence burdens be related to the per capita incomes of 
, . '
the N.A.T.O~ countries? Per capita incomes are not ideal 
since they are not necessarily a goo~ ~easure of the 
standard of living or welfare of each country, but in 
/ 
the absence of a better m'easure per capi ta income will 
be used as a proxy for the level of welfare. There is 
110 i.1.1formation :)f the utili ty-of-income schedll.les of the 
Ie.~. ~Ll. o. countries on T[[hich to ·Nork out an appropriate 
schedule for tax rates, but we do know how particular 
countries treat different levels of income for tax 
purposes. 
B8sed on the method employed by De Striou (1968) 
and more recently by -Kennedy (1979), Britain's tax 
• 
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schedrlJJ~ wtll be used to deter1l1ine e-jch COtlntry I 8 ability 
to pay theN.A.T.O. defence burd~n in rel~tion to their 
per capi.La i.ncomes. Thus although the principle of ability 
to pay is a s~bjective matter this method proceeds as if 
Britain has, through its democratj_c processes, determined 
an approprt,ate tax for,mula which lS consistent wi th the 
principle of equal sacrifice. 
There is still the problem of deciding on the 
actual s-chedule of taxation used in Britain. Inorder 
to determi.ne how eachuni t (individual or family) fares 
in Britain under the system of taxation it is necessary 
to take into account different forms of' taxes and benefits. 
~:-herc Cl.re both direct and indlrect ta"'{es and benefi ts 
that operate in Britain but it is virtually impossible 
to get enough information on these to be able to estimate 
C't t net' ta.x rate. 79 It will be assu::J.ed here that the 
dj .. rect tax rates a.pplied in Bri tain are the appropriate 
ones to use, since income tax is generally ta'k'en to be 
the one which aims to satisfy ability-to-pay. However, 
because it is recognised that inJirect taxes and benefits 
, 
also influence the 'net' tax rates applied in Bri.tain 
'eUl 2.1 ternJ,ti ve schedule of taxa.tion has been used in 
Appendix 2, although 'the conclustons are broadly similar. 
+ 
The method employed is to ra~~ the N.A.T.O. countries 
accordinc to their per capita incomes and the ratio of 
their per . t . C '" ',' -, a l"'" C (Yl'1 (:) ~ "--,,',}"_ ~_ .l.t '-.0.-""'-'"'-" ___ to the R.A.T.O. avera~e, which 
is then used to estimate the ta.."{ liabili ty of f:acb. 
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country as if it were an individual in Britain at the 
equivalent point in the income distribution. Having 
determined the tax rate that would be paid by each 
country according to the British tax schedule this is 
then used to calculate the required defence burden 
using Britain as a standard. 
In Table 4.2 the per capita incomes of N.A.T.O. 
countries are given for the years 1958 and 1977, and 
alongs:Lde, in colu:rnns (2) and (4) the per capi ta income 
is shown as a percentage of the N • .A.T.O. average. 
Table 4.3 shows the direct tax rates that were 
impoSt;-\~ on individuals at different levels of income ill 
Britain for 1976-77. In the lowest range of income, 
£735-£1000 p"a. the average tax rate was 3.1 per cent, 
and this rose to 75 per cent for:incomes over £100,000 p.a. 
The average personal income in Britain in 1976-'77 was 
i;'3 69~' d.J, )" 
In Table 4.4 can ·be found an adjusted tax rate for 
each country, and then based on that the required defence 
burden. ~[,he adjusted tax rat8 is calcul_ated as follows, 
1Jsin{~ the U.x. to illustrate. In 1958 the U.K. per 
capi~~D_ incoIn8 waS ,31254 (from Table 4.2) which was 
119.20 per cent of the N.A.T.O. average. If an individual 
in Brit2.in had received an income which was 119.20 per 
cent above the average in 1976-77, this would have been 
r. 114 r,r) 
-v .. -t \ I L , 
". tl . \,1 n111 
in the income range £4000 to £4500 (see Table 4.3). 
.f.:llis income range the average inco!Ile stood at 
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1\ .ABLE 4.2 
in % for 1958 an~ 1971-
}-958 1977 
Per Capita Per .Qapita Per C . 4- Per Capita anl'J3. 
.. . . 
Inc OIC.2 ** Income as Income Income as 
~!:..centage of percente.ge of 
-
~A'.rO. averag~ NATO average 
C oD]2;..t.r;.,y' (1) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) 
U. S • A. 2602 247.34 8520 143.05 
Cana.da. 1979 188.12 84'n bu 142.04 
UoKo 1254 119.20 4420 74.21 
De' eriUD' 
... 1_) -'-b J..1. 1155 109.79 7590 127.43 
NOy",oV1Y 
_ II c~ 1139 108.27 8550 143.55 
Fra..Ylce 1107 105.23 7290 122.40 
Denmarl~ 1101 104,,66 8040 134.99 
Germany 1066 101.33. 8160 137.00 
Netherlands 845 80,,32 7150 120.05 
Italy 598 56.84 3440 57.76 
Greece 384 36.50 2810 47.18 
Portugal 246 23.38 1890 31.73 
Turkey 204 19.39 1110 18.64 
* 5956 Average 1052 
~-
1:J 0 t e : u::.!.~·; e i gh t e (1 • 
Sources: 1958, U.NM Statistical Yearbook, 
1969; 1977, World Development 
Report, The World Bank~ August 
1979. 
** This is nominal GDPper capita derived by using exchange rates 
to convert each country's GDP per capita into dollars. 
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T .ABLE 4.3 
The Distribution of Personal Incomes 
before Tax in Britain for 1976-77 
- -
Range of Average Averag~ Tax as % 
-
Income Income £'8 Tax £'s of I~come 
.... 
(1) (2 ) (3) 
735-1000 87') 27.5 3.1 
1000-1500 1257 118.0 9.4 
-2000 1748 243 13.9 
-2500 2248 388 "17.3 
-3000 2743 522 19.0 
-3500 3254 636 19.6 
-~()OO 3753 747 19.9 
-4500 4237 860 20.3 
-5000 4748 986 20.8 
-6000 5459 1188 2J.~8 
-7000 6455 . 1500 23.2 
-8000 7445 1861 25.0 
-10,000 8822 2415 27.4 
-12,000 10,880 3435 31.6 
-15,000 13,185 4741 36.0 
-20,000 17,125' 7350 42.9 
-50,000 27,143 14,929 55.0 
-100,000 73,000 5lP67 70.8 
100,000 + 148,571 11l,429 () 75.0 
Overbll- average income: £3693 
Source: Board of Inland Revenue, Inland 
Revenue Statistics, London 3.M.S.0., 
1979, ~able 2.3. 
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TABLE 4.4 
iflh c _ v
-
PeTcentage of...,Q.N.P. to be 
s]?ent ,on ])e.£s:.n.~e u?ing the adjusted tax rate 
as t,he determinani....£f the burden sharing, 
aYl.d . Uf3iYJ-2; the U. K., defenc e bu-rden as a stand ard 
19.28 1977 
Adjusted "l""> • d LLe9..ulr~ Adjuste~ Required 
Tex Rate Defence Tax Rate Defence 
Burden ~ 7~) Burden 
C_oy.ntrx. (1) (2 ) (3) (4) 
U.S.A.6 28.0 10.7 21.6 5.7 
Ca.nada 24.0 9.1 21.5 5.7 
U.K .. ?O h - • ::> 7.'8 19.0 5.0 
BelO'ium I~ 20.1 7.6 20.8 5.5 
Norway 20.1 706 21.6 5.7 
France ""'1"\ 0 LV. 7.6 "0 r c:.. .0 5.4 
Der>:J .... 1""r JI':' d._c h, 20.0 7.6 21.-1 5.6 
Gerl"on~T L./ .) 19.9 7.6 21.2 5.6 
NetheTlands 19.3 7.3 20.5 5.4 
It::_~ly 
Greece 
Portugal 
TurLey 
16 .. 3 6.2 16.5 4.3 
10.2 3.9 13.9 3.7 
2.9 1.1 8.0 2.1 
2.5 1.0 2.4 0.6 
Source: jI;Iethod, TIe Strihou (1968); Kennedy 
(1979) • 
Derived from Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
, ] .--, 
- ..L _':; 
~% ~ 
f'4 r ·'Z'7 ' th - . t w (-:J ana e oorrespondlng ax rate imposed vias 20.3 
per cent. It is necessary to estiu3te the tax rate 
that would have been imposed on an income of ":440?, 
wh:i.cb. lies in -bet','{een the average income's of £4237 
(pay:Lng tax of 20.3 per cent) an.d £4748 (paying tax of 
20.8 per cent).. It is assumed that the tax rate changes 
in direct proportion to the change in income between the 
two average incc'me points, which can be easily calculated, 
and in this case gives an adjusted tB,x rate of 20.5 per 
cent for the U ~K. in 1958, as shown in Table 4.4" ~'he 
c6~'1JplE::te set of adjusted tax ra tes for each N. A. T. O. 
cow1try in 1958 and 1977 is gj.ven in columns (1) and 
(3) in 'Tible 4.4. It will be ob~erved that ~or both 
1958 and 1977 Turkey has the lowest adjusted tax rates 
Of'!=-) 1 1 "f.J 1\ T 0 f' 0 1 'TI +. 1"1· e Cl be; n 0'" 2 t:; ~ ~nd ? 4 ~- C-I.....J- ... ".11... .. .. v 1",4 - -.... ......., '1 ".L. ... (..-:l .. ./  "- • per cent 
re3pecti vely. ~'he next step is to calcu1~:te the require,] 
defence burdens for each country taking into abcount 
the corresponding adjusted tax r~l tes and using the U.K. 
as 8. st&.'1.dard. The aim is to calculats a required 
defence burden for each country for the two years, so 
th2t the burden is in direct proportion to thp adjusted 
tax !'o.te. In 1958 the U.K. devoted 7.8 per cent of her 
G~J:.Po to defence, and it is assumed that this was 
appropriate for her income per capita. For 1958 the 
ratio of the adjusted tax rate to the .defence burden 
for the UQK. W&s 20.5/7.8 = 2.628, therefore to find 
+1' ..... 1.-_', 1-'. f:." ',.-t.', l' rca" o'c.f'e-:-ocp hUi"d°Y' of ;:JlJ o-+_::ler c:cl1ntries it v, _ _ • ,: __ J '. ," ,_, _ _ ,_ J.J. . c ~ -
:Ls nr:>ct.·~~'c:-r>rqr to divia'e their ad.iusted tax rates b;r 2.626, 
. \.' ~- .... v C), - c/ -- _ .I 
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a.'fJ.d t'n:;.s is done in colurrm (2) of Ta~)le 4.4. The S8.Y1e 
procedure is used to ca:culate the required defence 
burdens for 1977, which appears in colu.mn (4). Since 
the adjusted tax rates are derived from a prog~essive 
tax formula it follows that those countries ~ith a 
higher per capita income th~m the U. K. will be r8quired 
to carry a. higher defence burden. In the case of Turkey, 
with the lowest per capita income in N.A.T.O. the 
calculated required defence. burdens were low, being 1.0 
and O~6 per cent for 1958 and 1977 respectively. 
In Tables 4 .. 5 and 4.6 the required defence burdens 
and the required defence expenditures a.re compared with 
the actuals for the years 1958 and 1977. Because these 
ca,lculations have used the U.K. as a standard then her 
defence ccmmitment appears to be appropriC3.te in both 
ye8.rs.. It would have been an easy matter to have used 
another, or even all, countries as a standard in turn 
(Kennedy, 1979) . but this would not hc.7e ai'fected the 
over-all conclusion that 'the poorer members of N.A.T.O. 
ha're borne an unfair share of the defence burden. For 
Greece; Portugal, Turkey and the U.S.A. the actual defence 
burdens and defence expenditures are cbove the reClui:'ed 
lcve.1s for' both 1958 and 1977. The remaini.ng members of 
N.l~.rr.O., 2.part from the U.K., do not carry a defence 
burden that can be justified using the criterion of 
equity used here. In the case of Turkey her excess 
;1c.C on C 0 'bn-.ccl en (ac tual minus required) ""'i8 h"; ,.-i--1 n r than '1tL Jo. .......... u- ...... 
fo~' ~i.n;r .other country in both 195? and 1977, and, 
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~.ipC; the .p. Y. defence bllrde21 
;t 
as a st.8ndard, 1958~ 
~~ired Actual G 1\~ P Def. Exu. -~.~. . 
_ ....,. ... -
-
Defence Defence U.S. Sb. in 
--
--.-.........1..-
Burden Burden U. S. gmt 
.Q~ountrY- (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) 
}Jorway 7.6 4.0 4.0 160 
U 0 S • A. 10.7 10.9 455.0 49591 
Canada 9.1 6,,0 33.9 1356 
Germany 7.6 3.4 57.9 1968 
Denmark 7.6 3.3 5~0 164 
Belgium 7.6 3 .. 9 10.5 408 
]1rance 7.6 7.9 49.6 3916 
Netherlands 7.3 5.0 9.5 473 
U.K~ 7.8 7.8 64.5 5053 
Italy 6.2 4.3 29.3 1262 
Greece 3.9 5.8 3.1 182 
Portugal 1.1 4.5 2.1 96 
Turkey 1.0 4.5 5~3 239 
Source: As for Table 4.2, 
also I.1.S.S. (1964). 
flequired 
Def. EXJ2. 
in U.S. L:1l· 
(5 ) 
305 
34577 
3084 
4399 
378 
794 
3767 
690 
5053 
1819 
122 
.24 
53 
A. 
Defence expenditure figures are based on the I.I.S.S. 
defini tj_on of defence spending which may differ 
from national budget estimates. 
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T .ABLE 4.6 
P~locations to Defence by N.A.T.O. Countries 
usin& the U.K. defence burden 
as a standard, 1977 
Ee9.,u,ired Actual G.N.P" Def. EXE· 
Defence J)efe_n~ U.S ~. in 
---
Burden Burden U.S. Y?'b. 
-- ---
,Qountr;y: (1) (2) (3 ) (4) 
Norway 5.7 3.1 34.2 1.1 
U • f) • A. 5.7 6.0 1874.4 104.3 
Canada 5.7 1.8 197.1 3.3 
Germ;:;...."1Y 5<6 3.4 501.1 17.1 
J)cnmark 506 2.5 41.0 1.1. 
Belgium 5.5 3.4 74.4 2.5 
France 5.4 3,,6 387.1 13.7 
Netherlands 5.4 3.6 99 .. 4 3.7 
U~K. 5.0 5.0 247.1 12.4 
Italy '4.3 2.4 194.4 4.7 
Greece 3.7 5.0 25.9 1.3 
I-'ortuga.1 2.1 3.3 18.1 0.5 
Turkey 0.6 5.7 46.5 2.6 
Source: ,As for Table 4.2, 
also I.I.S.S. (1978). 
- 123 . 
Required. 
Def. Exp. 
. 
in U.S. %b. 
(5 ) 
1.949 
106.829 
11.235 
·28 .. 056 
2 .. 296 
4.092 
20.903 
5.368 
12.355 
8.359 
0.958 
0.380 
. 0.279 
fur'thermor'e it increased from ).5 pel' cent to 5 ~} per C8Et oyer' tte 
period. 
It was pointed out earlier (p. 117) that these celculations 
have been based on nominal GDP per capita. Recent \'wrk by Kravis 
et al.(1978)80 has shown that raal GDP per capita adjusted for 
differences in the purchasing power of currencies reduces the 
apparent gap in per' capita incomes between rich and poor cOlL"'1tries. 
Nevertheless, even if real GDP per capita bad been used in these 
calcula tionc (this v:·as done for 1977 but not presented.) the 
conclusions would have been broadly the same, for 1977, at least g 
Using the real per capita incomes given by Kravis et a~L. for 1974 
it was found that in 1977 Turkey, Greece and the USA all contributed 
more than their 'fair' share to NATO defence, ar:.~: ~Purkey' s excess 
defence burden at 3.5 per cent VlTas the highest within NATO" Moreover, 
even if allowance ~s made for US economic assistance 'given' to 
Turkey to cover part of the military bU:L'd..en the conclu.sion is 
unaffected. Turkey along with the other poorer members of NATO s 
have t8.-K:en on a disproportionate burden of defence. wllile it is true 
tha t defence expendi ture in Turkey has also Il.ad a 'iery impOl"tall t 
domestic role, so that not all of the defence allocation should be 
credited to NATO, it is doubtful if this can fully account for tha 
unequal defence burden. 
wllen the tax rate calculation takes intI") d\;count Doth direct 
and indirect taxes gnd benefits then the low income groups become 
net recipients, that is the benefits they receive are greater than the 
taxes they pay. In this case it has been estimated that Turkey should 
have all of its defence expenditure paid for by other NATO members on 
grounds of equity. The detailed calculations for this are given in 
Appendix 2. 
Before leaving the topic of Turkey's share in the NATO defence 
burden; one further set of calculations will be considered based on 
equal proportional burden sharing, and this io shown in Table3 4.7 
and 4.8, for 1958 ar..d 1978 respectively. In both Tables column (1) 
gives the GNP of each member in US $ billion; column (2) gives each 
countries' share of the total NATO income; co1(3) the defence expenditure of 
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each country in U .. S. t; 801umn (4) gives each country's 
shf1xe of the total N. F. T. o. defence expendi ture; colu:::.,.,. 
(5) gives an estimate of what each country should spend 
on defence, assuming that total NeA.T.O. defence spending 
remained as it was for the two years, but each country 
contributed according to its share of N.A.T.O. income; 
and column (6) gives the actual defence burden for 
each member. The interesting data appears in column (5) 
since these estimates assume that members contribute 
in proportion to ·the size of their G.N.?, which is 
equivalent to each country contributing s'o that the 
. 
proportion of defence expenditure per capita to income 
per_capita is. the same. First of all looking at Table 
4.7 (1958) it can be seen that 7.87 per cent of N.A.T.O. 
income was given over to defence, and the only countries 
that contributed their proportion were the U.S.A., 
France 3.Yld the U.K • .411 the other countries, including 
Turkey! ShC"~_lJ,~ have contributed more. By 1978 the 
N.A.T.O. defence burden had fallen to ~.4 per cent, see 
Table 4.8, which left four countries paying more than 
their faIr sht:.re - Greec e, Turkey, the U. K. and the 
U.S.A. - with two of those countries enjoying per capita 
incomes wull below the aV2rage fer N.A.T.O. 
5. bCOllQ2.11i~~L a1)d .£Q.wer Interests ..2l.. tl.!? Military 
Es t abl ~~hI~en t. 
h ·) '" l-'. (, \' , 
There n~e two olvlous ~aJo~ interest groups that 
1 f . , . t . a st~~1ke in the leve 0 ~-:L.Ll ary 
. 
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~xpenditure - the 
rr ~B····'·;' 4 7 ~ .fl • .L...., • 
Required Defence Expenditure 
for Equ?) Proportiona.l Burden Sharing, 19?.§. 
G.N.P. Share Def .. Share Equal Actual 
- -
U.S. 
-
of Exp. of Propnl Def. 
e'h NATO u. S. NATO Def. Burden 
--
! 2:' . lm!. ~ Exp. ~ :2 
U.S.tm. 
Qountry" (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) 
.Belgium 10.5 1.3 4·08 0.6 843 3.9 
Canada. 33.9 4.1 1'.)r6 ~ ::> 2.1 2660 6.0 
Dt;';nmark 5.0 0.6 164 Oe3 389 3.3 
France 4906 6.0 3916 6.0 . 3892 7.9 
Germany 57.9 7.0 1968 3.0 4541 3.4 
Greece 3.1 0.4 182 0.3 259 5.8 
Italy 29.3 3.6 1262 1.9 2335 4.3 
Netherlands 9.5 1 .. 2 473 0.7 778 5~O 
Nor1,','ay 
Portugal 
TlJ.rkey 
U.K. 
u . S • A. 
Total 
4.0 0~5 16.0 0.2 324 4.0 
2.1 0.3 96 0.1 195 4.5 
5.3 0.6 2~Q ..,. ... 0.4 389 4e5 
64.8 7.8 5053 '{ ,,8 5053 7.8 
455~0 55.2 49591 76.4 35807 10 .. 9 
824.5 64868 64868 
Sour'ces: Column 1 TJ.N. stp..tistical Ye::::.rbook, 
1969. 
Column 3 derived from I~I.S.S. (1966). 
N. A. 'I'. o. Defence 
Note: N .1'.. T. O. Defence Burden: Exnendi ture 
N. A.T .0. Income 
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TABLE 4.8 
J-{eg,u,ired Defe12.£e Expenditure 
for ~~a~1-R.~o~ortio~al Burden Sharing, in 
~ • A. T .0., 1978 
G.N .. P. Share Def. Share Equal Actual 
-- --
U. S. of EJU2. of P nl D f rop ~. 
lfE.. NP.TO U .. S. NATO Def. Burden 
--
oi ~. clo Exp. ~ IV J-
-
U.S.$b. 
~o~ntr:'l. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) 
Belgium 89 .. 1 2.1 2.476 1.3 3.957 3. ~? 
Canada. 215.7 5.1 3e635 1.9 9.609 2.0 
Denmark 50'.6 1.2 1.320 Oe7 2.261 2.4 
}!lraJ1C e 440.2 10.3 17.518 9.3 19.406 3.9 
Germany 587.3 13.8 21.355 11.3 26.000 3 .. 4-
Greece 30.6 0.7 1.523 0.8 1.319 6.7 
It ~"1 ' " ~ .. ..Ly 218.3 5.1 5.619 3.0 9.609 2.4 
, Luxembourg 3.2 0.03'7 0.141 1.1 
Nether1~3j,lds 116.9 2.7 4.208 2.2 ' 5.087 3.3 
Norway 
Portug'a1 
Turkey 
U.K. 
u . S • A. 
1'otal 
39.0 0.1 1.291 0.7 1.720 3 .~ .,./ 
19 r::; 
- • ..J 0.568 0,,) 0.860 3.5 
51.7 1.2 2.286 1.2 2.281 5.1 
280.7 6.6 13.579 7.2 12.435 4.7 
2128 .. 0 49.8 113.000 60.0 93.826 5.1 
4270.8 188.406 188.406 
Source: I.l.S.~. (1978) S.I.P.R.I. (1980) 
G • N "P..: (W 0 rId B arlk T a'b 1 e s ) • 
N.A.T.O. Defence 
Jfote: N.A.T.O. Defence Burden: EXgenditure = 4.4 
H.A.T.O. Income 
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mili tal'y leaders, and the firr:-18 that a.re engaged in 
producing military hardware or supplying the day to 
day consumption needs of the arned forces. 
Military leaders can be assumed to derive utility 
not only from the salaries they receive but also from 
tlle power and prestige that they possess, which itself 
is a. fU:'1ction of the level of military manpower under 
their control and the size and sophistication of raili tary 
hardware. This suggests the following utility function: 
U = f(S, M, H: T) 
where U ,- Utility 
S -- 1,1ili tary Salary 
M -- :Military Manpower under their control 
H ::: Milj.tary Hardware 
T = th8 Technology and sophistication of military 
equipment 
If ,military leaders are utility maximisers thEn 
they have a reason to see military expenditure as high 
PS possible. A higher level of military spending permits 
hi~~her salaries and/ormore soldiers andlor more tanks, 
hc:licopter~:;, aircraf-t or guns which all give increased 
levels of 'utility. There can be little doubt that 
mill tary 'leaders a.re concerned vvi th the power and prestige 
t.hey pOSSeSS. After the 1960 coup in Turkey there were 
some elc~ent8 within the military lcade~sbip that believed 
t~-"ere should be a more por:nanent invol venent of the 
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military in the future politics of Turkey.8l Those 
officers who participated in and supported the 1960 
coup believed that civilian government had been betraying 
Kemalist ideals. The bureaucratic elite· found their 
power declining, and the same policies deprived the army 
of its tradi tional role as guardi&"l of the peace. 
Significantly one of the measures taken while the military 
were in pOvver was to increase the pay of the military so 
as to restore not only their real incomes, but also their 
morale. Given the obvious power of the military in post-
war Turkey the thesis that the level of military 
expenditure is determined in part by pressure exerted 
by the ~ilitary itselI seems plausible, but it will be 
argued that this has not been resisted by the politicians. 
The other important interes~ group with a stake in 
the level of mili tary spendJng are tile firms that supply 
the arms, vehicles, petrol, clothinR ~~d food to the 
armed forces. Any cutback in the size of military 
spending would adversely affect those firms supplying 
military requirements. There is a great deal of literature 
on t:::-Le lmpact uf mili tary expe:adi ture on the U. S. economy. 
Clayton (1962 )82 described in d2tail the enor::lOUS econoi,_j_c 
impact that military expenditure has had on firms in 
., 
C I " ~ " Buck (19b'5)83 stressed the stronb~ backward a :t 1. 0 r Il]. a ., .' 
linkages that mllitury expenditure induced in the U.S. 
which rer.:ulted in a positive net productive effect after 
aJ lO'.T!.ru:r for thE: F:.bsc:rption of resources for mili tary 
L- ••. 
. °4 J'l1rposo~. Burton 2nd DyckwaYl (1965)~ Isaaro. and 
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Schoole~ (1963 )85 and Pcte!:'30n and Tiecout (1963 )'S6 all 
present evidence to show that di8arma~ent would have 
serious negative effects on the entire Californian econ.omy. 
The business of' producing arms and supplying thE; mj.li tary 
is virtually risk free yet enormous profits are earned 
by firms fortunate enough to receive mili t2.r;y- contracts. 87 
As most of the large mi.li tary contracts in the U.S. A. go 
to the giant· corporations, vvhieh possess considerable 
political muscle, there is pressure on the U.S. governm.ent 
to maintain or increase military spenCing. 88 It is also 
in the interests of the military elite, as was previously 
argued, and the politicians whose careers depend upon the 
military sector to push for more military spending. 
This clearly implies that there are several powerful 
groups in the U.S. with mutually consistent interests 
(Wright Mills, 1956)89 who are able to illd.ke military 
spending acceptable. 
Several writers have studied the military industrial 
complex in the U. S • Allison (1971) 91 8.L"'1d Halperin (1974) 92 
stress the bureaucratic process within the state as 
dete~mining thd method by which military hardware is 
pI-ocured, whereas I,1elman (1974)93 enG ?osen (1973) 
. 
emphasise the military - industrial complex. Rosen 
.. 
concludes: 94 
"The U.S. (and the Soviet Union) haye developed 
ext2Dsive industrial sectoTs orienta~ed to Dilit~ry 
'J."'>{) ers for the}}' output. A by-product of this development 
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is the creation oia class of individuals whose interests 
are served by defence spending. The careers of related 
managers and (on the U. S. side) the profits of O1J'lners 
and share holders are tied to high levels of ;rrilitary 
preparation ••• These industries are in critical sectors 
of the economy. On the U.S. side, they include the 
largest industrial corporations and the crucial cani tal 
J.. 
goods industry ••• On both sides, t~e most powerful 
interest,s in the economy are substantia1ly tied to 
continued high levels of military prociuction .. t1 
The validity of the 'military-industrial' thesis, 
as an explp...nat1on of the magnitude of military spending 
in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.,' seems to have been 
established, but it is not so clearly perceptible that 
the same applies in other countries. Turkey is interesting 
in this respect because in 1960, while the military were 
in po\ver, the Armed Forces Nfutuul Assj stance Fund (Ordu 
Yardimlasma Kur~mu or O.Y.A.K.) was set up which was 
instrumental in establishing the military as private 
entrepreneurs. Under O.Y.A.K. rules, regular officers 
in t::e armed fucces, who number about 80,000, pay 10 per 
ce11t f Ll' 1 rl'e~ onto the 1~'1ndl _fer p'Te~~v-"p.l .. 0 G.l.lelr ScL,_3 ..:> J_. ~ '- - -- "'---
. 
reimburseTIento The funds have been invested throughout 
.. 
the economy and by the early 1970s O.Y.A.K. had become 
one of the country's biggest and most pervasive 
conglom0rates, solidly integrated into the economy. 
By 1972 O.YeA.K. had control1int interests in the 
21ur};:ish /llltomotive Industry, a comp[l...Y}.Y that asser::oles 
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International Harvester trucks and tr~cto~s; ~., ~ rn J..~~ • .:i • ..:... • , 
a truck and tractor sales firm; the O.Y.;LK. Insurance 
Company; 11 .U.K"A.S., a food canning firm; and'a 
}t3 million cement plent. O v ~ T{ al • ..;.. ri •. L... so held a 20 per 
cent interest in the %50 million Petkim Petrochemical 
Plant; 8 per cent of the Sta.te-owned Turkish Petroleum; 
I.l2 per cent of O.Y.A.K.-,Renault and 7 per cent of the 
Turkish subsidiary of the Goodyear Tyre Company.95 
jl1rom. an initial investment of 8 .. 6 :I:cL.rn.il1ion in 1960 
O.Y.A.K. ;h.ad grow'n to 502 'r.L.million in 1970 and had 
assets of %300 million (approximately 4000 T.L.million) 
in 1972. 96 
During the 1960s there developed a new closer 
relationship between the political, the industrial and 
commercial capitalist class and the military. The upper 
echelons of the army began to take up positions within 
the bureaucracy, or were recruited into private or 
, 97 9~ 
stateent8rprise and many were sent abread as ambassadors.. " -. 
O.Y.A.K .. was given special tax allowances. It was not 
required to pay any of the 25 per cent corporation tax 
0::'1 its earnings. It was al so exem.pt frum paYlng the 
10 per cent tax ch8Tged for business transactions, and 
. 
the payrncJ'its made to and by rrrembers vlere not cha-rged 
~.' 
income or inheri tance tax. }c'urthermore, O. Y. A.K. 
companies were given preference in supplying army needs 
, t . d gg ana con 'racts were even rlgge • 
Beginning in the. 1960s the Turkish economy caIne to 
- 132 -'. 
be dominated 'by a 'mixture of state, bank, industr"' 
<f , 
foreign and ~Iili tary capital.' ~OO T'he military had an 
interest in preserving stability and the status quo, 
and the po Ii tical and financial oligarchy sav{ the army 
as the guardian of the new regime. From the late 1.960s 
the growing strength of D.I.S.K. and the Turkish Labour 
Party could only be held in check ultimately through 
the power of the military, and the fortunes of polittcians 
and capi talists bec8.me linked to those of the mili tary 
officers. All three elements in the power eli te withi,n 
Turkey have had a stake in the maintenance of economic 
and social stability and this has IDeaYlt a comrr.i tment to 
contilli~'8d high levels' of mili tary spending.-
6. Economic Policy 
The Under-Cons~mption Thesis: 
The Marxist analysis of capitalism emphasises the 
fundamental laws of motion of the syste!T'. whj,ch if left 
unchecked lead to periodic economic crises &~d eventual 
breakdown. .Into this analysis it is necessary to introdu~e 
th t Ot 101 b' b ' d t 't t t b~l'~e e s a e WlC 1 lS aSSll..rne -0 In ,erVl:?ne 0 s a ill. i:j 
the economy or expsnd aggregate demand. 
·Capitalist crises arise for two reasons. Firstly, 
because of the inevitable tendency for the rate of 
profit to decline with a rising organic composition of 
08.ri t8.1, or secondly, because the surplus ca'1no~_ OE 
realised, and is held in the form of unsold commodities, 
- 133 
i.e. the under-consumption thesis. The realis~tion 
. 
problc~ occurs when the growth of the forces of 
production generates a potential output which is greater 
than effective d.emand, which itself may be limited by 
the attempts of capitalists, or the state, to keep wages 
down. Both versions of the crisis require the state to 
intervene (in the interests of capital) to expand state 
expenditure. 
It ~as Rosa Luxemburg (1913)102 who first recognised 
.the rol e of PIili t3ry expendi ture and arms production as 
a purely economic weapon to aid the process of capitalist 
accumulation and surplus-value realisation. According 
to Joan Robinson (1963):103 
"The analysis which best fits Rosa Luxemburg's own 
argument, and the facts, is that armaments provide an 
outlet for the investment of surplus (over and above any 
-
contribution there may be from forct:a 2aving out of 
wages) which, tullike other kinds of inv2stme!lt, creates 
no further problem by increasing productive capacity 
(not to mention the huge new investment opportunities 
crea.ted by reconstructi.on after the capi talist nations 
have turned their weapons against each other." 
This interpretation of the role of military expendit~re 
. . 
. 104 105 106 107 is taken up by several wrlters. ' , , The 
argument they present is that advanced industri2.1 
capit31ist societies have a problem of absorbin~ the 
surplus. The Second 00rld ;far mopped up the surplus of 
< 
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the late 193?s but the crises began to reappear in the 
late 19/:·0s. The only way that the capi talist economies 
coul~ be stabilised was through vast military spending 
and the spa.ce race. The 'permanent war economy' was the 
state's answer to the under-consumption bias in the 
capitalist system, a,.'1.d arms production had the advantage 
of being ideologically acceptable to the capitalist 
class. Arms production does not compete with private 
interests nor does it create productive capacity yet 
it genera.tes employment and investment opportunities 
and therefore moderates the tendency for the rate of 
profit to fall. 
Cypher (1974) studied the macroeconomic effects of 
military expenditure on the U.S. economy in the post-
war period to determine to what e.xtent such expenditures 
have been used as an instrument of capitalist planning 
in order to stabilise the U.S. economy and reverse the 
tendency toward.::, secular stagnation. H-~ argues that 
military expenditure has been an instrument of capitali3t 
planning) and through the multiplier accounted for about 
1GB 25 per cent of G.N.P .. in anyone year. 
It can...not be denied that military expenditure can 
• 
expand output and reduce unemployment but it is not 
sufficient to establish a correlation between them as 
evidence that the state has purposefully chosen to use 
mili t~l"·Y e~=-t)endi ture to combat undeT--consump"tion tendencies. 
,_ .l 
-,., t I~ Ll ~;~ \~.rCl'J_16 be required is evidence of a 'state reaction 
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function' and Smith (1977) finds no evidence for' a 
'systematic posi tive reacion function i using tiLie series 
data for the U.S.A .. and the U.K. In the case of the 
u.s. it would be necessary to conclude that the Korean 
Vlar, 1951-53, and the Vietnam 'Nar, 1966-69, were 
entered into primarily to achieve full employment, and 
this seems implausible. 109 Furthermore, there are 
theoretical grounds for 'questioning the theory of the 
'permanent arms economyi as Purdy (1973)110 argues, 
sj_nce the long run development of capi talism is unlikely 
to be held back by a realisation problem. Not is it 
clear why military expenditure should be adopted to cope 
with unemployment rather than investment in the welfare 
state, since military activity is largely capital 
intensive and c8.-"tJ.not be adjusted quickly, so it is 
unsuitable for stabilisation purposes. 
The thesis that military expenditure is used as a 
tool of economic policy is ~nlikely to help in 
understanding military expenditure growth in Turkey. 
The high levels of unemployment in post-war Turkey, 
which reached 20 per cent towards the end of the 1970s 
have YlO'~ been the result of proble23 of absorbing the 
economic surplus, but rather the result of repeated 
failure to achieve planned levels of investment, too mU8h 
emphasis on capital intensive projects, the high rate of 
popuJ.atj.on growth ~ and an inabili ty to expand export 
11ur"{c!~,~ began, to operate a seri es of. five year plans 
. 
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beginning in 1963 but this does not mean that the 
Ministry of Finance w~s able to 'fine tune' the economy 
through discretionary fiscal policy, or that military 
expenditure was a tool for stabilisation' purposes. The 
Armed Forces have always been represented on the National 
Security Council even in peace time, and this is the 
commi ttee which reviews and makes recommendatiOJ.ls on 
interngl and external security to the government. The 
military has had a. direct and dominant say .in the 
formul8,tion of defence policy since llj60 and military 
expenditure has been largely determined by Turkey's 
foreign policy and internal security rather than any 
desire to·stabilj.se the lev~l of actiiity. 
To confirm this view it was decided to test the 
under-consumption thesis using reiSressionanalysis 
and annual data for the period 1952-'{6. The argument 
is that market economies are likely tfl experience a. 
deficiency in ~.3gregate demand as they becoEe more 
affluent, that· there is a growing surplus and the problem 
becomes one of absorbing the surplus~ Military 
expendi ture is one v'lay of absorbing the Durplus which 
counte:r:-acts the ter..dency to\;".3xds st8.gnation and crisis) 
so t4e test consists of estimating whether the share of 
military expenditure in G.D.P~ is related to the G.D.P., 
G.D.P. per CapiGCl or unemployment. The following result 
was obtained: 
X/GDP ::: 0.141 + 0.0009 GDP - 0.00006 GDPC 
(2.8) (3.0) 
+ 0.00003 U + 0.025 D 
(0.5) 
2 R - 00883 S = 0.0029 ME = 0.048 D'd = 1.6 
where X = Tur};:ish mili tary expendi ture 
. . 
0.-DP '" = gross domestic product 
GDPC = gross domestic product per capita 
U -- LeveJ.. of unemployment, 000' s 
D = dUImny varia.ble wi th value 1 for 1975 and 1976 
and zero elsev:here. 
2 . 
The R. and the value of S/NrE indj_cate a fairly good 
fit over-all, but the result shows a positive relation 
with G.D.P. and not with G.D.P.C." and a.s the latter is 
the best me~sure of affluence, it casts doubt on the 
under-consUI!lDt~_on thesis. The coefficient on U is also 
posi tive, but not signific~'1t, although if we ignore 
the s:ignificance and concentrate on the sign of the 
coefficient this may be interpreted as providing further 
evidence against the under-consumption tbesis. When 
militury expenditure as a proportion of G.D.P. is high 
t~1(~n~ assuming ceteris paribus, there should be a higher 
level of economic activity and lower levels of 
une;'tpl oyment, which would give a negative coefficient. 
HO"rc'\re'r 
- \1\ \,. .. " '. , in this case there is another possible interpretation, 
whie;h :~s based on the causali ty running, in the opposi te 
dire',; tiOll. Thuf. high levels of uneTJ:yloyment may cause 
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tr;,€ goverYlEent to respond by spending more on defence 
. ' 
which would give a positive coefficient. In ano~her 
regression, not reported, it was also found that the 
coefficient on'''unemployment lagged one year was also 
positive, but again not significant, so it should not 
be taken as good evidence for the under-consumption thesis. 
fi~ regression analysis can not establish causality (only 
correlation) then the correct-interpreta.tion must be 
based on other evid8nce, and that evidence does not 
support the under-consumption thesis. 
Cost Effectiveness 
-- - -
Recent literaturel11 on the budgetary and fiscal 
a.rrangements for planning and controlling defence 
expenditure in the U.S. and Britain indicate that the 
methods of allocating resources to defence have been 
inefficient.. ~rl Turkey mj,li tary expendi tures are 
determined within the National Security Council which 
is domina.ted' by 'the Joint'Chiefs of Staff. This 
administrative form of decision making can give rise 
to inefficiency at two levels. Firstly, there is no 
way that the appropriate level of total military 
exp84diture can'be determined in order to maximise 
a social welfare function, bearing in mind that there 
are overall resource con8traints. Secondly, it is by 
no means certain that the allocation of military inputs 
bet',vE'en the various branches of -che mili tary establishment 
will be optimal. The power structure between the chiefs 
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of staff of each of the arm.ed services m.ay ':lell 
determine the a.llocation of resources between them, 
particularly if they as individuals are 'empire 
builders' and take a parochial view. This procedure 
can easily result in the output of military services 
not being maximised for a given level of inputs, and 
can. lead to an imbalance in military forces. To 
overcome this second problem there needs to be forward 
pla.YJ.ning and co-ordination between the armed forces 
but this is frequently lackinge 
Hartley (1974) points out that because defence 
activity is a public good there are no private markets 
to establj_sh the price or value of the output which 
could then be used to determine society's evaluation 
of the product. As military reQuirements are likely 
to be expressed in absolute terms, the question of 
whether the defe~ce budget is appropriate tends to be 
ignored, so there is no attempt to consjder whether the 
level 6f military expenditure is worth the cost in terms 
of what is forgone, that is whether there is allocative 
efficiency. 
c' 
It is also neces,sary to consider thellcost and 
defence effectiveness of alternative force arrangements 
c_~d alternative weapons systems in relation to some 
npecified objecti.ve. 1t (Hartley, 1974) .112 Efficient 
~~Jloc,~) tion reouires the I:lili t,~ry to analyse margiYlal 
costs too, but this is r~rely done. 113 In order to 
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select the most suitable equipnent for the fulfilment of 
military tasks~ systems analysis~ operations reSearch 
and ~ilitary studies are required so as to objectify 
the definition of goals and objectives, to assess the 
risks involved in each alternative and, finally, to 
identify the most cost effective solution. The kind of 
specialised research facilities and expert knowledge 
that is required for military decision making is not 
c3.vailable in Turkey .. N.A.T.O. has recognised that there 
is a need for a comprehensive framework for defence 
planning over the longer term, but in practice has 
urged member countries to compensate in full for the 
ef.fects of inflation and to in...;~ease expenditure on new 
equipment 0 Until Turkey adopts functional costing and 
cost there is the possibility 
. 
that the military will absorb more resources than is 
consistent with allocative efficiency. 
Growth of the lublic Sector 
,Another issue that has received a lot of attention 
in the literature in recent years has been the growth 
of the 1lv.blic sector, \1hich has been aroused by the very 
increases that have occurred in public 
e:1.:p8ndi ture in a number of countries. In Britain much 
of the interest in the 1970s was focussed on the work 
of Bacon 8.nd ~l tis (1976 )114. who argued that the poor 
poriOrmaYlCe of the U.K.' economy, partic~larly after' 1965, 
\'.';1.;:1 lcn~gel~'- due to the L~rowth oi' the public sector. 
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Turkey has a~so experienced a considerable g~owth in 
public expenditure, both in absolute ter:ns and in 
relation to G.N.P., in the post-war period., The growth 
of public expenditure is summarised in Table 4.9, and 
shows that as a percentage of G.N.P. it increased from 
l?.I~ per cent in 1952 to 24.5 per cent in 1976, while 
at constant prices it rose from 9.9 T.L. billions to 
1952 
1960 
1968 
1976 
T lillLE 4.9 
The Growth of Public Ex£~nditure 
in Turk~J, 1952-76 
* 
T'?:t-?_l ,Budget 
£2!.~endi t~ . 
* in TIJ billion 
9.9 
13.4 
29.2 
54.8 
B~dget Expe~d~~u~ 
~:percentage 
of GNP 
o 
17.4 
18 .. 5 
22.2 
24-.5 
Note: at constant, 1970, prices. 
Source: Turkey: An Economic Survey, 1977. 
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The first major theoretical atte2pt to explain the 
growth of state expenditure is founc;, in the Vlor}: of 
A. Wagner, who, writing in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, argued for a "la\v of, expanding 
state expenditures." Wagner's La.w, as it has become 
known, argued that, for industrialising countries with 
rising per capita incomes, state expenditure would tend 
to expand more quickly tha.Yl other sectors of the economy. 
There are a number of developments in an industrialising 
society which would help to explain the growth in relative 
importrmce of the public sector. The most importa..l1t can 
be summarised as follows: 115 
1. the increasing complexity of legal relationships 
and communications, which aris9s with the greater 
division of labour durin.g industrialisation, as 
,\ 
well as the rise in populatlon density and 
urbantsation, which necessl t;p.ta the expansion 
of tho protective (security) and administrative 
functions of the'state. 
2. an expansion of cul tura1, and welfare expendi ture 
, 3. 
under the pressure of social progress which 
render ~ these aC+l'vl'+l'n~ 'superior ~oods' or , ~ _, ;:; _ .... 'v I.i I.~ '-' _  
~luxuries. ! 
technological progress and the accompanied 
increase in the scale of production which make 
'public corporations preferable to private 
monopolies in the interests of econouic efficiency. 
\fagner was arguing th~t s~curi~y expenditure would 
inevitably rise with the growth of the state, as the 
armed forces grevl in size and their e1uipment became 
more sophisticated. Moreover as democra.tisation 
advanced, in the sense of wider political participation, 
internal conflict between different strata of society 
would necessitate expansion of the security forces. 
state expenditure on cultural and welfare facilities 
would also rise in line with economic development as the 
state took on responsibility for education, health and 
welfare. 
The reasons advanced by Wagner in support of his 
law have been criticised on several grounds. One of the 
most importa..Y.lt criticisms is that his explanation is 
based on an acceptance of the 'organic' theory of the 
state,' so that his explanation d~pends upon the validity 
of that theory ... 4s Peacock and V{iseman put it: 
nIt cannot be accepted, then, th::-_-: Wagner succeeded 
in demonstratirg that a secular increase :in community 
output must inevi tably pr'oduce a more than proportionate 
secular growth in the importa..'Ylce of government services. 
Ul ti~llately, the law o.f increasing governJuent expendi ture 
is <1 corollary of the politiccd philoscphy and 
interpretation of history that ~agner accepted. His 
t PT'C'" ('o.£C. f 
.. " 1. of the existence of such a law, therefO.re, 
dep(;~ds upon the validity of the organic theory of the 
st~:te upon vlhieh he relies. ,,116 Even if we observe 
th;).i.. ':~l1e em])iri c8J. worl~ done on the I,a\~' confirms the 
g81'~,::r~J.l proposition of expanding state activity it does 
• 
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not follow that there will be a uniline~tr Y'elationship 
between j.ndustrialisation and state expenditure irrespective 
of the form of the state. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to explain not only the trend of public expenditure as 
a proportion of national output but also its fluctuations 
over time, a1'ldit is unlj_kely that industrialisation can 
do this. II? 
It was decided to test whether \'fagner' s JJaw can 
help to explain changes in the milita.ry burden. Once 
again using aJlnual data for the period 1952 to 1976' 
regression analysis has been used to fj.nd out if a larger 
share of state expenditure in G.D.P. was explained by 
increasing industrialisation. The following result was 
obtained: 
SE/GDP - 7.582 + 0.00)39 GDPC 
(2.4) (4.1) 
') 
R .... = 0.432 S = 3.376 ME- 20.1 DW = 0.7 
where SE = state expenditure 
GDP = gross domestic product 
GDPC = gross domestic product per capita, 
constant pricese 
.The result confirms the validity of the general 
proposi.tion of the rising relative importence of the 
public sector, with GDPC as the proxy for industrialisation, 
but tLc' DurlJin 'i'latson statistic indicates SOT"e :Josi tive 
ser- l' , . 1 t" ,Y'I iPhp. T?2 ~s qlll_" -te lCN and ~he S,/T!~E - 8,_L corre a- ,lCu. ~ _~ _ -- - - -
value high so theT'e must be other factors that have 
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influenced the growth of state expenditure. 11.8 rlagner 
gave tIle growth of security expenditure as one of the 
reasons for the more rapid growth of the public sector 
we would also expect the defence burden to be positively 
related to G.D.P.C. This was also tested wit~ the 
following result: 
X/GDP - 0.068 _. 0.00001 GLPC + 0.03 D 
(16.3) (5.0) 18 7) ~ • I • 
R2 = 0 .. 78 S = 0.003 HIE - 0.049 DW = 1.2 
where D = dummy variable. 
This" result shows that there is a·negative relati~= 
bet·,/;'een the military burden and G.D.P.C. (industrialisation), 
and that the growth of security expenditure does not 
contribute to the relative growth of stat~ expenditure. 
~J.lhere have been a number of st'udj €~3 carried out to 
test whether defence €xpenditure is part of tt1e relative 
grO\vth of the public sector. Martin and Lewis (1956)118 
carried out a cross-section analysis of 16 countries, 
10 0: which wel~ L.D.C.'s, and eoncluded that higher 
d~;cnce burdens were positively related to affluence 
. 
'-1~thy'JGh much more important for rich than poor countries, 
but the sample was rather small to give unambiguous 
!'eslll ts. .Another cross-section regression ~"'1alysis was 
c8.rc~.ed out by Lotz (1970) who investigated defence 
alone with other aspects of ~ublic expenditure 
fc-'-' ~)7 IJ.D.C,,'s using data for the 19603. Lotz found 
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that military spending was not closely related to the 
level of economic development. 
result:119 
He obtained the followin~ 
C> 
Diy = 0.262 - 0.006 Y/l' + 0.02 MX 
(1.8) 
+ 0~048 U + Oe08l Ely 
(2,,6) (2.2) 
·where D - defence -expen.di ture 
Y =G.N.P. 
P - Population 
MX == mineral and oil exports (proxy "for natural 
r-esource endowment) 
U = proportion of population urbanised 
) 
B - Budget expenditure 
The relation between Diy and B/y is positive which 
supports Wagner's Law. There is also a positive coefficicn.t 
on U, which can be taken as a proxy for economic 
development, giving furthe:c support for Wagner's Law. 
The coefficient on MX is positive as would be expected 
since mineral and oiJ. exports provide economic resources 
whicn. permit defence spending and may also be the reason 
for it, in order to protect valuable resources from 
external attack or internal secession. The coefficient 
on yip is, however. negative, \'lhile this should have 
been positive accordipg to Wagner's Law. 
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S~he use of cross-section studies to test ~',ragner' s 
. 
Law suffers, however, fro~ a lack of historical dimension. 
Implicit in cross-section studies is the assumption that 
the poor countries, as they develop, will imitate the 
richer countries with respect to their pattern of public 
expenditure, irrespective of different econo~ic, social, 
political and strategic motivations. Wagner was concerned 
with the tendencies towards the relative growth of the 
public sector wJthi:n a country, which can only be 
adequately tested with time series data. Therefore it 
was decided to test a similar relationship using time 
series data for Turkey over the period 1952-76. The 
follo~l~g result was obtained: 
X/GDP = 0.078 - 0.00001 GDPC - 0.0013 IND 
(1.2) (2.1 ) 
+ 0.0006 SE/GDP + 0.028 D 
(2.5) (7.2) 
R2 = 0.844 S = 0.003 -ME = 0.049 DW = 1.7 
where IND - share of industry in G.N.P. 
On the one hand the positive relation between X/GDP 
and SE/GDP is precisely what one would expect from 
."-
1~' • L li1agner's aw, but once again the coeff~cient on G.D.P.C. 
is negative, as too is the coefficient on industrialisation. 
As both of the latter two variables are proxies for 
C20nor:nc developnent then one essential ele2ent in 
Law would SBem to be in doubt. Lotz also found 
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a negative coefficient on G:.1). P. c. (Yip) yvhich he tried 
to explain in terms of c~rtain indivisibilities i~ 
military supply. Small or poor countries with low 
national incomes would have to spend a higher proportion 
of their income on securi ty, and as their' per capita 
incomes grew the defence burden would decline. This 
hypothesis does not hold for Turkey where the size of 
the military has always been very large and certainly 
above a basic technical minimum. It is more likely that 
the military and political leaders in Turkey, with U.S. 
assistance no doubt, llave determined the size of the 
military with respect to an absolute level of force 
capabi~ -i.ty, which has meant a declining defence burden 
(apart from after 1974) with a rising per capita income. 
) 
Although most of the empirical studies made on 
. . 
Wagner's Law seem to support it, they have not established 
what variables determine the growth of state expenditure 
nor have they be8n able to identify the processes through 
which it occurs. It is likely that there is no single 
factor which explains the relative growth of the public 
sector, or its components, and. the fa.cto:::s in any case 
o 
are likely to be different for different countries o~ 
for ~he Sallie country at different stages of developnent. 
Peacock and Wiseman's analysis of the growth of public 
expenditure in the U.K., which emphasises a displacement 
effect, due to, for eXaIJ.ple, external threat that shifts 
, 
public revenues and expenditures to higher levels, ca.'l 
only be part of the explanation, and it is unlikely that 
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it has any relevance for Turkey in the post-war 
Summary 
This chapter has considered several uossible 
.J,; 
explanations of the growth of military expenditure in 
T'.lrkey in the post-war period. There is no evidence to 
support the tbesis that military expenditure has been 
used as a tool of economic policy to control the level 
of unemployment or to stabilise the main macroeconomic 
varia'bles ~ 7rllat has emerged is that the military in, 
Turkey must be understood iJl terms of its position within 
the state bureaucracy where it performs a strategic role, 
in maintaining the existing power structu.re. The 
military is part of the political 'superstructure' in 
Turkey and as such it is not neutral, but is intent on 
supporting t~,e hegemony of Western values. There are 
four elements to the ma...l1oeuvres of the mili tary. 
The milita~y are regarded as the guarantors of 
• 
national security, defending the n8.tion againsi the 
threat ,of rivals. There is some evidence that an arms 
race has occurred between Turkey and her main opponents -
-th€ U Q ,.., 'Q th 
- ~ 1....1 • :'::l co ..... , ...... e ,'jar.saw Pact coantries 811d Greece. 
Closely related to the previous expla-'I'].ation is the role 
·given to Turkey by the U.S~ and other N.A.T.O. members in 
defending Western interests against the threat of 
communism, which at the same time helps to k'2ej) !Euch of 
the world open to fre~ (ca,italist) trade. ~ithin Turkey 
the 'military have had the prime fu~ction,of pr.eserving 
. 
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the econo~ic and social status quo, which has meant 
conservation and opposition to radical solutionc as 
expressed by the labour movement. The military has also 
fulfilled an ideological role in exposing all conscripts 
to 'l/estern values and by creating a sense of pride in 
the nation state. Finally, there is evidence that during 
the 1960s and 1970s the military establishment became 
.. 
fully integrated into the Turkish e00nomy with investments 
spread throughout the manufacturing sector, which gave 
the generals further reasons for maintaining the 
existing economic and social system. 
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ARMS PROnUCTICN 
Introduction 
As an old imperial povTer Turkey has long possessed 
arms production facilities but by the twentieth century 
she had ceased to be a major producer. At the end of 
the Second World War Turkey was able to produce light 
arms aXld ammuni tion but Ii ttle else in the way of wee.pons. 
There were plans to build up an arms industry in the 
late 1940s, and it was intended that an aircraft industry 
be create~, but the flow of U.S. military aid made it 
all unnecessary_ Turkish plans to build up domestic 
arms produoti.on re-emereed in the J.9603; 
result of the cutback in the U.S. 'military assistance 
programme and the increasing burden of arms imports on 
the balanc e of pa;!llIlen-t;s , but it was not until the "lJ. S. 
arms embaxgo was imposed in 1975 that priority 'lias given 
to establishing a domestic arms industry. 
In 1976 Tu~~ey was one of 46 developing cOlliltries 
produci ng arr.:lS s of Turkev's ~efence ~yoJ~ctio~ ~ ~ 
Aircraft Form of Production 
1. Fighters, jet t.rainers, engines Lp 
2. Light aircr~ft 
. 3. lielicoptel'z None 
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Ships Form of Pro6uct~on 
1. Large warships 
2. Medium warships (up to 
3. Small warships, patrol 
(below 100 tons) 
4. Submarines 
1lissiles 
1. Missiles and rockets 
Armoured Vehicles 
300 tons) 
boats 
L 
L 
I 
L 
L 
1. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers Lp 
Small Arms 
1. Small arms and ammunition L 
Electronics and avionics' None 
Key: L - licensed production and technical assista..l1ce 
I = indigenously designed ana produced 
p - planned 
The production of warships under license began during 
the 1960s and by 1968 Turkey was committed to developing 
new and modified domestically designed fighting ships 
(destroyers, frigates and escorts) with a displacement 
over 1000 tons. 2 The first major warships designed and 
built in Turkey were started in 1968 at the Go1cuk Naval 
Dockyard ,and pere launched in June 1971. As .,'!d. th the 
Turkish motor industry the engines for t'hese warships 
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had to be imported. 3 By 1973 Turkey was also planning 
to produce indigenously designed missile boats, again 
powered by imported diesel e~gines, and in 1976 production 
began on Nasty Class torpedo boats at the Taskizak Yard. 
During 1974 Turkey began to assemble TIP-209 submarines 
powered by diesel and under license from Western Germany. 
In the same year two other agreements were signed with 
-Western Germany, one to produce Jaguar III missile 
boats and the other to build missile armed patrol boats. 
The prototype of this latter ship was not delivered until 
1977, but then a£ter trials, production of the remainder 
continued in Turkey. Missile production had began as 
early as 1966 since when the Coora 2000 rocket had been 
'assembled in Turkey, with parts imported from Western 
Germany, and had even been exported on a small scale to 
the Far East~ A 1975 report by the Turkish General 
Staff4 claimed that Turkey was 90 per cent self sufficient 
in the production of light arms, with howitzers, rocket 
launchers, machine guns, ammunition and mortars a.lso 
being made. The same report elso stated that Turkey was 
30 per cent self sufficient in heavier weapons and 15 per 
cent in sophisticated equipment • 
• 
A New Turkish Defence Policy 
The mid 19708 were a crisis period for Turkey. 
There were a series of wea1c ooa1i tion governments v.rhich 
. 
weI'e. unable to ?revent a polarisation of domestic politics 
with the growing strength of the labour movement on the 
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left and the emergence of the, conservative, Islamic 
nationalist National Salvation Party on the right. 
Inflation, unemployment and a shortage of foreign 
exchange began to impose constI'aints on econonic growth. 
The invasion of Cyprus in 1974 broucht Greece and Turkey 
,to the brink of war over Aegean rights, and then the 
U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on lillkara under 
pressure from the Greek lobby. It was the embargo more 
than anything else that insulted the Turks and led the' 
country to re-examine its defence policy &~d re-orientate 
its foreign policy_ On the latter Ecevit, the leader of 
the R.P.P. has stated: 5 
"We should make our natio';:J.d.l securi ty primarily 
,dependent on good relations and on establishing an 
p..tmosphere of mutual con::ic.ence v:i th all 
. 
with all the countries of the region." 
0 ·,.,... U..L neighbours: 
There weT'C moves to strengthen ties with Iran which 
led to a grant of $1.2 million in credi~ to expand the 
. 6 
Turkish transportation system. Turkey also made moves 
to participate more actively in the Organisation for 
Regional Co-operation and Development. At the politica~ 
level Turkey beg~l to give support for the Arab position 
in t:qe Middle East and establisbed links with the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The new orientation 
in foreign policy, which has been called the Turkish 
'Ostpolitik',7 was also designed to strengthen links 
. 
wi th the 'Soviet Union a..l1d its Balkan all,ies, although 
thi~ was not regarded as being incorrpatible with 
• 
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continued mem"bership of N. A.. T .0. There follovred a 
. 
series of poli tical exchanges b8tvfEen I.:oscov.' and l~kara 
which strengthened relations betvreen the two r;ountries 
and culminated in the Friendship Agreement of June 1978. 
The improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations wss 
accompanied by increased trade and aid flows, joint 
investment projects and in June 1979 an agreement was 
reached on the construction of a Soviet nuclear power 
plant in Turkey. At the same time as Turkish-Soviet 
relations improved so did relations with Bulgaria and 
Rumania, which also led to 8,greements on poli tical and 
. t. 8 econom~c co~opera ~on~ 
The domestic ,counterpart "to the foreign policy 
re-orientation was the new defence policy. On this 
Ecevit said: 
"Another factor that we have to keep in mind in 
e\"dving a new s2·curity concept, and based on that, a 
new defence policy is that our defence ~ystem and defence 
structure should not be a'burden, but rather be a spur 
to our economy. We should therefore try to develop 
such industries for our defence as would be compatible 
\ 
wi th the means of our economy 8.Ild which vlould j"ncreas~ 
its w-oductivity." 
From the moment the arms embargo was introduced 
Turkey set in motion arrangements to produce a plan which 
would make the domestic armaments industry self sufficient 
and be able to compete in export markets'. 9 By August 
1975 an armaments plan had been prepared "by the T.:inistry 
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of Deft:nce and the state Planning Org;:.Ylisation, ·,'Thictl. 
would lead to an expansion of arr::s production t}~ro;)gh 
partnership with forelgn companies. The strategy for 
defence production contained a list of projec~s ~bich ~ould 
be give:i1 priority and would be produced dOIJest~cal1y in 
the near future: (a) m.anuf2.cture tanks, (b) 1'e1'i t 
existing tanks with mod.ern equipment, (c) produce 
armoured personnel carriers and other vehicles for the 
armed forces, (d) produce electronics equipnent, 
(e) manufactur~ optical implements and eqUipment, 
(f) produce aircraft and helicopters, (g) manufa.cture 
rifles J machine guns, anti-aircraft and ant~-tank 
weapons, (h) arn.i'llunition, (i) :L''J0kets and guided missiles, 
(j) warships, submarines and support ships.IO There 
followed a great deal of activity and negotiations 
between Turkey and other countries and international 
corporations on the 'luestion of foreign investment and 
licenses to pl'u~luce arr."lS but not a great deal came from 
it. Three years after the roL~o~~cement of the Turkish 
defence plan a Ur.S. delegation to Turkey was given an 
almost identical li2t of military projects that were to 
be produced in the 'near future', indicating that little 
11 progress had been mad~. The achieve~ents 0= the ne# 
defelIce concept were listed in the Turkish jour!1a1 
Gunaydin in September 1977, where it was pointed out 
that Turkey was then producing artillery guns, light 
infantry 8.r~11.S, 8o'bra anti-tank r;issiles, :.:-3 and G-5 
.. 
heavy machine guns, 75:::L>l and l05mm mortars, TIP-209 
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b . 1~ SU mar~nes and FEB-57-type missile boats.~~ Yet all of 
these weapons had been planned or were in production 
before the U.S. arms e~bargo, so that the most tha~ can 
be claimed for the new defence stratelY was that the 
level of production on existing weapons had increased. 
Nevertheless, beginning in 1975 there was 3 biD" o 
Turkish effort to develop the armaments industry with 
foreign assist&~ce. In June 1975 an agreement was 
signed with Iran to establish a joint defence industry,13 
and in November of the same year discussions took place 
between Pakistan and Turkey on the opportunities for 
joint military production. Neither of these approaches 
led to ~~y significant developments in the field of 
arms production, and the fall of the Shah in 1979 brought 
an end to the Iranian agreement a l[ore successful was 
. the Turkish-libyan agreement of February 1978, which, 
according to press reports, included the establishment 
of a jointly fin~~ced ~~unition factory in Turkey. 
There was also agreement reached on Turkey supplying 
Libya with submarines, heavy machine guns, artillery 
pieces and shells,l4 and training Libyan cadets, N.e.C.s 
d · 15 an alrmen. 
From a N.A.T.O. viewpoint the most threatening 
move by Turkey was to enter into discussion with the 
U.S.S.R. on the possibility of military co-operation. 
D . . t '. +' U ~ S R uring 1976 alone the~e were t~o V1Sl s to ~ne .. v •• 1. 
by Turkish mili tary leaders which fully indj.cated the 
willingness of l{OSCO .... T to s\.lI='Ply arms and mili tary 
. 
- 158 -
technology to Turkey. After t"NO years of d5scussion 
1978 and it was widely reported in the Turkish press 
that the U.S.S.R. was willing to help Tur~ey produce 
arms, including spare parts for U. s. manufactured 2.2.r-
craft and ·tank's .16 I J 1978'" ,. =-,-l..!: n· une ~unayGln, the Istal1bul 
journal, gave details, which were unconfirmed, that 
Soviet arms would be made available to TUTkey through 
a secret Turkish-Libyan a.greement. 17 There is no 
evidence to show that Soviet-Turkish military discussions 
have resulted in joint arms production, but it was 
largely the threat of this possibility that led the 
U.S. to end the arms embargo in August 1978. 
There were also Turkish moves to encourage her 
N.A.T.O. partners to help develop arms production in 
. Turkey after the imposition of the arms e~bargo, yet 
progress was very slow. In 1975 th~rp ~ere discussions 
between A..YJ.kara. :md the British Aircraft Corporation 
and Hawker Siddely, about the possibility of assembling 
the Jaguar and the Hawker Harrier in Turkey but nothing 
came Jf it. The ;~erican companies ~orthrop al1d Lockheed 
were involved in si~ilar propos~ls whic~ also failed to 
t . l' 18 ma er.la lse. Two ye.ars later 'J:. U. S. A. S., the Tur~'.:ish 
aircraft industry, a~ounced that a contract with A.S.R. 
Macchi would be signed in October, but the Turkish 
armed forces boycotted the ceremony. This pronpted. 
the ?inancial Tj.ITles to drav,' the conclusJon that in the 
context of Turkey's economic diffic~lties it was not 
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feasible to contemplate setting up a 'heavy industry' 
like aircraft productior~.19 
During 1978 talks took place between Turkey and 
Western Germany on what Turkish 8~ns ~ight be imported 
by the Germans, and what scope there was for joint 
production. 20 It was 8.1so announced that Tur}::ey _1.ad a 
contract with the West German firm Air-Metall for the 
construction of the MlC-lll light transport to be 
redesignated KC-lll, and built at Kayserai. 22 Under 
the Turkish expanded defence production programme it 
was planned to set up anrerospace industry which it was 
hoped would be capable of replacing the F-4s? F-5s an.d 
F-l04s. It was for thj_s reason that fresh talks were 
opened up with the U.S. firm Northrop in November 1978, 
to secure permission and assist~ce for the production 
of F-5E fighters in Turkey. These discussions on the 
possibility of joint production made little progress 
because of the sensi ti ve nature of the .... ssue wi thin the 
u.s. Congress where it was felt that the U.S. would lose 
some of its leverage over Turkey.23 
In October 1978 it was announced that a military 
electronics plant had. been cOI!lpleted in .4nkara vlhich was 
financed by the Ground Forces Reinforcement Fund. The 
new plant was expected to provide jobs for five hundred 
workers who would produce three thousand military radios 
annually~at a foreign exchange saving of 200 sillion 
lira. 24 
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S I P -') I 25 . ••• h.. glves details of an agreement rea~hed 
in 1979 between the U. S. A. and 'rurl:ey to produce 100 
tTodel 500 :um (Hughes Defender) helicopters, under liceYise 
at a factory to be built in Anatolia, probably near an 
existing aircraft maintenance plant at Kayzeni, by the 
Turkish company Profilo. The agreement specified that 
the new plant would start licensed production within one 
year of the contract, and there was a planned indigenisation 
of 30 per cent in 1980 to increase to 80 per cent by 1983. 
The remainder of the components would be obtained from 
Hughes or Breda Nardi in Italy which was already 
manufacturing the type under license. The planned 
produc ';;on rate was 25-30 helicopters per year initially, 
which was expected to rise to 45-50 by 1982 or 1983. 
It was not until March 1980 that a general defence 
production agreement between Turkey and the U.S.A. WR,S 
signed. The second annex within the agreement dealt 
with the issue of joint defence product:i on an.d promised 
u.s. technology to help Turkey produce and export 
, ')6 
military equipment and materials.~ This agreement did 
not lea.d to immediate action and by the time the military 
o 
took power in T~rkey in Septe~ber 1980 no further progress 
had peen made. 
In summary it must be concluded that the planned 
establishment of a Turkish arms industry, in the context 
of the Nations1 Security Concept that emerged after 1975, 
Was on the whole a failure. Although Turkey was able to 
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increase the rate of output of arms already in production 
in 1975, little progress was made in producing those 
weapons given priority in the 197) armament plan. The 
new defence policy of 1975 was partly a nationalistic 
response to the U.S. arms embargo and most of the 
military agreements that Turkey forged outside E.A.T.O. 
had little impact. It was only in the Turkish-Soviet 
exchanges that there was any real possibility of 
establishing joint arms production in Turkey, and the 
fact that Turkey remain9d on the brink in this context 
may indicate that Ankara was using the U.S.S.R. to exert 
pressure on the U.S.A. to lift the arms e~bargo. From 
an eC0~.()mic point of view the establishment of new 
weapons industries would have had quite serious effects, 
which may not have been recognised by successive Turkish 
governments. During the period 1.975-80 the' Turkish 
economy was sliding rapidly into its worst crisis since 
the Second World Vlar, and the setting up of a large arms 
industry would have placed an intolerable burden on 
very scarce d'omestic resources and seriously retarded 
the development process even further. The reason3 for 
this are worth considering. since the creation of new 
defence industries remains a long run objective of Turkey, 
yet ihe economic implications are rarely examined. 
Creating Def~pce Industries 
It has been shown that Turkey already produces a 
. 
range of arms and military hardware - guns, rifles, 
• 
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artillery, missiles, ammunition, 
. 
subl:larines, 
patrol boats end landine craft - to c=-=tend 
thp. range of production even further. The motivation 
for this is quite clear. Turkey has been in dispute 
with sever2l countries since 1945 - the U.S.S.~., Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Greece, Cyprus - and has required military 
equipment as well as a large army to achieve a satisfactory 
solution to national security. The military have also 
been vital in preserving a pro-Western direction in 
internal politics, through direct intervention on three 
occasions since 1950. Up until 1974 most of Turkey's 
arms were supplied by the U.S.A., but the almost total 
depend~~ce of Turkey on the U.S. for military equipment 
. was shown to leave her in an extremely vulnerable 
position after the 
. 
moves to break this total dependence already stirring 
befo~e the actual arms embargo, but it was the embargo 
itself which finally convinced the Turks that they must 
become militarily independent. There was another factor 
operating too, related to the development strategy 
adopted after 1963, which emphasised the importance 
of industrialisation through import substituti6n. 
Achieving self suffic-iency in arIr.s production could be 
.. 
seen as an extension of the import substitution policy. 
The ultim~te objective of the new Turkish defence 
policy was to achieve self sufficiency in production 
. 
in order to assert national independence. There are 
several countries that have expres.sed similar goals 
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(India, Israel, Iran, Argentina) and they all have 
. 
required massive investment in creating plant tc prod~ce 
arms, but even with unlimited resources pushed into 
defence production it is impossible to achieve self 
sufficiency in arms in the short-run. In the case of 
. Turkey resources have been very scarce and that is why 
the armaments plan of 1975 laid great stress on joint 
production projects with developed countries, although 
it was always unlikely that any of the N.A.T.O. countries 
would be willing to totally underwrite such development. 
It is more likely that it will take Turkey many years 
to reach the final or highest stage of arms and weapons 
production, and she may never io so. To understand 
the difficulties of achieving arms and weapons self 
sufficiency it will be useful to summarise the norm!:ll 
pattern of development of arms iridustries -in the L.D.e.s. 
The 'build-up of domestic arms production capacities can 
be considered ln ~erms of seven stages: 
1. arms are imported but are serviced and maintained 
domestically. 
2. a license to produce arms is acquired and 
production facilities are built requiring huge 
technical and personnel assistance from the 
supplier. 
3. production starts and to begin with involves 
local assembly of imported sub-assemblies. 
4. ,the sub-assemblies are assenbled locally from 
imported components, and sometimes re-exported 
~o the licensor. 
• 
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5. componen-cs are manufac tured locally from inpJ:'t'2d 
raw materials. 
6. local production of raw materials. 
7. complete indigenous production including design, 
raw materials and manufacture. 
Even those L.D.C.s which have been pursuing ;T.ilit2.ry 
self sufficien~y for many years have not reached stage 7. 
India, for example, began to give priority to its arms 
industry after the 1962 War with China, but nearly twenty 
years later most of its weapons are overseas models made 
under license. In the sphere of military aircraft it 
is true that India now designs i t·s own fighter and ground 
support aircraft, but still as much as one third of the 
components are imported. 27 The implication is clear, it 
will take many years for Turkey to reach t~e final stage, 
and although this might be desirable in so far as it 
enhances nationql security and national pride it must be 
considered what are the likely economic consequences of 
such a course of action. 
The Economic Consequences of Developing the ArillS Indu3tr;y: 
Arms production .can be regarded as a branch of 
manufacturing industry, and a country that decides to-
produce military equipment which was previously imported 
can be said to be engaged in import substituting 
industrialisation. There are ma:..I'J.Y LDCs that have pursued 
a policy of impurt- sul;>stit"uting industrialisati~n, 
including~ Turkey, and severf'~l othe!"'s that have butl t u] 
arms production, conseqnently the 
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problems that this policy creates have been fairly 
. 
extensively studied. Inward looking policies fer 
development emphasise the learning effects of domestic 
manufacturing rather than importing, "a kind of learning 
by doing without."28 There is a stress on the need for 
the right kind of technology that will utilise available 
domestic resources. By rejecting 'outward looking' 
strategies for development, import substituting 
industrialisation stresses an independent for~ of 
development. 
Kennedy (1975)29 has emphasised the positive impact 
of military procurement on the dom~stic economy. "Large 
numbers of men need to be fed and clothed, sheltered, 
trained and supervised. The administrative systems 
re~uired just to control their location and their 
movement wil:i require all kinds of inputs from the economy." 
Moreover, arm8 production is less likely to be terminated 
than other industrial projects because ;_t has a "ready 
and assured monop-sonistic' market", is "automatically 
protected from competition" and "is not s1.A.bject to normal 
.competiti ve commercial cri teria.." "~hus long production 
runs a.re assured. n 3.nd. 'Nllere arr.1S are tt produc ed under 
lice~se the country c~~ also coobine the benefits of 
modern design and performance standards and the advantages 
of establiohing domestic manufacturing activities." 
Although an arms industry diverts labour, it also creates 
1 
a need for a large scale training prog~amme and other 
forP'ls of infrastructure. "This is probably the rr.ost 
• 
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impoY'-cant dimension in domestic arm:.:. production .•• 
Becr~.use the govern:nent gives priority to ar~~s produc-:ion 
it also has to face up to the shortages in huma~ 
resources. To meet its military anbitions it has to 
tackle some of the social barriers to development." 
From an economic point of view the establishment 
of an arms industry will have the effect of absorbin2" 
'-' 
scarce resources of capital, specialist labour, industrial 
raw materials and foreign exchange, which will not, 
therefore, be available for other pro j ects \vhich may be 
deemed socially useful. Each of the five ;y-ear development 
pla~s in Turkey set ambitious targets for domestic 
savings, thus for example it was envisaged that savings 
would grow by 12.7 per cent per annum during the Third 
Plan, much higher than the planned rate of growth for 
income. In spite of the targets, domestic savings have 
not been adequate to meet the financing requirements of 
existing investJT1ent, 30 let alone investr'.ent in arms 
production. There has been a great deal of open and 
disguised unemployment in Turkey during the 1970s yet 
there has been a shortage of labour VIi tl: managerial, 
:> 
teclmical and profession8~ skills of the kind that '''10'uld 
be r~quired for the production of military weapons. It 
is certain that Turkey would have to train an adequate 
number of Turks to operate and maintain the specialised 
equipment that would be required for arms production. 
In the setting up of the arms industry and in the early 
t f d + . ~. n personnel 'w'i,ould be ~ ~ges 0 arms pro UCvlon ~a~y ~o~elg 
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required (until i::Jcli 2s enous skilled labour rlas avail8.tls) 
, 
which Vlould generate foreign exchan~e costs of t}~e 
p0licy. In addition to the employment of foreign skilled 
manpower the plant and equipment reg.uired to prod-u.ce ~rI:::, 
would need to be imported which would also put pressure 
on scarce foreign resources. During the econo~ic crisis 
that hit Turkey after 197·t nearly the whole of her export 
earnings were required to finance the oil bill and to 
service the external debt, so that foreign exchange was 
very scarce and would have been even more so if the a~ms 
industry had been established as pl~~ed. 
In the ca.se of Turkey the establis:bJIlent of &11 2.rms 
industry would have diverted scarce resources away from 
other development demands, but that in itself is not 
sufficient reason to argue agains.t it. Whether an arms 
industry c~~ be justified on economic grounds depen~s 
upon the wider contribution it makes T.~ the industrial-
isation and development programme. From the consumption 
side, arms production must be seen as wasteful since 
weapons provide no positive utility apart, perhaps, from 
the ~ubious on~ of national security,31 a11d Bust, the~~fore, 
be seen as inferior to the production cf houses, ed~~2~io~ 
or o~her welfare services. On the supply side the 
decision to produce arms, including the ~ost sophisticated 
weaponry, will have implications for other sectors of 
the TurKish economy, and will influence the pattern of 
industrialisation. It is 5_ffiportant to consider the lL·::ely 
eff~cts of industrialisatio:r~ throuGh arms production fo:::, 
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the rC:J.te and direction of development. 
. -
The turns Industry as 8. Leading Sector 
Domestic arms production in Turkey was seen as a 
way of enhancing national security and reducing the 
country's susceptibility to any future arms embQrgo. 
There were economic reasons too why indigenous weapons 
production was thought to be desirable. During the 
19608 and particularly after the U.S. arms embargo arm8 
purchases began to make a bigger drain on the country's 
foreign exchange. The production of arms in addition to 
reducing the foreign exchange outflow would also set 
up certain linkages with the domestic economy and speed 
up the import substituting industrialisation • 
. 
It has been pointed out that complete self sufficiency 
in arns production means that L.D.C.s have to go through 
up to seven stages and this could only be achieved over 
a long period, most likely decades, under peace tiillc 
conditions. Even the production of small arms and 
ammunition requires inputs cf special metals and machine 
shop skills32 but when"the list is extended toO ships 
and aircraft then the level of skills required are 
, 
considerably more advanced, the power sources become 
vital and 'metal fabrication' and 'instrumenta~ion' much 
more critical. If the production of arms is to generate 
back~ard Ijnka~es in the domestic econony then the 
----' 
manufactuTin~ base IIlUSt be capable of supplying the 
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necessary inputs, otherwise the components and ra','l 
materials wlll be imported end the arffiS inc:.ustry ','fill 
merely assemble the products. 
Not all branches of manufacturing industry a!'e 
relevant to the production of arms, but lacking detailed 
input-output data on the Turkish econo~y it is necessary 
to use an indirect method to approximate the relationship 
between arms production ar~d manufacturing. There are 
figures available on the pattern of industrial employment 
on defenc,e production j,n the' U .K. which point to the 
following industries as being the most importaJlt: 33 
1. Explosives. and firewu ..... '!:r.s 
2. Iron and steel 
3. Steel tubes 
4. Light metals 
- 5. Metal working machine tools 
" 6. Engineers small tools and gauges 
7. Industrial engines 
8. Other machinery 
9. Ordnance a~d small arms 
10. Other mechanical engineering 
11. Scientific, .surgical and photographic instruments 
12. Electrical machinery 
13. Insulated wires and cables 
14. Telegraph and telephone apparatus 
15. . ~adio and other electronic apparatus. 
16. Other electrical goods 
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17. Ship-building a.1J.d ship-Y'f: r~airing 
. 
18. I,'letal indus -:;1'i e s 
19. Rubber 
'<'Ii thin t1:e 12'lternational Standard Industrial 
Classification (I.SGI.C.) there are seven th~ee-di7it 
G 
or major group categori8s of Danufactul'ing that er.CO:2)Ci.SS 
the above list as follov,'s: 
1. Iron rold steel (29 sub-cat€E;Ories) 
2. Non-ferrous metals (33 " " ) 
3. Metal products (15 !I 
" 
) 
4. Machinery (64 " 'I ) 
5. Electrical machinery- (32 
" " 
) 
6. Ship buildi:1.g and repairi!1g (4 " " ) 
7. Motor vehicles (10 It " ) 
Kennedy (1975 )34 refers to this group of induGtr::Les 
as the potential defence capacity (P.D.C.) of the country, 
and measures the share of P.D.C. in total manufacturing 
capacity. This is done for Turkey in terms of the 
absorption of the P.D.C. of employment, gross output 
and value 2.G.ded, and can be seen in Table 5.1. The da-t8. 
refer to 1977 which was during the period of the U.S. 
arms embargo when Tur.ke;y was plal111ing to build-up domes~ic 
t 
arms production. \Ybether one takes employment, gross-
output or value. added the proportion of manufacturing 
capacity in the P.D.C. group is considerable, and 
certain2.y hit;her than it was for countries like India, 
Israel and Brazil when they were building up their arms 
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T ABL:S 5.1 
The St~re of the P.D.C. in 
Total lIIanuf'act 1)Tir..g in terms of 
Employment, Gross Output, and Value tdded, 1977 
I.S.I.C. 
Iron. and steel 
Non-ferrous me t::j~s 
:Metal products 
Machinery 
Electrical machinery 
Ship building a..'1d repairing 
Motor vehicles 
Total P.DeC. 
Total Manufacturt:n~ 
Total P5D.C. as a percentage 
of Total Manufacturing. 
55.6 
19.8 
30.7 
40.5 
28.1 
7.4 
32.6 
214.7 
755.2 
-)(-
TIJ billion 
37.29 
9.74 
12.67 
17.17 
16.02 
1.69 
24.06 
118.64 
413.63 
28.7 
'*= Note: in prod~cers values. 
TL billion 
16.42 
3.71 
4.96· 
6.59 
6.26 
1.09 
8.38 
47 /1 . :-'-
153.79 
30.8 
Source: Yearbook of lndustrial Statistics, 
Vol. 1, 1978 Edition, U.N., New 
York, 1980. 
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industries in the 19608. It would seem therefore that 
Turkey with a large share of P.~.C. in total manufacturing 
would have no difficulty in diversifying into arms 
production (K'ennedy, 1975). 
,This conclusion is somewhat misleading since the 
three-digit classification gives wide industrial groupings 
which disguises the real potential for defence production. 
If the P.D.C. group of industries are classified at the 
six-digit level then the seven major groups beco~e 187 
, 
sub-groups ~,35 In the three-digit manufacturing group 
'Machinery (I.S.I.e: 382) alone, there are 64 six-digit 
sub-categories, ,and 33 out of these 64 sub-categories are 
not produced in Turkey at all, including steam turbines 
(I.S.I.C: 382101), internal combustion engines (382108), 
gas turbines (382113), hydraulic .turbines( 382116) , 
forging, stamping &'>J.d die casting machines (382307), 
grinding and --:harpening machines (382310),' met21-for~ing 
machine tools C582331), rolling mills f Jr rolling meta.ls 
(382337), electro-mechanical hand tools (382343). All 
of these six-digit sub-categories might be required for 
defence production yet are not produced domestically in 
Turkey, and even those sub-categories that are produ(~ed. 
. 
in T~rkey are heavily dependent on ~nported parts and 
components. To take ffilother example, the three-digit 
group Motor Vehicles (l.S.I.e: 384) contains 10 sub-
categories of which only 4 are found in Turke~ - passenger 
~ars (r.S.I.e: 384307), buses and motor coaches (384312), 
trucks (384315), and trailers and seI.1i-trailers (384322), 
• 
yet all of these products are assembled mainly from 
-IT:f~ 
imported parts. Significantly of the other 6 sub-
categories not produced in Turkey 2 of them are diesel 
and internal combustion engines for motor vehicles, 
which would also be important for arms production. 
This indicates that the P.D.C. group of industries 
is nowhere near self sufl'icient, but is heavily dependent 
on imports for its survival. in 1977 47 per cent of 
all Turkish imports (%2722 million out of %5694 million) 
were inputs and components' for the P.D.C. group of 
industries, while it only accounted for 3.3 'per cent 
36 
of all exports. Furthermore, in 1977 over 95 per cent 
ot all imports were for construction materials, machinery 
and equipment and raw materials. In the short-run it 
is unlikely that the Turkish economy would benefit to 
any great extent from indigenous ,defence production. 
Many inputs would not be available domestically, either 
because they were too technically so~~~sti~ated or in 
" 
short supply, ~o that imports would need to rise, with 
adverse effects on the foreign exchange position. 
Rather than creating new jobs and. developing the skill 
level of domes~ic labour many foreign personnel might 
need to be brought in, a"YlJ. even if 10c&1 labour Vlere 
give~ training, it would be at great cost and the skills 
ac,quired might not be relevant to civilian use. 
One of the arg~ments for import substituting 
industrialisation is that the nGW industries created 
(i.e. arms) may set u~ a stimulus for the production 
174 
of inputs by other industries, whic~ in some cases 
. 
may make the supplying industries viable and able to 
produce at above the minimum economic size. 37 The 
strength of the stimulus to the supplying industry(ies) 
will partly depend upon the level of input demand in 
relation to the minimum economic size. If the inputs 
are a very small part of the supplying industry's 
eventual output then the setting up of an arms industry 
may not of itself lead to the establishment of the 
backwardly linked industry, although, without detalled 
information on input requirements and minimum economic 
size, it is difficult to make firm conclusions. The 
evidence available £or the U.K. would indicate that th~ 
" production of arms accounts for less than 10 per cent 
of employment "in 8~1 but 2 of the;i..supplying industries 
within manufacturing, as is shown" in Table" 5.2. 
Direct parallels between Great Br!tain and Turkey 
are not possible since for one thing the m~~ufacturing 
sector is both absolutely" and relatively much larger in 
the former country than in the l~tter, so that for most 
indu,jtries lis'v9d in Table 5.2 the defence induotry is 
f ' , ~ df ...... o marginal importa..Ylce. In TurKey t.r.e Ge~aJl or lnpu lJS 
by a.new defence industry may be crucial in establishing 
the viability of some supplying industries, but it would 
be wrong to assume that the bac~Nard linkages would 
always oe strong enough, for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the absoiute level of production in defence industries 
would almost~certainly be much lower in Turkey than for 
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T JillLE 5.2 
Employment on TIefenc9 Contracts 
as a percenta~e of Total Employment 
for Great Britain, 1961 
II~DUSTRY 
Iron and Steel 
Steel Tubes 
Light Metals 
Machine Tools 
Small Tools and Gauges 
Industrial Engines 
Other MacJ:1inery 
Other Mechanical Engineering 
. Scientific, Surgical and Photographic 
Instruments 
Electrical Machinery 
Insulated Wire Cables 
Telegraph and Telephone APparatus 
Radio and Other Electronic ECluipmen'~ 
Other Electric2,1 Goods 
Shipbuilding and Ship-repairing 
Marine.Engineering 
Motor Vehicles Manufacturing 
Metal Tndustrie.:J 
Rubber 
4.2 
4.3 
7.1 
3.5 
3.8 
6.8 
1.5 
4.2 
7.7 
3.4 
3.8 
7.1 
16.7 
5.0 
6.1 
12.6 
1.9 
2.2 
1.8 
Source: The Economic Effects of Disarmament, 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1963. Derived from Table 4. 
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example Great Bri tain. Secondly, ma.'1.y of the bra'1C~2S 
of manufacturing industry supplying the defence sector 
require a high level of technological sophistication~d 
require 
some large scale capi tal intensive production, so tnat 
the minimum economic size may be relatively large. 
This leads on to enother problem that must be 
considered before an arms i.ndustry Call be justified 
on economic grounds. Most of the arms producers in the 
less developed world have a limited home market which 
may not be sufficient to generate full capacity pr8duction. 
In the case of Turkey the military establishment stanc~ing 
at 485,000 men in 1977 was the second largest in N.A.T.O., 
yet even though it is the government tha.--c determine3 
the military budget, the levels of G.N.P. and G.N.P. per 
capita impose a constraint on de~ence spending. Turkey's 
G.N.P. standing at %46,509 million (and G-.N.P. per 
capi ta at ,31110) was much lower (thp. ~_~west) than for 
nearly all oth?r N.A.T.O. countries, and ce~tainly 
would not sustain a domestic arms industry without 
considerable expo~ts. Exports of arms, however, can 
only be achieve1 in world markets if the dorr.cstic indus-:rv ... 
is efficient, its -orodu.ct of geod quali ty 2"~d i 1;3 ::9:?:"'ices 
com:p~ti ti ve. For a cOlmtry like Turkey -,'iLieh has a 
highly dependent ma..'1.u.facturing sector anti virtually no 
research and development capacity- it would take many 
years fur it to achieve any degree of competitiveness 
in the more sophisticated arms prod~cts. in 
the, tecl~~lology of aerod=rr~3.:-;:ics, engines, ::lvionics a.~d 
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materials has meant the:. t mili tarY3.ircraft in pa~·ticular 
have become increasingly cOrI'.pl~x a..."'1.1 costly to c~eve=-o~. 
This explai~s why even the maj or lJ. it. T. o. pl-'oducers of 
arms have tended to collaborate on new military ::::ircr2ft 
projects in order to share development costs and exten-:.: 
-oroduction runs • 
... 
It is unlikely that Turkey would be able to cOElpete 
with established arms producers who spend more on research 
and development and are, therefore, able to continuousl:' 
improve fu"ld modify existing weapons. Not surprisingly 
there has been an enormous increase in the cost of 
weapons ~d related equipment. 38 To develop new equipwent 
with superior performance characteristics means increased 
costs, but for military equipment the increase in costs 
has exceeded the improved perfoI'I4ance by a wide margin, 
as is indicated in Table 5.3. In an effort to iDp~0ve 
performance above that of rival prod1]cc:rs all.d to reduce 
the possibility of early obsolescence new milita~y 
hardware must incorporate· technology which is not yet 
available. Developing new technology is very ccstly, 
particularly Wh2:G. the:!'e is a time period within which 
to cODplete prod~ction, since the shorter the time pe~iod 
the greater the tota{ costs. 39 
Table 5.4 shows that the costs of developing a 
fighter aircraft have increased almost tv.rent~.rfold betv.'een 
1946 and 1972. Y9t even the IllOSt sC~Jhisticated '.':ea.f ons 
rapidly become obsolete which forces the producers to 
modify 3.n.d improve on a contin;uous basis. ~/Ihile the 
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T J3L3 5.3 
Comparative Increase for tbe 1950s 
to tile 19608 in the Cost and Tech..'1.ical "Performance 
-
of Military Aircraft 
C081' PERFOR~,1Al\fCE 
R&D 
5.2 
Unit Payload Range or Speed Avionics Delivery 
Endurance ]1unction 
4.2 2.3 1.9 1.8 3 
N.B. figures are averages based on a study of 
13 major sets of old and new systems. 
or 
Navigatiol 
Accuracy 
3 
Source: Cost Growth in Weapons Systems, Report 
to the Committee on Armed Services by 
the Comptroller General of the U.S., 
March 26, 1973. 
" o 
components of all V!2apOnS have becor:1e more costly the 
technical ~eriority of weapons may be no different 
to earlier generations of weapons, so that there is no 
tangible benefit from improved performance. 
It rmst be coniuded that Turkey faces a techn'Jlog:r 
gap in sophisticated arms production that is so great 
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Year 
1946 
1947 
1953 
1956 
1912 
TABLE 5.4 
Development Costs of U.S. Fighter 
AircraftJ 1946-72 
ldrcraft Designation 
F-84 
F-86 
F-IOO 
F-I06 
F-15 
fost per P~ototyDe 
(U.S. $n1..) 
3.4 
4.3 
16.1 
24.4 
66.3 
N.B. costs are expressed in constant (1962) prices. 
Source: Official Price List, London, AviatiCJ:u 
Studies Atlantic (periodical). 
that the countries that engage in majol research and 
development have an unbridgeable gap for the foreseeable 
future. The best that Turkey could hope for would be 
licensed production of the latest generation of weapons, 
but 'Intil the industr:ial base becomes lar3ely self 
suff1cient the assembly of imported components would 
inevitably be characterised by high unit costs. The 
alternative for Turkey would be for it to aim to 
produce different kinds of weapons tha..Yl tLosc used by 
the more developed co~ntries, that is ~ith a 10~er 
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technological le-.-e1. 'ifeapons purchased by- L.D. C . s 
often have different characteristics, for eX2-xple they 
may be suitable for counter-insurgency warfare. 
Therefore, Turkey could concentrate on producing 
personnel carriers, tan."lts, armed trainers, light 
transport and strike aircraft, light patrol sublJlarines 
and helicopters. Once again it would be necessary to 
begin with licensed production but it would be hoped 
that eventually full domestic production, with most 
components produced indigenously, couid oe achieved. 
This alternative approach to arms production is 
also frau.ght with problems. Until the major proportion. 
of components for the arms products are produced 
domestically then Turkey would simply be moving from 
one form of dependence to another - from dependence on 
imports of weapons to dependence en imported licenses 
and components. This r..ew form of e~o1'10mic G8pendence 
can still have repercussions in terms of political 
dependence, which can be used by the supplying country 
to enforce its hegemonic position. During 1977 Israel 
want3d to expoI·t the Kiir fighter to Ecuador, but 
bec'?use it Vias powered by an 1~merica2,} engine the U.S. 
bl + f '.. 40 ~ T '.", so far was ii e vO re use permlSSlon. ~,-,-oreoyer, l ...... 
as Turkey was unable to produce the latest and most 
advanced weapolis, then the international arms race would 
put pr~ssure on Turkey for these to be impo~ted at great 
co.:::t to the balan~e of paYllients. In the case of t~ose 
, ~. d 
weapons that are produced dOITestically Tur~ey ~ay ~ln 
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that it is cheaper to import. Whynes (1979)41 gives 
the example of the Gnat fighter produced by India at 
a,unit cost of %2.5 million, a figure in excess of 
the import price. During 1980 India was negotiating 
to produce the Anglo-French Jaguar, a deep penetration 
strike aircraft, under license, but one of the arguments 
against it was that the unit cost at Rs 200 million 
was about double the cost of buying the plane from 
Britain. 42 
There are several reasons why domestic arms production 
in Turkey would be more expensive than importing the 
complete system. Arms production is capital*intensive, 
but Turkey is relatively well endowed with labour while 
capital is scarce a~d expensive. The labour that is 
re~uired in weapons production needs to p~ssess skills 
which are no·~ readily available. In so far as tra.ined 
manpower is dr~wn £rcm civilian industry there may be 
harmful side-effects, and manpower training will be 
expensive. Initially many of the components will be 
imported and the supplier is likely t6 use its monopoly 
posi tion to charge htgher prices. On the other ha."'1.d 
domestically prQduced components are also likely to 
. 
be expensive since manufacturing industry in Turkey 
• 
is inefficient having groWIl up with the help of subsidies 
and tariff protection. Unless Turkey is able to carve 
out an export market for its arlliS, which will be difficult 
unless the quality of its products is at least as high 
. 
as ~lsewhere, then the scale of production and the length 
*allowing for investment in human cap~tal 
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of the production run may not generate sufficient 
economies of scale to minimise lmi t costs. Large scale 
production a.Yl.d 10:1;2: production rlillS would be p8rticul~~ly 
important once Turkey b.egan to cOrrlTIit resources to 
research and development, otherVlise the cost would be 
prohibitive. The cost of launching a new aircr~ft, 
for example, falls into three major (overhead) categories 
- design and development, expenditure on jigs and tools, 
early 
and education in theApart of the production cycle when 
project skills and expertise needs to be acquired - car.. 
be extremely expensive and is only worthwhile if a good 
production run is likely. 
Domestic arms production Nay be more costly th~'I1. 
importing arms, but there is 8.L'I1.other aspect to the 
decision which needs to be considered. One of -the 
objectives is to reduce the foreign exchange costs of 
acquiring a.r~s, and once domestical ~y -}:lroducea. components 
and parts are ;.ncorporated into the products then savings 
on Ioreign exchange should follow. The practice of 
limiting imported components in arms production would 
be cunsistent with the arrangement in all the major 
assembly industries i~ Turkey, where iLports of parts 
are .only permi tted when local content re{~uirements are 
met. The existing arrangement is that the Turkish 
government sets the amount of foreign exchange to be 
saved by local content substitution and this deteymine3 
the maximum value of .93.rts to be i~:por~-ed. Unfo:-tunately 
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one of the consequences of enforced levels of foreign 
exchange saving is that it leans to inefficiency 8.J'1.d 
high cost production, which would in the case of ar~s 
production, diminish the possibility of exports in the 
absence of subsidies. 
Manpower and Employment 
One of the important ways that the 'defence industry' 
. affects the economy is through the number of persons 
that are employed in military service. Table 5.5 presents 
estimates of the changes in mili tary IDaJ'J.pO\Ver and related 
variables that have occurred in Turkey betvreen 1950 and 
1978. There are also two other groups of people enployed 
in the defence sector - perso~~el of the service and 
supply departments .and persons engaged in defence production 
and research work - but while it is possible to estim8.te 
the numbers employed in the armed services it ~s virtually 
impossible to do so for the other two groups. Civilians 
employed in defence provide not only specialist and 
administrative expertise which is necessary for the 
effective operation of the ar~ed forces but also direct 
support and maintenance for day to day acti\ri ties. j~ 
. 
stud:;( of the manpmver structure in defence for Britain, 
Germany and Australia indicates that approximately one 
civiliru1 is required for every 2.4 memb8rs of the armed 
forces. Although it can only b~ a very crude estimate 
the same kind of servicing ratio "vould I:lean about 
250,000 civilians eI!1ployed in supporting the Turkish 
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8.I'rz-ed forces. An estimate of tho3e ~~ ""Y"'-r!~ 
_..L ... .-.:.I...,..i 
production "Clust also be 7ery approxim,3.te since not 811 
of the workforce e;r~ployed by the mul ti-product fir~s 
that prod'u c e arm.s are actually in arr:~s prod uc t ion. )n 
enlightened guess would suggest about 30,000 people 
engaged in defence production. Table 5.5 gives details 
of the total armed forces, including conscripts, the 
ratio of military manpower to population, the proportion 
of the male population betw-een the ages of 15 and 64 
that are in the armed forces, the level of military 
expenditure per member of the armed forces, the number 
of trained army reservists and the level of the para-
mili ta-,': forces. 
The level of military manpower in the armed services 
has remained remarkably stable since 1950, averaging 
between 450,000 and 500,000. There is cross-section 
-
evidence to show43 that the size of the population is 
positively related to the numbers emplored in the armed 
services, but in the case- of Turkey while population 
more than doubled in the period 1950-78, military m~~powe~ 
remained more or less constalit. This pcint is made clear 
in colurin (2) of 'l:able 5.5 vlhere it ca.~ be seen that 
mili~ary manpower as a proportion of the population 
declined from a peak of 2.4 per cent in 1950 to 1.1 per 
cent in 1978. These figures do not fully reflect the 
diversion of manpower away from productive activity, 
however. since the m02t uyoductive labour group in the 
. ~ 
eccnomy are males a3ed between 15 and 64. Co1UEn (3) 
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TABLE 5.5 
r,lili tary_ Manpower aud _Relatc_<t_V"w-iables, 1950-78 
l\'Ji Ii tar:£. Military Ivlili t ary NHli tary <,Trained Pr'T'n.-
---
Manpower ManEower as Mal\2oweI: EX12enditure lIrmy rrr"l't •. lJ.l ary 
OOO's R~rcentage of as percentage Lr member Reservists Forces 
P012ulation of Ma.le of ~,~e OOO's OOO's 
Popu1ati..2,!! Armeo Forces 
~ Year aged 15-64 TL 
--
. , 
(1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5 ) (6 ) 
1950 500 2.4 n.a. 5404 n.a. n. a. 
1963 452 1.5 5.3 10978 2500 \D n. a.. OJ 
1968 514 1.5 7.7 
ri 
11562 450 40 
1970 478 1.4' 7.3 13048 . 570 40 
1973 455 1.2 5.9 17523 800 75 
1975 453 1.2 4.9 31912 775 75 
1978 485 1.1 5.8 32419 525 110 
* Note: at constant, 1970, prices. 
., 
Source: Derived from I.I.S.Se Military Balance (various dates). 
shows that o~ average over 5 per cent of the potential 
economically active male population has been re~oved 
from civilian production. Even this, however, under-
estimates the displacement of labour, since there ~ere 
110,000 men in the para-military forces in 1978 and a 
further half-a-million part-time soldiers enployed as 
trained army reservists. 44 After allowing for these 
other two groups and the people employed in the service 
and supply departments and those engaged in d9fence 
production it is likely that the proportion of economically 
active males absorbed into military activity was in 
excess of 10 per cent in 1978. 
Table 5.5 also reveals that increases in military 
.--
expenditure have not been associated with higher levels 
of military manpower, but rather, that military expenditure 
per man has risen considerably as shown in column (5). 
There are twn ~ain reasons for this. Firstly, the rapid 
rate of development in military technoJogy means that 
each new generation of weapons is more expensive and more 
capital intensive than the old. Secondly, the salaries 
and wages paid to the armed forces have risen in line 
with the growth in per caplta income, particularly since 
the .;mili tary coup of 1960. 
An important question to be considered is whether 
the 'defence industry' which has absorbed over 10 per 
cent of the potentia.l economically active male poyul'3.tion 
represents a loss to'civilian prcduction. On the face 
of it the c::.nswer would seem to be no, since Turke-y 's 
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problem in the post-w~r period has been one of excess 
labour rather than one of shortege. EVen durinG ths 
rapid growth of the 1960s unemployment was between 8 
and 10 per cent, while during the 1970s it rose towards 
20 per cent. It is quite clear that Turkey has needed 
to create more jobs which could be taken to indicate 
that military expenditure should have been increased 
even further so as to absorb' more labour from ths pool 
of urlemployed. Thi.s response would have been wrong 
since military activity, like much of manufacturing, 
has become highly capital intensive and might not create 
too many domestic linkages. It has been shown45 that 
for the U.K. defence spending ~ccounted for only 1.2 
. per cent of production in construction, 1.3 per cent 
in. food and 0.7 per cent in clothing and these were the 
industries most likely to benefit from increased military 
expenditure. To take on more militaTY manpower in order 
to reduce unemployment would not solve the problem, but 
merely switch the burden of maintaining the (former) 
unemployed from the private to the public purse. 
Furthermore, there may be other labour intensive state 
activities. that could be expanded which would. create 
more jobs and contri'bute more directly to welfare. 
t 
While it must be accepted that the military does 
not deprive other 'civil' industries of 'general' labour 
there is the need to distinguish between different 
. 
types of labour. Agricultural under-employment &11d 
urban unemployment amongst the unskilled co-exists 
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wi th short2.ge3 of labour possessing skills and education. 
Each of the five year p}_ans have recognised that while 
there has been a general surplus of labour in Turkey 
there has been a shortage of skilled labour. For exa~ple, 
the documents relating to the Seco?ld Five Year Plan4-6 
specificfdly refer to the scarci ty of trained :T.9.ll:9o','ier 
and the need to commit resources to education in order 
to raise the skill level of labour. Turkey has been 
particulaTly short of trained management, engineers, 
technicians and trained workers as well as all kinds 
of professional workers. The shortage of skilled V!orker's 
was made worse by the system of exporting workers to 
WesteJ~ Europe. Abadan-Unat (1976)47 has shown that 
between 1965 and 1971 over 30 per cent of Turkish -.'l'Jrkers 
departing to work abroad were 'professionally' qualified 
in manual skills with the majority of them aged betwee~~ 
25 and 35 years. The important question for this study 
is whether the military deprives Irore productive sectGTS 
of the economy of 'scarce huma.."1. capi tal. ' In order to 
try and answer this question it is necessary to consider 
the position of military education ~ithin t~e Turkish 
educational system. 
Military Education 
Primary education in Turkey is compulsory a.."Yld free 
in state schools from the age of 6 years. Those who 
graduate from .p:-'i:na.ry school can go through to secondary 
education. Wi thin se(~ondary education there are t'.','o 
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pathways, on,e providing general education, the other 
one voc~.tional and techLical. Those students -\\-~o wish 
to receive a theoretical ~Ld practical training before 
becoming skilled workers in industry go through the 
trade institutes, and those who aspire to the lower 
supervisor and management grade or to the higher 
positions in industry go on to the technician and 
technical schools respectively. It is also possible 
for students to go through secondary (mid.dle and 
lycee) and higher educational schools of commerce. 
The 'general' pathway through secondary education 
involves going through two levels, middle school and 
~ lycee, which then permits the student to enter higher 
education. The various-pathways through the educational 
system are summarised in Figure 5.1. 
Military education begins after the middle school 
with 
,. 
a system of military lycees. Entrance to these 
, -lycees is competitive and although theTa are no detailed 
published statistics the 'number of applicants was almost 
certainly rising during the 1960s. 48 After military 
,-
lycee students enter the Army, Naval or Air Academy as 
o 
officers, and those ?lho successfully complete two years 
then go on to do a further year at the Joint Staff 
Academy_ The highest level of military education is 
the Academy of National Defence where officers of field 
or general rank are given further training designed to 
fa.cili tate co-operation between the civilian and mili tary 
authorities, particularly with reference to resource 
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I-' 
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l!'.lGURE 5.l 
The Structure of Education- in Turkey 
.. 
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TEc nr\~TC t'L J D . .L \ ~ .... ' 
r. (lTTOOL':::-O 
..:) v~. J 
4 "'y~" r p,~ _...L~ 1. l ,..J 
mobilisation in time of emergency • 
. All three branches of the service 8~SO provide a 
large number ~,f technical training schools for officers 
and enlisted men. l~ong the airforce training schools 
are a war school, a reserve officer school. a technical 
school, a c0ll1 ... 11unications school, 0. supply school' and a 
maintenance school. The army also has many training 
schools including those for vetinary medicine, cartography, 
communications, personnel, music, medicine, cavalry, 
engineering, supply, finance, and artillery.49 
As of 1975 out of the total armed forces of 480,000, 
257,OC~ were conscripts, required to do 20 months military 
service, so that the remainder, that is 223,000, were 
:pr()fessioneJ soldt0rs. 50There are no recent official 
statistics on how many of these professional soldiers 
.. 
wer~ comrn2.ssioned officers, but using the rule of thumb 
. 51 -
of one officer to every nine men, would suggest around 
60,000 commissioned officers, including about 10,000 
in the para-military forces. 52 Since 1950 it has been' 
possible for non-commissioned officers to move into the 
commissioned officer rank, but Rob.inson (1967)0 claims 
·tha.t few non-commissioned ofI'icers make this vertical 
~ 
movement. It can be assumed, therefore, that about 
60,000 commissioned officers were serving in the Turkish 
armed and para-military forces 53 in 1975, each one of 
them having graduated from the lyc8e and possessing 
advanced training from one of the military academies • 
• 
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The 60,000 c080.issioned officers ~Tl the -:2urkish ar::ed 
forces were a.~ong 333,107 people wi th B. uni versi ty 
(or equivalent) degree in 1975, which is shown in 
T8ble 5.6. Only 3.8 per cent of the Turkish population 
, 
were 1ycee graduates in 1975 and only 1 per cent possesseo 
a university degree, yet in spite of the grea.t sho~tage 
of professional and higher level management perso~~el, 
18 per cent of higher education graduates were er::ployed 
in the armed forces. There is no evidence that the 
armed forces absorb the brightest anG ablest talents 
from the Turkish educational system, although historically 
and continuing in the period since the founding of the 
Republic" all civil servants, including the military, 
have enjoyed a high st~tus and have been an honoured 
stratum within Turkish society, so that many talented 
young people may have been attracted to the military in 
preference to fproductive' civil indust~y. Two sep~rate 
studies on the ranking of occupations by lycee students, 
carried out by Helling (1958)54 a~d K~zruJias (19n5)55 
both give a military officer a rank of 5, which 
indicates that an army career was still highly valued. 
by students in the pos·t-war period • 
. 
, 
It is not only that the mili tary may Grail off very 
able youths which are then lost to industry but it is 
also that the educational facilities for trai:!1ing man-
power in Turkey have been very scarce throughout the 
+ . 'd d tb t.J..h "l" .J..~.,. -]·~T~'(1 -'-0 -'-'y,o p03 ",-war perlO ,s.n ... a v e prlor vJ t, v <:'-- II V':'J._ 
military academies, ~hich dates back to the ~i~eteent~ 
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T ft..BLE 5.6 
Turkish Population h2.ving Comnleted Lyc:ee Level 
and Higher Education, 1975 
Total L~cee Level Higher 
POEulation of education education 
completed completed 
Total 33,672,121 1,274~149 (3.8) 333,107 (1.0) 
Male 17,084,625 842,343 (4.9) 266,014 (1~6) 
Female 16,587,496 431,806 (2.6) 67,093 (0.4) 
Note: percentages in brackets. 
Source: 1975 Population Census, 1 per cent 
sample Results, as reported in the 
Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1979, 
State Insti tu·te of Statistics, Pub. 
No. 890, Pnkara, 1979 Table 33. 
century, has meant that other branches o! education have· 
been deprived of res.our8es. In a period when ':::urkey 
has·found it very difficult to expand its educational 
sector because of a lack of resources, including trained 
teachers, then the opportunity cost of giving priority 
to educating the military has been the ey:gin~ers, the 
chemists and t:le economists tlult have been sacrificed, 
with the wider effects this has had on the development 
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process. The conclusion to be dra',vn is clear. Turkish 
industry has been short of the highest levels of s}:illed 
labour and the military have been very successful in 
draining off a significant proportion of the student 
population wishing to enter into fields of higher 
education. There is another issue to be considered 
too, and that is whether increased arms production, as 
envisaged under the new defence policy of 1975, would 
help to solve the pro·blem of unemploJ'ulent. This will. 
now be considered. 
Job Creation in Defence Production 
The more developed countries dominate the generation 
a~d control of technology. The critical fact from the 
point of view of the L.D.C.s is that in the non-
socialist world 98 per cent of all research and 
development t~kes place in the more developed countries 
(M.D.C.s), and 70 per cent occurs in the U.S.A. alone. 56 
This fact has led many economists ~~d politicians (and 
others) to argue that inequality in the origin of 
technology has a.dverse effects on development within 
the L.D.C.e, pria~rily because tbe tecbnology57 t~at lS 
. 
tr~sferred is inappropri8te to :actor endowments. It 
is argued that the M.D.C.s are characterised by a 
scarcity of labour and a relative ab~~dance of capital 
so chat the technology that emerges tends to be labour-
. 
-+ bl .J..' L n C saving and capital intensive. IneVl,,8. y vIle .~'.. s 
that adopt Western tech..''101ogy employ· capital i!1~ensive 
• 
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techniques and it is important to consider the 
. 
consequences of this for those countries that h~ve 
abundant supplies of labour. Consider a hypothetical 
example using a two-factor producation function with 
capital and labour as the inputs. The production 
function can be represented by 
Q f (K,L) (1 ) 
where Q = output or production 
K 
-
capi tal input 
L - labour input 
Given any level of output, Qa, efficiency re~uires 
that it be produced as cheaply as possible. This means 
that the expenditure on inputs should be mininised', 
where this expenditure is given by 
M - rK.+ wL (2) 
where 1Vf - total cost of production 
.. 
:r 
-
price per unit of capital 
w - price per unit of labour 
The optimQ~ combination of inputs will be achieved 
when ~;I is minimised subj ect to the constraint ilTIposed 
by the p~oduction function. 
-8 
The Lagrangea~ ~xpression' 
for this constraine~ minimisation problem becomes 
, M>. = rK + wL + >. [Qo - f (K,L)] (3) 
where ~ is the undetermined Lagrangean multiplier. 
To find an extreme value, that is to minimise the 
expression (3), each of the partial derivati~es of 
(3) are set e~ual to" zero 
• 
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d ~h). d f 
- r -) = 0 (4) JK i> K 
d M). 
w -~ df - = 0 (5 ) ~L ~L 
d M Qo 
- f - (K,L) = 0 (6) 
0/\ 
The values of L and K that simultaneously satisfy 
these three e<luations are those that minimise costs, 
given w and r~ to produce Qo. From~uations (4) and 
(5) we can rewrite 
r -. ~fK and w = AfL 
'"" 
where fK = df and fL = 8f 
dK {J L 
Dividing one equation by the other we obtain 
r IK 
= (7) 
W IL 
This states that for cost minimisation the factors 
should be employed in such quantities that the ratio of 
their marginal products are equal to the ratio of their 
. ~ 
prices. This is the familiar ta.ngency condi tio~. 
• Relating this to the U.S.A. and Turkey, it will be 
assumed that Turkey is well endowed with labour but has 
a scarcity of capital, while the U.S.A. is capital rich 
a..'1d hlS a scarci ty of labour. 59 Furthermore it is 
. 
aS~-~UT-:;.ed that these factor endovrolents are reflected in 
factor prices, such that 
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(1 
..L U C' ' .0.li • (8) 
Therefore it follows that cost minimisation requires 
tha.t 
( 
.£'K' ;~L (9) 
If it is further"assu:aed that the production function 
is continuous and we have diminishing marginal substitut-
ability (isoquants are convex to the origin) then the 
equilibrium capital/labour ratio will be higher in the 
U.S.A. than in Turkey. 
(:) U.S.A. (10) 
'11his is illustrated in :B'igure 5.2 where the isoquant 
represents a given level of output, Qo. In the U~S.A. 
capital is relatively cheap which gives the price line 
(
Y'\ USA h·l· w ) •• ~ Vh 1 e ln Turkey capital i8 relatively 
expensjve which gives The points of tangency 
EUSA and P.T represent the least cost combination of 
inputs required to produce output Qo for the U.S.A. and 
Turkey respectively~ It cru: be seen that the U.S.A. 
emplo.ys more capi tal per uni t of labour than does 
Turkey. 
If this hypothetical example was a close 
approximation to reali ty then Tur2::ey would use more 
laoour intensive methods of production than the U.S. :\. 
- 198 -
FIGURE 5.2 
Hypothetical Production F~nction with 
given Fa.ctor Endowments for 
Turkey and the U.S.A. 
K 
1-(1 I---f---+--~ .... 
L 
within its defence industry. However the preceding 
an2.lysis is Del.sed on unreali '3tic assUIDi.jtions, and when 
c 
these r:re allowed for the outco~e is cha."rlged signific2ntl:r • 
. 
Fi!'st of all, the production function and the cor::,espondi~G 
t 
isoquant used in the example assumes -that labour and 
I 
capital can be combined in any proportion to produce 
arms, yet in the real world there may be a very limited 
chotcc of tecbnology. Raldor (1980)60 argues that 
mili t,:,ry technology takes a 'specifj_c form' in e8.ch 
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society and is a function of the available level of 
technology, (which itself depends on the mode 0= 
production), the military objective ~~d the form of 
military organisation. In the U.S. the technology 
generated reflects the prevailing industrial structure 
but is also related to the need to keep to time and 
design s:gecj_fication limits. Kennedy (1975 )61 points 
out that the production techniques depend on the 
product. 7/jth sma.ll arms, which are the simplest 
weapons to produce, there is a need for light machinery 
- lathe~ drill~ bore, ream, grind and press machines 
and metal forming - but with aircraft p=oduction high 
technologies are involved and nanufacture tends to be 
on a small scale. Airframe construction is similar in 
C (\ 1'1 r; p :0 t t () t h "'"1 t 0 f abo ~ t, bu t th e ,~ tole r a-11 C e s ar e fiU c h 
finer and the fabrica.tion processes much more complex 
and must meet r"igid design standards." 
Secondly, the hypothetical a.1'J.alys~ s takes no 
account of different kinds of labour. ~Yhen complex 
weapons systems are produced (for exaTIple involving 
aircraft) then mainly skilled personnel are required 
and few jobs for unskilled labour are created, which 
h3 14recisely the opposi te of the labour force available 
in many L.D.e.s, including Turkey (Lock ~~d Wulf, 
1979).62 The design, manufacture and assembly of 
aircraft 7 some i terns of armour, and guided :niss iles 
if u 12~our-intensive process, but req~ires very 3killed 
ma..'1pO','.'er which m8.y need to be imported at very great 
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cost. In the case of India -t:he defence research ,~::,.d 
deve~opment org8nisation 2nd the related rese~rch 
projects employ more scientists, engineers and technic::'a~3 
th8n private industry as a whole. 63 Clearlya.rms 
production can be expected to create new specialist 
jobs but skilled labour requires investment of scarce 
capital and it must be considered whether more jo1:s 
could have been created elsewhere. 
Thirdly, the analysis is a static one ~ld does 
not allow for the time 64 t twill inevi tably t·ake to 
build up indigenous arms production, which in any case 
is likely to be on a limited scale. 
The danger for Turkey is that arms production will 
be relatively capital intensive (allo-Ning for investme~1t 
in human capital) and employment' creation limited. Por 
reasons outlined previously it is extre=.rc..ely unlikely 
that arms production in Turkey could be justified on 
comparative cost grounds, even after a. period as an 
infant industry, and in terms of employnent creation 
other products would be more appropriate. The choice 
of product iscloesly li~~ed to the choice of technique 
since once the product has been determined then the 
choice of technology is constrained. So~e products 
can be manufactured using more labour intensive 
techniques - like wood and leather products, rubber 
products, cheElicB.ls, tobacco (Sutcli=:.'fe, 1971 )65 ar~d 
canital goods industries may actually be relatively 
~ 2Dl -~. 
labour-intensive (Pack and Todaro, 1969).66 These 
products may be more appropriate to Turkey than the 
sophisticated products, like arms, where technological 
choice is likely to be limited or non-existent. This 
can be illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
Assume that Turkey is endovled with abundant labour 
(L) and scarce capital. (K) whi.ch is fixed at K. Further, 
a choice has to be made between produoing arms or 
capital goods, the former employing a capital-intensive 
tec:b..ni'lue (T 'arms) and the latter a more labour--intensive 
techni~ue (T capital goods). If arms are produced 
output would be Qo with employment of 1 1 , . whereas if 
the labour-intensive prod,uct is produced then the same 
output, Qo,67 could be achieved with less capital (Kl ) 
and employment of L 2 • Al ternati:lely, if .capi tal goods 
are produced then output could be expended to ~l and 
employment to L3 -
Arms production then is likely to absorb scarce 
capital and skilled labour, yet do little to create 
jobs for the mass of unemployed. In the short-run it 
would be necessary to 'employ skilled foreign personnel, 
but even when indige-nous labour has acquired the necessary 
• skills there may be no direct spillover effects to the 
civilian economy, as the specialised knowledge, 
especially in research and development, may be highly 
- ., 
specific to sophistic~ted arms production (Landeren-
68 Backs trom, 1980). . 
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FIGURE 5.3 
Choice of Technique and 2nploym8nt 
T (arms) 
K 
T (capital goods) 
-K 
o L 
One way that capital intensive (arms) production 
mel.Y be deemed to be superior to labour-intensive 
production is through the i~pact on growth. The 
theoretical literature 69 indicates a Sh3~P conflict 
between future growt.h and present output, consumption 
<t 
2nd 8rlploy:nent. Capital-intensive techniQues generate 
~". higher surplus than labour-intensive techniClues and 
therefore l}~ke possible more investment. This conclusion 
rests on the follo~inG assumptions: (1) that wages are 
no higher under C~~2Ji tal-in"tensive production, (2) tInt 
') 0 ..... 
- c... ) 
savings out of wages are negligible, (3) that 
unemployment does not reduce community saving, 
(4) th8.t consumption h:;_s no investment content, and 
(5) that govei'nments are not able to use taxes and 
subsidies to achieve desired ends. Once these 
assumptions are relaxed then there may be no conflict 
between output, employment at"1d saving, 70 so that it 
cannot_ be argued that arms production will inevitably 
generate higher rates of growth than more labour-
intensive production. This does not mean, however, 
that Turkey, or other L.D.e.s, should always choose 
labour-intensive techniques (intermedj_ate technology), 
indeed i~ some cases there may be little choice once 
the product has been determined. 
Summary 
It has been argued that the s~+-ti.ng up of 8.."'1 arms 
industry in TlJ rkey in order to enhance national securi ty 
and to act as a vehicle for development may not be as 
successful as is sometimes assused. 7l During the 1970s 
Turl\.ev has fac8d a series of economic problems which 
~ -
have been socially divisi-ve 2TId/or have impaired the 
rat~ of development. The main probleT,s have been a 
lack of foreign exchange, high and rising levels of 
unemployment, dependence on imports of machinery, raw 
materials and technology, and a scarcity of capital 
resources. It must be seriously questioned ';"hether 
arms production C8.11 be a vehicle for industrLalisation 
- 204 -
and development since it does not tackle these 
problems. 
Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970)72 and 
(1972)73 have argued that import-substituting 
industrialisation has severe shortcomings. It has 
often resul ted in ineffj_ciency and high prices due to 
excessive protection •.. Domestic econc~ic policies in 
L~D.C.s and the availability of foreign aid encouraged 
the import of capital-intensive technology, unsuited 
to factor proportions. Old industries-were replaced 
by new, but uilGmployment and excess capacity increased. 
In short, import-substitution turned out to be self-
defeating as the domestic market was soon exhausted 
and. imports of machinery, components and teChJl0logy 
placed a burden on foreign exchange. This' does not 
mean that the alternative of outwarG. looking strategies 
would be more successful since it C811 be argued that 
import-substi t'ltion has failed because it has been 
badly'conceived (Sachs, 1973),74 and that import-
substitution through arms production in Turkey would 
suffer from t:r.l.~se same shortcomings. :\~oreover, there 
is the dW1ger that sophisticated arms production 
. 
pr0c-rammes wi th capi tal- and skill-intensive technology 
would increase th~ dependency of Turkey on the U.S.A. 
and perpetuate uneven development and under-development 
(Lock and Vlulf, 1979). 75 Technology can only be 
transferred gradually in &"'1. embodied form, but the 
rate of product innovation and technological obsolescence 
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in weapons production is such that Tu~key could not be 
self-sufficient in the foreseeable future wi thO-;lt 
impossible levels of expenditure in manpower training 
al1d research and development. Licensed production of 
arms leaves the control of technology in the hands of 
foreign firms but even when L.D.e.s are able to acquire 
some 'share' in the production of arms the parent 
company retains control of the tech..""lologies employed 
and determines the allocatj.on of resources, so that 
the pattern of production that emerges is a form of 
ilvertical integration of production on an international 
scale. u ?6 These characteristics of arms production 
combined with the high level '_':' indireot costs of 
infrastructure and software provision may mean that 
it contributes less to development than other 'civil' 
industries. It is certain, at l~ast for ~urkey in the 
short-run, that domestic linkageS will be limited, and 
the requirements of machinery, machine tools, energy 
and raw 'materia.Is will need to be imported, so that 
it is by no means certain that the foreign exchange 
position will be improved.?? 
. . 
In spite of rapid industrialisation since 1962 it 
. 
is qrguable that Turkey's industrial base is not strong 
enough to sustain'an uneconomical and un~eliable arms 
industry which is inherently dependent on imported 
inputs and therefore cannot make her self-reliant in 
the nea~ luture. Since sophisticated ~ms projects 
en~2.il a long and unprec.ictable gestation period cost 
• 
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estirfL:.;.tes are very dif'ficul t to rrral:::e 78 but the 
advancement of other industrial sectors may be 
inhibited through the absorption of scarce resources. 
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CHAPTEE 6 
" 
l!IILIT j~RISr.1 AND EXTERN PoL :SCONC~!iIC RELATIONS 
Introduction 
It is widely agreed that those countries th~t rely 
on imports for their supplies of military weapons are 
absorbing scarce foreign exchange resources which are 
thus prevented from being used forcther peaceful purposes 
including development. l On the othe~ hand while it might 
be 2.rgued that disarmament would permit improvements in 
the standard of Ii ving aYld the rat e of gro· .. '.'th of 
partiuular countries it is by no IDe&nS obvious that 
th b 1 f t Id b f "L 2 e aance o. paymen s won ene lv. Some writers 
have stressed that it is important to distinguish between 
. 
different kinds of military transfers and that the U.S. 
military assistance programmes have had beneficial 
effects on recipient countries. Burke (1964)3 has 
argued that military ass:tstance in the form of public 
works may have fa.vourable economic effects. Glick 
(1967)4- stressed that military assista~ce programmes 
that encouraged public' w'orks and educationB~l activities 
would help economic 'development. Shepler and Campbell 
-\ r. (1969)? emphasised that U.S. military assistance abroad 
could have favourable effects on recipient countries 
since it mea..Ylt a substantial inflo'~r of fi:;1ancial 
reSOllrces. Other 'sri ters 6 ,7 have recog::-lised that -the 
contribution that mili tary assistance ma..1{es to economic 
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development may depend on it not absorbing too many 
domestic resources or s~arce foreign exchange. 
This chapter considers the reasons for the gro~th 
in the supply of arms to Turkey and assesses the 
conse~uences for economic developnent. It is argued 
that U.S. economic assistance must be understood in 
terms of its complementary relationship with military 
assistance and that it has not as a consequence been 
very effective in the development effort. Political, 
strategic and military motivations have determined the 
level and form of Western economic and military 
assistance to Turkey which have been instrumental in 
opening up the economy to private foreign capital flows. 
The pattern and type of foreign investment contributed 
to an inefficient allocation of' resources., led to 
higher levels of imports of capital goods and industrial 
raw materials yet did little to improve employment 
prospects or export earnings and incre;:-sed Turkey's 
dependency on the indus trialised worl'd. 
Military Transfers 
For most develo~ing countries military resource 
+ 
consumption is divided between the purchase of military 
resources from the domestic economy and the flow of 
arillS from international suppliers. The international 
~!J'?~S flow can be ei ther in the forQ of trade, or aid, 
which, theoretically, are quite separate and distinct. 
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/~id is distinguished from trade tIl that t!'_e former 
iarlies 3. transfer of reSOUr(;e3 at a concessional r2.te 
in th8t either a grant is given to the recipient country 
which does not need to be repaid, or a loan is made, 
to cover the flow of goods, vvhich carries a low Tate 
of interest, a long repayment period or a 'period of 
grace' during vihich J.nterest charges are wai iled. 
Trade on the other hari.'d is the result of the operation 
of normal market forces, and the terms of trade are 
determined by the form and degree of competition in 
the market. In practice the distinction between trade 
and aid is not always so obvious in the sense that one 
coun-t:":'y receives a concession from another cOli....11.try, 
particularly since export credits have become a normal 
part of the trading activity between L.D.C.s and the 
industrialised countries. Both econorr.ic and military 
aid tends to be given because it enhances the national 
-
foreign policy of the donor country a~d it is 'tied' 
to parttcular cOIDJ:Tlodities which reduces the freedom of 
the aid-receiving country to .buy the most appropriate 
goods at the most favourable price. 8 
:) 
In the case of international arIS flows the 
distinction between trad.e and aid is extremely difficult 
to ascertain. Whynes (1979)9 categorises international 
military transfers into six forms, as follows: 
1. donations of military equipment to L.D.C.s, 
which ure often surplus to the donor'S 
requirements, 
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2. direct financial grants to L.D.C.s for the 
purcha.se of military equipment or to develop 
other military facilities such as training 
schools, 
3. the gr~~ting of preferential terms for the 
purchase of military equipment, such as credit 
arrangements or the permission to pay in local 
currency, 
4. 'normal' trade at cost price. 
In addition with respect to labour, the industrialised 
countries might: 
5. provide training facilities in a developed 
country's institution for selected members of 
the L.D.C. armed forces, 
6. send military missions or experts to advise 
and train the L.D.C. military, in situ. 
Although (1), (2), (5) and (6) might--be categorised 
as military aid they are likely to be 'tied' to certain 
conditions being satisfied. Myrdal (1971)10 claims 
that the U.S. foreign aid programme after the Second 
World 7{ar vIas motivated by the intensified Cold V/ar 
o 
that developed rather than the development needs of 
recipient countries. The reason why countries like 
'" 
Turkey, Greece and Pakis.tan received considerable economic 
and military aid was because it satisfied certain political 
.objectives and these countries were required to remain 
poli tic ally and mili tarily close to the U. s. ~\. and to 
commit a laree proportion of their domestic resources 
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to defence. The third form of military transfer has 
elements of both trade and aid, although the concession 
given by the donor on the terms of repayment may be 
offset by an inflated price. Only the fourth form 
of military transfer would seem to be a clear case of 
trade and even this is likely to be hedged with 
conditions. Consequently given the difficulty of 
separating aid from trade it is easier to combine the 
two and refer to them as military transfers,ll 
although whenever there is clear evidence that the 
transfer is aid or trade this will be pointed out. 
The main arms suppliers to Third 7{orld countries 
are the industrialised. countries, of which the most 
important are the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and 
France. It can be seen from Table 6.1 that the four 
- . 
major suppliers accounted for 80 per cent of arms 
transfers in the 19508 and over 90 per cent in the 
1960s' a..Yld 19708. The rise of the U.S.~.R. to be the 
major supplier in. the 1970s was mainly at the expense 
of the U.K. which had been second only to the U.S.A. 
during the 1950s. Other sup~liers in the rest of the 
world are West GermarlY, Italy, Canada, Sweden, 
Swi~zerland, the Netherlands, Japan and China, while 
in recent years Israel, .India and Brazil have also 
beg-un to supply a.rms on a very much smaller scale. 
The growth of the arms trade has been very rapid, 
even more rapid than-the growth of military expenditure, 
• 
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r:l t uL;" r ., 
.... _ ,..0_ ---J c. 1.. 
S • I • P • R . I ._Y:s'_l u ? t ion S 0 f 1,1 a j 0:' Tir' e a po n S S U :] p 1 i e d. 
to Third :,-;'o~ld Countries by the Four 1,~2:or 
SUEPliers, 1950-75 in U.S. gru. at 
constant (1973) prices 
Fizures in brackets are percentages of totals. 
1950-59 1960-69 1970-75 
U.S.S.R. 1058 5749 7381 
(15) (41) (38) 
U.S.A. 2272 4506 6690 
(33) (32) (34) 
U.K. 1631 1745 1951 
(24) (12) . (10) 
France 561 1877 1881 
(8 ) (13) (10 ) 
Total of FO"Jr 
Major Suppliers 
5522 13877 17903 
(SO) (98) (92) 
1.220-75 
14188 
(35 ) 
134uo 
(33) 
5327 
(13) 
4319 
(11) 
37302 
(92 ) 
Source: F. Barnaby in R. Jolly (ed.) Disarmament 
and \'~!orld Development, Table 2.8, p.18. 
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and about two thirds of the world total has go~e to 
Third World countries. By 1976, according to S.I.P.R.I., 
95 countries imported major weapons - tanks, ships, 
missiles and aircraft - so that participation in the 
build up of arms has been worldwide. Table 6.2 
presents data on the value of imports of major weapons 
by Greece and Turkey together in the period 1950-72 • 
. . 
As there are large fluctuations in imports from year 
, 
to year two series are given - the yearly figures and 
five-year moving averages. The value of weapons 
imported by Greece end Turkey remained fairly constant 
in real terms in the period 1950-72, although this 
represented a declining proportion of the world total·, 
Between 1950-54 Greece and Turkey between them tock 
over 20 per cent of all. imports of major weapons 
received by Third World countries and thi's reflected 
their designation as 'forward strategic .areas', but 
from then on the proportion fell to ~5 per cent between 
1960-64 and down to less thfu~ 7 per CCilt after 1965. 
During the 1970s Turkey (and.Greece) continued to 
import arms on a large scale, ~~d even in 1978 when 
the economy was in serious difficulties Turkey rar~ed 
sixth in the indust~ialised world in the list of 
importers, accounting for 3 per cent of the world 
total and 8 per cent of the industrialised countries 
total. 12 
The data available on the arms trade cannot, 
however, be taken as complete since there are certain 
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TJ..BLE 6.2 
Values of Imports of I':aj or 'NeB-pons by 
Greece and Turkey, 1950-72, in U.S. gill. at 
constent (1968) p~ices 
The figures in brackets are percentages of the Third 
VTorld total. 1 
A = yearly figures 
B = five-year moving average 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
A 10 20 70 140 110 
(1-.5) (7.4) (33.3) (26.9) (21.6) 
B 70 80 90 
(20.0) (19.0) (17.3) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 ).959 
A 50 110 70 330 go 
~ 
(8.2) (14-.3) (9.2) (25.2) (11.7) 
B 100 130 130 140 130 
(15.9) (16.4) (15.5) (15.7) (14.6) 
1960 1961. 1962 1963 1964 
It 110 30 20 100 70 
(12.8) (3.9) (2.2) (11.9) (10.:1-) 
B i: 120 70 70 70 90 
(13.0) (8.5) (8.6) (8.5) (10.1) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
A .l ~o 
-J 80 80 70 130 
(16.1) (703 ) (6.8) (5.6) (10.0) 
B 100 90 
• 
100·· 80 80 
(10.5) (8.7) (8·.7) (6.6) (5.9) 
1970 1971 1972 
f, 20 90 130 1<. 
(1.6) (4.9) (11.0) 
B 90 
(6e6) 
Note: 1 Total excluding Vietnam. 
Source: SaI.P.R.I. Yearbook, 1973. 
omtssions from the list and the values are not reliab19. 13 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 cover the trade in 'major weapons' 
but this is only about half of the total trade in arms, 
other items being small arms, ammunition, support 
equipment, spare parts and manpower assistance, some 
of which may be in the form of a donatj on al1d all are 
very difficult to trace.· Another problem arises because 
the official prices quoted for arms transfers do not 
necessarily represent tne m&~ket va1ue3 but may be 
adJusted for political re~sons. ~hus for eX2~]le 
Hovey (1965) 14 point·s out that the value of U. S. mili tary 
~ 
assistance in the 1950s was exaggerated because the 
mtlitary equipment that was transferred was surplus 
stock, or even second hand, and several years old, 
yet it 1:v'as valued at replacement cost. As ne':: 
. 
er:-~1·JjDII12nt would be more sophj.sticated and powerf'..:l 
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the replace:nent value would be higher than the true 
value of the transferred arms. Indeed in this )eriod 
Hovey stresses that the prices of U.S. arms eqUipment 
was considerably above what other suppliers were 
asking for equivalent equipment. The estimates that 
S.I.P.R.I. makes on the value of arms transfers have 
the advantage that they are based on kno7m costs or 
market prices for the weapons supplied and thus give 
a measure of the volume of resources transferred, but . 
. this means thd-i; they do not correspond to the cash 
flow between buyer and seller, particularly since 
most arms deals are a~ranged on a credit or grrolt 
basis. 
The Supply vnd Demand for Arms 
The arms trade has grown very rapidly in the 
post-war perio~ and the reasons for this are partly 
to be found in factors that exist in the supplying 
countries, which relate to both political and economic 
poliCies, ~~d partly to be found in factors influencing 
demand in recipient countries • 
. 
Fac~ors Influencinf, the Suppl~ of !~ms 
There are several different factors which 
determine the supply of arms and not all of them will 
necessar:ily apply to all sup:plying countries at all 
times. The poiicy adopted on supply by each country 
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is invariat:ly de-:erI1ined by politieal decis~ons 
which may reflect not only tbe position of the 
supplying country in the iLternational syste~ but 
also, in the case of ~:le3tern countries, ·the pO';/'er of 
private capital in the domestic economy. S.I.P.R.l. 15 
distinguishes three factors that determine the pattern 
and level of supply. 
1. hegemonic 
2. industrial 
3. restrictive 
The first faetor refers to the control of arms 
tra..c"'1sfers by a. s~.1pplier in order to maintain 8. posi tioYl 
of hegemony or domination either within the receiving 
country or more widely within the world. Arms may be 
supplied to non-arms producing cOlmtries to support 
a particular political group or cla~s, or prevent 
another faction from assuming poweL. Certainly the 
u.s. used its military assistance programme in Turkey 
to reinforce anti-co~~unisB and e~courage support for 
the West, and lllI!.erica in particular, against the 
u. S. S.R. Yet 51.. hegehl.onic posi tion cannot be maintain2d 
throur~ ar~s supplies .... lore ~Y'i-I +'r'e l· ,;:;eo: :):c-i,-'pl roi e c. ......:.., ..-.. ..1. !."- v...... ...-'. .......:..,.. -"...;...-- -
. 
of !:'lili tary eeuca tion and trainin.g 1':':-'0 sr a...."'llTe s pro~.~ided 
~ 
by the U.S. in Turkey were, perhaps, even more vital 
to continued U.S. domination. Furthermore, the 'nutual 
competition' between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.3.. to 
increas~ their s~he~~s of ~nfluencc in the rest of 
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trans1'ers, particularly to Third ','(orld countrtes. 
the 19608 the U.S. changed its arns supply strateGY 
away from the concept of 'IT.assive retaliation' towards 
, flexible response', which implied a vrillingness to 
use conventional forces in combat. The weakness of 
Turkey in its ability to engage in external conflict 
also led the U.S. to concentrate its aid on "training 
and equipping local forces to co~nter internal 
oIl .' t· ,,16 d ° + d h 6 gu.erl. a opera lons, all 1. v was uring t e 19 Os 
that the U.S. exports of major weapons to Turkey began 
to decline. 
The second factor determining not so much the 
pattern but the level of arms transfers relates to the 
economic adva.ntages of large scale production. Even 
if an arms industry can be kept viable by domestic 
consumption alone there are still enormous pressures 
to reduce the ~ost of arms by expanding the market 
and thus achieving lower unit costs of production. 
Arms transfers abroad permit longer production runs, 
which reduces the unit cost of overheads like research 
and development and fixed items of capital. A longe~ 
production run also inc:'eases productive efficiency 
and.labour and naterial costs per unit can be 
expected to fall as experience is gained. The willing-
ness. of producer countries to sell arms also depends 
on the prices that can be charged, although the 
. 
existence of two major suppliers, eaCh. -vying for 
influence, may often result in prices below full 
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cost. Furt~ermore, do~estic demand for particular 
arms nay fluctuate and 2xports can go some ':ray 
towards filling surplus capacity.17 The savings on 
U.S. p~ocurement costs due to arms sales have been 
shown to 8mount to about 7 per cent, or ne2.rly half 
of one per cent of the mili tary budget, 18 a"t1d the 
absolute level of dollars involved runs into hundreds 
of millions. 
There are also financial gains to be made from 
selling old or second hand lliilitary equipment. The 
pace of weapons technology is very fast and obsolescence 
becomes ever more pressing yet old arms continue to be 
sold. Turkey was receiving supplies of F-86 Sabre 
aircraft in the late 1960s even though these had been 
produced in the early 1950s. For the supplying country 
selling second ~and is better th~~ scrapping, for 
example the aged M-47 Patton medium tank was estimdted 
to be worth $2~000 in the early 1970s ~et they were 
sold by the U.S. at %32,000 each. 19 
There may well be a conflict bet'.veen hege:r::.onic 
interests and economic' efficiency, since -::'_2ximising 
exports of arms WQul-d re~uire selling to any country 
even if that country was pro-communist, and it w01.1.ld 
also require a guarantee of follow up supplies and 
spare p~lrts, which could mean the supplie~ loses control 
01' lcver~:1 Ce over 3uppl ie s • ==oreover, a hegemonic 
policy May require the giving of arms as grant-aid 
• 
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which may generate higher levels of production but 
. 
cannot be justified in te:-c:ts of economic profi tubili tv . 
., 
The third fuctor influencing supply is the 
restrictive factor whereby the supplier declines to 
provide arms to cOlmtries if it is likely to dravi the 
supplier into local, national, region2~ or interna.tional 
confli l~t.. This third factor may operate against the 
industrial and/or hegemonic interests, which create 
pressures to supply arms. The U.S. arms embargo on 
Turkey introduced in 1975 was a ·special form of 
restrictive policy, since it was imposed pending 
withdrawal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, 
yet it clearly created a conflict of hegemonic interests 
for the U.S. because of Greece's position in N.A.T.O., 
and also restricted potential sa~es of arms to Turkey. 
One of the consequences of the embargo was that 
Turkey bega.:r! -t~J look around f or alternative supplies 
of arms a..nd entered into negotiations with the U.S.S.R. 
for SJJ.I-6 and SAM-7 low al ti tude missiles. 20 The 
developing Turkish-Soviet friendship was crucial in 
the U.S. decision to end the arms embargo and indicated 
shifting hege~Qnic interests. 
Facto~s Influencing the Dema~d for Arms 
In 1925 Turkey had signed a Treaty of neutrality 
and frie~ld8hip ';,:i ~h the Joviet Tlnion w~1ich was re~:e\'1ed 
in 1929 Rnd again in· 1931, and exte~ded for ten years 
Relations betwee~ Turkey and the Soviet 
_ 'J'Jl _ 
Union at this time ~;.'ere good, and -,vi-len in 1936, at 
a Conference at l;~ontreux, full Turkish sovereig:'1i t:: 
over the Straits through the Dardanelles was 
restored, the Soviet Union signed the Convention 
and thus recognised Turkey's right to fortify 811d 
defend the Straits. After 1936 relations be"tween 
Turkey 8.nd .the Soviet Union deteriorated, partly 
because of conflict over the establishment of a 
Communist Party in Turkey, but mainly because in 1939. 
the Soviet Un';"un demanded changes in the Montreux 
Convention which would have given her participation 
in control of the Straits. 22 During the Second World 
War the U.S.S.R. dropped her ~pmands for revision of 
the I/lontrell..-X: Convention" but in 1945 in::ormed Turkey 
that the Treaty of friendship and non-aggression would 
not be renewed when. it expired l~~ ter that" year. The 
period immediately after the War was one of extreme 
uncertainty 101' Turkey as an important part of her 
territory was "vhreatened by Soviet expansionism. 
Arms were demrulded for security, to defend the nation 
state egainst possible Soviet aggression~ yet Turkey 
was in no position economically to acquire weapons. 
A desire to acquire arms for security redsons is not 
sufficient to crea.te demand, since there must also be 
the means or resources to carry through the transaction, 
but as Turkey was strategically very important to the 
bl - t' r S A West, :ni~_"i tary aid '\v~;.s made availa e b"JT ; ... 1.e ...;. • -.. 
which finaxlced the transfer of arms. 
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A second factor that may influen86 the demand for 
arms is the desire of political leaders to affi~D the 
national identity, which is often centred on a strong, 
modern mili tary insti tution. The influence of Ataturl~ 
has been all pervasive in Turkish politics and as a 
military man who led the fight for national liberation 
against the Greeks he ensured that the army has had 
.. 
a specia~ role in Turkish society. With the founding 
of the modern Turkish state in the 19208 Ataturk 
declared its j)oli tical obj ecti ve as "peace at home and 
peace in the world", but this peace, it was ill1~erstood, 
could only be achieved through strength. This expression 
of national strength and uni-~~;' was adopted by subsequent 
Turktsh leaders, and has meant a commitment to a large 
well-equipped military establishment. 
A third .factor in the demand for arms ha.s been 
'. 
the role of tne armed forces in politics in Turkey. 
The great power of the military in Turkey where it 
has been the final guarantor of economic and social 
stabili toy a.."YJ.d pro-Western orientation has ensured 
arms requirements have been given priority. 
It is possible .that these three factors illay be 
related. The demand for arms is increased when war 
breaks out or is threatened, yet wax may. be a product 
of na.tionalist rivalry and disputes over territory. 
]!~oreove:r) ar!':led conflict may oe more lilrely t:18 
greater the stock of. weapons ~osses2ed·by a country. 
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But it is not only national rivalry that causes ar::.s 
r,~,-ces, the rapid rate that I1ili tary hardvlare becomes 
obsolete means that there must be a continuous re-
investment in the latest technology if security fu'1.d 
strategic factors are to mean anything, and the 
latest most sophisticated weapons can only be obtained 
through imports for most L.D.C.s. 
Supply end Demand Factors ?cel·-:1.ted 
The arms trade more than any,other can be seen 
as an expression of a particular relationship between 
the supplier and the recipient. Turkey and the U. s . .J;i.. 
ho.ye been members of the same military alliance in 
the post-War period, but it has been the U.S.A. as 
the supplier that has largely de,termined the form and 
. 23 
size of the flow of arms. Luckham (1978) describes 
". 
the recipient countries as 'clients' vvho are dependent 
on the superpowers to sell or donate apms and it is 
the 'dialectic' of the arms race taking place between 
the supplying countries that determines the kind of 
arms that are transfer~ed. ~his means that the 
superpowers sell weapons which are either surplus 
to their own needs or which flow from existing 
production lines. 24 The U.S.A. as one of the two 
superpowers has satisfied Turkey's demand for arms 
because it has been in llJIlerica t s interest in its 
struggle for 7!orld hegemony. This important determinant 
of the transfer of arms does not denY that there has ,- .., . 
.. 
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been a coincidence of aims between Turkish ,military 
and political leaders 821d U.S. governments, but the 
arms were only supplied as long as Turkey remained 
a disciplj,ned" and reslJonsible member of N • . fJ .• T.O. 
Turkey was willing to rely almost exclusively on the 
U.S.A. for arms supplies, even though this put her 
in a position of dependency with ./I..merica, because 
the weapons vlere supplied as grant aid. The 
deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations after 1974, 
and the subseq,uent arms emba.rgo, did not cause Turkey 
to reduce its arms imports, on the contrary she began 
to look for alternative sources of supply and was 
willi!<: to comrni t vast sums of foreign exchange to 
acquire arms in spite of a declining economic position. 
Th0 rpr:U:'\0P \"88 the conflict over, Cyprus :;I,nd the !_eeean, 
and the mounting. social and poli,1;ical unrest internally, 
all" of vvhich required a strong mili tary posi tion. 
,0 
t 
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The U. S. 111i1i tary Assistance PrograILrne 
-Turkey has been a vital member of N.A.T.O.'s 
southern flank since 1952. It is the only country 
within N.A.T.O., apart from Norway, to share a border 
with the U.S.S.R., and Turkey also has a common 
border with Bulgaria, another member of the Warsaw 
Pact. Turkey's position at the Eastbrn end of the 
Mediterranean where it controls the crucial Turkish 
Straits means that it can regulate the flow of Soviet 
naval forces between the Aegean and Black Seas. 
Turkey controls strategically vital airspa.ce and 
until recent years has provided essential,intelligence 
facilities. Turkey also stands at the crossroads 
between East and West, and North and South and the 
world I S greatest known oil reseryes lie n,ear to' Turkey. 
The position of Turkey-is so important that it is 
virtually a firebreak, a fire wall optween the Middle 
East and the Soviet Union. 25 ,26 
Within N.A.T.O.'s'southern flank the headCluarters 
of the /t~lied IJandforces Southeastern Europe (LA~mSOUl:=-r-
EAST) are si tuated at 'Izmir and these forces are 
responsi ble for the .land defence of Greece and Turkey • 
• In the event of war breaking out with the Soviet Union 
on the southern flank LANDSOUTHEAST would be the main 
N.A.T.O. defensive force. Turkey's contribution to 
Lli~mSOUTLI=!~T is considerable, since the co~:-_a'l1d c():~2ists 
of three Turkish Armies together with the N.A.T.O. 
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t.llted Tactical lur FOTces, botb staffe:l by ~u!'i:ish, 
Bri tish, Italian and J\:-nerican perso:ru:.el. 
which is the !T. .1\. T. O. ti tIe fOT the U. S. Sixth Fleet, 
has its headqu3.2:'ters afloat, but =Ls 8~SO depe1:.dent orl 
Turkey for rest facilities. 27 
r 
After the Second ~orld ~ar Britain had taken 
responaibility for supplying Greece and Turkey with 
military and economic aid. The assista.nce to Turkey 
was to help maintain the large army that was required 
to counter Soviet threats, but Turkey was very poor 
and the modernisation of the army demanded resources 
that neither Britain nor Turkey possessed. In February 
1947 Britain informed the U.S.A. that it could. no 
longer maintain its support for Greece and Turkey and 
this prompted the U. S. government to step. in and fill 
the gap. Gl'eece was, p'erhaps·, seen as the greates·t 
and most UT,~e1'lt problem, because of the 'danger' of 
Communist takeover, 2~ but Turkey too w~.s under threat 
from Soviet expansion, and even though the Turkish 
H,rny still contained more than five hundred thousa.1'J.d 
men i tUwas still (in 1948) hors e-drawn, equipped 7ii t~l 
~:.;orld ';',iar One ':,'eapons, ill-trained., poorly fed a.nd 
ino.~equately c1othed." (Lerner and ?.obinson, 1960).29 
Because of the continued Soviet threat, Turkey was 
ready to accept assistance from the U.S. under what 
became known as the Truman Doctrine. In President 
TruP.')2.n i s :!:ess2,";e to Congress, T.~3.rch 12, 1947 the 
dap.gers of Cornrnunis:n \vere spel t ou t ~ It We P 
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( 
made clear that the U.S. on behalf of the West P.lust 
take iW_ Y:1edi8,te action to [',uP:t;ort Greece 2.nd Turkey 
in their fight against interne,l revolution and 
external threat. 
"I believe th8,t vIe must assist free ~Jeoples to 'v"iorlc 
out their OVll'l destinies in their OVln vlaYfJ •.• Should 
we fail to aid Greece Rnd Turkey in this fateful hour 
the effect will be far reaching to the West as veIl as 
the East. n30 
At the same time as President Tru.man gave his 
messa.ge to Conp-ress he 2,sked for JJ400 million for tt_e 
perind ending 30 June 1948 for Greece and Turkey (of 
which ,$100 million was for Turkey), and for authorisation 
to send selected U.S. personnel to those c01LYltries, and 
to l)rovide Greek and Turkish IJel?sonnel with mili t2,ry 
training. The Bill, which becane known 8.S Public L8,V; 
-
75, VIas aplJroved by the House on 22 May 1947 and it 
began to be ihlple~ented i~nediately. Between May and 
July 1947 the Pen~agon completed a preliminary survey 
of Turkey's military needs but before an aid rnis2ion 
could be sont to Turkey it was necessary for the 
Turkish Assembly to. ratify an aid agreement. There 
, 
was some dissent over certain 2spects of the agreement 
that Washington presented to Turkey. The Americans 
wanted to eYl,sure there would be free access for U.S. 
officials 2nd jOl;;.rYl~:lists to obr-erve t be aid -JrO!"'Y'~--:-,e - ..J.. '- - .- .-.- , 
the right to supervise it, the right to restrict the 
usc of U.S. assistance and terminate the proCr[mLT!l.e 
if recirJ}·ent governments faile~ to carry out t~eir 
co ur nees ,,31 a...,s . Cl. • In the face of ~urtish oPposition the 
u.s. government agreed to change 30me of the details 
of the agreement, but the essential content renained 
unchanged and ensured U.S. leverage in Turkey. 
i,~!j th the agreement signed the aiel prograrmne .c-ot o 
u-nderwtlY. The major short run objective was to 
modernise the Turkish army which possessed obsolete 
equipment. The U.S. took on the responsibility of 
providing all the equipment required by the Turkish 
army, including vebicles, communications systems, 
artillery, machine guns and small arms, l.'luch of which 
32 was surplus to Pffierican needs. Later on during the 
1950s the Turkish air force was equipped with Sabre 
3~ jets, ]1-5s and ]1-104 supersonic a.ircraft ~d helicopters • ..) 
By 1959 Turkey had acquired long range surface to air 
, '1 ~4 1 th h d bId b' d mlSSl es~ . ann e navy a een oane su ffiarlnes an 
destroyers. 35 However,much of the early equipment 
received. by the Turkish army was misused because of 
la.ck of training, and as a consequence was breaking 
down. By eHrly 1950 almost a half of the trucks acquired 
by tbe ~'l).rk::'sh ar:r.y were non-operational and the main 
1 ... d 36 rea~on was th~t they had not been proper y maln~alne • 
The American response which was adopted for all 
the major milita.ry aid progra.m.mes - Greece, Turkey, 
Ir~~.n, P2}=istan - -;[8.S to send a fully staffed :':ili tary 
Assis tance Advisory Group or =.:ission C.1. A. A. G.) which 
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had the job of providing essential instruction in 
the use and maintenance of eq~ipment. One of the 
major functions of the M.A.A.G. was to administer 
the American mili tary grant aid programme ~Hhich vIas 
vital to maintaining U.S. influence and control, 
although in later years the LI • .A.A.G.s also became 
an essential tool in the U.S. ~ilitary sales drive. 37 
l~though much of the training provided by the U.S. 
missions \',78.S of a technical nature they also furnished 
Turkish officers with Ha rudimentary general education" 
which had the "advantage of permitting a maximum 
exp"osure to U.S. and Western values and ways of 
thinlc .. ::::g and acting. ,,38 :lVIost of the training provided 
by the J~ericans was performed in Turkey by skilled 
°1'+ :]. °1' , ° ., + ml_lvary aDQ ClVl lan personne~ asslgneQ vO 
missions. In October 1948 there: were 374" American 
military and ci vilia"Yl personnel serving in the mi1itary 
missi,on', and this had increased to 1364 by April 1952' , 39 
whereafter it declined to reach 602 in 1965. 40 
By 1951 25,000 officers and men had been trained 
by the U.S. military mission in the use of equipment,41 
:l 
but a much STaller nu=n.ber than. this (2,200 by JUYle 1952) 
wer~ trained in specific skills as drivers, machine 
. 
operators and mechanics,42 and even at the peak of the 
training programme only 21 .. 1merican speCialists were 
employed in teaching Turkish workers. A number of 
Turks also received military training in the U.S.~. 
Up,to June 1952 62 Turks were, or had received such, 
• 
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traininG_ E~ch trainee remained in tne U.S.A. for siz 
to twelve months but the Turklsh government paid the 
costs of the training as well as the salaries of the 
trainees and their transportation costs, while the 
U.S. government merely paid the trainees' living 
expenses in the U.S.A. Although the U.S. continued 
to prov:Lde instruction for Turkish personnel in the 
use and maintenance of· equipment throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s it was on a much smaller scale tha...YJ. in the 
early ;)rears, and averaged less than a thousand a yea:r 
between 1950-69. 43 
Another top priority recognised by the U.S. 
military mission was the need to construct a network 
of all-weather highways. The prime concern of the 
Americans was to build roads that would facilitate 
the movement of a mechanised army and help to integrate 
nationa~ security, but the programme was also justified 
on ec·onomic grounds in that 1 t would O1"'en up to trade 
parts of the country that were formerly inaccessible. 
It may have been that Turkey neglected to-build a11-
weather roads earlier, especially in trIG Eastern 
prov '~ b o.l~ t11e fear +h~t t'ne\T ml_'~ht be used luces, eca.use u u. .; '-' 
by other countries as invasion routes, but the U.S. 
~. 
military mission regarded them as essential to the 
defence of ~he Southern fla:r1k of Europe. 44 The highway 
prograrnme was ini tiated as part of· the ·1~ili tary 
As~:nstf:L';'cc Programr:le U,l.l,.P.). An agreement waS 
reached between the U.S. Public Roads Administration 
• 
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and the Turkish General Staff whereby the for~er 
would supervise a road. building programme and train 
a number of Turkish army personnel to operate and 
maintain road construction machinery. 
The highway programme resulted not only in the 
constructi.on of a new system of primary roads, on 
which the main effort was concentrated, but also a 
!letwork of secondary roads throughout the Turkish 
countryside. In 1950 there were 15,000 miles of 
primary roads which had been increased to 27,000 
miles by 1962. 45 Although the road building progr~"'U.e 
had its origins .in the H.A.P. it was mainly carried 
out by the Turkish civilian. Highway .Administration. 
u.s. aid in the form of materials, e~uipment and 
supplies provided %32,156,000 towards Turkish road 
development between late 1947 and March 1953 but 
during the S3.me period Turkey had spent the eCluivalent 
of %177,000,000, dravvn from domestic rr~sources. 46 
Closely related to the road programme was the 
naval proe;r31J1:me ':;hich resulted in the establisr.l.IJlent 
of port facilities on ·the r,Iedi terranean coast~ By 
1954 four major new ~orts were in operation which were 
vit~l for the operation of the American Sixth Fleet, 
although this programme also satisfied economic as well 
as military objectives. 
To-tal U. S. mili tary assistance for Turkey in the 
period 1948-60 was substantial and averaged about 67 
• 
. 
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per cent of , Turkish domestic military expenditure, 
with a minimum of 21.9 per cent in 1950 and a 
maximum of over 110 per cent in 1957 and 1958, vlhich 
was the high ~oint in U.S. military aid·to the forward 
defence areas. The details of U.S. military assistance 
to Turkey are given in Table 6.3, but there must be 
some uncertai.nty over the validi ty of the figures 
presented. 47 Lerner ~nd Robinson48 quote a figure 
of %2 billion of U.8. mili tary assista..:"'1.ce received by 
Turkey up to 1959, and other estimates have beer: even 
higher. 49 
In the period 1948 to 1960 most of the militexy 
aid that Turkey received from the U.S. throueh the 
Military Assistance Programme was in the form of a 
grant requiring no Turkish repay.ments. The U.S. 
M.P..P. VIas designed to meet the needs of the forward 
defence areas, and as Table 6.4 ShOl.MS, during the 
19508 only a :=-mall proportion, of all U.S. arms 
trffi~sfers were in the form of foreign sales, the vast 
proportion being in the form of gra:."'1ts. By the 
Mutu.al Security Act of 1954 control of U.S. arms sales 
lay wi th the President, and it was he ·.7~lO would 
detcruine what constituted 'iI!J.plements of Vlar I. Up 
to 1961, and the Foreign Assistance Act of that year, 
over go per cent of U.S.' arms tr~nsfers to the rest of 
the world were as military grants. 
From 1961 to 1968 u.s. military grant aid declined 
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T A]3L'S 6.3 
U ,< 
.... 'J • 
~~·l·t ,'1 __ l er'! 
.-'~ 
2~d LC onorr.i c As .~ i s ~ ~.Y1 C e to 
rpur'~ r-.-:r 
-- •.. '''':-1. 1948-601.- i ") i. r:lillion at curr~::~t "C::.~ices 
~'.li li tary Economic ~~i1i t2T~r _," s s . ,,-::;, 
If 
. ~ 
Assistance !-cS s is ~ P'=''1C e ~r 0= ='ur~ish I)o~. v _ i~ 
Ye,Jr 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
19)'( 
laSS J; . 
1959 
1960 
Total 
- -
n01·t 
.. 1 1 C3.ry "",:1-V-~ 2:"'E -.J..J._V 
72.0 50.0 38.3 
55.0 5.2 27.9 
46.5 48.7 21.9 
58.5 35.2 25.3 
145.0 86.3 72.6 
174.1 54.2 95.8 
219.9 41.9 93.1 
164.9 86.1 88.6 
170.9 115.1 94.0 
208.1 179.0 110.1 
251.1 112.6 111.6 
125.1 167.1 67.2 
86.9 103.3 32.9 
l777.9 1084. 'f 
Source: I.::-.F., Ba18Ylce of P2YLlents Ye8rooo~-<:, 
Turkey Sbeets, October 1954; also 
F2Cts i Washington, 1963, pp. 30-31. 
Quoted in F.C. Shorter, OPe cit. pp. 38-39. 
J...ge"llcy for In~ernational ::)evelop:nent, U. S. 
Eco~omic Assistance Programmes, 1948-69, 
'1' -.." 1070 
,.a2.11ng iJ on, ,.) • 
U rt • i:J • l~ms ~r8nsfer lG~eements, 1950-73, in 
g ~i11ion, current prices 
1950s 1960s 1970-73 1974-73 
Grants 2,213,877 1,080,855 3,159,863 686,529 
Sales 
F.M.S. 
Agreements 162,371 1,010,749 2,523,730 12,509,100 
Commercial 
Exports 405,029 1,016,552 
Total 
Current 2,376,248 2,091,604 6,088,622 14,121,18::' 
Total 
Constant 
(1978 const:mt 
dolks) 6,137,887 5,292,785 9,769,081 2.6,399,333 
Source: Report of the Comptroller General of the 
United states, ID-79-22 (U.S. Government 
~ccounting Office, Washington D.C., 21 
May 1979<), appendix 1. 
Quoted. in S.l.P.E.I. 1980 Yearbo()l~, p.67. 
2 '~h 
- '" I -..-..,
r[;\pidly and arms sales rose indirect propo~tion, as 
is sllown i.n Table 6.4. In 1968 there was an P.meriC2-11 
atte~pt to control the sales of arms through the 
Foreign ISili tary Sales (p .~!I.S.) Act, which formally 
separated sales from grant aid. The immediate reason 
for this legislation was to reduce the U.S. defence 
burden abroad, for, as Smith (1978)50 explains, 
"foreign military sales will allow substituting for 
what in many cases ~ight otherwise be a vastly more 
expensive direct military presence. 1t .A.J5 the :'il.A.P. 
declined in importance after 1968 the U.S. introduced 
F .J;~.S • credits which went through the same funding 
procedure 8.S M.A.P. and were designed to bridge the 
gap with F.M.S. cash sales. The credits granted by 
the U.S. were guaranteed by the U.S. Department of 
Defence from its appropriated funds, while the finance 
came mainly from the Federal Financing Bank. In order 
-
to control the level of F.~.S. crediLs restrictions 
were introduced and every purchaser h~a to enter into 
an agreement which set out what was to be purchased, 
the terms, the interest rate and the repayment schedule. 
t ' d l' . th ~t; ~ p after 196~. In spite of ne ec .... lne In e .,d .t:....~ • ~ -
. 
Turkey, along wi th a haJldful of other countries 
'\ 
(including Greece and Israel) continued to receive 
military grant aid throuehout the 1960s right up until 
the ar:!lS emb2Tgo that followed the invasion of Cyprus. 
Furtherinore, the permanent u.;:;. =,,~ ... ,~. ~~ .. G. in Turkey 
. 
ensured that Turkish military procurement was consistent 
• 
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with U.S. policy. It was the responsibility of each 
M. A. A.G. to "assist the foreign goverThLlent in m!:!.king 
its decisions, dissuading it from those that constitute 
an unwise allocation of resources or that othervrise 
do not contribute effectively to the achievement of 
U.S. objectives. u5l AJ3 Table 6.5 shows U.S. milita.ry 
assistance after 1961 was considerably less than it 
.. 
had been in the 1950s and apart from the immediate 
years following the 1960 military coup represented a 
declining proportion of domestic military expenditure, 
but most of the assistance continued to be in the form 
of grant aid.' Even in 1973 the last 'normal' year 
before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the arms 
embargo, grant aid dominated U.S. military assistance 
to Turk8y~ !-<s Table 6.6 indicates. 
The decision by the U.S. Congress to stop all militery 
aid to Turkey !}ut a,..YJ. end to the M.A.P. but a partial 
lifting of the ban gave Turkey $125 million of military 
credit in 1975-76 and the same in 1976-77, with 
t175 miJlion in 1977-78. These credit limits were 
considerably below the %340 million per year: that weald 
haV"e been nvailable from various sources if t~e fo.ur-
4- • ~. 1'I/f h ;year defence co-operation agreemen u slgnev. lrl marc ... 
t 
1974 had been approved by the U.S. Congress. Moreover~ 
the limi t on credit and sales mea..YJ.t that Turkey had 
to pay more for its ::nilitary equipment than otherwise, 
. 
and the' credi ts gr&nted by th8 U.S. T{{e~e soon swe~low'ed 
uP. by 40 Phantom· jet fighter bOL1bers purchased at an 
• 
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T "~~. --c;, 6 5 .J 1.--,l.J~ • 
.'..38 istance 
to Turkey, selected years, 1961-73, 
• TT"'" d In 0.0. p Dillion at curyent prices 
7"Tili t ~-""-T 1;... Cr'''':'''' ,/ Econo:1ic 
AssistBnce ,A.s sis t al'}C e 
V'l "t ~,:l_l ~~r7 ./s s . as 
" -
,~ of Turki~h :021. , . 
"TO l' t "!:"(Dre , , h~ r 
.,.l ...L :::: • .1..', ..J __ _ ~ 
1961 131 126 
1962 172 188 
1963 155 2-7 5. 
1968 122 110 
1973 149 71 
Source: As for Table 6.3, also U.S. Economic 
Assistance Programmes, 1976 A.I.D., 
Washington, D.C. 
", 
TABLE' 6.6 
to Turkey in _1973 in U. s . . '3 ~il1ion 
1',iiIi t~y Assistance Grants 
Foreign ~Iili tary Credit Sales 
Excess Defence !uticles 
Ship To ~:ns 
Total =\.~ili tary 
• 
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85.6 
15.0 
.1(;.0 
5.1 
148.7 
v 
43.7 
52.3 
44.5 
21.4 
17.7 
Jt.I.~'. ~conoj:;lic . . t l-:.3SlS ance 43.0 
Narcotics Control 15.0 
P.L. 480 13.0 
Total ~cono:r~ic 
-71.0 
Total ;~.~i 1 i t ary and Economic 219.7 
Source: S "1· • ,8lSSInaYl, OPe cit., pp. 246-7 
estimated cost of %480 million. 52 
The arms embargo hit Turkey very hard because 
she ,\vas almost totally dependent on the U.S. for her 
arms yet was put in the position of ~aving only 
restricted access to U.S. arms and military spares 
even on a cash basis. In response ~o the embargo 
Turkey turned to her other N.A.T.O, n.~rtners - Britain, 
France, W. Ger'TIany, Italy and Norway - to obtain 
necessary arms. In spite of Turkey's serious balance 
. of payments problems, which cau;::;ed both I .~LF. and 
If.A.T.O. offieials to express concern towards the end 
of 1977, -tbe country was spending more Ci. defence th~-v:. 
the.economy could bear. The estimate for military 
expenditure for 1977-78 was %2.63 billion, which 
represented nearly 30 per cent of the budget, a...."1d 
. Turkey 'Nas also paying $'500 million each yeer on 
, 
ac~uiring ar:ns. 4~ the teflsio~ over Cyprus and the 
Aeeean dispute increased after 1974 Turkey -.vas 
• 
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compelled to continue· blJ_ying heavily from abroad. 
Of the other N.A.T.O. countries only ',vest Germa'1.Y 
provided any military assistance, about $100 million 
a year, part.ly through its offici.al military aid 
programme and partly through guaranteeing credits on 
arms exports to Turkey. But the Turkish econony in 
the second half of the 1970s was in a serious 
condition and guarantees were very difficult to 
find so that some of the arms that Turlcey wished to 
iTIport, like 180 Leopard tanks, had to be postponed. 53 
The U.S. arms embargo was not finally lifted 
until August 1978, but the increased military aid 
that began to flow from that time could not prevent 
the Turkish economic and political situation from 
further deteriorating. On 29 March 1980 the U.S. 
signed a five year defence 8.greement with Turkey which 
provided a first instalment of %250 million a.ssistance. 
In addi tion West Germany W~1S planning in 1980 a 
military aid package worth %500 million. The Bonn 
agreemerJt was to transfer to Turkey a large number 
of F-I04 fighters and ground attack aircraft which 
would be 8urp111s to Ger:n.any' s needs when its ow--:'.. 
air force received more adva...'1.ced fighters. -;\'est 
• 
Germany a~so pledge~ to supply over 200 Leopard t~1S 
to replace some of the ageing American built lli-47s 
"and M-48s that were still the basis of the Turkish 
arnour8d forces. Several years of arms embarco had 
left large numbers of tne P.merica"l tanks inoperable 
. 
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and the West Germa."Y1.s also pledged spare parts to 
restore them. Turkey was also particularly keen to 
receive spare parts froTI the U.S. to revive 93 F-4 
Phantoms which '.vere considered superior' to the F-I04 
Starfighters. 54 
The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of :~ms 
Up until 1961 almost the whole of the arms 
transfers received by Turkey were through the U.S. 
M.A.P. and did not affect the import capacity of the 
country directly to any great extent. In this period, 
up to 19?1,. the consequences of the arms tra.YJ.sfers 
for the Turkish economy were felt through the condttions 
that were attached to the military agreement between 
Turkey and the U.S.A. After the Second World War the 
u. S. 'used its foreign mili tary policy to Daintain its 
hegemonic posi tion in the world. ir'..r~'l-~ey was encouraged, 
indeed re~uirej, to commit a very large proportion of 
its domestic resources to the military establishment~ 
.partly to meet the needs of N.A.T.O. and the Western 
Alliance, but also to ensure that the country 'lIQuId 
develop, both economically &-YJ.d· poli tic ally, in 
sym~athy with the Western world. The military were 
assigned a key role in the development process in 
Turkey and other countries, and a general case was 
made out by some v7estern politicians, poli tical 
scierltists and economists that the rJili tary being a 
moder-:::., rational and burea"vlcratical1y organised 
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institution wus ideally suited to initiate development, 
and guide the political system accordingly.55 
The indirect conseQuences of the arms transfers 
Vlere, therefore, that Turkey committed an enormous 
level of scarce domestic resources to defence and that 
Lhe pattern of development was structured such that 
the Tu.rkish e:::;onomy became integrated into, and 
dependent on, the economies of the industrialised 
countries. To understa.."'1.d this latter it is necessary 
to show a causal link between the arms tr8.nsfers and 
the flo'lNs of economic assistance and . private foreign 
capital. This is taken up in the next section. 
In addition to the indirect effects of arms 
transfers on the Turkish economy, there were after 
1961 more direct effects as military grants began 
to be replaced by credit sales. During the 19608 and 
particularly a.fter 1974, when nearly all military 
imports into T~rkey had to be purchased ruld even 
credit was difficult to obtain, arms transfers began 
to p1!.lce strains on the bale.TIce of payments thus 
reducing the capaci ty of. Turkey to import vThat wa.s 
required for the industrialisation effort. 
The arms trade accounts for no more than 2 per 
cent ot world commodity trade, yet for Turkey the 
share of military imports in total imports was as high 
. 
l.lE~~r cent in 1969 and VIas over 15 per cent ir.. 1978 
vilien ~~e eco~omy was in the ~idst of its worst crisis 
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in the post-r;8T period. r-'he s~1aY'e of L~ili to.ry 
iI1?Orts tn ~1J.Tkish trade is presented in Table S. 7, 
but there is no way of knowing the true level of 
military imports56 since the recorded volu~e is only 
part of that flow, so that the strains imposed by 
them may be even greater than that indicated. 
Th~ burden of military imports on the development 
effort c~~ better be understood by reference to those 
imports vlhich are essential to Turkish industrialisation. 
C2tegory number 7 of the Standard International Trade 
Cla,ssification consists of machinery and tranGport 
equipment, Bnc1 these imports represent the contribution 
of imported technology in total imports. 57 For the 
five years considered in Table 6.7 the average 
proportion of military imports to foreign. capital 
imports was over 48 per cent, and' was marginally above 
that figure in the crisis year of 1978. Since military 
imports are pri marily for military pur~_oses they 
crulnot be expected to contribute to an expansion of 
h8 
.productive capacity,J nor do they increase present 
or future consumption, therelo~e they represe~t a 
h~ ;) t t ~. d .L. 1· t· ./~ re~uc ion in the potential ra e o~ ln~us~rla lsa lone 
, 
In addition to the volume of military imports' it 
:Ls also important to consider the form that they take. 
During the 1950s most of the ar~s transfe~red to 
T~rkey were in general surplus or obsolete types, 
0110. a la.rL?;e part \7ere second hand and in the process 
.. 
• 
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Ye2T 
1965 
1969 
1972 
1973 
1978 
_T_h-..;e~S:-.[....:la;;;..T;;...p;;...~ _o,;:...;f~:.'ili·:::; :::cry I~r.ports 
in Turkisll TT':'.cle. 1965-78 ; 
Imnorts of 
I t CI4' ~ Ii l "'" r-, 1 mnor s ~ u ~~ no.:-
- ....... ~-;..-~- I~'lpo:rt s 
in F.3.%TI!. in U.S.%:-.l. in U.S.p'::'l.)S of total 2S ~~ of 
572 
747 
1508 
2099 
4479 
1 
214 
301 
677 
864 
1372 
YlO. 7 = 
83 
241 
327 
205 
6772 
... ,,- ~. 
, ''''''''lnery lJJ C:.l.\'" 1.-'. J. , 
Equ;ipment 
irrroorts 
+ 
14.5 
32.5 
21.7 
9.8 
15.1 
Tr81l.3port 
SITC nc.: 
38.7 
80.1 
48.3 
23.7 
49.3 
2 1978 data was given by S.l.P.R.I. in 
1975, u.s. tm. prices, and an estimate 
waS obtained for current prices by 
assuming an annual inflation rate of 
10 pe:r cent 
Source: 1965-73, Uni ted Nations, COr:lI'1o,di ty 
Trade Statistics, StatisticEl P2pe~2, 
S'eri es D; U. S" Ar'S13 Control and 
Disarmament Agency, ~lorld =;~ili tary 
Expenditure 2lld Arms Transfers, 
1964-73, Washington D.C. 1974 • 
. Quoted by Lc~k and 7[ulf, op. cit. 
1978, U olT. Yearbook of In-terl1c ... -:ic~lal 
Tr&de Statistics, 1979; S.I.P.rt.I., 
1980 Yearboo~{ .,' 
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of being replaced by the U. s.!~. On the 711:01e these 
arms v/ere sinGle weapons requiring Ii ttle more in 
the way of spares, support equipment and service. 
But the predoninant pattern of militarisation in 
L.D.C.s has been based on the structure found in the 
Dore developed countries. Since the 1970s the armed 
fOl'"'ces of Turkey have increasingly been based on the 
complex technologically sophisticated 'weapon system' 
- the main battle tank, the capital ship and the 
combat 2.ircraft. These systems could only be imported, 
but once the decision had been taken there was a 
commitment to a lot more. A squadron of modern 
combb~ aircraft can require the support of several 
hundred dlversely skilled people and the availability 
of hundreds or even thousends of components if it is 
to operate at anything like its :potential effectiveness. 60 
What tlJis has mea.nt is that Turkey has been required to 
illaJce lo.rge addi tional investments in the training and 
education of operators, maintenance personnel and 
technical staff, and to call.in outside aid in the 
I 
. form of technical and mili tary advisors, as well as 
providing a special i~frastructure, and all of this 
to be included on t~e debi~ side. In so far as there 
are"civil.iari spin-offs from military investment 
the opportunity cost is reduced, but it is by no means 
certain th[1.t mili tary skills and capi tal will have 
positive extern2-1 effects, nor is it necessarily a 
cost effective VfFlY of promoting development objectives. 
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Detail~d information on the chain of supplementary 
domestic and import demand set up by arns i:nports is 
not available, but some of the additional costs can 
be ill-ustrate'Ci. In the early 1970s the Turkish Air 
Force possessed mainly F-I04, F-IOO, F-84 and F-86 
aircraft,61 and for every hour that one of these 
! planes spent flying the rlaintenance a.11.d operating 
costs alone 8Jllounted to %250, but in addition 30 man-
hours were necessary for repair, and each aircraft 
needed four men for operational maintenance. To 
provide a field organisation, with all the necessary. 
service and support, 50 more men were required per 
aircraft. On top of this it t.)ok about 3 years to 
train an aircraft mechanic with a good educational 
By the late 1970s the Turkish Air Force included two 
squadrons with F-4 Phantoms, and these aircraft require 
an inventory of 70,000 spare parts to keep a squadron 
operational. 63 Gi veri. the rate of tecfu"'1010gical 
development a present generation of fighter aircraft 
PO:::-;S8sses a life cycle of about 15 years, a...~d over 
that period. the cost of ovYnerslfip, like dep.qt costs, 
man~:"G8rlent personnel, maintenance and operations, 
~ h . . t· t 64 and training are greater tllan t e a.CqUlSl lon cos • 
Itost of the ovmership costs of imported armaments 
are for capital-intensIve technologies which in the 
Cr:\~:~; of Turkey need to be imported, an~ in the 19703, 
esp~cially after the arms embargo, they beC81l..e a 
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direct drain on the balance of payments. l~though 
there is no information on the sources or composition 
of Turkey's external debt and the corresponding debt 
service problem so as to deter~ine tae milit8~y 
component, what is clear is that after 1975 military 
imports had to be purchased. "{{ith rn.ilitary credit 
difficult to obtain, terms were close to those 
available on otb.er cOIIr!11ercial transa.ctions, whj.ch 
meant that all military iL1ports began to absorb 
import capacity and to exacerbate the debt servicing 
problem.. Making a very crude estimate, using the arms 
imports det~ilsin S.I.P.R.I. Yearbooks,66 it wo~la 
appeo.-I:' that military imports of at least ¢3, 300 million 
were absorbed by Turkey between 1975 and 1979. 
The enormous level of arms imports after 1975 
should be considered in relation to the severity of 
the crisis facing Turkey in 1979. Unempl-oyment stood 
at over 20 per cent, externa.l'_debt was in excess of 
$15 billion, much of it short-term, and Turkey was 
,finding it impossible to service this debt. Even after 
the debt restructuring arrar.3ements th2t were promised 
., 
by the I.~',=.F. and O.S.C.D. countries during 1979, 
Turkey was still faced by the prospect of needing 
t 
perhaps $15 billion of new aid in the fol1o~ing five 
t t . '11 67 F th years 0 preven econom~c co_ apse. ur ermore, 
Turkey was faced by the fact that the whole of her 
export 2Drnings would be required to service its 
externc.l debt and pay for oil imports alone. In this 
• 
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context the, arms imports after 1974 would appear to 
have seriously increased Turkey's econo~ic proble2s. 
Not only did the military imports fail to increase 
productive' ca:-paci ty ·or to increase the efficiency of 
Turkish industry, but they imposed a future debt 
burden on the coun~ry. Moreover, the importation of 
major arms would be expected to generate imports of 
supplementary needs, so that the military import 
burden would be carried through to future time periods. 
Over the longer run it could be argued that the priority 
given to military imports resulted in a distortion in 
the allocation of foreign resources and may have 
reduced the rate of development. But the distortion 
does not end there, since, as the U.N. Report of 1971 
recognised, military considerations have also distorted 
the direction of international economic aid, which 
tends to follow the pattern of military-aid and greatly 
influences the form and direction of development. 
Economic Assistance 
-
The Truma~ Doctrine was designed to help Turkey 
and Greece to resist the Com:nunist t1.11'eat, and it was 
fol~owed by a programme intended to assist Europe to 
achieve economic rehabilitation. In a speech delivered 
at Harvard on 5 June 1947 Secretary Marshall described 
how vital it was for the U.S. to provide Europe with 
economic aid, which became known as t}-,e I,IDTshall Plan. 
Nine months later on 3 April 1948 the Economic Recovery 
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Act was passed in the U.S. '.'Ihicn provided economic 
aid for Turkey, and Greece, as ~.'tell as for ':7e s"t ern 
Europe. Apart from the short-run objectives of 
maintainine the socio-political status quo, 0: 
achieving rights over certain military bases and 
installations, of gaining the support of Turkey in 
international organisations like the United Nations, 
of supporting leaders or governments that have been 
friendly to U.S. interests, there was also the long-
run objective of promoting in Turkey a type of economic 
and political development which vIas harmonious with 
. .. .68 
capltallsm. 
The economic assistance programme for Turkey bef,8n 
in 1948 as part of the European Recovery Programme • 
. As Table 6.3 shows economic aid ,up to 196.0 exceeded 
%1 billion, and was made up of transfers of !r..erchandi2e 
and tec.hnif"!91_:9.ssistance services, as well as agricultural 
products under Public Law 4$0. 
Hovey (1965)69 has stressed that there is a 
complementary relationship bet'.'reen economic and military 
assistB.nce. "Economic assistance ca.""! provide the 
where'{vt thaI for mili·tary assistance reCipients to pay 
t 
troops, and purchase supplies." U.S. uilitary assistance, 
Hovey explains, was given to provide arms and equipment 
supplied, of course, by the U.S., but it was not 
deSiGned to pay for troops or food consumed by the 
mili tary, since these were reg2.rdcd as' the responsibility 
of the recipient government •. The relationship between 
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economic and mili tary aid is clear. "~,~ili tary 
assistance :pays for the costs of e<luip~eYlt, supplies 
and training, and economic aid provides the budgetary 
support necessary for local purchases and pay and 
a.llowances of foreign forces.,,70 
Between 1949 and 1971 the U.S. gave over %2.5 
billion to Turkey in e~onomic assistance,71 with over 
three quarters of the funds being adr::J.inistered through 
the. P.gency for International Development (A. I.D.) and 
predecessor agencies, and the remainder under P.L .. 480. 
The details are given in Table 6.8. A:pproximately 82 
per cent of A. I.D. economic aid between 1949 and 1962 
was in gr~mt form, but from 1963 loans became more 
important as they replaced grants for general imports. 
Under the terms of the gr~~t programme Turkey was 
required to deposit into a 'Special U.S. CounterpaTt 
Fund' Turkish lira at the official rate of exchange 
for each dollar of grant aid provided hy the U.S. for 
general commodity imports. Ninety per cent of these 
deposits (95 per cent prior to 1952) were made available 
to the Turkish government fc~ mutually agreed projects, 
::> 
and ten p2r cent to t~e U.S. gove~n:2ent to TIeet 
administrative and dther costs in Turkey.72 Up to , 
1962 about 80 per cent of the 'Counterpart Funds' were 
used within the Turkish national defence sector, in 
the form of additional military programmes, although 
from 19S3 the funds ·.7cre on a much s~cller scale and 
r:ere u~3ed for general bud{;et2.ry support or to finance 
- 250 
2 Year 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
190n ,-, J 
'" 1970 
1971 
TOT/~ 
1949-71 in ,3'n. 
S:otal U. s. 
Economic 
[:,' d _~l 
-
5.2 
48.7 
35.2 
86.3 
54.2 
41.9 
86.1 
115.4 
179.0 
~1~~6 
167.1 
103.3 
126 .. 0 
188.1 
231.3 
148.8 
152.9 
126.6 
132.2 
110.2 
109.5 
106.9 
106.9 
2512.0 
Total 
5.2 
48.7 
35.2 
86.3 
54.2 
41.9 
59.8 
87.8 
109.3 
63<7 
131.9 
68~7 
lQO.3 
104.9 
155.8 
99.0 
113.3 
112.8 
.110.3 
lC186 
88.6 
69.2 
77.6 
1926.1 
1%e21C i es 
Loans 
5.2 
40.0 
20.0 
15.3 
4.5 
20.0 
25.0 
25.0 
0.8 
1.5 
22.8 
86,,2 
64.5 
103.6 
108.1 
106.8 
96.9 
85.1 
65.9 
73.9 
971.1 
1)"'" .1,80 _.D. 
Gr8.D.ts lid 
8.7 
15.2 
71.0 
49.7 
41.9 
59.8 
67.8 
84.3 
3Q ...., ~. , 
131.9 
67.9 
98.8 
82.1 
69.6 
34.5 
9.7 
4.7 
3.5 
3.5 
3.3 
3.7 
955.0 
27.6 
69.7 
t10 a 
-, . ......) • J 
35.2 
34.6 
25.7 
83.2 
81.5 
49.8 
39.6 
13.8 
21.9 
.... 0 7: ) .'/ 
50.7 
33.8 
481..2 
Eo t c s: '1 ;\ • I • D. is the },G en c:r for I r: t e !'I'a t ion al 
:Development. 
e-",,1; n n- '30 June of t:1<iicate:: 2 U.S. Fiscal Ye~rs, ~~~-~o-
years. 
- 2'1] -, -
development projects both in the public &~d private 
sectors. Details on the utilization of CounterDart 
... 
Funds are given in Table 6.9, and confirm that up 
until 1962 u.s. economic aid was largely used to 
release Turkish domestic resources which could then 
be put into defence. 
As was fointed out above, after 1963 loans came 
to replace grants for general imports. Between 1963-
71 total A.I.D~ economic assistance amounted to 
%928.2 million of which %791 million was in loan form, 
.~ounting to 85 pe~ cent of 'the total. Direct U.S. 
economic a.ssistance was supplemented by pledges of 
over %2 billion between 1963 and 1970,73 and a. further 
$'1.3 billion between 1970 and 1975 74 by the Arnerican-
West European Economic Consortium. This level of 
economic aiG meant that Turkey r&~ked sixth among the 
major recipients of economic assistance during the 
19608, and created a dependency on external financing 
which continUed into the·1970s. 
The conditions attached to the U.S. loans 
depended on whether they had to be repaid in dollars 
or Turkish lira.. Ab.out 20 per cent of the 108.. .. '1.s were 
repaYable in Turkish lira and interest rates charged 
ranged from 3t to 5~ per cent. The remainder of the 
loens (80 per cent) were repayable in dollars and 
carried a ten year grace p~riod, thi:::'ty year. 
a:rortization thereafter, with inte~est ·rates of i to 
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1. 
rr ABLE 6.9 
Utilization of Connter})art Funds 
As of December 31, J-971 (TL 'l'housand) 
Description 
National Defence Sector 
1. ~echanicB1 & Chemical Industries 
2. Petty Officer Program 
3. Addi tionctl Hili tary l,id Program 
4. Equivalent of Certain Military Expenses 
of the Fiscal Year 1951 
5. Additional Military Program of 1952 
6. .:';ddi tiona1 Mili tary Program of 1953 
7. ".Addi tional I',Ii1i tary Program of 1954_ 
8. jl,ddi tiona1 Military Program of 1955 
9. Additional Military Program of 1956 
10. },ddi tiona1 :vIi1i tary Program 0-:: 1957 
11. ((1 d -i ti on.-} i,'r~ ] -1 t·~ ry Pro C"1'am of ] 058 ~~, ~_' ~ ct. ", . .1- -~ ,1 b - 'j 
12 •. .Army Education Progr&"ll 
l3. j~d for 1959 Fiscal YeDr 
- 2~'3 -
Amount of 
Agreement 
5,500 
10,640 
72,884 
80,000 
100,000 
111~400 
115,920 
108,600 
91,520 
104,797 
170,000 
43,000 
ll0,000 
() 
!greement 
.No. Date 
20 10/18/51 
22 12/20/51 
23 12/28/51 
25 12/28/51 
26 8/5/52 
32 8/5/53 
33 11/9/54-
34 12/29/55 
35 8/10/56 
38 S/30/57 
39 9/25/58 
4l 1/20/59 
42 6/21/59 
!J11ount 
Disbursed 
5,500 
10,640 
72,884 
80s000 
100,000 
111,4-00 
115,920 
108,<::00 
91,520 
104,7;17 
l 70 ('Ina ~ I , \... ,-' 
4-3,000 
110,000 
t<\ 
l..C'I 
(.J 
14. Addi tional ~\1:!.li tary Program of 1959 240,000 42 9/18/59 240,000 
15. Additional Military Program of 1959 280,000 42 12/19/59 280,000 
16. Additional Military Program of 1960 500,000 46 7/4/60 500,000 
17. Additional Military Program of 1961 363,300 54 7/29/61 363,300 
18. Additional Military Program of 1962 44·9,647 57 6/30/62 449,647 
19. Budgetary Support (POL) 68,000 64 5/30/63 68,000 
Total ·3,.025,208 3,025,208 
II .. Public Sector 
\ 
. , 
1. Agricultural Bank 15,339' 1 10/22/50 15,339 
2. Public Roads and Water Works 56,997 2.,6,28 Various 56,997 
3. Technical Co-operation 173,977 3,9,37 Annual 173,977 
4. Acricultural Census 1,000 14 7/20/51 .1,000 
5. Tuzla, Roads 404 15 7/20/51 404 
6. Immigran,ts 30,000 19 8/10/51 30,000 
7. ,i Eti banI\: 42,352 8,17 V . s.rJ.Ous 42,352 
8. I-.!ini s try of .Agricul ture 34,300 21 12/20/51 34,300 
9. lmkara Hospital & Nurse's Training Centre 1,000 24 12/20/51 1,000 
10. Railways 3,864 27 2/27/53 3,864 
11. Minerals Research.& Exploration lnst. 1,000 29 .5/15/53 1,000 
12. Mood.y Program-Productivity Projeot 2,520 6/25/53 2,520 
13 •. Earthquake Relief 4,000 30 7/7/53 4,000 
14. Statistics l,OOO 3l 8/5/53 l,OOO 
.15. State Enterprises 
1G. Projects j_n Support of TO Activities 
17. Gener;ll Budbetary Support 
18. General Budgetary Support 
19. General Budgetary Support 
20. 1963 Development Grant Support Project 
Procrom 
21. Projects in Support of TC Activities 
22. Technical P~sistance 
Tc·tal 
III. Private Sector. 
1. Private Enterprise Projects Financed 
prior to Establishment of Industrial 
Development Bank 
2~ Marshall Plan Private Enterprise of IDB 
3. Capital Participation Fund (IDB) 
4. Special Working Capital Fund 
5. Tourism Development 
6. Industrial Development Bru~k 
7. Ir..du8·~rial Investment & Credit Bar It 
.!""t ______ - TT'-' " T"""T"'t. /rTl ____ ,_ --- m_+_' 
259,866 
176,574 
120,000 
150,000 
388,000 
5',569 
2,150 
40,953 
1,510,8E?5 
• 
] 7 ,867 
81,633 
65,000 
60,00C 
40,000' 
20,000 
37,000 
~~~ ~~~ 
43 Vartou.:3 259,866 
44 3/26/60 176,574 
58 7/13/62 120,000 
60 2/21/63 150,000 
64 5/30/63 . 388,000 
66 8/7/63 5.,569 
67 9/6/64- 2,150 
3/5/69 40,953 
1,510,865 
Various Various 17,867 
18 5/15/63 81,633 
50 5/6/62 65,000 
O~-'YC1i' ;J, ;.: 4/18/61 . 60,000 
68 8/16/67 40,000 
76 .,. 7/17/67 ~.'~ r, ;"! ("'0 ,- '- ~ "- -_/ 
78 12/15/67 ~-~ ~oo ) t , l) 
--
2 per cent during the te~ year grace period a~d 2 to 
3 per cent t~ereafter.75 On the surface the terms of 
the loans were very generous, but they were a form of 
I tiea aid I as indeed was the grant aid a..."'1.d' it is by 
no means obvious that this economic assistance contributed 
_._' 
very much to Turkish development • 
Tied .Pid 
• 
• 
,U.S. economic and military aid to the less developed 
world, including Turkey, was almost completely tied to 
goods produced in the U.S.A. Snider (1972)76 recognised 
this when in discussing ways of relieving the U.S. 
bal13nce of payments he eliminated two possible measures. 
"Because aiel recipients tend to spend most of their 
grant and loan dollars directly on U.S. e~ports, 
reinforced'by the' government policy of tied aid, only 
a fraction of any reduction in aid would be reflected in 
improvement in the U.S. balance of payrr..~nts." 
This view is also su'pported by Gaud (1968) 77 who 
argues: 
"The biGgest single misconception about the foreign 
aid progr3:n~ne, is that we spt;nd money abroad. We don't. 
Foreign aid. consists of llIIlerican equipment, raw materials, 
expertocrvices, and food - all providing for specific 
development projects which we ourselves review and 
a})}))"ove ~ ,. • Ni,nety-three peT cent of A. I.D. funds are 
SDent directly in the. United States to pay for these 
things." ' 
• 
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.' 
Cooper (1972)78 comes to a similar conclusion and 
his empirical results indicate an average addi tionB.li tv 
., 
for the entire aid programme of 90 per cent, &"'1d for 
many countries the additionality factor is in excess 
of 100 per cent. These results indicate that the 
tying of aid is consj.derably more effective thaJl is 
generally recognised. There can be little doubt that 
the Americ~~ aid programme has been good for U.S. 
business and has crea+-ed many jobs, nevertheless it 
did not prevent a decline in the U.S. share of Turkish 
imports. In 1950 the U.S. accounted for over 20 per 
cent of Turkish imports but this had declined to 8.5 
per cent by 1976 as West Germany with 18.4 per cent 
of imports became by far the most important trading 
partner. 
The tying of aid also invariably means that high 
prices are attached to the comnodities involved j 
particularly when grants are given, wht~h has led 
Myrdal (1971)79 to suggest "an unjustified padding of 
the amount of' aidG n U'.N;C.T.A.D. in its secretariat 
progress report of 1967 gave instances \)f 'tied' aid 
80 0 
costing bet';reen 12 and 20 per cent more. ?ood aid 
, 
V/8S a particular kind of tied aid t:hat was provided by 
t 
-the U.S. under Public Law 480, and. this was count~d at 
the prices found on the protected home market in the 
United States, rather than at the lower prices at which 
it coul~ be bought on the international market. 8l The 
U.S. grain shipments to Turkey and elsewhere were 
• 
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influenced by the huge J~erican grain surpluses that 
existed because of the agricultural support policy. 
Furthermore, this expensive food was transported to 
Turkey in high cost P~erican ships which. was then 
charged to the aid-receiving country. Given the 
obvious benefits of food aid to the U.8. itself :.:yrdal 
was led to suggest that th8 cost of the food deliveries 
should have been charged as national agricultural aid 
instead of as foreign aid. He went on to question the 
value of aid, in particular food aid, for .the receiving 
country. 
liThe most important reason fo~ disco~ting the 
development value of the aid was, of course, the fact 
. that the motivation for • .L. ~ u, and largely its direction, 
was polj. tical, mili tary and strategic. When P?li tics 
goes into aid whether at home or a,broad, it is 
unavoidable that standards both of morality and of 
effectiveness are apt to be radically lowered." 
The contribution of food. aid to economic development 
has received some attention and has been criticised for 
depresbing.agricultural. price~, which then causes the 
0.2 domestic supply to b~ reduced. 0 U.S. shipments of 
agri·cul"tural commodities to Turkey under P.L. 480 began 
in 1954 •. Most of the food received (over 85 per bent) 
\vas under Title I agreements', whereby the U.S. sold 
surplus ,pgricul tural C01Tli'nodi ties, mainly wheat and 
other grains, in exc4ange for loc a1 cu.crency. There 
Here also shipments uncter Ti tIe II which were co~modities 
~ 
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granted for emergency relief and development nurDoses 44' 
. 
and u..~der Ti tIe III which provided for the donation 
of surplus foods to U.S. voluntary agencies for 
distribution in Turkey. As Table 6.10 shows the first 
food aid arrived in 1954 when there was a disastrous 
harve~j; j_n Turkey due to drought. There wa.s a similar 
flow of food aid in 1955 when agricultural production 
Vias still below the 1953 level} but after that there 
was no obvious link between the level of food aid and 
domestic production. Thus in 1964 anQ 1965 when 
agricultural production fell, so did the level of food 
aid, and when in 1966 agriculture~ production increased 
by over 10 per cent, the level of food aid increased 
su'bstantie.lly. Then again the bad harvest of 1961 
resulted in' a large increase in food aid, but when 
agricultural production recovered the following yeax, 
food aid continued at a,high level. 
Between 1954-59 when wholesale and retail prices 
in Turkey doubled, the rise in food prices lagged behind 
the general rise in prices. This was in part due to 
the substa~tial imports of food under P.L. 480,83 but 
aJ so due to government controls on prices of sotJe basic 
foodstuffs, especially grain products. p~ th~ prices 
received by Turkish farmers in the period 1954-59 
increased at about the same rate as consumer prices of 
food, then farm p~ices as a whole and grain prices in 
particular, did not keep up with t~e ~i8e in the general 
price level, which is shown in Table 6.10. After 1959 
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Yeax 
--
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
m1 :,-ql-';> 6 10 . -',-J!.J • 
Flow of U.S. Food aid under P.L. 480 
and relnted variables t 1955-70 
Growth of 
Food aid A,sric1 Prod. -',Th ole S 8.1 e D:,ice i~dex: 
----f million at constant 1953= 100 
-
current nrices 1968 nrices 
. . 
General Grains 
, f chan~e 
26.3 
'20 
-13.9 III n.!? 
27.6 9.8 119 n. a. 
69.7 5.0 139 n. a. 
48.9 6.5 165 n.a. 
35.2 9.2 190 150 
34.6 0.3 227 177 
25.7 2.3 239 202 
83.2 -4.9 246 242 
81.5 5.0 260 270 
49.8 9.0 271 268 
;9.6 -0.4 269 265 
13.8 -3.9 293 297 
2.l..9 10.7 306 304 
8.6 0.1 ~2° ) L-. 294 
30.3 ,1.5 n.a. n.a. 
40.7 1.2 n .. a. n.a. 
33.8 2.3 2'1. a. n. a. 
Sources: 
Survey, 1977, OPe cit. Table 39; O.~.G.D. 
J~ricu1tural :Development in Southern 
Europe, Paris, 1969, p. 299. 
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government policy ensured that food prices increased 
in line with the general price index, but tbis cha~ge 
in policy did nothing to stimulate grain production, 
the main import under P.L. 480, and indeed in the 
first ten ye ~lrs of P. L. 480 grain supplies, grain 
production in Turkey stagnated, indicating that food 
aid discoura~ed domestic production. 
The giving of aid has been criticised from other 
viewpoints. Bauer (1971)84 has argued that it is 
unltkely that aid, whether as a loan or a grant, vlill 
automatically generate development. Bauer stressed 
thc:,t aid may encourage L.D.C.s to take the, view that 
development ce..n be achieved without effort, when what 
is really required is structural and institutional 
reorganisation and an outlook which emphasises self-
. . 
reliance. Griffin (1970)85 has argued that foreign 
exchange flows, including aid, nay low~r domestic 
savings. "Give~ the level of income, the larger the 
capital inflow the lower the level of domestic savings", 
and the "higher is the ratio of 2.id to income the smaller 
will be the ra-~8 of domestic savings." 
Both of these v~ews need to be considered in a 
specIfic historical context. In the case of Turkey 
in the post-war period there is no doubting the 
motiva.tion of successive goverr&ents, particularly 
,=,.fter 1963 VihC!l the series of Five :rear },lans be~a-J., 
to achieve; rapid industrialisation and econo:nic development • 
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Nevertheles8 it might be arg~ed that the underlying 
. 
weak:r:css on the Turkish external account was 
persistently ignored during the 1950s and 1960s, 
and indeed up .to 1974, since the series pf defic:i_ ts 
could be made up by foreign credits, worker rer:ittances, 
import controls, devaluation and U.S. and other economic 
aid. The e2.se with which Turkey could finance its 
trade deficit meant that very little progress was made 
on breazing the dependence of industry .on imported 
~apital goods and industrial raw materials which 
accounted for 95 per cent of imports in the 1970s. 
In terms of Bauer's general analysis, there was no 
incentive- for Turkey to increase its self-~ufficiency, 
partly because of the 'generosity' of aid donors. The 
danger of this dependency was revealed a~ter 1974 when 
the invasion of Cyprus led to an -increased military 
. burden and the U. s. arms a,...1"J.d aid embargo, -oil prices 
.. 
Cluadrupled, and the econorlic recess~o.Ll. in the West 
ca.used worker :r-emi ttances to decline. 
Griffin's position has been criticined on 
th . - I ~ 86 me odological~ theoretical and emplrlca grounas. 
Kennedy and Thirwall (1971)87 a.YJ.d 'Papanek (1972 )88 
have argued that ratlier than aid causing a decline in 
savings, a.s Griffin found, it may be the reverse. 
Papanek gives a hypothetical example of a crop failur~ 
or a de"-'line in export prices leading to a fall in the 
savings rate as consumption levels are maintained, 
which is accompa..n.ied by an inflow of aid. Although 
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PalJanek'-s example is quite plausible it cannot be taken 
. 
as generally accurate without considerin~ the c&se of 
--' 
each country separately, and further~ore, the causD~ity 
of any negative· relationship bet':reen the savings rate 
end aid or capital flows needs to be established. 
Y~at cannot be accepted is that aid and capital inflows 
wi.ll inevitably increase savines and/or investment 
directly, since a large par~ of the floVI of aid into 
Turkey and elsewhere vvas for mili tary purposes, and 
smaller portions for health, medicine and education. 
If savings and/or invest:nent were to respond positively 
to aid flows it would be the result of part of the aid 
going directly into investment projects or through the 
.indirect effect of aid releasing domestic resources 
whi.ch ~onld then eO into s2-vi~3 2:.n.d invcst:::r:cnt. 
As was pointed out previously the vast proportion 
of the 'countprpart' funds were used to increase the 
military effort in the period up to 196?. A.I.D. loans 
only started to go into c'api tal projects in 1960 and 
by 1971 had accounted for only about 15 pE:r cent of 
total eoonoe.ic assistence. SiP.lilarly the local cUTrtllcy 
Payments made l1nder P.L. 480 between 2.955 8:ld 1971 ·,'re'!.'c 
distributed as follows: 
Loans to the Government of Turkey 
Loans to Private Firms in Turkey 
Gran ts for I:Ii1i tary Budget Support 
Grants for Economic Development 
U.S. Purch~ses in Turkey 
Initial Payment in $ to U.S. 
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per cent 
41.1 
11.3 
12.2 
0.4 0 
33.3 
1.7 
100.0 
t ·1 1 . rll ...... ..L.lon 
240.9 
66.3 
71.2 
2.5 
195.2 
9.8 
585~9 
It is n?t clear that the funds gen2rated under 
P.L. 480 contributed to increased savi~Gs or investment, 
although part of them were used to fi~o~ce the nilitary 
effort. l'lili tary aid itself was tied to imports of 
U.S. arms end equipment, and rather tha~ releasing 
domestic resources Vlas only advanced on the condition 
that the Turkish government com..rnitted vast domestic 
resources to defence, averaging nearly 26 per cent of 
central government budget in the post-war period, to 
the detriment of investment and the dev~lop~e~t effort. 
The precise relationship between aid a.~d savings can 
only ultimately be determined by reference to the 
empiri0al data, and this is attempted in the next 
chapter. One further point on this issue concerns 
the i:::-:,poI'"Lance of certain kinds of C01l01.l.Glption: like 
. 
education and health, which are stimulated by aid flo'ws, 
since these can be regarded as investment in human 
capital 90 and may be important in the development 
process. 
One of the areas of the economy that it is claimed 
the economic assistance program~e was r~ally successful 
:: 
W2S in agriculture. In the period 1949 to 1953 Turkish 
agriculture was stimulated by a mechanisation programme, 
with 40,000 tractors alone imported in. that period, 
mainly through the U.S. aid programme. The enormous 
growth of a~ricultural production in Turkey in this 
reTiod led President Truman to claim it as an eXaDple 
"p . 91 
of the success of the I'lutu9~ Secu~i ty - rograrn@e. . 
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flTur.key l" s ""YlotbAl'" ex ' h . t bl <:UJ. ... -- ~ ~a:-:~:I.J..:...e w __ erE a verl a e 
agric-v.l tural revolution is being brought about wi th 
a team of nine lunerican experts.... In three yea:rs 
Turkey has raised its grain production by over 50 per 
cent and tripled its rice produ8tion." 
.American claims on vihat they achieved in Turkey 
were exaggerated. For~y per cent more land was 
brought into cultivation in the few years up to 1953, 
mainly communal and state land, through an extended 
lar.Ld distribution programme, which largely accounted 
for the growth "in agricultural production. The 
increasing mechanisation of agriculture in the period 
1948 to 1953 still meant only 15 per cent of all 
'cultivated land was under the plough in 1955, and the 
new level of mechanisation was unable to prevent two 
disastrous years for agriculture. Between 1955 ann 
1962 the mechanisation rate in Turki.sh agrJculture 
remained practically unchanged, and it was not until 
the Five Year Plru1s began. in 1963 that mechanisation 
was given further impetus. 
_P_o..;.;l .... i .... t;..;;;i;,..c;...~.:..:..:;l~;;;;;E,~f..;;;f...;e;.,.;c:;....-L.:;..;ll s~~o..;:;;f~E;;..;c;,...;o:;...Y1 __ o..;;,.'Ti_.n_i_c--.,;2_m_d_I_',Tl_· _I_i_t .;;..a;;;;..r_y_.~..;;,..s_s_i_s_t_. r~~Y1 ___ c_e 
~It is widely recognised today that aid is not given 
for altruistic reasons, but it is an important weapon 
of foreign policy for donor countries. In 1961 President 
Kennedv exulained: "foreign aid is a method by which 
... ... 
( 
the united states maintains a position of influence ~ld 
control around the ",orId, and -'- . SUSv8.lnS a good many 
• 
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countries which 'would defini tely collapse or pass into 
the Communis't bloc." 92 Professor H. B. Chenery, who 
tW1as an economist with the U.S. ~ T D ruak . '1 tv .Ii. .• ~. ., L '- e s a s l illJ. ar 
point: "economic assistance is one of the instru~ents 
of foreign ~olicy that is used to prevent political 
and economic conditions f:rom deteriorating in countries 
where Vle value the preservation of the present govern-
ment.,,93 Aid programmes grew with the intensification 
of the Cold War between the ;:lest, led by the U.S • ./u , 
and the U.S.S.R., and the different geographical 
patterns of aid at various times reflected the cha"Ylging 
importence of certain countries to the struggle for 
hegemony. 94 
One of the ways that political influence can be 
maintained is for aid to promote economic development. 
. . 
.. The U.S. A.I.D. specifically recognises this point 
when it states~ t1jlid as an instrument of :foreign policy 
is best adapted,to promoting economic dAvelopment. 
Develq:pment is not an. end· in itself, but it is a 
critical element in U.S. policy, for in most countries 
some progress in economic welfare is essential to the 
()~ 
;cr'.?interl8J:.ce and gro'I'lth of free, non-80::l~UIlist societies." ~-
·The role of aid in development has been critically 
nnalysed by Hayter (1972)96 who argues that an essential 
element in the giving of aid is the concept of 
'conditipnality' or PleverQ:e',97 TIhereby the.donor 
countries try to control recipients' Do1icies. The 
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U S ~ T D . . ~ .. -. . has been fairly open about its ~olicies on 
. 
mainly bec2use it ~as neeeed to justify 
to the U.S. Coneress why the aid it gives should be 
continued. Thus, for exa.mple, the U.S. ~~.I.D. tries 
to encourage aid recipients to liberalise t~ade or to 
press the interests of United States firms. Furniss 
(1957) 98 has 8rgued that because of the ~..;:. L.P. a 
"slightly more favourable investment climate has been 
structured" tn T'urkey vrhich "paved the way for economic 
aid and conseqv.en.tial U.S. influence over economic 
1 · k" It po lCY rna lng. However, when security conditions 
demand the U.S. support a particular governnent, then 
the A.~.D~ is less concerned with evaluating the 
perforr:J.ance of the aid given, 99 and as existing aid 
is allocated according to security and political 
considerations it is hardly such ~s to encourage good 
100 
economic performance. 
Hayter points out that the major instrument for 
eXercising leverage is the system of conditional 
'progra~~e loans', which are tied to the purchase of 
goods in the United States. lOl These programme loans 
" 
·accounted for al~ost 30 per cent oft 0 t 8.1 .:\. I . D • 
economic assist8.J.1.ce tOo Turkey up to the early 1970s. 
AJ3 Turkey was in receipt of programme loans it had to 
negotiate loan agreements with the A. I.J:. which needed 
to be approved in Washington. C~e conse~uence, is that 
thE: Govel~YL"118n t of Turke;)T would discuss its policies 
'''iit~l the A.I.D., and the existe~ce of a perm~.nent A.I.D • 
. 
- 267 - . 
mission in Turkey could be expected to incre8se U.S. 
leverage. Hayter stresses that because the A.I.D. is 
under the direct control of the U.S. government it is 
more flexible in negotiation than other aid giving 
insti tutions like the World Bank and the I .;:,'~.F. This 
flexibility may work to hold back development when the 
u.s. government has reasons for supporting particular 
governments as it has done in r:Lurkey. 
There is another very import2nt role of the A.I.D., 
as part of the U. S. mili ta.ry -assistan.ce programme, 
through the contribution it makes towards training ~~d 
education. The official justification for training 
Turkish soldiers was that it wa.s necessary for them tc 
_be able to handle the military equipment provided by the 
U.S t, but there W!?8 a.nother v:i t?l non-technical aspect 
of the M.A.F. training, as Wolpiri has stressed, "as a 
source of optimally -lJnerice ..l1. and secondarily r,7estern 
group ide~tification by officers from rhird World 
countries. ,,102 Wolpin argues that "pol.i tical indoctrin-
ation" and social interaction"· have become integral 
concomit2.nts of the training experience and were 
intended by U.S. policy makers to "develop a propensity 
to solicit and acquiesce in _werican policy suggestions" 
to n;tructure a definition of national interest which 
precludes non-alignment" and to "inculcate an ideology 
of development whic~ stresses subsidies a.."Y1d hospi tali ty 
to transnational corporations. n Furthermore, ·,':olpin 
argues-that the U.S. eovernment is fully aware of the 
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actiye political roles that military !:len can play in 
developing a country's poli tj.cal systems and thet this 
is a "key justifi6ation for assigning training a higher 
priority than the provision of Dili tary equipnent. tI 
He concludes that the "psychological dimensions of 
M.A.P. training have been moderately effective in both 
making foreign militp.ry el1tes more responsive to the 
.. 
U.S. defi.nition of mutual interest and more disnosed 
J.: 
to accept the advice of American military perso~~el 
and diplomats. a 
Applying Wolpin's general analysis to Turkey it 
would be necessary to show that her military contl;'ibution 
to N.A.T.O. has been less important than her anti-
Communism and Western orientation domestically. Neither 
of the.se propositions can be 'proven' but there is 
indirect evi~ence which c~~ be used to suggest a~ answer. 
The official U.S. view is that the I,I.A.P. -is seen, and 
was conceived, as a means of increasing the potential 
military fore es avail able· to the N .A. T • o. allianc e for 
the fulfillment of its securi ty objectives. ':.Tnile there 
is Ii ttle doubt that Turkey is a vi tal member of ~T. A. T. o. , 
beC2use of iots geogra.)hical location, its intelligence 
. 
facilities, and not least because of its very large 
• 
army, it is also true that Turkey's military equipment 
is and has been mainly old and obsolete. 
By the mid 1960s lYlany of the ships p~ovid ed by t~le 
, 
u.s. were r8.pidly bee.oming obso1ete and' although the 
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airforce had some F-l04s and F-5s its aircraft :r.ainly 
consisted of F-84s and F-86s which had been produced 
during or before the Korean ';Ta:r. Most of the transport, 
training, liaison a..1'J.d utility aircraft 'were also old 
103 
and obsolete. The poor level of military e~uipment 
possessed by Turkey led Secretary of Defence, :::,Ic:~amara, 
t . t'f 104 o tes l Y: ' 
"Except for missile units, a~l major components of 
the Turkish ground forces 'are short of a substantial 
part of their major mission equipment. Uuch of the 
Turkish army equipnent is below minimum N.A.T.O. 
standards. Much of it is World War Two or ea.rlier, for 
which :!,:'':'pa.ir parts are no longer available or on which 
,maintenance costs have become prohibitive to continued 
. , 
Ten years later, in 1975, the Turkish army was still 
using mainly old equipment. The biggest component of 
the Turkish mili.tary forces was the arm:· which consisted 
of twelve infroltry, two mechanised infantry and one 
armoured division, with thirteen independent brigades. 
Within the armoured division the major equipment 
:> 
consisted. of 1500 ~.l-,t 7 and 1,1-48 tD1':l{s' which ':;ere ~~.:r.eric8'}. 
surp~us fro~ll the Xorean 7/ar period , expensive to maintain 
and possessed an outdated go millimetre C~1'J.non •. The 
navy ha.d 13 destroyers, 15 submarines, 5 escort vessels, 
70 patrol boats and a number of support vessels, but 
r.1ost of thOSe were ..:' .... -rnerican or Bri tish hand-me-dovms. 
Tho airforce consist~d of 13 figh~.er squadrons, three 
• 
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of which possessed either F-4= o~ F-I04S airc~2ft 
. 
but the remainder were usine F-104G, F-ICO=, ?-5L or 
F-84F aircraft which ~:lere regarded as being inferior 
or even obsolete. 
It must be co~cluded that Tur~(ish mili -'ce~J e~uipm2nt 
consisted of a great many tools of Plar that ':ie?:8 
several years out of date, and th9.t this situation W9.S 
a per~&~ent feature of the post-~ar period. Yet apart 
from defending the country and deterring atta.ck by an 
extremely powerful neighbour, the Tur~{:is~ mili tary 
programme has to be viewed in terms of its ~omplementcry 
1 t · h . P . t' 'th T\T,' TOt' . .:; . t . re a ",lons. l Wl n 0 e1' 1.,. :L. • • _ coun rles, an ...... l lS 
in this aspect that the Americans have on the whole 
been satisfied. ~i~ore importantly , it is impossible to 
treat external defence in isolat~on from internal security, 
and Turkey's procurement policy, under the advice of the 
'(J ("I rtr A A G 
• u. 1..11.. • .h.. ., has been to diversify i~s weapons stock 
and to place a ,,;sreat deal of emphasis on its ground 
forces, which are highly tnobile and possess the meaYlS 
to supress and control political and industrial unrest. 
Furtl'1.ermore, th8 existence of large para-mili -::ary forces, 
~hic~ in J,975 consisted of 75,000 Gendar~erie i~cJ~ii~g 
thre~ mobile brigades, has meant that Turkey has had a 
permanent force concerned ~ith civilian disturbance 
control. The heavy armour that the ar~y and para-
mili tary forces have at their dispos8~ - t2nks, armoured 
, 
, ~. c r .." f' t r ,~ ;J l')crE;~n!1el carriers, helicopters, 'Granspor v alr =-'- ~L.u. 
even ground-attack aircraft - are sui table for cOlJ.trolling 
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demonstratiops or carrying out a military coup. 
It has been pointed out previously that the U.S. 
M. A. A..G. and the U.S. A. I .D. are required to worlr out a 
joint wilitary and economic assistance programme. l05 
There have been many instances when A.I.D. funds have 
been used for mili tary purposes and Til. A. P. funds made 
available _for development proj ects .106 A very important 
role for the A.I.D. has been to train Turkish army 
recruits, but it has also been used to orga.'YJ.ise a police 
programme designed to promote internal security. The 
U.S .. Public Safety Training and Advisory Programmes bega.'Yl 
in 1954 and were designed to increase the strength and 
capability of civil peace and para-military forces to 
enforce law and maintain public order. Stein and Clare 
(1974 )107 in their study of U.S •. police aid emphasise 
that local police-forces "receive training not only in 
routine pol~~~ matters, but also in para-military and 
counterinsurgency techniques developed in response to 
the threat of civil unrest.t1 . In the period 1961-71 
41 Turkish persoILTlel were trained in the United States 
under the Public Safety Prograrnrae, at a cost to the U.S • 
. 108 
of %5,000 per head. 
~ 
While it would be wrong to underestimate the 
.. , 
~ilitary contribution of Turkey, and the importance of 
her U.S. supplied equipment in particular, to N.A.T.O., 
it is clear t~at a ~ajor objective of the U.S: covEr~Dent 
hHS been to maintain "its influence in Turkey, which has 
• 
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required the 'U.S. to support the 2nilitary as an institution 
. 
and to use the traininG progra.'N:le as a..""l instru=..ent of 
leverage. On the whole the U.S. :tT.A.P. has been successful 
in fulfillj_nc; "A;nerican objectives in Turkey and on three 
occasions the Turkish military have stepped in to keep 
the country on a pro-Western course of development. 
Hovvever, U. S. leverage in TurJcey, and particularly over 
the Turkish military, is not a constant. :Dunn (1961)109 
has.aTgued that the U.S. training programme generally 
has had an influence which has varied from time to time 
and from issue to issue, "yet there caYl be no doubt 
concerning its existence." He also acknowledges that 
anti-Co"1munist officers'may be incapable of distinguishing 
,non-Communist progressives from Cor.ununists, which may 
Yet in Turkey, although the military has been committed 
to the West, . it has also been very nationalistic and 
capable of independent action. Furthermore, there are 
inevitably cleavages within any mili~ary orgaYlisation, 
which arise because of the structure of society, or are 
inherent iYl organisational str~_lCture, or result fro:n the 
interaction of the two~110 Nevertheless the influence 
of Ataturk is still dominant in the Turkif?h army and the 
guid~-lines he established for its role in politics hav~ 
been acceptable to the U.S. and made it much easier for 
.America to l~t1intain its sphere of influence. 
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· Private ForeiGn Capital 
, . 
One of the stated objectives of U.S. policy in 
Turkey was to promote private enterprise. and 8..."'1. open 
economy, which led to Turkish atterlpts to encourage an 
inflow of private foreign capital. The la:;v to Encourage 
Foreign Capital Investment W2.S introduced in 1950, then 
~J!1ended and made more liberal in 1951, but it was not 
successful in encoura.ging foreign capit'3.1 on a scale 
necessary to have any great impact. During 1953 the 
Americans took the initiative to convince Turkey that 
it was necessary to go to greater lengths to attract 
foreign, c.a.pital. On 26 August 1953 Clarence Randall, 
Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Commission 
on Foreign Trade Policy, who was also President of the 
Chicago Inland Steel Company, px~ived in Ankara for 
talks ',"lith the Turkish government. R8ndall worked hard 
to convince the Turkish government ~~0 other influential 
eroups that there should be no restrictions on the 
activity of foreign capit"al nor on the trsnsfer of foreign 
exchange. In order to encoura.ge foreign investment 
Randal] argued that Turkish stocks should be available 
OYl foreic;n stock excl~8.Ylbes a..1.d in'v'estrlent opportuni tie.::; 
in T~rkey should be publicised abroad. Domestically 
Randall and his party suggested that state involvement 
in industry should be limited and all firms whether state, 
foreien or local should oper8 .. te ul1rier eQual conditions 
b t · i . 111 ased on the principle of free compe l-lon. 
The Turkish government r-e,?ponded in a positive nay, 
_ f') '7 .1 _ 
and the L8~'{~0 Encourage Foreign Investment was amended 
once aGain in January 1954 (Law 6224) 22:d an Oil J~ct 
d · ... .,- h p8.S S e ln .I.;; .. 2..rc_ • It was hoped that an influx of 
foreign capi tal would speed up the rete of gro1,';,th a...'1.d 
help overcome the scarcity of foreign exchange, but the 
new concessions had a disappointing effect. ..A.llmad 
(1977)112 has argued tha.t the new laws provided neither 
the capita.l necessary' to develop and exploit her 
resources, nor did it create jobs to ease the increasing 
unemployment. Krueger (1974)113 also argues that in 
spite of official policy to encourage &~d attract private 
foreign capita.l flows they were much less important than 
bilateTal capital transfers throughout the 1950s ~~d 
·1960s. The problem of unemployment will be considered 
. 
although the foreign investment was on a relatively 
sIDeJ.l scale, foreign capital came to have a very big 
impact on Turkish development. Most of the foreign 
investment was in partne~ship with local capital, but 
it was an unequal relationship with the external capital 
, 0 " • t oelng aorn .. Ylan • The process of externally controlled 
d.epenO.ent ind\lstrial~sation was eX~8nded after 1963 
when many of the state economic enterprises ONere 
t 
transferred back to private firms, both local and 
foreign, but very often in the form of joint ventures. 
Berberog1u (J981)114 has pointed out that these joint 
ventures· r1S8nt thc.~t "a large section of the national 
Lldustrial bourgeoisi"e was integrated into the dependent 
economy ••• thusbecomin.g ••• a.dependent -industrial 
_ ')7~ _ 
capi talist cless ~Hi th direct ties to metropoli t:m 
. 
transn0tional mononolies." 
The Pattern of" Foreign Investment 
l~most a~l foreign investment in Turkey comes under 
J.J::tw 6224, which is extrerr:.ely Ii beral a.'1C_ perroi ts an 
unlimited transfer of profits abroad. Foreign investmel.lt 
is permitted in &~y field except state monopolies and 
there is separate legislation to control investments in 
oil and I::1ining.. Between 1950-70 foreign capital 
entering Turkey averaged only about %19 million a year, 
as Table 6.11 shov{s, yet after the massive devaluations 
of 1958-60 foreign exchange was able to buy a bigger 
share in Turkish industry and there was a significant 
increase in foreign holdings. I~ terms of Turkish lira 
foreign investment was T.L. 12 million a year in the 
19508, but 8.bout six times higher than this per yeer in 
the 19608. 115 
The influence of foreign· capital waS increased 
because it was concentrated in the manufacturing sector. 
At the end of 1974 there were 109 firms operating under 
Law 6224, \'lith 93 ip.manufacturing, two in mining, one 
. t. 1 d 13 . . 116 tfi thin manufacturing In agrlcu ture ffil 1n serVlces. 
25 firms were in ·chemicals, 16 in electrical appliances 
B.nd electrcnics, 11 in metal goods, nine in food, 
8100ho1io bcv,::rages cmd tobacco, and eight in ;:::otor 
·r h' 1 117 ,,~ .. -1.C es. 
-"?.76 
, 
The iT et Flow of J?ri "'fate :Jore: fz;. Capi -::; a1 
1950-70, i~ u.s. % million 
Year ~. Ye2T ~. Year ~. 
1950 9 1957 -61 1964 58 
1951 -30 1958 73 1965 -1 
1952 43 1959 14 1966 -8 
1953 141 1960 25 1967 -2 
1954 76 1961 -34 1968 11 
1955 12 1962 50 1969 -10 
1956 -29 1963 -7 1970 78 
00urce= I~y.rr.p. Balance of P2Y!rlents Yearbook! 
Washington, various. issues. 
Overa~l foreign cepita1 accounted for 11.7 per cent of 
gross sales in manufacturing (1974) and 6.3 per cent of 
e~lpl t· 118 .1' oymen . In five sectors, however, firms with 
forei{;:1 pnTtnership. accounted for :lOTe tha'1. 30" per cent 
of sales: 
Stone and Earthware Industry 37% 
Electrical Machinery and Equipment 40% 
liotor Vehicles 44% 
C 1 ~ e:n i c 0.1 s 4 6 ;~ 
Rubber and Tyres' 59~~ 
• 
- 277 -
The power of, foreign capital is also indicated by the 
fact th!),t in the 1970s 70 out of the largest 144 Turkish 
companies were partnerships of domestic and foreign 
"t 1 119 cap). a • 
Unbe~8nced Growth 
During the 1960s ,the construction a"1.d service sectors 
performed well both in terms of profitability and rate 
of growth, but while these sectors exceeded targets the 
agricultural and industrial sectors grew less ra.pidly 
than plalh"led, and as a consequence G.N.P. grew somewhat 
more slowly than envisaged. The failure of agricultural 
production to increase as planned was largely beca.use no 
lan.d reform scheme was achieved, and investment and the 
>120 
spread of 'new technology was slower than expected. 
In the industrial sector there Was considerable progress 
and by 1973 the sector accounted for about 22 per cent 
of G.N.P., yet the full achievement of the planned 
manufacturing capacity was impeded by insufficient 
amounts of well organised investment projects, foreign 
h d d t " '" 121 exc ~~ge an ames 1C ~avlngs. 
With the start of the first Five Year Plan in 1963 
t 
it was expected that the state would playa subsidiary 
role in development, and that the private sector would 
lead the struggle for growth. Only if the private 
sector f,'.:~iled to achieve the plC>J1...Yl.sd t~'rGets -:Tould the 
stQte step in to carry out investment in neglected areas, 
or to :provide public funds or .foreign exchpnge when 
_ ')7):;, _ 
pri v8.te savinGs ';:ere -too low. In effect the government 
expressed its confidence in prlvate enterprise and its 
ability to overcome Turkey's economic problems. 
In the manufacturing sector foreign investors in 
partnership with local firms set about producing goods 
for the domestic market. In the firms \vi th foreign 
partnership the domestic partner put up most of the 
c8.pi tal122 a.."'1d the foreign investor provided the patents 
and trade maries, most of the com:ponents of the products, 
most of the machinery, and some of the managerial know-
how. The foreign capital deterBined the kind of 
products that vlould be produced, but while the avail-
ability of local raw materials and relatively cheap 
labour meant high profits for the investors, the 
investments made virtually no contribution to export 
earnings and increased Turkey' s d.ep~ndency on a few 
industrialised countries. 
AsEects of ~ependenc~ 
From the earliest years of the post-war period 
Turkey has suffered from. a foreig:r:- exchange gap, and 
1., t ' l1~JS been a permanent aim vf successive governments 
to r~duce and eventually remove the need for foreign 
capital and economic assistance. In order to consider 
wheth~r foreign investment and economic assistance has 
h 1 ff ' t' fo"~el' ~-n D"~c'n"'''''' ~o ,<:l( ~-: po?i tive or neg.9tive e ect on ne .... ad ~.~ ... <.. ...... 0'"' 
gap in Turkey it is necessary to analyse the effects 
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of the inflow of the foreien resources On import require-
ments, the growth of eXforts, profi t tr~:lsfers aY' ... d 
, 
debt servicing. 
Foreign investment and economic assist~~ce may act 
to raise import requirements in two ways. Firstly, they 
may, through the emploYD.er ... t of predominnntly skil.led 
and expatri~~.te labour, cause the distribution of income 
to be tilted towards those with a high propensity to 
consume imported foodstuffs and luxury goods. Secondly. 
they may result in investment and production processes' 
which have a high initial imported capital content and 
a continuing dependence on imported intermediate goods 
d 1 . ·t J 123 an rep ace~en~ cap~ a_. 
In the cnse of Tll-rkev there h~_s been an enormous 
., , 
demand for luxury consumer goods "particularly since the 
1960s when a large middle class set its sights on the 
commodities available in '.'1estern consumer societies, but 
all consumer goods imported into Turkey have been subject 
to licenses, which have been very restrictive, and many 
goods h.3.ve been excluded from the permitted imports list. 
In addition ta.riffs and other charges on imports have 
been very h1eh, and still averaged about 50 per cent of' 
the ;.i.f. value of imports in the mid 1970s. These 
policies have restricted the importation of consumer 
goods, so that while they accounted for about 20 per 
ccn~ of imports in 1950, this hed been reduced tc 9.6 
PCI' cent j_n 1960, 5 per cent in 1970 and 3 per cent in 
1976. Insteod Turkey began to. produce her own consumer 
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goods 'llhich was consl.stent with the eIphasis on 
. 
industrialisation after 1963 and provided the incentive 
for foreign capital to seek investment opportunities. 
But if the inflow of foreign capital ~as successful 
in establishing a whole range of new consumer goods 
industries it was not so successful in ste~.lT:.ing the 
flow of imports. The reason was that the new units of 
production were engaged in 'screw driver' activities, 
, assembling mainly imported components, employing 
relatively few workers. The highly protected market 
encouraged inefficiency but it did generate high profits 
for investors. This kind of structure has been aptly 
described as the 'Trojan Horse' of Turkish industry 
serving both foreign and local investors.124 In the 
short-run the profit motive ensured a rap~d rate of 
industrialisation after 1963 but it would have been 
impossible without a. protected home market- and by the 
early'1970s, when the home market was nr) longer large 
enough to provide suffici'ent demand for continued 
expo1J,sion, the new industries found they could not 
compete in foreign markets. 
;) 
The 'l\urkish government must bear the responsibility 
for the distorted market structure thate!:lerged. The 
policy of adopting high import duties, an over-valued 
exch8ngc rate and of providing substantial investment 
]• -n n ''''}1 t; 'F r-. C" 
- _L\..' C· "" _l...' 1'"':'; V , which he::'vil"iT subsidised cel)i ta~ costs 
v 
I'·?lEd,:ivc to labour costs, meant that the signaling 
• 
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mechanism provided by the price system was no longer 
functional. Rationing in goods and capi ta~ marl:ets 
also meant that market prices no longer reflected 
relative sCB.rci ti.es. As a consequence the industriel 
sector grew in response to market incentives tha.t 
bore little relation to the social value of producing 
different goods. 125 
The textile industry has been one of the most 
successful of the new industries established in Turkey, 
and unlike other branches of ma~ufacturing its production· 
has been almost completely geared to export markets. 
In 1978 raw cotton made up a quarter of Turkey's total 
and a third of her agricultural, exports, making Turkey 
" 
the fourth largest cotton exporter in the world. 126 
Furthermore, textile exports accqunted for about 20 per 
cent of total end over 50 per cent of industrial exports. 
There were only three firms with foreign partnership 
operating in tho textile industry in 1975 and these 
accounted for a mere 1 per cent of sales, so that the 
achievements of the industry have been largely due to 
Turkish efforts. Yet the industry has failed to produce 
o 
, 
dOl:'le:-:3tically th'e machinery reeJ.1lired, eJld in s.pi te of 
plaYl~ having been dravm up to begin domestic production, 
neither local nor foreign capit8~ has been forthcoming. 
The dependence on imported capital goods has 
conti:1ued throughout the post-'.·:ar period. By encouracing 
foreiGn capital into certain key sectors (leadine 
sectors) it vIas hoped that bacJnvard and forward linkages 
.. 
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would integrate the rest of the econon:y into the 
modern sector. Instead the unba.lanced growth has 
per~etuated the dependence of the Turkish econonv on 
" 
the industrial'ised vlorld, partic~llarly for invest:T.snt 
goods and industrial r8W materi2.ls. The encouragenent 
of foreign capital failed to bring about the creation 
of an independent capital goods industry so that Turkey 
continued to rely on imports for machinery and technology. 
Table 6.12 shows that in 1976 52.3 per cent of 
industrial production was either in intermediate or 
investment goods, whereas in 1962 the figure had "been 
37.7 per?ent. However, this figure for 1976 is 
misleading since the investment goods include electronics, 
of which 81.6 per cent of the output is in consumer 
127 equipment, and road vehicles, ,and these two sectors 
should really be regarded as consumer clurables. .After 
allowing for electronics and road vc}1icles, the investment 
goods ratio falls to 11.2 per cent which is not a great 
improvement on 1962. Furthermore, the investment and 
intermediate goods sectors are largely dependent on 
fore~gn technology and components for their survival 
. ·aY'J.d barely 'make' a.ny contribution to th~ foreign exchange 
prob~em. Table 6.13 gives a breclcdovm of production in 
the manufacturing industry for 1976 and clearly indicates 
the emphasis on consu..lD.ergoods production. 
The. second el.ement in the foreiGn exch:J.nge equation 
is the export performance after the inflo~ of foreign 
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rn f,D.T -:::-' 6 12 4"1.12'"",,,-,...LJ • 
T' (' ·t· -f' r1 t il2 __ 0T.1POSl lon O-L. lE'_eUS riai 'Production 
196~-76, percent?3es 
8eC1;02:' Year 
1962 1967 1973 1 976 
Consu!11er Goods 62.3 52.9 53.5 47.7 
Int r 'Y""'0d': ate GOOQS 27.8 35.4 32.5 36.2 ,~ .;!.!. '-' .!-
Inv83tr.Jent Goods 1 9.9 11.7 14.0 16.1 
,,- t 1. 1 ~ d ~o e: lnc~uaes consumer urables. 
Source: Turl<:ey: .An. Econorr.ic Survey, op. cj_ t .. 
Table 50. 
TABLE 6.13 
Production in Uanuf9.ctu~ing 'Industry 
J- 976, p e r.c en t 2g e s 
Consumer Goods Industry Inter~ediate Goods Industry 
. 
Food 
Beverages 
~o1)acco 
rnev-L.]·le·r)· 
...1. _ ... l' _ _ L", 
28.8 
1.4 
3.$ 
~3 .. 8 
47.7 
Invest~r~C:(lt Gd s. Industry 
l',:etal ::?rod nc ts 
:':IClchi.ner y 
1 
,. • -L .,.,-- ,. 
:~~:'} C .":::LC~lln '?l'Y 
''''-1 ..Ll "r l' 
':"'_0c l" L~-:.C llnery 
II r:.p.Ll"'O'YlI.l..-: cc 
,"""...., v._ _.... u 
3.0 
3.6 
1.4 
2.1 
1.0 
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'Forest Products 
Pulp 2::. Paper 
P:!:'inting 
~-{id est: ~eJ. t?ler 
Rubber 
Plastics 
o 
Chemicals 
Petroche!:licals 
Petroleum Pruducts 
:?ertili3e~'S 
Cement 
Clay Products 
3.0 
o. ~, 
0.6 
'j Q 
/C..J 
0.8 
1.1 
4.4 
1.9 
8.1 
1.3 
1.2 
Ro~~d Vehicles 
. 
Raill,r;;.y Vehicles 
Ship Building 
4.0 
0.4 
0.5 
16.1 
Glass 
CeraI.'lics 
Iron & Steel 
Non-Ferrous :,:etals 
Source: Derived from State Planning Office 
Publications. 
0.6 
0.3 
5.4 
1.9 
36.2 
capital. Turkish exports failed in the poSt-v18.I period 
to keep in line with the' enormous growth of imports. 
Table 6.14 shows that the trade balance has .grown 
considerably since the 1950s, with exports financing 
.a declining share of imports. By the 1970s the financing 
requi rement h.~r1 ree.ched pstronnT'1lC :rroI:0rtions a EYen 
in 1976 primary products (agricurture, mining and 
quarrying) still accounted for 69.6 per Gent of exports 
(1950 = 81.9) and although industrial exports were 30~4 
per cent of the total in 1976 (1950 = 18.1), 5 per cent 
of the total were agriculture'based processed products 
and another 13.5 per cent ,,'lere textiles, which is shovm 
in Table 6.15. 
~The whole of the improvement in the ratio of 
. industrial product exports was due to the growth of 
textile exports, which had been non-existent in 1950 
and e.ccuunted for only 0.8 per cent of total exports 
even in i960. Yet foreign partnership firxs only accounted 
for. 1 per cent of sales i~ textiles, so that the 
• 
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TABLE 6.14 
of P':::.YT:12Y'l t s 
u.s. % million 
I1Eports 
Exports 
B::i1ance of Trade; 
In~,.ri3ible Tr ::~:r:.s ac t ions 
Current Account Balance 
External Debt Repayment 
:B'in2nc ing ReCluirement 
Financing ReClllirement 8.S 
'percentage of Exports + 
Tny~~ihle B?l.~nce 
Financing Re::}uirement as 
percentage of Imports + 
Debt Repayment 
Exports as percentage 
of Imports 
1950 
-286 
26~ 
-' 
-23 
-27 
-50 
-It:; 
-' 
-65 
27.5 
21.6 
91.9 
1960 1970 ' 0"""6 .L J , 
-468 -948 -5128 
321 588 1960 
-147 -360 -3168 
-44 +121 of 0 (1 () ~'-''-
-139 -171 -2274 
-65 173 -119 
-204 -344 -2373 
73.6 44.7 82.9 
38.3 30.7 45.2 
68.6 62.0 38.2 
Source: s:'urkey: A"'1 Econo:nic Survey, OPe cit. p.112, 
Table 86. 
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T /,1)T,-;'- ~ 15 J~...L...J...J.",."J .....,. 
The Pattern of Turkish ~xports 1950-76, 
percent3ges 
Year 
Sector 1950 1960 1970 1975 1976 
--
l~ricul ture 75.1 70.8 75.2 56.6 64.0 
n,lTinin,0N and () . 6.8 4.1 743 7.5 5.6 .1_ 0: ,~uarrylng 
or ~ t' 1 J.naus rla Products 18.1 25.2 17.5 35.9 30.4 
of which Textiles 0.8 4.4 9.5 13.5 
Source: Derived from Turkey: An Economic Survey, 
OPe cit. Table 87. 
contribution of textiles to exports was entirely due to 
the efforts of domestic capital. In conclusion, not 
only did the rapid industrialisation fa~l to generate a 
growth in exports in line' with the growth of imports, but 
apa.rt from textiles, the pattern of exports remained 
essentially the same, displaying a high dependence on a 
narrow' range of prir:~-2ry products './hich ·.~lere ::-:_ai:0.1y 
destined for the industria~ised countries of the T.7est. 
~ 
The third factor to consider is the relationship 
between the inflow of private foreign capite.l and profit 
transfer$ and related payments. It \'I2.S the inadeq,uac.y 
of saving mobilisation efforts in financing investment 
that led to the heavy reli8nce. on "foreign sources. 
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Turkish 'dependence on foreign capital and economic 
, 
assistance hps been suct. that when the flow frow 
Western sources slowed dovID the economy was forced 
into crisis. Furtheruore, foreign capital flows 
subsequently caused a large external deficit throu~h 
v 
the interest payments and profits transfers that were 
the counterpart of the investment. Between 1947 and 
1964 Turkey received %953.1 million in foreign capit~~ 
flows end paid $287.3 million in interest. :3etween 
1963-70 loans to the value of $918.8 million were 
received and %1197 million was paid as repayments and 
interest. Turning to profit transfers, these too have 
been v;;:"y high, amounting to 25 per cent of actual 
. investment in 1964, 68 per cent in 1966, 218 per cent 
in J967 aJ'1.d J_96 per cent in 1968~ Between 1967-70' 
tt133 mtlli:on '.vas invested and :t122 million was transferrecl 
- . 128 to parent companles. By 1976 the position on the 
external capital account was quite serious as is shown 
in Table 6&16. Profit transfers were 217 per cent of 
the inflow of private foreign-capital, although in 1975 
the ratio W8.S a mere 12 per cent. Taki~g theth.!'ee years 
(1974--76) together the "inf1qw on capi tal account was 
.. ' : 
,3] 340.6 million compar'cd with an outflovv of .31020.9 
.. 
million which clearly emphasises the enormous cost of 
servicing and repaying foreign debt. 
Another measure of the scale of indebtedness is the 
debt service ratio,12 9 which stood at 17 per cent in 1976, 
33 per c,ent in 1977 and 41 per ce:s-t in 1978. 130 The very 
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t, 
T lillLE 6.16 
Foreign Capital Flows 1974-76 
u.s. t million 
1974 
Private Foreign Capital 88.1 
Project Credits 268.5 
Interest Payments 102.4 
Profit Transfers 71.1 
Payments for Services 
from Project Credits 17.0 
Debt Repayments 126.1 
1975 1976 
304.8 27.4 
286.8 365.0 
124.0 217.0 
36.3 - 59.6 
15.0 15.8 
117.5 119.1 
Source: State Planning Organisation publications. 
high debt seTvice ratio is one of the reasons why Turkey 
has sought, and the developed countries have been willing 
to advance, further forei-gn credi ts. 
The grov,·th of foreign inclettedness is not Ylecessa.!'ily 
a serious problem, sinc~ the foreign capital may generate-
an increase in production which more than covers the 
.. 
cost of servicing the debt. However, in the case of 
Turkey it has been. shown that the foreign investment, 
although it contributed to a rapid rise in industrial 
productipn, did very little to expand export8.a~d res~l:ed 
in a steep rise in "ir:1ports of capital goods and raw 
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ma.terials. Even in the period 1974-76 nse.r:'y 70 per 
cent of the capita~ inflow was in the form of n~o~nc+ 
......... ~'-- u 
credits, (Table 6.16), which were a form of 'tied' 
aid, and could not be expected to r8duce the fcreiz;n 
exchnnge deficit. By the second half of the 1970s when 
exports were stagnating, when' the cost of oil imports 
w~s crippling and military imports were %500 million 
a year, then the debt servicing problem was adding to 
the balance of payments crisis. Yet as the crisis 
deepened in tile late 1970s T.urkey found it very difficult 
to obtain further foreign capital or credit and it was 
this that forced the government to go to the I .~.1.F. for 
finance, which was only given 2ubject to stringent 
domestic economic pblicS. ./ 
Unfortunately for Turkey during the second half of 
the 1970s there was little hope of solving the foreign 
exchange problpm in the short-run. Exports were mainly 
of prim.ary products, and agricultural p~oduction could 
not be increased without land reform and substantial 
injections of capital. The traditional short-ru...VJ. macro-
economic solution to external deficit is to devalue vr 
deflate, but neither of·these"policies are wit~out side-
effects. Deflation is particularly hard on poor countries, 
4> 
like Turkey, '.vhere the per capi ta income is low and 
unemployment already high, since the burden is likely to 
be on the less privileged members of society. Dev2luQtion, 
on the other hand., may not increase exp?rt receil)ts, 
bec2use of supply constraints in the case of pri~~ry 
• 
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products and, barriers to trade in the case of ind~strial 
goods like texttles. IJor are iI:l.lJorts li~-:sly to respond 
to devaluation when, as in the case of ~urlrey' t ~ L ,1r:1PO:' S 
are essentiaJ.and there is no domestic substitute 
industry, but there is al'vVays the danger the.t dev8.1uation 
will exacerbate domestic inflation. Nevertheless Turkey 
was forced to deflate and devalue the lira in the late 
19706, yet the foreign exchange position had become so 
serious. that it was impos,si ble to me.nage. wi thout ,further 
foreign credit in the short-run. 
External Economic Relations and Unemulo:rment 
Two of the major issues that have occupied the United 
Nations in discussions on the problems facing L.D.C.s 
have been employment and income distribution. 131 These 
two. goals are closely connected since, for the vast 
majority of the population of L.D.C~8. income is derived 
solely from emrloyment, and rising unemploywent inevitably 
means that there is uneq,ual participation in the 'benefits 
of development. In the case of Turkey the labour force 
has 1.)een crowing more ra.pidly than employment opportunities 
in the post~~~r p~riod, ~ith the result th2t une~rloyme~t 
and \lnder-employment have been rising. Sta'"'cistics on 
unemployment prior to 1962 are unreliable but the growth 
in it since then is shown in Table 6.17. The unemploy-
ment problen is actually more critical than indicated in 
~~~tle 6.i 7, firstly bec8.use cericul turcl under-employment 
is probably greater th&~ thut recorded132 and secondly 
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Uneop1oyment 1952-76 in OOO's 
1962 1967 lO7? ..II~ ., 0'76 ~_I 
L3_bour Force Supply 12197 1-;Ll42 ~ ... T 14320 15990 
L~,bour Forcs Demand 11951 12732 13510 14634 
/:~;ricul ture 9216 9073 8760 2680 
Industry 995 1175 1500 -, <:, 1 9 ........ ........ l~ 
Ccnstruction 305 369 440 594 
Transporta.tion 258 324 460 670 
C! • IJerVlces and Other 1177 1719 2350 2706 
lTon-.4gricu1 tural Surplus 235 530 725 1356 
Disguised Uneciployment 
·in J'.c;ri cuI ture 750 910 850 710 
110t al Labour Force 
Surplus 1085 1440 1575 2066 
Une::lploymcn t Rete (ct ~ r, 8.1 10.7 -11.0 12.9 
Source: Turkey: M Economic Survey, 1977, OPe cit. 
Table 129. 
- 292 -
because there is also under-eLlrloy~ent in --urban areas. 
Furthermore, many T1J.rl:isD. workers :h_~.ve been obli:;::ed 
'--
to go abroad to find work. In the mid 19603 there were 
about 150, 000 Turkish workers a.broe.d, and this h2.d 
risen to almost 700,000 by 1976. )~though this export 
of workers involved economic and social costs to Turkey, 
it did result in substantial remittances, and 77i thout 
it open unemployment would have been higher. 
A Ifl8,jor cause of the rising unemployment has been 
the very rapid rate of population growth which has been 
over 2.5 per cent per annum since 1950. The rising 
population h2.s been accompanie-d by an even _ more rapid 
growth of urban population, due to both rural 'push' 
and urban 'pull' factors, particularly after 1962 when 
the introduction of planning resulted in greater emphasis 
. -
on industria~isation. In spite of illdustry increasing 
its absorption of the e~onomically active pcpulation 
fron 8.3 per cent in 1962 to 13.0 per cent in 1976, the 
rate of urbanisation was even more rapid, so that urban 
unemployment rose rapidly after 1963. 
Unemployment is a -problem which is not unique to 
Turk~y, yet it is imp.ortant to consider in what ways the 
particular path of industrialisation taken in that country 
affected the level of employmen~. In particular it is 
necessary to consider how the flow of economic assistance 
- " 
through ~he U.S. ~.I.TI. and its predecess8r 2Ge~cies 
fUld the flovv of foreign ca.pi tal affected eUlploy~ent cre8.tion. 
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The ~'i... I ~D. programme for i'urkey ~::ent sone '::av 
" 
towarU2 meeting the shortage of capital experie~ced 
by the country but the impact on employment was adverse 
because of the kind of technology transferred. ~'J.rkey 
possessed 2bundant supplies of labour but capital was 
scarce, yet the technology imported through A.I.D. 
loans and grants '"vas mainly capi ta.l intensive. There 
are several re8sons vlhy' the A. I.D. funds resul ted in 
capital intensive technology beir..g imported: 133 
1. U.S. A.I.D. officials who provide advice to their 
Turkish counterparts are only aware of technology which 
is produced in the United States. These offiCials do 
not have access to alternative technologies nor are 
they aware of the' possibilities of adapting existi~g 
technologies to meet the conditions in Turkey. It must 
also 1)c recognised that it is in ·the interest of the 
U ~' .0. to sell its own teclmology and one of the stated 
-
objectives of the .A. I.1). is to extend lJnerican influence. 
2. The form that A. I .. D. economic assie t~"'1ce took did 
not reflect econo~ic scarcity.but rather it had the 
effect of shaping the pattern of investment and, therefore, 
developillent. Because of the A.I.D. policy of limiting 
aid :financing to fore.ign· exch8nge costs, the Turkish 
government a..'rld private firms were encouraged to over-
emphp-.sise those projects which called for large sums 
of foreign excha...Ylge and which were inevitably capi tal 
intensj .. -;re and useo more e12borate c8pi t2.1. Further::lore, 
the ernphasis of lee I .D.. on pro j ect lending had the 
eff~ct of restricting the choice of Turkey because of 
• 
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the 'tying' of aid. It would have been better for 
Turkey if she had been given greater c~oice to se~ect 
the best technology, but this was impossible under the 
terms of the aid. In so~e cases the econo~ic assistance 
was given under the condition that U.S. contracting 
firms would be employed, which in the case of construction 
meant using machine intensive methods. 
3. The rates of interest charged by the J~. I.D. on loans 
to Turkey were low, which meant that 'capi tal \vas bei!lg' 
subsidised.. :F-urthermore, Turkish policy on trade and 
exchange also encouraged the importation of capital 
equipment at favourable exchange rates, and by offering 
'low interest rates, tax allowa'.~~es on investment, 
.preferential tariffs on imported capital goods and 
made artificially cheap. McCabe 'and Michalopoulos 
. . . 
(1971)134 have shovvn that these domestic policies and 
the relative ease with which foreign credit was available 
have had a significant impact on the composition of 
investment a.l1d the capital stock. 
However, what is profitable in ter:ns of individual 
cnlc:ulation may ~:.:.ot be prcfi -:abie frc:-::. th2 ~}cin.t of vie-:: 
of t~1e country as a '::1:101e. The artifi:::iall:; induced 
capital intensive technology limited the employment 
opportunities in the modern industrial sector and made 
it ilnpossible for industry to absorb the labour releasea. 
f 1 d'· + . ] t 11:1 the neo-c12ssic al tr[',di -'cion., rOL1 'CTf'. l v.lO!lB. _ sec OT's. -
, 13C::: T'ttl ~"t 1 and s~ott (19~/2)- J hav~p. ar~o~ued.that, ~l' .~ e, 0Cl oVs~y ~ ~ -
4 
- 20 [:) -J.,
att8J:1pts to speed up industrialisatior.. thro':::'h ,,";,'"I~Te"'''Y1;'1(;r:+ 
......... 0.... U V 1/ ~ _i..I....o..I. ... oJ 
. 
(or f0~eio~n.) intervention in the econo~l·es· ~ T ~ C 0.1.. ~.~ •• s 
by subsidising capital, causes inefficient resource 
allocation, rising une2)loy~ent, cenerates inflation 
and leads to continued under-development. It might be 
arGued that Turkey has suffered from all of these 
consequences; moreover, there \vere long term adverse 
.. 
effects of under-pricing imported capital goods, in that 
the establisIL"TIent of ca.p1 tal goods' industries in :::urkey 
was inhibited in spite of plans to create them. Even 
at the end of the T.F.Y.P. (1977) the process of import 
substituti.ng industria.lisation had not gone slgnificantly 
beyond the manufacture of cons ;rm..er goods, end the 
. production of intermediate goods, domestic ravl'materials 
and ca.pi tal goods wa.s still largely undeveloped .136 
This has been unfortunate in the 'case of Turkey since 
these latter industries could produce equipment which is 
more labour inLensive and better adapted to the factor 
endowments OI the country.137 
4. Loans and grants made by the A.I.D. invariably go 
to large public insti tutions and the large:' firms end 
businesses, which further induces the adoption of 
capital intensJ. ve met.l10ds. A. T.D. technica.l assistance 
has also been geared to the economic ~d social 
institutions meeting the needs of large operators, 
while the needs of smp~l firms have been ignored. 
All . of these factcrs have led to the substi tution 
of <?npi tal for labour and :19ve reduced the growth of 
• 
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employment opportunities. Turkish ~overr~ents EUS~ share 
the blame since they he.ve encouraged the .e.doptio~ cf 
projects which incorporate the latest technology a."'1.d 
are, t.herefore, ·capi t8~ intensive. F'urther!J.ore, the 
encouragement of foreign private capital has also led 
to the employment of the same capital intensive methods 
used in the developed vforld. McCabe and l,:ichalopoulos138 
have sho~~ that industries using imported equipment are 
more capi tal intensive than industries ~,.;i th a low 
component of iiillJorted equipment. This means that the 
employmeht-capitG~ ratio is considerably higher in a 
sector using only domestically produced equipment than 
it is in one using only impor'(..-:r1. equipment. Significantly 
.they conclude that a shift in the composition of 
investment to sectors with a. high component of domestic 
capital goods would not only have'beneficial effects on 
empi6yment but also on value added. 
By 1973 it was also noticeable that those firms in 
foreigri partnership were employing relatively-less 
labour ·thb.n their domestic c01..mterparts, reflecting the 
greater capital intensity of their production. This 
was not only be 0 2use fo:rei.gn firms '.:ere concer.trated in 
. 
the ma..."'1.ufe.cturing j_ndustry, bec2.1lse even 'Nithin 
• 
manufa.cturing Table 6.18 shows that those firms in 
foreign partnership accounted for a larger share of 
sales than employment, apart froil in the clothing and 
b ' . everaGe industrlcs. Overall j_n t!1e ~anu.facturing 
. 
industry the firr.ls with foreign capi -:2.1 accounted for 
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11.7 per cent of sales but only 6.3 per cent of 
employment. 
In conclusion it is ~uite clear that if e~ployment 
had been made a major priority in post-war Turkey it 
would have been necessary to control the direction and 
form of foreign involvement in the economy by raising 
the user cost of imported capital. Furthermore, it mus~ 
be: stressed .that the growth of manufacturing industry 
with the help of foreign capital led to a higher 
propensi ty to import raw materials and capital goods 
and created a longer-term dependency on those imports, 
yet the foreign capita~ failed to generate higher 
exports or to break the dependence on a narrow ra.YJ.ge of 
primary products for sale to a small number of industrialised 
countries. These aspects of dependency were not 
inevi ta,ble and might have been prevented if the Turkish 
government h~d pursued an interventionist ~olicy which 
encouraged the substitution of domestic resources for 
imported ones. However, there must be a big question 
mark over whether foreign capital flows and economic 
assistance would have been fc::-thcoming if Turkish 
o 
economic policy had insist~d on new investm~nt going 
. 
into import-substituting industries like capital goods, 
• 
and into projects which utilised domestic or domestically 
produced inputs. The United states certainly had a 
great influence in post-war Turkey in pushing her towards 
a free unregulated economy and it is 'lUestioDac2.e 'Hhetr:er 
foreign exchange flow~ would have beell on the scale they 
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enterprise. 
Irrtro(lu.ctioTI; 
The object of this chapter is to estimat2 the 
rel::ltions~Clip betvleen defence exper..di ture e.nd economic 
l.lsing ~ '~' 
...... conOIrnc IJne'Jry 
tell us ~hether higber def2~ce 
reduce or increase the grovlth of output, but it C2n he~p 
us to understand the mecha..l1isI'ls through vlhic:h. defence 
. "I t ..L. Y -I- ~' t:b .., lrJ.r uences ou pUt.. ell many 01. ,,~e ear~ier stUdies on 
the subject failed to specify t~e precise linkages 
,betvreen defence and output, so that much of the evidence 
'\':1'1_',("','::::0 ... 0:1, lJ/t-.l." th ""~'11+l' on v ~ . • _ _ \..; C, .'_ v • 
O ..(., ,ne 0.1. simplest a.9proaches to tr. e rela:ti ,:n: Ehip 
bet~T.'een delc!1(, c. expeI~di ture and economic gTO"Nth is found 
in Kennedy (1975).2 He uses two indica~ors of economic 
performance, -:;he growth r'a.te of G.D.P. and. the growth 
:r'~,,,-te of G-.D.P. per capita, and using cross 2ectio~ d3.ta 
for 38 Third World coun~ries estimates the effect of 
tll<.~t'\ t~le countri2s '{vi th the ·l1.ighest defence burdens 
(military expenditure as a proportion of G.N.P.) differed 
widc~ly in ter;-n.s of growth of G.:D.P. Byarbitra.rily 
b:cc.:aKing up the cQuntries into ,Zrou?s accord:5'Y!0 to '.'ib9the-r 
-1-1",'" r1 eI''''Cl-'CC> h:'T'~ c-Y' n' '=> feuna.' +n' 9t rwre countries -;;i.:h V_~\ ..... \.,.oi. . __ u:....l ....... u. .. "".L.1, c:;; ... ..... "-'" 
--Or\ 
- ) 'J 
high defence burdens experienced high growth rates, but 
overall concluded that .there ',r,T3.S no obvious relationship 
between growth rates and the percentage a~located to 
~ f 3 de ence. 
Kennedy also looked at the growth of per capita 
product in relation to tbe defence burden for three 
recional groupings of ·the 38 countries, lSrica, Asia and 
Latin America. For each of these groups there seemed to 
be some evidence to support the view that the higher 
growth L.D.C.s had a lower than average defence burden, 
nevertheless, Kennedy dismissed the 'crude t relationship 
and argued that it might be due to varying rates of 
po:pulation growth as much as, or more than, any 
differences in military spending. 4 Unfortunately 
Kennedy does not extend his analy,sis to consider the effect 
f 1 t · th G D P . + ' . , o popu a lon grow. on ••• per caplva, wnlcn, 
presumably, could be either positive or negative. He 
concludes that +'he statistical evidence is not unambiguous. 
The s&~e procedure that Kennedy used for his analysis 
can a.lso be used on tine series data for Turkey. Table 7.1 
shows the growth of G.D.P. and G.D.P. per c?pita against 
the defence burden for the period 1952 to 1976. The 
aVt~:!:,~ge defence burden for the five years with the highest 
growth of G.D.P. was 4.9 per cent, while for the five 
years with the lowest growth of G.D.P. it ~as 5.3 per cent •. 
A simil~~ differential is obtained if the best five ye?rs 
~".'lr! worst fi ve years in terms of G.D.F. per capi ta are 
• 
- 3()1 -
T JJ3LE 7.1 
G-'-'o 1ntv, ..J... 1t .... _ G T, P • _".J • • per c2)it~ 
and t~e ~ercenta~e of G.D.P. p110cated 
to defence i~ ~urkey, 1952-76 
n t 'a P .1. .... ..- "J of ,.. -r> 0 "'+ n \~T..I... ., l.J _ :i..2te o£' }-::o,','th ~.~ll2. t ~r~;" -~ 
of ,.. D n C~) of G:!)P ner cG-nita Burden ' .I) IJ • .1. t-
ID . * 
( ~] 
1952 12.0 5.7 5.4 
1953 11.2 8.2 5.3 
1954 -2 a . ../ -5.6 5.9 
1955 8.1 5.1 5.6 
1956 3.3 0.8 5.2 
1957 7.9 4.4 4 .. 3 
1958 4.6 1.5 4.2 
1959 4.6 1.2 4.9 
1960 2.9 0.7 5.1 
, "r·o• 
.L jU...l. 1.7 J -0.7 5.5 
1962 6.1 3.5 5.1 
1963 9.4 6.6 4.7 
1964 4.1 1.6 4.8 
1965 2.6 -0.9 5.0 
1966 11.7 9.4 4.4 
1967 4.5 2.5 4.5 
1968 6.7 3.8 4.6 
1969 5.3 3.5 4.3 
1970 4.9 2.4 0 4.3 
l e)71 9.1 6.3 4.5 
. 
19'7') 6.6 4.6 4-.3 ~ 1<-
'\ 
1973 4.4 1.5 4.1 
1974 8.8 5.4 3.9 
1975 7.8 5.8 6.4 
1976 8.1 6.8 7.0 
Sources: S.T.P.R.I. Yearbooks; Tur~\:ey : An :s C 0 -::. 0 ::1 i c 
Survey, 1977. 
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compared wi t~ the defence burden, \'lhich indicates, if 
anythin.g, th2>t the defence burden has reduced the growt~ 
rate. However! the results must be interpreted as being 
inconclusive, "partly because 'the procedure C3nnot 
distinguish betvveen cause and effect. To observe a 
correlation between two sets of variables tells us nothing 
about causality, and it is quite possible that a spurious 
relationship may exist e ~~oreover, Kennedy does not 
fully analyse the relationship between growth 8,.."Y1d the 
military burden. He argues that miliiary expenditure is 
generally rega.rded as wasteful and might divert resources 
away from productive activity, which implies that the 
military burden may reduce savings and/or investment, ;:n.d 
,through this, therefore, reduce economic growth. Kennedy 
does not, however~ try to establish these links tn any 
formal "'lay, nor does he try to test them. Clearly this 
procedure ca~not help in any way to dete~mine the influence 
of the rlilitary burden on economic growth. 
Vlhynes (1979)5 found' a positive correlation between 
defence expendlture growth and p9r capita income growth, 
with a coefficient of 0.649 for developed cou~tries a."d 
the defe~ce burden a.YJ.d per CD.pi ta i~8o=e Vias found to ~le 
4: 
0.224 for L.D.C.s, but negative (~O.355) for the developed 
country- sample. These results must be discounted, 
however, since ~11ynes uses data expressed in current 
r:r-ices, ~o that part of the correl;:c.tior. is dU0 to the 
inf.lutionary trends wi thin each series. _,Io:!:'€: over, there 
- 303 
i3 no analysis of the statistical the 
results. 
The Opportunit~ Cost of Defetice =zpe~diture 
An interesting approac:1 to the Clues-sion of the cost 
of mili tary expenditure is p:resentec1 by 3enoi t aYiu. 
Lubell (1967)6 who derive some estimates for the net 
opportunity cost of military expenditure, which they then 
express as a percentage of G.N.? Emphasising that their 
results were suggestive rather theJl conclusive, they 
found that.for Turkey the net opportunity cost or burden 
of mili tary e:::pendi ture ..... vas about 2.8 per cent of G.N. P. 
There are several reasons v/hy Benoit and Lubell's 
estimate for the burden is too low, so it is worthwhile 
going through their figures and correcting as appropriate 
. . 
to derive a more accurate estimate. 
Using data for 1964 Benoit and Lubell present the 
breakdown of mili tary expenditure in Turkey as follows: 
(in T. L. million, coluum 1) (1) (2) 
Total Defence Expenditure 2911· · 3443 
· 
Personnet 1443 
C' 1707 :,::i1 i t f-xry · • 
M.ajor Procurement 326 • 386 • 
.}1cseQ.-Tch a.."YJ.d Development 1 · 1 • 
Construction 264 • 312 • 
Operation and Maintenance (0 & "1\;) 848 • 1003 .I. .... • 
TrDnsfers: Internal 4 • 5 • 
External 25 • 30 • 
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The first under-estimate is found in~' T" :...ne ~ 2.. (Sure 
total jefence expenditure, which is tB2en f~c:n the 
T -" h '1\T t" 1" t url':lS J.~8, lona -nccoun s. The N.A.T.O. estimate of 
military expenditure for 1964 was 34-43 T .. 1 __ • r.lillion, 
which is shown alongside the n8.tional estiTIate. The 
for 
il.A.T.O. estimate is likely to be more accurate since it 
takes into account military expenditure which is disguised 
by being financed by o'ther I,!inistries. As the N.A.T.O. 
estimate is 18 per cent above the Benoit-Lubell figure 
all the components of defence expendit!.lI'c have been 
increased by the same proportion, and the adjusted figures 
are shown in the second column. 
Benoi t and Lubell argue qui te correctly that the 
'total level of military expenditure does not give the 
true opporttl.ni ty cost, which represents the amount of 
non-defence goods and services that ~re sacrificed in 
ord.er to make possible the defence activit_ies. In 
particular the amount that is paid for the military use 
of resources nay not correctly reflect what would have 
been paid for the same resources in the market. Thus 
military conscY'ipts are paid lass than the average wage, 
but the opportunity cost is' 'Nhat those =-~en",.ould have 
contributed to produ~tio~ if they had been e~ployed in 
" 
ci vilictTI. acti vi ties. The opportunity cost of military 
persolmel can be.; estimated by mul tiplying the number of 
tlen in the armed forces' by the average civilian v:age. 
DenOi t and I;uoe11 give a ii_sure of 180, CC'O :or I:"ili t2r~~ 
personnel but this does not include para-:lili tary forces, 
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which inc:Y'c:?,ses the nUDber to 563, ceo. :he ~ext Cl'lestior.. 
is what the armed forces would have earr..ed i:1. civiliar.. 
productive activity, but Benoit and Lubell give no 
details on h::wr the~T 2rri'led at a figure for t~:e~veT?ge 
wage in the civilian sector. It is knO"'lTI. that the average 
daily wage for male workers covered by social insurance 
was 20.01 T.L. in 1964) which, 2ssuming a working year 
of 250 days , gives an avera6e a."Ylnual civilian male wage 
of 5002.5 T.L. The opportunity cost of rIili tary personneJ. 
can now be estimated as 563,000 times 5002.5 T.1., '\'rhich 
gives 2816 TeL. million,? and is shown in Table 7.2. 
\" 
TABLE 7.2 
The Opportunity Cost of tlili tary 
Expenditure, in TeL. million 
Military Personnel 
Major rI~~urement 
Research and Development 
Construction 
o &'M 
Transfers Abro ad 
Total Gross Opport~~ity Cost 
2816 
386 
265 
907 
30 
4404 
For procurement, like Benoit and Lubell, it will be 
assumed that purchases are specialised weapons and \Yleapons 
SystSlDs without civilian capability, and, therefore, all 
, '" 
of 't " b::j Re search '-'nd d evelo ~;)l:.e::l'l; l S ,l lS a ~uraen. 0 
1'· ' . +" t and cc<:>~1' be l' [J')~'10red in tl:~ estit13..te. nSl :::;nl.L lC c,~n C.l- c. L 7.'ith 
• 
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military construction it is not imwediately clear 
whetLtr it is a burden or not, since if it has a 
civilian use, or would have been provided by the civilian 
a.uthori ties in any case, then it should not be regarded 
as a burden. Like Benoit and Lubell it is assumed that 
15 per cent of military construction has civilian use, 
and the rem3.inder (265 T .L. million) is ta1{en as the 
opportunj_ ty cost, which is also shown in Table 7.2. 
For O. & M. once 2gain there may be SOIDe civilian use, 
e.g. medical services, housing, upkee~ of communications 
and transport systems, but in the absence of detailed 
information on Turkey it will be assumed, like Benoit 
and ,Lubell, that the opportunity cost is gO. 4 per cen t 
of the expenditure. Transfers abroad are taken as a 
burden at the full cost. The total gross opportunity 
cost can now be determined, roLd TS presented in Table 7.2. 
To arrive at the net burden of nati6nal defence, 
Benoit and Lubell assume that instead of each country 
keeping its own defence system, there is a unified world-
wide peace-keeping operation, then the cost of this would 
be the minimum 80St of preserving international security. 
They use an estimate ~ade by the ~.S. ~.C.D.~. on the 
cost of sllch an inter:national securi ty org2T~is8tion 8.r~d. 
~ 
this cost is allocated to each country in proportion to 
... :, . 
its contribution to the U.N. This cost needs to be 
deducteC!. froID the gross opportunity cost, and is shovm 
t ~? + . l' n ~ablr..' 7 7 It ','I('u1d al~o be necessary O.h.".ln valn 
.l ''''; •. ). ~)~  CJ 
1 se ~url·LL·Y so t~e ex,enditure u military force for interna - - _ - -
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by the Gend~~merie in 1964 is used to 2r~roxirnate 
this cost. The net o~p0~tunit'JT cost ~~ e~L~~·te~ . 
_J<...J U u.LL~a \...L. lTI 
T?b1e 7.3 3.nd it C2n be seen tho.t 98 a percent2se of 
. 
G .i'~.P • it amounts to 5.3 per cent. 
TABLE 7.3 
The Net ~ilitBry Burden for 1964, 
in T. L. mj.llion 
Gross Opportunity Cost 
Contribution to InteT'national Security 
Organisation 
Minimum Defence ProgrB.mme for Internal 
Security 
Net Opportunity Cost 
67,397 
4,404 
583 
275 
3,546 
Net Opportunity Cost as percentage of G.N.P. = 5.3 
This estimate of ~.3 per cent is alnost twice as 
c 
h13h 8,S th8,t of Bcnoi t and Lubell and a mo::'e accurate 
refl€ction of the opportunity cost of military expenditure • 
. The main limitation of this estimate as a measure of lost 
ci vilia.."VJ. production is that it takes no account of ~Y!y 
posi tivc effects th2.t mili t2.ry expenditure Tay have on 
t ~. d ~ Lhol ecor..omic 0~()'Ntll, arYJ.d this canna ue 19nore. ..., ever l. ~ ess 
the, results do·· point to a serious .. and heavy cost of 
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al ternati ves forgoYle in maint::dning a large mili t2J'Y 
presence in Turkey. 
-pnother a.pproacb.. to the opportunity cost issue is 
to try to determine eElpirically which 2ectors of the 
economy experience a smaller share of tl-::.e 'cake' when 
military expenditure rises. ~his exercise should help 
to establish if there .i~ any systematic transfer of 
resources to military expenditure from the main components 
of aggregate demand. l.loreover, the results may help us 
to do a cost-benefit an~lysis of military activity, and 
to identify those components of aggregate demand that 
suffer disproportionately from a military build-up. The 
opportunity cost of military expenditure could be in the 
'form of current· welfare (consumption, health, etc.) or 
if investment is reduced, then future generations may 
suffer through lower economic growth. 
Pryor (1968)9 and Russett (1969)10 both looked at 
the relationshil-' between the defence burden and other 
components of G.N.P. Pryor found no evidence of a 
systeme.tic rela.tionship between defence expenditure and 
other aspects of civilian spending, based on cross section 
~nHlysis of O.E. C.D • . countriE;s between 1956-62 and time 
series regTession analysis over. the same period. Russett 
w~s mainly concerned with the U.S.A. between 1939 and 
1969 and found that consumption declined most in absolute 
terms a.'1d investment in relr).tive ter2s, so t!1.2.t futu:'2 
. 
prod.ucture capacity Vip.S hit most. He also found that 
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\'.'i thin soeial investment educatior.. and research suffered 
at the expense of defence expenditure. For Canada 
Russett found a positive relationship between defence 
expendi ture and inve3tment, although for. the U.K. a.l1.d 
]'r8nce there was a negative correlation. The main 
criticism of Russett's results is that they are unduly 
influenced by the effect of the Second World War, but 
they also -ta.1reno account of the statistical significance 
of the correlations. 
There are two· possible ways of looking at the costs 
of' military exp8nditure. One way would be to determine 
the distribution of the burden of extra t~~ation that 
would be reQuired to finance military expansion also 
taking account of any resulting inflation. This particular 
approach would require very detailed information not only 
. 
on the structure of taxation and its impact at the margin, 
but also on the ability of different i~come groups to 
resist pressure on real incomes. Unfortunately this 
detailed information is not available for Turkey. The 
~ 
other way, which is the approach adopted here, is to 
brea"k" down the G.N.P. into its main components to see 
which of thefu bears the main brunt of 8ilitary expenditure. 
·Using data for Turkey over the period 1952-76 the 
various components of aggregate demand are expressed as 
percentages of G.N.P. and then regressed against the 
t .C' G 1':r p ~ d f "h - T d e .C' 0 lJ " e I tis per c en ag e O.L .• 1 ~. • 8. ceo un " e 0 r v J ..:..'~ J. '" • 
assumed that the first priority out of G.E.P. is defence, 
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so this is t2l\:en as the independent variable ~ e.nd 1311 
other components treated as depender-t on it. 
in the defence burden cause or per~it changes in the 
other COI:lpOnents of aggregate deTIBnd. 1n increase in 
the defence burden must come at the expense of sane other 
component of demand since in a formal sense the 
proportions must add to 100, but also in a country with 
scarce resources there"'is an opportunity cost of military 
spending. This does not deny that there may be some 
positive spin-offs from defence expenditure, which is 
considered later in the chapter. 
The main components of G.N.P. are taken to be 
consumption, investment, government expenditure and net 
··foreign trade. ConsuJ,nption and investment can be broken 
dovm into pUblic and private components, foreign trade 
into imports and exports, and government expenditure 
into education. heal th and social welfare _and public 
works. Table 7.4 gives the R2 (the proportion of variance 
in the dependent variables accounted for by defence) 
and the regressi.on coefficients. In each case the 
dependent variable has been regressed on the defence 
burden, but included in e2ch equ~tion ~~s a const2~t ~nd 
u tre~d, 8,8 , .. tell as e. dummy variable to pick HI? -:he effects 
, 
of. the invasion of Cyprus after 1974. The government 
"'\ 
expenditure categories Health, Public Works and Education 
a~e ziven a second set of R2s aT-d regression coefficients 
v"-hich w8re es-timated after 63Ch of the cOIponents ',·/-:)3 
expressed as a proportion of the TotaJ. 3ud[j2t 2X:.r.. then 
• 
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~h~ Effect of the ~ilit~ry 3u~Cen O~ V~riou2 
in Turkey, 195?-76 
-0 2 
Regression 
... ~ ': 0 effi c j_ 1~~'"1. ~ 
.. 
--:-'~""ortC' J..,.JX1.J )....) 0.109 , 0.419 
Imports 0.450 1.64<] 
3alance of Trade 1 0.471 1.181 
Total Inv8 s t:-.1ent 0.432 0.877 
Public Investment 0.189 C.333 
Private Investment 0.309 0.535 
Heal th 0.000 0.000 
Public ','{ o-'"'l~s II -'- \.. 0.058 --0.063 
. Education 0.034 0.086 
Total Consumption 0.004 -0.089 
Public ConsuI!lption 0.151 ,0.357 
J?rivate Consn ..mption 0.050 -0.447 
-lE-
-0.021 Hee.l th 0.084 
* J?ub1ic Werks 0.182 -0.099 
.lE-
-0.042 Education 0.024 
Notes: 1 = Imports-Exports 
* 
R2= sq,uDred :partinl cor~elaticn 
t-value in brackets 
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(1.56) 
(!~.O) 
(.~ ?) 
..... '.-
(3.9) 
(2.2) 
(3.0) 
(0.0) 
(1.1) 
(0.8) 
(0.3) 
(1.9) 
(1.0) 
(1.4) 
(2.1 ) 
(0.7) 
regressed on defence expenditure as a )roportion of 
. 
total governnent spending. ~his second set of 
calculations was designed to determine the cpportunity 
cost of defenc~ within government expenditure. 
The results show that the cost of defence 
expenditure is borne by a risinG level of i2ports, 
which is also reflected. in an increasing bala.'1ce of 
trade deficit, by a cut in public works and by a 
decline in consu~ption, which is concentrated on the 
private sector. ."". t' . ~.l Dln the total budget there is a 
• 
negative relationship between defence and the other 
major components. Turning to the significance of these 
results it appears that defence expenditure occurs 
mainly at the expense of rising imports, a deteriorating 
balance of trade and a smaller share of public works 
, 
in government spending, with 45 per cent, 47 per cent 
and 18 per ep.n"t of the variation in these variables 
being accounted for by cha.."Yl.ges in the dp.fence burden. 
For the other components that have a negative regression 
coefficient the t-values are low so that it appears 
that defence spending has no systematic effect on them. 
On the other ha,..Y).cl it does appe2:r' th2.t defe~ce sfending 
has ~ positive ftJ."1.d significant iIlpact on investIJent 
and public consumption, although, perhaps surprisingly, 
it seems the effect on pri ve.te investment is more 
pronuunced than on public investment. 
These results are not particulqrly surprisiL0 and 
• 
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tell us very little about t.rle influence 0:: defence 
spending on growth. As it is the results presented in 
Table 7.4 do indicute some regularity in the pattern of 
resource ~ovements between defence and certain components 
of a.ggregate demand, but causality is not established. 
What is required is an economic model which can pick 
up the dyr.amic links in an economic system between 
such vari9.bles as defence, savings/investment, iIJports, 
infla.tion and growth. 
The· Contribution of Benoit 
A much more rigorous and interestinG study of the 
relationship between military expenditure and economic 
growth is found in Benoit (19i;).11 For developed 
countries Benoit estimated that defence burdens were 
in'V~rsely correlated with growth rates (-0.2557), 
al though this iNas found to be insignificant at the 
0.05 level. He also found a negative r01ationship 
between defence and investment (-0.5114, with a t-
value of 2.454) which led him to conclude tha,t"in 
developed countries defence programnes compete more 
2ctively for reSOUTC'2S ';Ii th investnent prO.E:r3.r.'~ces, as 
04-al 0 t . ,,12 woul~ be expected since they are more caplv ln enSlve. 
Benoj. t also argued that the ma...'l').power training benefits 
of nilitary activity were less for developed countries 
Since civilian education and training was better for 
, 
acquiring civili!ill.-applic2.ble skills. 
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In his study of L.D.e.s, using data for 44 countries, 
between 1950-65, Benoit fou~d the olnposl_0te ~ tt b ld 
.:..)8. ern.Joe • 
His main finding was that countries ~;'!i th a heavy defen~e 
burden held the most rapid rate of growth' e .. Ild vice-versa. 
He considered whether the relationship might have been 
due to defects in the data, but rejected this explanation 
eve~ t1..1ough he accepted that the validity of the data VIas 
in doubt. He a~so considered the possibility of a 
spurious relationship, but after further and more detcdled 
an?~ysis he believed i t was unlikely. 
u 
Benoit stressed that there was a good probability 
th8.t the interaction between the defence burden and 
gro~yth rates wa.s strong enough to mB~{e one a significant 
" determina~t of the other. On the question of the direction 
of the relationship Benoit found ?O signif.icant correlation 
between income per capita and defence burdens, nor "vlere 
tax revenues, total governnent expeYlG i_ t~Ire-, or the ratio 
of defence to t;tru_ government expenditures closely 
l7j linked to the rate of economic growth." ~ Furthernore, 
when he used multiple regression ana.lysis, econo~ic 
grow·th did not 8.ppear to be a significant determinant 
d t . ~,- °lOt t.J.. lO eTTlents r':ll"~-;cularly e e:t;r11lnCu. Dy Till l 'ary s .ra"egy reQu r .,,-,- . , 1!<'-.- v__ . .J_ 
with reference to national secur~ty. Benoit concluded 
that the chain of causation was such that the defence 
burden was a significant deter7Tlinant of the growth rate 
and ?10t ";ice-verGa. If there were 8:,~:r ,,,,,c.V'3rsc; effects 
of ~ hi.gher defence burden on ;:3rov/th these vrere more -:ha."1 
• 
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offset by the positive effects. gave 
for this \vas th2,t only 8. smp~l p2.rt of ;.:J.C. nCTI-
defence expenditure went into. highly product~ ve inYest:Jent, 
[tos t of t t 1(,Tent into consl).~::ption end tbe re s t into 
soci81 investment and the welfare state. 
The main variables considered by Benoi t ':rere: 
. , 
I =-gross capital formation as a percentage of 
G.D.P. 
R = Inflow of external resources, of which 
R2 = bilater&~'economic resources is the most 
important, as a percentage of G.N.P. 
1 G - civilian growth, t 8.1ren to be growth of 
(G~D.P. minus defence expenditures) 
B - defence burden 
The pattern of causal relations a~ong the main 
variables was assumed to be as follows: 14 
I ~-.-------------- J3 
·t 
Benoit hypothesised that a reciprocal influence 
exists between R,., and B, and Gl and I, a.YJ.d 'that a. posi ti ve 
c;.' 
but TIe~k influence of B on I exists. It ~s also 
hypot~~esised that a strong positive influence of B on 
Gl . . t 11 c::. an l' n~l' rect l' nfluence t~1rouoC"h R2 - eXl f' J 2, as we a .. , ..... <. 
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and I, B.l tho~J.g1:. Benoi t ad:1i ts that ~e h~~s not been ?blc 
to prove the direct influe~ce of B on G. 
In the r.rql tiple regressio!1 analysis carr:'ed out 
by B.enoi t the growth of civilian output '{fas made a 
function of three independent variables - B, R2 and I _ 
and he obtained posi ti ve correlations with each • ,':her.. 
the same equation is applied to annual data for Turkey 
between 1952-76 the following result i8 obtained: 
G1 = 15.66 - 12.484 I 0.06.4 R2 
(0.25)' (0.65) 
1.399 B 
(1.4) 
R2 
-
0 .. 116 DW = 2.7 
The equa.tion is no t ~Nell specified, since 2 . .1.1-,"" R l"" L,.......... ..:. 
low, and none of the coefficients ~'T'A .::i1.gnificant, although, 
u...'1.1ike Benoit, it is found that the coefficients are a.ll 
negative. Nevertheless the result for Turkey may 
indic ate that Benoit's findings, based on cross section analysis, 
do not apply to individual countries over time. 
There are several criticisms of Benoit's study. 15,16 
• First of all, he omits certain variables from the growth 
equation which might conceivably be important, such as 
the rate of inflation, the level of development, po~ulaticn 
Growth, and. the balance of , ,.... '.J... I 1 ueI lCl '.'/ Jl-:.rp us. 
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Secundly, Deger (1931)17 argues that the results that Beno~t achieved 
are sensitive to the specification of the data and the variables 
used and when a. different sample of count~·ie.s is taken she finds 
a negative relationship between the defence burden aLQ the growth 
rate of income per capita. She concludes that not too :::iuch weight 
should be attached to Benoit's results si~ce the relationship 
between defence spending and groT;!th at the cross section level 
could be negative. Finally, although Benoit allows for a 
reciprocal influ8lice between R2 and B, and I and G 1 in the pattern 
of causal relations, he does not incorporate this into his 
regression analysis. In effect he is implicitly assuming that 
the independent variables (I, B, R2 ) i.n the regression analysis 
are exogenous, whereas he has previously admitted that there is 
1 
a reciprocal relationship between I and G. It is apparent 
in this case that the dependent variable'G1 is also an 
explanatory variable in the investment equations but Benoit 
nowhere alloviS for' this. What is required is that the growth 
equation Le treated as being part of a larger model, for which 
there are as many equations as there are endogenous variables. 
The specification of the causal links between defence 
spending and econorr:.ic grm'lth is the subject of the next section. 
It is not possible to deyelop a full model of the Turkish economy here 
but the main causal interconnections between grovlth and defence 
will be estimated by single equations. 
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Assessing 
IDefence spendi~C ca~ i~~luence the 
through five main ChHJ1~els: 
1. the multilJlier effect 
2. through 2 diversion of scarce econonic resources 
3. secondary econo;r.ic effects 
4. the ~olitical role of the rr.ili tc·rv 
" 
5. through international economic relations 
The theol'etical links between defence, c;r0V!th aYld 
these five che,nnels are examined in t:le follo':.'i:r2Y sections 
'-' 
equations 
and a ser'ies of are proposed 'llhichare u~;ed to esti23te 
the effect of defence spending on economic erowth. 
1. The :.:ul ti nJ ier Effect 
Let us d2sume initially that the governnent of e 
hypothetical cOll.."'ltry introduces non-productive mili -ta,y-y 
This calI be shov:n in terxB of the siI:lple Keynss2.8:' ... 
income-eX2e~diture identity 
y == c + I + D (1) 
1 Y C d I h ~h· l1L·O~1 1 ~~O~l·n~s and wler¥ , an ave u ell" conve Gl. .I.-a l.lt;::;,-,~~ .at, , 
D d f + 1 t ·ql - t is military spending. It is assumc- _or Jae Tomen U~G 
. b 1 • there is no foreign trade and non--r:ill t8,I'Y :pu ~lC 
expenditure is zero. 
Furthermore, it is assu~ed that: 
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c 
-
cY (2 ) 
S = Y -. C == sY (3 ) 
where s == 1 - c (4 ) 
Solving (1) through (4) gives the reduced forn for 
output 
Y == (1 + D)/s 
~~y increase in the autonomous components of 
aggreg:J.te dema..-rJ.d (I and D) -will have a mul tiplier 
effect (l/s) on income. ,Assuming initial excess capaci ty,. 
output and employment will rise in a series of di~inishing 
increments, until a new equilibrium income is achieved. 
This basic Keynesian model needs to be extended to 
~.'":'.~r,,, -_~.""'_,+o r:0t'~}1'''1t the r,: ~.C'-I-'; ,,,,~ t~T ",-P <='".,....."'1·'" -:.,., +hc. 
... _---.- - - _ f..",. .... _·'-..:v.""'_J 'J \.....---_ •• ,"-"I,.,_..J.L_ cJ ..... _ ;.....,J .... -.t-~y-u ...... _ .... v ... _" 
productive sector, foreign trade; the res~onsiveness of 
investment.to output and the effects of financing defence 
spend.ing through taxation. 
The introduction of 'a non-productive military sector 
which is finallced through money creation may cause 
inflation to occur, although this will depend on the 
+}ie l'nd."r-l--y>'; os u _ _ _".c..,::; lJ.l.. .... c 
iY.!.:~)t;~ts. In t~le extreL1e case of output being fixed an 
incre';2E' i11 military demand will cause prices to rise, 
\yh:L~.;h -:;ill go on until ex-ante savings and investment 
arc equal.. In practice it is more likely thJ.t only sone 
~':t.~~, t~ of' tl1e economy \,/il1 have i!1elas~i,c s"-.lpply, '.7i th 
( l Q5c'),)13 th t 1 0k 1 T- lec'-': J" agrj, c-:) 1 ture being ... e mO;:i l ~e y. l.:.j, ,AJ.. 
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h9.S :trcued t}-l8t it may be an uphill struGE;le for 2:.2!lY 
. 
L.D.C.s to increase the production of food. ~he feu~al 
end semi-feudal relations in land tenure may require 
institutionalc:hange but this may be opposed by the 
pri vileeed c12.sses. Hili tary acti vi ty is likely to 
dra:N labour 2.WB.y from the countryside but even if 
agricultural production does not fall19 there may still 
be a shortage of goods" if the food consumption of the 
renaining pea.sants rises or if soldiers consume more 
food. Therefore increased defence spending may cause 
pricRs of agricultural goods to rise even though 
production of industrial consumer goods can increase 
in li~8 with demand. 
Kalecki also argued that higher food prices m~~ 
result in hi6~ner profi ts for landlords, merchants or 
money lenders who may not expand "their dema..11.d for 
industrial consumption goods, whereas if hJgher food 
prices result in hieher peasant incomes then the demand 
for industrial consumption goods rnay rise, thus creating 
a 13.rger market. 
If foreign trade is ~ntrod~ced into the ipcome-
expenditure identity.(l) beccmes 
y = C + I + G + E - M + D (6 ) 
w'here E = exports, IJ = imports. and G = non-military 
covcrnment expenditure. It will be assumed thet 
in'/cctrwnt responds to changes in output (profi ts may 
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also rise as output increases) as follows: 
• aK I - K + (7) 
K - v Y (8 ) 
• • 
K - v Y (9) 
• ~ v Y therefore I = v Y + (10) 
• • 
where Y = dY/dt, K = dK/dt, v = capital output ratio a~d 
~ = depreciation factor. 
Exports are assumed too be autonomous and imports 
") 
are given as -f-ol1ows: 
from (2) and (10) 
m-lc'V_, + Tn_'2"TTY_· ...j.. m ~ -TY + Tn J) 
.- . \ . -2 () - ~') 
solving through (6), (10) and (12) 
y = cY + vY +" vY 
- ill2 vY - ffi2 ~ vY -
+ G + E 
which can be revlri tten as 
• 
(11) 
(12) 
(13 ) 
Y = (1 - ffi2 )vY/a + (G + E)/a + (1-m3 )D/e. (14) 
wher~ a = s - ~ v + illl c + m2 ~ v 
Equation (14) shows that output (Y) will respond 
Positively to an increase in defence spending as long as 
The expa,."1.sionary effect:::; of 
increased defence spending will be greater the s::naller 
• 
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is L'll' ill2 , In3 and s, and the larger is J 8:G.Q v. '::bere 
. 
will ulso be ~~ indirect effect of milit2~y expendi~~~e 
on the growth rate through the influence of increased 
output on invest:rlent. ,{[hether investment caY). be 
stimulated from the demand side faT L.D.C.s also depends 
on the existence of essential inputs of skilled labour, 
capital and foreign exchange. 
The influence of increased defence spending on 
investm.ent can be analysed. in terms of two effects. On 
the one haYl_d dE:mand stimula. tion will increase the rate 
of capacity utilisation 
u 
-)(-
y/y (15 ) 
-* 
'where Y = capacity output from existing capital stock. 
* As the ratio Y/Y rises ther-e is a.~ incentiYe to 
invest, however, investment is constrained by a.bsorptive 
capacity.20 In order to inplement ':n. ... ·cstr;1ent pro j ects 
there needs to be skilled labour, ill8naecrial expertise, 
key items of equipment and other vital inputs. p~ 
output expands and vi tc-.J. scarce inputs become even more 
scarce then capital for.mation is ~ade more difficult 
. pl th0"!.1.gh this may be .partly offset "b~T the availability 
of ::orcign exchange and the productivity effects of 
milj.tary spending in'earlier periods. It is impossible 
to say theoretic8.1ly whether the net effect of defence 
spending on investDen~ is likely to be posi~ivE or 
negf.'.tive, al though it seens l;iore likely that 'absorbtive 
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C ~paci~.'y dra~f will be stronge~ l"n L n C """" --' _ -- • .J..} • • 2 • 
Finally it i.B necessary to consider tl:e :luI tilJlier 
effects offtnancing defence 3pending through t2xation. 
It seems likely th~t at least so~e of defence spending 
will be financed through taxation, ';:hich can i:r..pose a 
large financial burden on L.D.C.s at a tine when there 
are pressures to spend .. ~ore on other government activities. 
Military needs may lead to higher taxation which can 
affect incentives, resource alloce.tion and equity, 
. although these are difficult to qUWltify. It '.'/ill be 
assumed that defence spending is financed completely out 
of tax8.tion, and tha.t there is no other non-:nili tary 
public expenditure. Furthermore, for simplicity, it 
'will be assumed there is. no foreign trade sector. The 
income-expenditure identity can then be written: 
y := C + I + D (16) 
Tile impact of an· increase in defence spending on 
income can be shown to be·: 
. . . 
Y = Dis (17) 
The tax multiplier depends on IThetherreve~ue is 
raised through a dire·ct tax or en indirect (sales or 
• 
expenditure) tax. If an indirect tax is imposed then 
, 
the effect on income can be shown to be: 
• • 
y = - Ti/s (1.8 ) 
The bal8.l1Ccd budget :nul tiplier can now be derived 
• 
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as follows: 
• • • 
Y = (D Ti)/s = 0 (19) 
• • 
since D = Ti 
It is not unusua.l for t'le O'overnm t f L "'\ ,.., 
. 1 b - en, sO • .i.J oJ • S 
to collect revenue through indirect t[LX8tion.,21 so (19) 
may seem a;.'1. appropriat.e. formulo.tion o~ the bala..n.ced 
budget multiplier. There are two reasons, however, why 
the· expenditure rlultiplier may be smaller than is shown 
in (17). F~rstly, part of ·government defence spending 
goes to milite.ry personnel as wages and salaries, and if 
soldiers have a lower propensity to consume than other 
members of society then the multiplier T.vill be reduced. 
Secondly, in so far as part of military needs are met 
through imported arms then there is a..~ additione~ leakage 
from the systen which reduces the impact of defence 
sp8nding on incone. 
In conclusion it must be stressed that there can 
be no presumption of a positive multiplier effect of 
dofence· spending on outIJ'J_t a..~d [ro\7th in L.~oC.s. In 
particular the existence of markE;t iTIperf2ctions, a 10'.'[ 
elesticity of supply.in food, a shortage of key inputs 
and a foreign exchange constraint may- mean tha.t military 
~ t' 1 d t . Tl t" 22 ucmand stimula ion ea s ·0 In_ 2. lone 
2. TJi vcr8io~"l of 
. . 
Economic models of growth generally e=phasise t~e 
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role of in~uts and techrolo8Y lTI the ,,'ro'''+h 'l"\ro nos S ..;,... U "v 1::' '.._.......' ~ 0 
given a theoretical basis in the Cobb-Doug13s production 
fr:Ylction: 
Q = AKQ< L~ 
where K = capital 
L - labour ", 
A = technical progress23 
v function 
Since the Cobb-Douglas productionAis linear in 
logs it is 82.sily applied to studies of the rate of 
growth of output over time. 24 
The j.t1portance of savings as a deterl:1inant of 
economic c;rowth is recognised in the early attenpts to 
t . b t th h H d' d D 25 heorlse a ou grow _ ~y arroah oroar. 
. ' 
They were 
concerned 'i~'i th establishing the conditions for stable 
economic gro~th, but their growth equation does give 
some insi[:ht into the determinants of g-"'owth. They 
~~2sume th8.t investment (l't) in any time period is equal 
to ~he capital-output ratio (v) times the change in 
• 
output (Yt - Yt - 1 = Y), 2nd tha.t for eqLlilibri~m to 
h()}{" r::.'~~_""l'l..Lo cr;;TJ'TI("::; (~ ) 1"luc-t e"'u!:Il eX-2X'~te iYlVe2t~,;,sn-:;. ~', ",l ,,'._ c,_ I;" '-" __ .,-, ,...)',' )....It ... v ,':1. c· 
This ~ives the following result: 
\ '-' 
the 
• 
It = St = v(Yt - Yt - 1 ) = vY (1 ) 
If both sides are now divided by Yt , then St!Y t = 
S~Vl-'l'C(': 'Y><'+8 and Y!Y.L. = the s~ro\vth rate (b)~ tl1en C.-I. .....-.1. L.I....... ...l~.-:t \,J , u __ 
s --. (2 ) 
• 
'\ 
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g:::. s/v 
This equation defines the equilibrium conditions for stead.y 
economic growth. Nevertheless, this 'warranted' rate of growth 
need not be a full employment rate. The 'natural' rate of growth 
is determined by population growth and technical progress which 
may impose constraints on economic growth. In the case of LDCs, 
however, it is generally assumed that the maximum rate of growth 
is 10vler than the natural rate. Turkey is no exception (as is 
suggested in the estimations reported later), owing to the 
relatively rapid g~owth of population and the inability to raise 
savings to a sufficiently high level. Consequently in Turkey 
employment opportunities have not kept pace with the increase in 
the labour supply, not because of a J.ack of demand, but because 
investment (not merely in fixed capital but in all goods that may 
be necessary to increasing output) has not been sufficient .. 
Rostow (1964)26 and Lewis (1954)27 &lso recognise the importance 
of raising the savings rate to generate economic growth. As LeV-lis 
puts it: 28 
"The central probleI!1 in the theory of economic development 
is to understand the process whereby a community 1-Thich was previously 
saving and investing 4 or 5 per cent of its national income or less, 
converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running 
at about 12 to 15 pel' cen:t; of national income or more .. " 
kostow too puts great emphasis on increasing the rate of 
saving: 
"During the take-off the rate of effective investment and 
savings may rise from, say, 5 per cent of the national income to 
10 ,.29 per cent or mOl'e.' 
The important question for this study is how' defence 
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spending will affect the flow of savings Ch"YJ.d hence the 
mobilisRtion of resources into :productive invest=ent. 
It is possible to approach this proble:n through an 
extended Har1'od-Donar model. The basic nodel, as 
expressed in (3) has been criticised for its assumptions 30 
and has undergone many refinements and extensions. It 
is proposed here that the basic model is extended to 
include 2 defence sector, a foreign traue sector and an 
investr::ent function. \7e start wi th the basic incone-
'-< 
expenditure identity: 
y = c + I + D + E - M 
where I, C, I, E and M are as conventionally defined, a~d 
.D = defence spending •. 
It is assumed that consumption is a s.imple f"LUlction 
. 
of incOJ:ne 
c = cY (5 ) 
'The investment function is of the accelerator type, 
I -. vY + {vY ( 6') 
end i~Dorts ure a function of the level of consu~~tion, 
... 
inve~t:-;,.c:u.t and defence spending 
(7) 
solving for (4) through (5), (6) and (7) gives the 
reduced forn for output 
• 
- 328 -
• 
aY - (1 - TI2 )vY + (1 - m3 )D + E (8) 
where n = s - &' v + TI:.1 c + ill2 .f v 
Therefore 
• (1 - m2 )vY = aY - (1 - ffi3 )TI - E (9) 
• 
Y = aY/(l - m2 )v - (1 
- E/(l - ID2 )V 
- ID3)D/(1 - ID2)V 
(10) 
The rate of growth can now be written as: 
• 
y/y = ~(l - m2)v - (1 - ID3 )d/(1 - ID2)V 
- E/(l - m2)v y (11) 
where d = Diy = defence burden. 
It follows that with given v, s, ml , m2 , m3 , ~ 
and E an increase in the defence 'burden will reduce the 
rat~ of growth. It also follows fromCll) that the higher 
-
is the propensity to import consump-cioll and investment 
. 
goods and the lower is the level of ex;orts then the 
greater is the inflow of savings on the external acco~~t 
(li! - E), and the more ra:pid is the incyease in income. 
Any receipts of foreign exch&~ge through private capit~l 
floVl3, ecopomic a..""1d ~ili tary assistance ',';'Quld. also be 
expe~ted to increase total savings. Without going into 
this refinement any.further, it should be pointed out 
that the two-gap theory argues that domestic savings 
and foreign exchange are not perfect substi tutes ,..-::.::d 
, 
this js not apparent ~n the extended Harrod-Domar model • 
.. 
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I:10I'c:;o-: .... sr, it is by no ~:eans cert2.in th-3.t dOrlestic 
savincs ~ill remain unaffected by inflo~s of eco~onic 
and n:ili tary aid. 
The inverse rele.tionship betT;leen growth of output 
and the defenc e burden in (11) is due to the irl)lici t 
assu~ptj.on of full employment or a supply con3t~qint. 
Increas~ng def~nce expenditure absorbs resources which 
are then denied to invest~ent, consumption, education, 
heAlth or urban development. Scarce labour, materials' 
and ca.pi tal are s.bsorbed by the military which reduces 
the supply of other goods and services. This burden 
of military expenditure is recognised by several writers. 
Lewis (1970)31 has argued that the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire was caused at least partly by the increasing 
burden of the military and bureaucratic machine on state 
. finonces. One of the c'onsequences VIas tha t higher taxes 
were imposed o~ agriculture which had deleterious effects 
on output Bnd contributed to the decline of the Empire • 
.-' 
Cipolla (1970)3 2 in "The Economic Decline of Enpires lf 
also stressed the negative effects of the oilitary burden 
on economic growth. He argued that defence spending was 
e -,· Y' e"" nl' ture n'~" l' ,..,"h 4 .... 1.. .•. ,' ........ """"' __, I ..... ~ _.-...L 
thr01J.;.::h higher tp ...xation reduced iL.ce~ctives, in~reased 
pessirlism l3.nd discouraged investment. A sinilar argument 
is made by Bernardi (1970.)33 and Finley (1970)34 who 
expl ain the c1eclj_ne of the Roman ~cpire in ter:ns of 
on t}:e state. 
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Yet thi~ opportunity cost of defence is not al~0ys 
recocnised p<.;;.-;-,ticularly :'1'1 viri tinn- 1'Trich c>~~n;",,-,c1' -""e'O' -l-he o .. - - ...... ~ .... ..IJ..J.~_-;c,l.,.,.I "'-' ....... V_..1 
role of the ~r:j.li tary 83 developers. Shorter (1967 )35 
hps 2crgued tIl'l.-S much T:rri ting on the :1ili -l-r,T'7 1" S 
.. -. v C ........ u 
ch~Tacterised by a habit of thought which stresses only 
the benefi ts of -those things w'hich have ha)lJened, 
without discussing other benefits which have been forgone 
to achieve the former results. Yet is is valuable to 
Sl)8cule.te \Vh8t might h3ve happened because the habit of 
cri tical revie'il may uncover al ternatives which merit 
more gener21 adoption. 
On the positive side it has often been argued that 
military tension has led some countries to mobilise 
economic resources and speed up the rate of production. 
Rosa Luxemburg in the final chapter of 'The Accumulation 
, 
- of C:::--lpi tal' was concerned vii th analysing the 'Nays that 
militarism may help the accumulation of capital. Firstly, 
she argued that military expenditure cr?ates a need to 
raise taxes, which will partly be imposed on the peasantry. 
The peasants are thereby forced to sell some of their 
produce and. in this way are illcorporateci into the sphere 
o 
of c~vitrrliat p~oduction. Pre-capitali3t ~odes of 
. . 
prodqction are further undermined by the restructuring 
·of final dem(J)ltl. that occurs with niili tarisn:, as mili tary 
inputs are .produced VIi th neVI technology in large-scp~e 
enterprises. IJili tarism also ensures a secure and 
(r~r"""l' nco r~'-~l'lre+ -fOl'" <:lr'~"~ nroducers, and the ne't; industries .j ....... , CJ _1.1.'-_ ... - OJ .~ - t."J.,. , ... '-' .J..~ 
Can both help to stabilise the lev.~l of acti vi ty a.'1d act 
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as w~ engine of growth. Finally, militaris~ may lead 
to a redistribution of income ~ow~~ds ,rafits ~s 
capitalists are allovled to depress w3.ges and increase 
the rate of exploitation. 
36 Benoit cites the exam_pIe of Israel where th _ e 
psychological ir:J.pact of extern~:l thre2.t led the nation 
to co-ope~ate m.ore effectively and work harder. KennedJ 
(1975)37 stressed the unique role of arms production 
in Generating backv/ard linkages to the manufacturing 
sector. It is also conceivable that in times of national. 
crisis people may be willing to save more or to accept 
forced saving, wlth positive effects on grovvth. However, 
in the long rU!l, outside a situation of war or military 
.... < 
government, there is no reason to believe that either 
savings or hard work are determined by ·th~ level of 
military expenditure. 
The extent to which military expenditure leads to 
increased employment and higher levels of economic activ1.ty 
depends partly on the strength of the bacbvard linkages. 
Hili tary dem~lncls for food will create fevl baclcT;'[ard lin.."k:ages 
since there are limited inputs required for primary 
industries. The strongest backward linkages might be 
expected to stem from mili tary demands for ma..."'1.ufactured 
goods, although the more specialised military needs -
vehicles,' aircraft, arrris and electronic el}uipment - are 
no:!:'c lilq:ly to cl-"eate link2.[,es abro:::.d, p2.Tticul3.rl~r in 
the case of L.D.C.s, including Turkey • 
• 
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Benoit38 found some evidence to show th~t . f' ~" In .J..<:A. l,lO~, 
caused by a military build-up, can result in B. subst,?_~tipl 
rise in the level of economic activity. He, argued tha.t 
unless the inflation is extrene it can succeed in fullinG 
into economic use unused or under-utilised resources 
vlhich contribute to ree.l growth. Furthernore, he stressed 
that inflation can also stimulate growth throuGh a 
redistribution of income towards profits, which might 
incre~se savings a~d investment. Nevertheless it is not 
at a.ll clear that the long-run influel.Lce of infle.tion on 
savings and the mobilisation of resources will alvrays be 
positive. Empirical evidence on the effects of inflation 
on growth" is inconclusive,39 although very high levelc 
of inflation appear to have a harmful effect on economic 
. growth, perno,Ds because it ma.y lead to speculation, 
discourage voluntary saving or cause a mis'-direction of 
capital formation. 40 Furthermore, 'uhen ~nflation occure 
simul taneously vvi th unemployment and heavy balance of' 
pa;ymGnts deficits, as in Turkey in the 1970s, military 
expenditure can hinder economic policies designed to 
lead out of the recession. Military expenditure creates 
demand but does not increase the volume of saleable or 
8xport3.ble goods &"1d .therefore adds to inf1.8.tiona.ry 
pres;;ures and balance of 'payments problens, which may 
require the govcrnment to contract other elements of 
public expenditure, thus causing a deeper recession and 
41 11J" __ r-.,'.1cr unn"11'] oy""" -,." t 
. _ • '-' ,j _ _ 1:. e  ...1. .• 
. -'-
V-lould suggest that in.flation, and the subsidisation of 
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capital, also led to art s:;cce3S~!" '!e 
8.dverse effects on groYlth and development. 
There is another possible liLk bet;:.'een def9l~ce 
spendinG and eQonomic zrowth relating to the coercive 
power of' the military, vrhich may be used. ei ther directly 
or indirectly to support the state to increase the rate 
of exploitation of available resources. Deger and Smith 
give sever?l exarr~ples of ~orJ this may be 3ctieved. 
"Surplus labour may be mobilised, reT:: 22.terial production 
developed in the face of opposition, agrarian surplus 
trp...Xlsferred to industry, consumption restricted, industrial 
dispute::) suppressed and the rate of work increased.,,42 
In conclusion it must be stressed that defence 
spendinG may be an importa~t channel through which 
.. -
resources are mobilised, yet this has to be posed a~ain3t 
the long run diversion of resources, 8:tlay Irom saving~ 
and productive investment, which occurs with military 
expenditure. Theoretical' analysis cannot resolve the 
issue [>.s to which is the most irn.portant influence, but 
theory can give some i~siGht into the links be~ween mili-:~r~ 
spendi::J5 811d resource Jiversjon/~obili32.tion. Several 
. 
infltlentinl models of growth and develol)ilient have 
emphasised the role of savings in economic expansion and 
it seens important, therefore, to look at the eTIpirical 
relationship between crowth, savinss and the defence 
burden in the case of Turkey. 
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))efencespending may con-:ritute to the civilian 
economy in sev"eral indirect vrays the.t need to be 
considered. Benoi t 43 argued that defence procr~.s.TIes 
make tangible contributions to civilia!l economies by 
(1) feeding, clothing and housing B. nULlber of people 
who would otherwise have to be fed, housed and clothed 
by the civilian economy; (2) providing education and 
medical care as well a.s vocational· and technical training 
(e.g. in the operation and repair of cars, planes and 
radioEl; in hygiene and medical care; in construction 
methods)" that may have high ci vilia.."D utili ty; (3) engaging 
in a variety of public works - roads, dar.1S, river improve-
/ 
ments, airports, communication networks - some of which 
may have civilian uses; (4) enga~lng in sqientific and 
technical specialities, as well as certain quasi-civilia."1. 
acti vi ties such as coast guard, li.ghthouse- operation~ 
customs· work, bnrder guard, and disaste-" relief which 
would othervrise have to he performed by civilian personnel. 
Milj.tary procurement may ma"k:e possible the production of 
certain manufactured items fur combined civilian and 
c 
rni1it~ry use (e.g. batte~ies end tyres) ~~ic~ ~i~~t ~ot 
be e~onomica11y produced solely for civilian demand. 
The military establishment may also be an important 
force for modernisation in L.D.C.s. It is eften the 
t ch 1· and bccau·~e it is utili tarian a.."1.d efficier..cy 8 no ..... ogy, -0 
oriented it helps j mplant ~~ode.rn attitudes towards time 
keepin; and self-discipline. Furth~~~o~ "'"t -~ 
. ~ -'- '" ... e, :n ~ l 8-L Y 
trainLl1.g i3 often ver:l inportent in brealring dO'::n 
custom 2l1d tradition, and replacing local interest with 
a national consciousness. 
Unfortunately it is very difficult to obtain direct 
evidence of the effectiv6ness of military 2ctivity in 
proviuing these civili~n spin-cffs anc even more difficult 
to measure their contribution to growth. Robinson (1967)44 
gives details of the Turkish, army engaging in basic 
education to deal with the cases of illiterate conscripts, 
but this did nothing for female illiteracy and the problem 
of secondary schooling reffiained. The militarv tr~inin~ ,~ 0 
progr&.mme in Turkey began in 1948 with the start of 
, AmeriCaJl military aid, and in addition to learning 
technical skills, conscripts also acquired a, new' outlook 
on life.' However, there is the danger of exaggerating 
the con~ribution of the military in the fiBld of education. 
Many new skills learnt in the army may be inappropriate 
for civilian employment •. Shorter45 has pointed out that 
the contribution Of , the military in tackling illiteracy 
was snaIl 8.Jld c:.cclining relati ~.,e to the illportwce of 
other educationDl institutions. Only abou~ 3 per cen~ 
of rurt:ll males "sho be"came Ii terate durine the decade 
ended 1962 learnt their skill in the army. Furthermore, 
mili t2ry e'ducation in Turkey largely failed to enhance 
the soc~Bl and economic =lobi1i ty of the poor and minority 
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Closely related to nili tary invest:-l:e11t in ed.ucation 
is milltary research and development. Scientific effort 
designed to develop new military tools h8S led to rapid 
achievements in the production of certa.in civilian 2"00o.s. 46 
"-' 
In the U.S.~. two thirds of all research and development 
work is finPJlced by the Department of Defence, N. A.S. A. 
and the Atomic Energy Commission, but although the 
resulting -spillover effects may be importa~t for the U.S. 
they are not particularly import8nt in the case of Turkey, 
where only 0.03 per cent of military expenditure goes to 
r. a..."'1.d d. 
Military expenditure on public works is more likely 
to have spillover effects in developing countries. It 
waS argued in chapter 6 that the military- in Turkey has 
helped to build public works such as roads,' ports and 
airfields which are valua.ble for civ.ilian activities. 
The highway prograr.ll1le was a case vvhen en 'integrated 
transport syste111 was beneficial to both the military and 
the general development of the country. Once again, 
however, it is easy to magnify the contribution of the 
mili~ary who f~nanced less than 1 per cent of the highway 
rr'Jr~'-r>y, -~ L.... .1. .... '- ove:- the 
~ . 
needs con"vinced tlle U.S. and Turkish :;overnnents that it 
• 
was necessary to develop the highway system, but the 
economic resources were absorbed and the task of road 
construction "vas performed by the ci vilial1 highway 
<h tbJ.e Cl" vl"ll" 0":)'" developers provided programme <:.'as a cas e VI en ~ ... 
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of 
:rE:sources (:..~--"~'-.~~ --c.~"-
------v-'--u 
';'.lsstions d- ev-elo~~'r::;"'~ p 1 ~ _'-J __ . .....,_ ..... _ va:.ue 
(l963)47 expresses doub~s on :~e 
Poll-: 
that !lot '~""-r 0 -... -I''''' __ -v. f __ 
·,"/.aen they return to civilian li:fe. ~r.J··l· "'cd _'oJ _...L __ 
so the 
con~ribution. of the =:i2.i t~.:ry is eX8.czera'tsc.. 
(1967)49 ci~es the -c~se of ~~r~~~h recruits 2.S 
0:: 
:r;ore SV:2bo:ic th2.l: eCQLo~:ic • 
. ' 
. 
CE'Y.:.e:r2.l :!fOin.t about :role of 
T~ t· h 
.l.l_ a coun r:; w~s es to ac~ieve spec.ific developmen-:cl 
second~.ry beEefits. .It is not S~.Aff icien-:: 
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Benoit does,. tha.t a mili te.ry probr8~;:!e contributes to 
the civilian economy by "feeding, clothing and 1:.ousi~g 
a number of people", since there is an opportunity cost 
involved whic~ has not been specified. 
4,. The Poli tic'al. Role of the :.:li 1 i tary 
There may be a unique role for the military in 
IJ.D.C.s, not only in the independence struggle, but also 
in the early years of independence in order to ensure the 
necessary stability and pre-conditions for economic 
development to take place. In times of great turbulence 
the military has access to power and can provide the 
political leadership to maintain internal stability and 
overcome pluralistic conflict. Some writers51 have 
stressed 'that the military is the one ins~itution in 
. 
L.D.e.s that is likely to be Westernised and able to 
introduce modern political and social structures. 
In Turkey in the early 1920s Kemal, the soldier-
cum-President, created,a regime that was Republican, 
secular and non-imperialist. The emphasis on nationalism 
and the rejection of the monarcy and religion·~ft€r 1923 
were essential elements in the plan for development, 
but it was a. controlled development which gave a. leading 
role to the s~ate and its bureaucracy, including the 
.] • .L. ml.lvary. It is importa.."'1t, however, to distinguish 
. t· , botr.'leen ,f mili tary sen' ['..TId the 'nili t2.ry Orc;aYllSa lon • 
In tVientieth century ['urkey several mili tary me~ have 
• 
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become prominent politicans (Kemal Ataturk, IS::let 
Inonu, Cernal Gursel), yet it ~:Jas these S8lTIe men that 
insisted tha.t control should lie with civilian government 
end that the military organisation be concerned ~.':i th its 
OVln areas of operations. 
There can be no denying that the military in Turke:r 
have been the last line of defence within the state 
apparatus, managing to keep a precarious balance between 
the extreme right and the labour movement only through 
direct intervention on three occasions since 1950. 
Furthermore, it must be recognised that the milita.ry in 
Turkey is not ideologically neutral, but is concerned 
with mainta.ining the status quo, which may have prevented 
it from encoura.ging a more progressive economic and 
social transformation of society.' 
5. International Econamic Relations 
The links between domestic military expenditure, 
military and economic aid, private foreign capital flows, 
foreign trade, and development e,re extremely complex and 
were the subject of the last chapter. It was argued in 
chapter 6 that military and economic aid are complementary 
and,· in the CB.se of Turkey, were only given on the 
condition that she committed substantial domestic resources 
to defence. High levels of military expenditure may have 
. t . . riti- fro"'" e:>-rtcY'Y'.-,' been ins,trumental i~ TIaln 3.lnlng seell':; .:. ~-. ~---;...-
threat 'and achievinG .internal stability, both essential 
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conditions I?X'. the encour2;ement of private. inve:::t::::ent. 
Against thi.s i twas argued that U.S. :r~ili tary 2!'li eco:!;'o:.1ic 
assist8nc e to Turke~y V[as in a 'tl· Cld' f""r~ ft 
>oJ v ."-,. very 0 en 
expensive, primarily desi~ned 
policy objectives, a.nd not alvlays appro])2:'iate to 
development goals. U.S. political inf11].ence in Turkey 
also ensured that the economy was opened u, to inter-
.~ ., . 
national flows of private capital. 
Under certain conditions the flows of aid· and private 
foreign .capital fiBS" help to overcome a shortage of domestic: 
resources and facilitate the transfer of technology, 
and thereby stimulate development. But there are d8J:lgers 
too - the technology may not be appropriate for ll.D. C • s 
and create few jobs; aid.flows may discourage domestic 
savings; private foreign investment may do little to 
. . 
stimulate eXIJOrts or to bre8k the dependence on i c:ports 
of capi tal g000.S; and the repatriation of -profits and the 
debt-servicing burden may create seriou8 balance of 
payments problems. FurtherlLore , military assistance. 
programr:10s may encourage the growth of the arms trade, 
end set up a chain of supplementary import demands r:Lich 
on the' di~ection of domestic econo~ic policy • 
.. 
EcoTIo~otric ~e3ults 
channels , . h 1"Tr1: ('\ "'0_ ~ ....... ·1' t o""-pe- Y1./.,l l· +u-.... e i "', Ii 1:-'-'1'~ to n~l l ary '-'4.. .J. U. V ~ ~o.) .-~ v 
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influence economic growth. It has been argued that military expenditure 
will have a direct influence on growth through demand stimulation, 
al though the strength of the mul tiplier-accelera tor effect \'7ill depend 
on absorptive capacity and how the expenditure is financed. Military 
expenditure may also have a direct effect on growth t:nrough resource 
mobilisation, through new ideas and technology, and via the military as 
an institution breaking down traaitions and aeing a force for stability 
and modernisation. Military expenditur~ would &lso be expected to have 
certain indirect effects on economic growth through the diversion of 
resources away from savings (investment) both directly and via iltl'lation-
ary pressures, balance of payments constraints and the flow of economic 
aid. 
The main objective of the regression estimates is to test the 
relationship between the military ratio ( or burden) and economic 
growth. The military ratio is taken as the share of military 
expenditure in gross domestic product and the growth of the economy is 
measured by the annual real growth of gross national product. There is 
a question that arises about the appropriatnes8 of these two measures. 
The military ratio could be taken as the share of military expenditure 
in GNP rather than GDP. The difference between GNP and GDP is the net 
earnings and payments on property fro In abroad, and the issue that concerns 
us in this study is the domestic burden of military expenditure, so it 
is appr~~riate to take the ratio of military expenditure to GDP. The 
measure of economic growth on the other hand is based on GNP since it 
is hypothesised that military activity might generate flows of trade, 
aid and capital, the consequences of which are more accurately picked 
up by the growth of GNP. As it turns out it makes very little difference 
to the results whether GDP or GNP is used to meaS'lre either the burden 
or economic growth, since the two series move so close together. It 
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-------was· also decided to measure economic gro-Vlth by Benoit's ci vi Ii [,_TI GDP, -:~~:;. t 
is the growth of GDP after subtracting defence expencli ture, but thi3 toe 
made littJp difference to the results and is not reported. 
Initially it was decided to test the growth rate as a function of 
the defence burden using ordinary least squares. T,"lO equations were 
estimated in order to ev"aluate the magnitude of the main direct and indirect 
responses of growth to the defence proportion. The first equation treats 
growth as a function of th8 savings ratio, which is taken as the prime 
engine of growth, (or could be taken as a proxy for investment); the 
defence proportion, which is used to pick up the demand stimulation and 
resource mobilisation effects, and is also a proxy for the modernisation 
effect; gross domestic product per capita, which is used as an index of 
development and reflects the ability of a country, as it develops, to 
apply the available te~hnology generated in the more developed countries; 
the growth of population, which picks up the effect of the changing 
number of dependents or may be a (crude) proxy for labour 8upplyj and 
the flow of US economic aid as a proportion of GNP, ,;"hich picks up the 
effect of foreign aid flows on domestic growth. In the second equation 
the savings ratio is made a function of the defence proportion, which 
picks up the resource diversion effect; the growth of national product; 
.gross domestic product per capita, again as a measure of development; 
US economic aid as a proportion of GNP; and the rate of inflation. 
Using annual data for Turkey between 1952 and 1976 the follolving 
results were obtained: 
where: 
gNP = 22.8 -1.255 s -0.185 X/GDP 
(2.2) ( 1.8) 
-0. 10 1 ~.uNP 
(1.0) 
') 
R-=O~336 S::;3.0l2 ME:::5.988 
s ::.. 13.4 -0.104 X/GDP -0.165 gNP 
(3.2) . (2.1) 
-0.094 AINP 
(2.8) 
+0.007 p 
(0.2) 
2 R = 0.867 S=1.116 ME=14.629 
+0.004 GDPC 
(2.5) 
DW;:;2.9 
+0.002 GDPC 
(5.7) 
DW=1.8 
gNP = the real growth rate of national product 
s ~ the savings rate (S/GDP) 
X = TurKish military expenditure 
GDP = gross domestic product 
GDPO = gross domestic product per capita 
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-0.932 gPOP 
(0.5) 
gPOP = annual g1.'o-dth rate of popul:::;.tion 
AINP = US ecunomic aid as a proporticn of national product 
P = rate of inflation 
vli th t-values in brackets. 
The growth equation is not well defined and thore is Gviden~e of 
negative serial correlation. There is surprisingly, a negative relationship 
between growth and the savings ratio, which is significant, but, as 
equation (2) makes clear, causality is not established. The coefficient 
on the defence proportion is negative and 3ignificaGt and suggests that 
military expenditure depresses growth. Gross domestic product per capita 
is positively related to growth, although, once again, causality has not 
been established, and the positive coefficient Illay simply reflect the 
common link with GDP to On the other hand the coefficient on US ecorw!!lic 
aid is not significant, nor does it appear that thv growth of population 
influences economic growth in any systematic way. If the gl'ol\'th of 
population is taken as a proxy for the grovJth of the labollr force , albeit 
a barely adequate one, then the 00efficient J'1l3.j simply re:lect a surplus 
labour economy. 
The savings equation (2) is well defined with a high R2, and the 
coefficient on military expenditure is negative and significant. The 
growth of national product and US economic aid as a proportion of GNP are 
both negatively related to the saving ratio~ with both coefficients 
significant. Gross domestic product per- capita has a positive effect on 
savings but inflation does not appear to influ~"lc", L:1.e savings ratio. 
Overall the re,>ul ts al'e inconclusive, and the growth equation in 
particular needs to be modi.fied. Part of the problem is that the dependent 
7ariables need to be estimated within a model 'which treats them as a 
~unction of both exogenous and endogenous variables in a dynamic simul-
ta.1'leous system, in which case ordinary 1east squares 1-{ould no longer be 
legitimate. 52 However, given the present limited availability of economic 
and social statistics on Turkey it is not possible here to develop a full 
:nacro-ecortomic model of the Turkish economy, which could be used to 
neasure thc magnitude of the causal links between the defence ratio and 
economic growth. If the links between the defence ratio and the growth 
Qf GNP were not directly related to the remaj_nder of the Turkish economy 
then the defence sector could be treated as a separate self-contained 
~ent and estimated in a small scale model. It is quite obvious, 
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however, in the context of a Keynesian type model~ that the defence sector 
does not form a separate compartment of the Turkish economy, so that it 
would be inappropriate to treat it as SU0~4. Given these difficulties all 
that can be done here is to select the most important causal interconnecticE: 
and then~ry to estimate the size of the responses. In effect this amounts 
to estimating a series of single equations which should ideally be treated 
as part of a much larger model of the Turkish economy. 
In order to overcome the bias and lack of consis-cency in ordinary 
least squares the causal interconnections are estimated by two-stage 
least squares using a first order autoregressive scheme to allow for 
any autocorrelation of the error term. In mac'I'o-economic models a dis-
tinction is normally made between those Variables that are given 
exogenously and those which are taken to be endogenous. In practice the 
distinction is inevitably blurred and the classification is a rel~tive 
one depending upon the system being studied and the purpose for which 
the model is being built. This raises particular problems when single 
equations only are being estimated (rather than the complete model) 
,since within those equations certain variables may need to be treated as 
if they were exogenous when wi thin a full scale mod.el theJ Ivould be 
regardeJ as endogenous.. There were special difficulties in the 
'estimations carried out here because the annual data used beh-Teen 1952 
and' 1976 generated only 23 usable observations which limited both the 
number of variables that could be treated as endogenous and the number 
of instrumental variables. Nevertheless, although some of the bias 
and inconsistency caused. by the correlation of the d-~sturbance term 
with some of the explanatory variables can be overcome by +-reating 
some of them as endogenous and using two-stage least squares the results 
have to be interpretted with great care and cannot be regarded as pr-oviding 
conclusive evidence on the impact of ue{ence spending on economic growth. 
The pattern of causal relations .?'1long the main variables considered' 
is assumed to be as presented in Figure 7.1. The growth of national 
-t 
product is made a function of the savings ratio and the defence ratio 
as in equation (1) but inste~d of using gross domestic product per 
Capita as an index of development it was decided to use the percentage 
of the labour force engages in agriculture (A), which also picks up the 
'productivity effect as labour moves from (inefficient) agriculture 
to the efficient (industrial) sector. The balance of trade deficit 
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FIGURE 7.1 S'low Chart of tl1e Causal Interconnections between Growth and the 
MiJ.:i.. tary Burden 
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(BOT) is also used as an explanatory variable :Ii Ill'(' i L r"lllq'al. r;::.; foreign 
savings but may on the other hand impose cerbd II. ('{'II:ll. 1':1 illl:1 on domestic 
economic policy and, through that, on economic /'TI'Wl.h. 'I'!I(; .. ~r(.wth of 
national product, the savings ratio and the UOfflliCI' 1':'1. j tl n I'f) taken as 
the endogenous variables. It is normal in macn""'I'tlII11IH I.(~ tilll:i(;ls to 
treat public authorities' current expenditure alld 1'.1 xnd \ nVI':; llflcnt as 
exogenous, in the sense that these demands arc lll'l, l')}:pl,'lil)(\(l within the 
model. Rov-rever, in this case, because of tho Cl 'III. 1','1 L 111'1 'Ill' !"'lllce of 
defence spending, one of the equations (7) tll:d; 1:\ 1,:d,i!iI'll.l't! "lttempts to 
quantify the determinants of the defence rntio. \,:11 i dl 111:;\;,):1 .I.t an endogenous 
variable. There can be no theoretical justin l: 1 i, I 011 i'() I' L I', l,'t bng ei ther 
A or BOT as exogenmJ.s to the Turkish dome8tic ()(~():I;Jl1:y \>11 \, !.lll' limi.ted 
number of observatioY's mad.e it necessary, altho: 1.':11 1.111.11 til Ii not a.ppeal" 
to distort the results. 
The savings J..'8.tio, as was pointed. out, 1:1 :11:10 \, I'on I.~~ll as an 
endogenous variable and is made a function of I,ll<' d(l~'('"lllll':) L'Lo, ifhich 
picks up the resource diversion effect; "[:to 1'1:.1". of .lllllnt.i()J\ (p); the 
gross domestic product per capita (GDPC), whldl 1,1 It IlIon: l1 )I'11 of the level 
of development; and US economic aid as a propod\()ll 01' (ii~i' (AINl)), Iv-hieh 
.is included to pick up the effect of foreign :li Ii "I <)\.,.n nIl d()w)stic savings • 
. Th v . bl 1:> d AINP t k d' . LI)(,,\.! nrc both e arla es J: an are a en as en ogcnou: 1 :11.1I(l1! 
channels through which the defence ratio IIl3y :inl'lll"lll:n :lllvLll(;8 and 
hence gro't'lth. There (':;.:(). be no theoretical ju:;LI('!I~:lt.i(1n 1'0:' tref:Lting 
GDPC t · 1 1 ' th c].O:'.(1 '1\111111\1,1 t. \"n of this variable as exogenous, par-lcu ar y glven . e -' , 
wi th growth of GNP, but the limited number 0 [' I) h:I(1 t'vn t;I (Ill;: m:tde it 
necessary for estimation purposes and this did 1\\) t. ,,!l\I:HI ((tty bias or 
inconsistency in the results. 
The rate of inflation is assUllled to bl' ,'l 1'11110 Li.Oll or the defbnce 
proportion or ratio, \:hich reflects the effol't () I' nUllIl1 Y (. i ,,-)cli ties; 
a dummy vPtTiable (DB) to pick up the influC')1('ll \l j' d tWlllll~1 UoCr., which, 
~ I I lion occurred in the csL.::_mation, takes a value of 1 in year;1 \~hl\ll (,tlVtI II.'l' 
d 
. ""ll,'I(lJ\1),oand 
an z.:;ro in. all other years; the level of W:I,":\' t.lll I fl, r' , 
ell . +h lIt' 't (PROD) '1'1 V'II,I"l,lt l ;l DB, DW angec J.n l; e eve of produc J_V1. y .. II I " •• 
, PRO . I " 't '1'111"" t.lle limited 
anu 1 D are all assumed to be exogenous, m;Ull .. \ 't,~· " 
I t ion Illll'posos, but number of observations made it necessary for (l:1 L 111:\, 
in any Ca3e they diff(,r from P in that th ey a\'t l 110 i, t\f1:llllllthl to be 
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channels through which the defence ratio influences savings. 
US economic aid as a propcrtion of GNP is assumed to be a 
function of the defence ratio, the balance of trade deficit and a dummy 
variable to pick up the arms embargo of 1975 and 1976~ The dummy 
variable can legitimately be regarded as exogenous but as was pointed 
out previously this is not entirely satisfactory for the BOT variable. 
The defence ratio is treated as a function of the gross u0mestic 
product per capita; the reciprocal of the gross national product, (RGNP) 
which reflects the influence of scale economies on military needs; the 
level of population; and a dummy variable to pick up the effects of the 
Cyprus invasion of 1974. As the defence ratio is assl.l.med to be the 
last link in the chain of variables explaining growtb the explanatory 
variables (of defence) are assumed to be exogenous and the equation was 
estimated by ordinary least squares. 
Usi~.g annual data for Turkey between 1952 and 1976 the assumed 
endogenous variables were estimated with the following results: 
(5) 
gNP = -10.57 +0.335 s 
(0.4) 
-Oe47372 X/GDP 
(2.7) 
+ 0.392 A 
(0.9) 
+ 2.085 BOT 
(2.1) 
Chi (7) == 14.35426 DW ;;:: 1.7 
s = 7.25 -0.4J49 x/GDP + 0.007 P + 0.003 GDPC (1.2) (0.1) (6.9) 
Chi (8) ~ 13.23907 
s = 15.69 -0.15 AINP 
(3.7) 
Chi (r-r) == 4.7863 
D\'l == 1. 3 
-0.91 X/UDP + 0.0017 GDPC 
(2.9) (3.7) 
DW == 2.3 
P = -0.279 + 0.70924 ~/GDP + 7.067 DB + 0.4 DW -0.511 PROD (0.6) (3.7) (3.3) (1.4) 
Chi (8) = 13.17825 DW = 1.9 
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-15.71 + 0.695 X/GIlP 
(1.4) 
+ 0.42 gNP 
(0.4) 
D~v :; 0.7 
X/GDP == -0.184 ·-0.00001 GDPC 
(3.0) 
+ 7,.6 RGNP 
(3.9) 
2 R == 0.883 
+ 0.0067 POP 
(3.7) 
S :::; 0.0029 
+ 0.025 DA 
(7.2) 
ME == 0.049 
-~-32 BOT 
(0.8) 
DVl == l.4 
-21.21 DA 
11 Lt.) \ ., 
The results are inter'esting and provide some support for the 
0.1.So results, although they leave much to be ans1tJered. One gem:!ral 
point that needs to be made is that the enforced exogenisation of tbe 
BOT, A, DW, PROD, RGNP and GDPC variables did not lead to any undue 
distortion in the results as is indicated by the Chi-square statistics. 
In the growth equation (3) the Chi-square statistic53 , 54 confirms the 
validi ty of the specification and the Durbin-vlatson statistic indicat8s 
insignificant serial correlation, but it is clear that the equation 
has by no mee.ns adequately determined the complex prOC8C~8 of gY'o1"lth. The 
coefficient on the defence ratio is negative and significant at thn 
1% level, which once again points to a depressing effect on growth. In 
-the 'unrestricted estimates I (not reported) the coefficient on the 
defence burden lagged one year was positive but not significant at 
the 5% level, so that there is no evidence to indicate that any demand 
stimulation effects manifest themselves within a year, although it is 
possible that a year is too shOTt a time lag, in "l'lhi'.:h case equation 
(3) may be incorr'ectly specified. The coefficient on savings is positive 
as one vlOuld expect (unlike the 0.1.S. estimate), but it is not signifi-
cant at the 5% level, Iv-hile in the 'unrestricted estimates' the 
coefficient on saving lagged one year is actually negative, although 
once again not significant. In view of the theoretical importance of 
the savings ratio in the growth process this result must be interpretted 
with care. It is possible that domestic saving is not a good proxy for 
investment or that a longer lag needs to be allowed for. There is 
also a positive coefficient O!l the balance of trade deficit which is 
significant at the 5% level and suggests that any indirect negative 
effects on growth through domestic economic policy constraints are 
more than outweighed by the direct contribution of imports to growth. 
In the 'unrestricted estimates' (not reported) the coefficient on the 
balance of trade deficit lagged one year was also positive, but not 
Significant, and in view of the level of Horker remittances after the 
"~=-*-~ '~.1-9 -
IDl' d-19UJ8 it must be concluded that there i;-', no r. d f .. ' 
- ~Vl ence 0 ~ne Gzternal 
position constraining growth up to 1976. Finally) the coefficient on 
A (the pel"centac:e of the labour fC1rce engaged in agriculture) is 
posi ti7e, vlhich suggests it is not a good proxy for the level of 
developm8ut, nor does it indicate any productivity gain as labour shifts 
from agriculture to industry. 
The savings equation (~-) is well sIJecified and indicates a 
negative effect of the military ratio on savings, al though l.ll1lil,=r~ the 
0.1.S. estimates the coefficient is not significant at the 5% level. 
Savings also increase with the level of gross domestic product per 
capita, and the coefficient is highly significant. The coefficient en 
the rate of inflation is also positive, but not significant, so that it 
appears that inflc~.tion has had no' systematic influence on the saving 
ratio in the period 1952-76o This result makes the inflation equation 
(5) redundant, since it is hypothesised that there is an indirect effect 
of the military ratio un savings through inflation, but this has not 
been established. The inflation equation is well specified and does 
indicate a positive influence of the military ratio on the price level 
but the coefficient is not significant. It appears that the main 
determinants of the inflation rate are changes in wages, the gro,·!th in 
productivi ty and the external value of- the cUl:rency~c ~ 
A second version of the savings equation (4') proved to be very 
well specified. In this version the coefficient on the defence ratio 
is once again negative. but significant at the 1% le-.;el., indicating 
a depressing effect on the domestic savings ratio. The coefficient on 
AINP is negative and also sigllificant" thus indicating a harmful 
effect on domestic savings. Gross domestic product per capita has a 
positive coefficient and is highly significgnt as in the other version. 
In equation (6) ... 4INP ,is positiVely related to the def~nce ratio 
althou[:h -the coefficient is not quj~ te s~gnif~can_t_ at_ the 5%_ level. The 
coefficients on the balance of trade defiai t and the invasion dllJ11ffiY 
Variable are both negative, but tpey -too are not significant. It also 
seems that the growth of nati,onal.product has no systematic impdct on 
the fl~Y .. ; of US economic aid. Clearly.AI~JP appears to be determined 
by factors outside the Tl~rkish domestic economy, and must therefore be 
rega:r\(l~d as exogenous. 
r-,! •• c..... '!: -
• ,~-- + • 
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The defence ratio equation (7) is well specifieJ and iDdic~tes 
a positive influence of RGNP, population and the invasion dummy variable, 
while the coefficient on gross domestic product per capita is negative 
and also significant. Apart from the influence of GDPC this equation 
may be interpretted as confirming that the defence ratio is determined 
mainly by exogenous variables, although the influence of strategic 
factors is not specifically allowed for. 
In order to determine whether military expenditure has had the 
same impact on different sectors of the economy it was decided to 
disaggregate the growth equation into the growth of agriculture, 
industry and construction. The results are as follows: 55 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
gAGR = -43.9 -0.144 s 
(0.1) 
-5.414 X/GDP + 0.708 A 
(2.3) (1.3) 
+ 14.696 M/E 
(3.0) 
R2 = 0.385 S = 6.02 
gIND = 88.27 
-0.015 .AINP 
(0.7) 
11E = 3.1 
-0 .. 703 x/GDP 
(0.5) 
-2.828 1\1/E -0.436 AlNP 
(0.9) (3.2) 
DI'l := 2.2 
R2 = 0.382 S = 3.792 ME = 9.296 DW = 2.7 
gCON = 69 .. 77 -2.18 s (1 - \ , .J, 
-1.819 x/GDP 
(0.7) 
-0. 759 ~1/E 
(0.1) 
-0.676 AINP 
(2.8) 
...Q.149 A 
(0.3) 
2 R = 0.313 S = 6c795 ME = 6.792 DW == 2.9 
where gAGR = the annual growth rate of ag~icultural output in real 
terms 
gIND = the annual growth rate of industrial output in real 
terms 
of 
gCON = annual growth rate of construction in real terms 
M/E = the ratio of imports to exports 
The coefficient on the defence ratio is negative in all three 
equations but is only significant in the growth of agriculture. A 
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possible explallation for this is that agricuJtural output is deter~irsj 
I[;::;.inly by supply and climatic factors and tne exp8.Ylsion of dcfe:;lce 
diverts resources away from that sector56 which slows do~n the rate at 
which nevi technology is introduced, but more cl,etailed evidence on t}:is 
is required. The coefficient on .A_Hir is also nega ti ve in all three 
equations anci is signifi82 1J t in the growth of industry and consJc;Y"ll:;iion. 
This result may be related to the kind of iectrl101ogy imported "\'12. tt 
US economic assistanoe and may be taken as tentative evidence in 
support of the findings of McCabe ~nd Michalopoulos (1971)~7 The 
only other 80efficient which is statisticall;; signific2.r.t is that on 
savings in the growth of industry equation. The negative coefficient 
on the savings ratio IIiay be due to the depend.ence of industry on the 
grovlth and level of domestic consumption which would give an inverse 
relationship with savi:n~s. The specifi<.;ation of eq,uai,ions (8) (9) 
and (10) is not, ho'wever, satisfactory and the R2 is 101'1 and the 
S/r1E high in ea ch case.. Clearly the grovrth of components of national 
prod1.Jct cannot he adequately explain8d in ter-ms of ffi'::lc:L'oeconomic 
variables alone and the results as a consequence are not very 
meaningful. 
The results presented here must be viewed with caution. Data, 
time and resource limitations have meant that the lines of c5usal 
interconnections have had to be estimated by single equations rC3.ther 
than wi thin a full macrooeco11oIllic model of the T'.lJ'kisfl e8onomy. 
Furthermore, the relatively short c bserva tion :r::eriod (1952--76) 
limited the nwnber of variables that could be treated as endo~enous 
within. the single equations (3) to (6) estiIL<:J.ted, ':!hich meant that 
several explanatory variables had to be treated as exogenous even 
though this could not be justified on theoretical grounds 1-7i thin the 
context 9f a full model. 11he grov;th equation in particular turned 
out to be inadequately specified and liaS unable to capture the cO::lplexi ty 
of the underlying groHth process, which lliay liave accounted. for the 
peculiar coefficient on the savings ratio. Economic theory would 
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J..uv.. .... v'-<. V~ VHV, V VU\~ ...L.lL v.L VUL'-\; lo-LVll Vi .lags ln the gro17th equation l:.igtt 
improve the coefficient of determination, but this could only be done 
c.t a price since the number of usable observations l;ould have }-.een 
reduced further. 
These qualifications notwithstanding, th8 results IDay be 
interpretted as showing that the defence ratio has had a negative 
impact on the growth of national product so that it is appropriate 
to talk of tbe defence burden. The- estimations indian te a strong 
negative direct influence of the defence ratio on zrowth ~hich 
implies that the demand stimulation and resource mobilisation chQnnels 
had a net drag effect on the economy. Increases in the milit2:ry ratio 
or burden were more likely to lead to greater imports, higher pric~s, 
increased taxes and Ci;.J.;S in public works, rather tban expanded output. 
Changes in the military ratio also seem to have had a negative 
indirect impact through the savings chenmel due to resource diversion 
and also possibly via the flow of US economic aio., although there is 
no evidence of inflation having caused Cl. decline in savings. 
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caNal us I O:'TS 
The importance of defence spending in the allocation 
of resources in Turkey in the post-7!ar period has been 
almost totally ignored. yet Tt1.rl:ey has cc~~~i tted about 
five per cent of her gross dome2tic product and over 
20 per cent of total government spending to defence since 
1950, which represents consideruble scarce resources for 
a country whose per capita income in 1978 was only about 
one seventh of that for the.industrialis~d world and 
whose people have suffered from serious long term economic 
and social deprivation. 
This study has argued that the levs1 end foyP.l of 
military resource consumption in Turkey can only be partly 
understood in terms of internal a~d exierpal security 
objectives. The military as a.."Yl institution also perforns 
an ideological function which is closely connected with 
\ . 
the integration of the military into the industrialisation 
process. Tr.e Turkish arm.y through the .Arned Fo:'ces :.:utU2l. 
Assistance Fund (OY lJC) has become one of t?J.e largest 
conglom~rates in the country so that the 2ilitary concer~ 
for inc.lustrialisatio'n is one of self-interest which is 
co:q.sistent vii th the interests of the capi talist class. 
Further~OTe, the level of Dilit~ry spending needs to be 
understood in relation to u.s. fo~ei~~ ;oli:y. ,~~E~i~~~ 
military and economic . aid to Tur~-::ey '/,Tas only ;iven or: 
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the conditio~ she allocated vast domestic resources to 
def(-'~J.ce, because the Turl:ish T:1ili t?!'J as an orG21~ised 
force was given a major role in the struggle against 
Com:::unism end in ensuring that tile conditions tl'lat 
allowed capitalist exponsion to take pla.ce ','rere satisfied. 
By creating and maintBining the conditions under which 
international capital could operate the military 
facilitated the tra.~sfer of resources tovlards the 
'metropolis' nnd indirectly influenced the forn:. of 
industrialisa.tion. The Turkish economy became highly 
dependent on the economies of the industrialised countries, 
which ultimately imposed enormous constraints on further 
growth in the mid 1970s. 
,. 
After the U.S. arms em.bargo in 1975 had brought a 
temporary halt to military aid Tu~key was forced to 
. 'purche.se' her arms on the world ~9.!'ket, and this bega.l1 
to exacerbate the already serious foreign exchange 
problem. One of the conse~uences of th0 embargo was tha.t 
Turkey unveiled a new defence policy designed to make her 
';., 
self-sufficient in arms production. It has been argued 
in this study that arms produ(;tion would. be unlikely to 
" 
reduce the need for foreign exch~~~e in the 8Dort-~un, 
woul<\ do Ii ttle to reduce uneJ:ployment, 2nd would a1;:os t 
cert.ainly replace one form of dependency by another. 
Moreover, arBS production has an uncertain and limited 
market and it would absorb scarce resources which would, 
ther'2fore', be denied to other civilian pros_uctive activi -ties . 
• 
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the resource allocational consequences of !:lilitery 
expenditure for economic progress. 
been argued that Turkey has f~tiled to Y'ssolve the I;lany 
deep rooted structual and institutional proble~s and 
economic and social imbalances that f8.ced the country 
.. 
in 1950 which can ·partly be explained by the role of 
the mili tary in Turkey.' The consec.l.uences of military 
expenditure for economic growth is a very complex issue 
for which ther-e is no general answer. It has been 
argued' that- it is essential to go beyond esta.blishing 
statistical correlations between growth and the defence 
burden, which could be spuriou.-1 J but rather it is 
necessary to formulate the various links between the 
militp.!,y burden And the growth rRte ~t the theoretjc~l 
level and then try to estima.te tliem in the context of a 
theorised 
model of growth. The causal links in chapter seven 
go SOTIe way Lowards meeting these reClui:'ements since 
the impact of d2fence spending on growt~ is estimated 
both directly and indirectly t:h.rough the savinzs :'8.tio, the 
r8.te of inflation, the balance of trs>de an.d the flo':! of 
C no 0 :'I 011
0 
+p'Y."T al'.-1 Ye+ bec):;use of the '??-l.ci ty :'jf' eo... ml C 2D G. TIll lJ _,,- J' -... • v...... __
data avail:;.ble on the Turkish economy B-Yld the intprnati.or~':.l 
are . 
rms 'tr d tbe that estimated In chapter seven a [J e 1. equations 
are only partial and much of the underlying transmission 
h o. 1 d '/i'hich mal{~s i t difficult to meCl alllSm J_S conce8- e , 
8en~rpte ~he v~rious 
.A.." . • 
d · .c-.... t t' econo"'l",_-1c ~tructure' and i~1.)ossible -:0 spen lnG a~Jec s ne - ~-
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test the vDlidit ... , r ·O.l..~ t~e re~'u.l~s. n t', 
'... _4 ~ v dever l'le ...... es.S ~ ur:til 
more dct:':;iled data. beC0I:18S ~tvai12.ble deGisions h~ve to 
be based on existin~ information and +", 1 . ~ - V';'ke resu~ 1:8 
reported in chapter seven do poi!J.t 
guns and growth. 
Jhe Cyprus Inva.sion 
The econometric results reported in chapter seven 
suggest that the invasion of Cyprus and the dispute over 
the AeeeeJ.1 in 1974, vrhen Greece :?.rJ.d Turkey· almost cam.e 
to war, vlould have serious conseQuence~ for the Turkish 
economy. In 1974 the total a.rmed forces of Turkey 
(453,000) \vere almost three times as large as the Greek 
forces (161,200), but in terms of the quantity and 
sophisticc.tion of the weapons possessed by. the two sides 
.thegep was not so pronounced. In t8rms of air power, 
,for eX2J1lple, Turkey had one F-4~ Phant("l~ squadron, -:wo 
F-I04G Starfigb~er SQuadrons, four F-IOOD squadrons, two 
F-5A squadrons, two F-104S squadrons and two F-84:5' 
squadrons against Greece's tt.vo four F-84-F, tYro 
F-I04fJ and two :F-5J... sq,uadrons. FurtherL'lore, during 1974 
Turkey h2.d 
. 
of 8~ internal securi ty problen than G::'sece, 21,":(1 ~2eded 
to .gup ....rd her fron.tiers with the IT.S.S.R., Iran and Iraq. 
Turkey w~s certainly not satisfied with the military 
balance and in 1975 a Fourth .Army (the krr:1Y of the 
Lesean) creo.ted. 
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In the short-run the inv~2ion of ('I~rprus r>o~" 
v cJ '_ ,_ v 
. 
Turkey over %500 !!lillion in ~ountin0 the 2ili t2.r;:l 
offensive, but there were elso temporary indirect costs 
as the fear or 'Nar with -Greece caused irpie:::'4:::.eYlt to 
fe.ll, foreign capital flows to dry up end tourisn to 
decline. There was, hovrever, c. much more serious and 
long term effect of the Cyprus invasion, namely that the 
... 
arms race ~etween the two countries accelerated. ~he 
invasion and the threBt of war made Turkey realise that 
much of its mili te.ry equipment was antiquated ~nC!. needed 
replacem.ent-. During August 1974 it was reported that 
the Turkish generals had presented the government with 
a long list of mili tary requirements, and two submarir.c3 
and 260 armoured personnel carriers were ordered from 
two unspecified Europe~n countries. The er~s e~bcreo 
meant that the economic impact of' the a.rms· build-up was 
ma.de more serious as scarce foreign excha.."'1ge vvas 
absorbed in buying arms from abroad. 
-Between 1970 and 1974 Turkish military expenditure 
increased by almost 40 per cent 7Thile Greelc !nili t2.ry 
expe!lditure rose by only eight per cent and in both 
t · t' . 1 . ~ b;:l coun rles ne ml_l0ary ur~en declined. 8onflic: 
of 1~74 there was. an enormous increase in military 
expenditure, the details of which are given in Table 8.1. 
In 1975 military spending increased by nearly 
70 t · T' ,.:j about 6e· n ..... er cer .. t iT: c;.::rccce, per C E;Jn - In ur .:{ey· eD ..... 
to sta.'1d at %1563 nillion and ,3'1043 million respectively. 
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Tur1':ish pnd £:zpe~di t·J.~·e, 
1970-78 
I;:ili t8~\,r E::~.) • ~,~ 0~ c~ ....~ ,-' ~2t2.J -:-.0 ·~rc:e~. 'J ~ ('" _'4 ......... ( _ ..... .J J (j ".-
in :T ,..., 'j'!l _, ... .J .;( L .... of Gnp of Ir:..f') ....... + -.....( '- " . ...). ~'cr(' es 
:-;t 1973 Erices EXQ. oeo's 
n ex. rates Ye8r c~ 
T G T G T G T G 
1970 675 603 4.3 4.8 20.9 20.1 450 160 
1971 790 638 A·.5 4.7 20.8 20.3 450 160 
1972 821 680 4.3 4.6 21.1 20.8 455 160 
1973 . 862 679 4.1 4.1 21.1 21.7 453 16l 
1974- Q4~ --' ) 650 3~9 Li 3 I • 20.5 25.2 453 161 
1975 1563 1043 6.1 6.5 26.6 28.5 453 161 
1976 1916 1022 6.8 6.0 29.4 26.0 460 199 
1977 1606 1230 5.9 6.9 21.1 20.2 468 200 
1978 1127 1230 5.5 6.7 0? 0 L ...... 18-.3 485 190 
Notes: T=Turkey; G=Greece 
Source: S.I.P.?..I. 1979; I.I.S.S. 1974, 
o 
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In 1976 there wes a further incre?se in the aefence 
. 
allocation in. Turkey of over 22 per cer~t ',';11:"C11 ~72'2 
followed by two years of contr2.ctio~ in. real "terms, 
althouGh the mili tary burden was stilJ, 1. t I)er c er:t 
higher in 1978 than it had been in 1974. In Greece 
mili tary expenditure fell slightly in 1976 and ',ve.s 
mainta.ined in 1978. Over the period 1970-74 an average 
of 4.-2 per cent and 4.5' per cent of G.D.E. was con:::.ittec. 
to defence in Turkey and Greece respectively, ~~d this 
rose to 6.1 a~1 6.5 per cent during 1975-78. The ar~s 
race was no.t noticeable in the mili t2rY budgets of other 
N.A.T.O. countries where the effects of detente had led 
to declining military burdens) and in fact II.A.T.O. 
military expenditure was lower in 1978 in real ter:rrs 
than it had been in 1970 and 1974 (see Figure 8.1). 
The rising military burdens in Greece and 'Turkey werG 
also refleoted in the proportion of government expenditure 
allocated t~ d,2ience vlhich rose to a pealr of 29.4 per, 
cent in Turkey in 1976 and 28.5 per cen'c in Greece in 
1975. It took longer for military manpOVler to respond 
but by 1978 the total arned forces in Turkey '71ere 30,000 
above the 1974 figure, x/hile in Greece by 1977 an extra 
f ' ~ , ' ... }, 40,000 milit2:ry perso.::1~el had been d~B- ~eQ l:r:.-::O ~~_8 
arm.e~ forces. 
Ignorin~ the significance of the results and 
allo~ving for the art:J.s embargo, the equations estimated in 
chapter ~eve~ ~ould predict 
burden in Turkey after 1974 Nould ceuse the @T0\7th rate 
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mobilisation drag' and indirectly through resource diversion, 
but the period 1975-77 does n~t appear to conform 
to this pa'ttern o 
d""'''J..· Y) 0' 1 07,1 .V'~_ .J..--b ...L...) l 1975 ce Y1+ of i' C", T~ ..I.~ I..J ....j • 1. c ...:.. • 
declined in t:'iO ye~:T'2 to 17. 6 ~'n.d 15.5 
cent, but the grovvth T~"te did not becin to slo'.'.' r1o';.'Yl-
U 11 til 1 977 ':/ h G ;.1 i t f c 11 to f 0 U I' r e r cell t • I H S ~):L t 8 0 f 
the underlyinc situ3tion ~~s not 
burden did hnve 2 on 
the ,srovvth rc-lte. Indus trin1 prod:.;.ction e:/:::pEmded cc~e-
wh8t rJore slo'N1y in 1975 thEtn 1n previous ye~rs but 
bec8Ti.s.:; agric'J.1 tural :production rose substsu'1.tiBlly, , Clue 
a.bout eight per ce:at. :Sut there ',,"rere oignc', of proble:-Js 
in 1975 and '.1.. 0""', hO U':->Y't : cul ':' 'r'"] ~T -i 1'11 i nduo-, tr'; l.',(J ey,c> c ~ ,] <:l0l' ty J ,...L:~_ ..... ..I- .-~~.-r...J _ . .J.. _.... t-..JV c) • - ... -'-' -'J.:--
utilisatioYl 
due to a decline in exports. Furthermore, these two 
years saw consumption risinG more rapidly, and private investment 
less rapidly than p1anned o 
beco.use economic ;olic,Y cave priori ty to ~(eepiES '-'-P the 
Turl:::Lsh econor:".~T to rr"'~-, P __ J.._ 
centr21 gove:cnI."cent br.d-:::;et aosorbed 18.8 per cent of t~~e 
G T) J-) lOn 1 0r11l ",1.-. l• C 11 t~'l''''n ":V"r>Y'e-· <=<ed e~0h y .. oar to • ~. .• . ..I I ·-t ~1":1 J.. _.I..t,;...L J.....l.l.v..L C-'.)..) .-..'-'. 
26.7 per cent in 1977, with a rising proportion 
f b ," -e 28 ~,~.1'.1~ S.2 S~O~3 • bucl ::.;ct beins ~lccountc(l . or "'J ',:018!l:"': '" -" ~ - . 
f! Y'o··,tb 
. .1"_ wJ .... of Govern:r:e~~ ===~cendi ture 
and ~elQtec1 'Ic:,irtbl es, 1974 78 
Centrel GO"TTernment Defence T'-..,.~ ....... ' .~ ... ,...) . 
...... 
r,l'"'o··"t~ J_ .. _ of 
Budget ~.S i- ... c:j I~ OJ:. as of the , 
G.D.P. Eudrret q :~one;( Sv-Enll[ 
Year ! 
1974 18.8 20.5 27.6 
1975 21.7 26.7 31.7 
---1976 23.4 26.4 28.0 
1977 26.7 21.7- 39.0 
1978 25.6 20.2 37.0 
./ 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, 
Vol. 34 , No.5, May 1981; s. I .1' • R • I. 19'79 • 
. 
As a result of the rising governtlent expend.iture there 
was 8 big incr€~se in the size of the public sector 
n D ""D t.:r. • ~ • in 1977, 
. 8l1.d 'H3.S financed by domestic oorro\","ing 
<t 
mainly from the-Central Bank. 
The expansion of the Tur~h economy in 1975 and 1976 
acceler2.ti l1e inflution caused by the :lor:et8.TY expO-x'_sion 
- 363 - • 
and" UllC?~~lI!loymen t als 0 incre 3.8 ed , but the n:8.~ o!' 
was t:'a,:; [:;rovling imbalance on the exte:rl~2.al 8.ccou~t. 
Betw"een 1974-77 it was possible for Turkey to fina.""1ce 
the foreign exchange " deficit through 'xor~~er re~i tt:::.nces 
and by short-tern borrowing on the Euromarket, but when 
this source began to dry up in 1977 the country was 
eventually forced to suspend foreign payments and 
introduce deflationary""policies." In the period 1952-76 
there VIBS no evidence that the foreign exchange pos::' tion 
bad constrained growth but a.fter 1974 the joint impact 
of ~he energy shor-tage and the rising defence burden 
finally created such a severe external deficit that 
growth was brought to an end. P.fter 1977 both intern~ 1 
and external ~ecurity objectives demanded high levels of 
r1.ilitary expenditure, yet in the context of a stagnating 
economy and· a serious foreign exc'hange pos"i tion this 
inevi tably meant that desirable civil eX12ena.i ture wa.s" 
crowded out wi th adverse effects on grvwth a.11.d social 
justice. 
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pxticle 141 states: 
es ts,bli2h or es taolis~es, or 
arreJlGes or conducts and ad~1inisters t~e activi ties of 
societies j.n 3ny way 8x:.d under any ::1cL:;;e, or fUTLishes 
guidsnce in these respects, with the purpose of 
t '1' ,. d '.L" ~ " 1 1 e8 '~JU lS11lngcL'1lYlavlOn oJ: a SOCl8 C_8,33 over other 
social clDsses or exterminating Q certain social cl~ss 
or overthro7.'inc any of the est8,blished bDs~c economic 
be punisiled by 
heD.VY irr1.vrisonmcnt of frola eif;?lt to 15 ye~rs. 7thoever 
or 811 such 
societies shall be punished by death. 
8"'t,,,1,,ll" e<1r.; n" +'ne c1omin2tic)l: of OY',e social class o~{(r oJ;:J '..J <.:,:. u _ ......, .i.l.J.......,.:;; V.lo. _ -.: .. 
.(, 
n~r:- '~ll'e "c,7a'hl ~.L' p.~,:-'l basic eccnoY!.ic \..J ..J,.. I..... _ v v ........... __ -.... ..... - "-' "- -
.L.. ''1 C> .... 'i" 1'1 ~"y>""< r 0 r :...Lt:;; CU d ... -.~ J , 
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+','" ,-, I'; t' c .... l or ""' i.;..t;: 1/0 __ l . r"""..; • ...L 
Or' 
APPENDIX 2 
Estimation of allocations to defence by 1I~ ~ rn 0 1\ • .: • ...:.... • 
countries for 1953, 1958 and 1977 using t::.e Bri tish 
'net ta.x rate' after allowing for benefits 8nd ta."'Ces 
to determine the reQuired share of the c.efence burden. 
-" 
The following tables correspond to Tsbles 4.2 to 4.6 
pp. 117-123. 
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Per C8.pita Inco~es of ~:._'_.rr.o. (::;oun~:ries 
/ in l for 1953 
Per Capi ta Per C . L ~\PllJ a 
, 
Income Inco:".e c .-,c C_v J 
of "IT • ~ n, _. _ ... __ \...I ~"'I:Ter [1""8 
. 
Country (1) (2 ) 
U • S • A. 2080 277.70 
Canada 1521 203.07 
U.K. 810 108.14 
Belgium 852 113.75 
Norwa,y 794 106.01 
France 866 115.62 
Denmark 791 105.61 
Germany 619 82.64 
'f'J c>tlY'r l r,Y1d 0 530 70.76 
.L.'t 'v .L "-' -l- "_',.I....... ..J 
Italy 353 47.13 
. Greece 190 25.37 
Portuga1 176 - 23.50 
Turkey 159 21.23 
* Average 749 . 
* ~iote: unvleighted 
Sonrce: U .IT. Yearbook of IJ2.~iona1 Accou~ts 
statistics, New York, 1964. 
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British F8~ily Income Distribution 
and allo':7in~ for 3enefi t8 2nd 
Range of /.ver'J. ~e f_'.~ e ,.~ 2 ,c; e T2Z 28 c'. !7er?f':'e ]PYl. r J ~ ~,T~+ ~:~ ~-c' c- .. _ _Ii _ \_, 
Income Income ~8X of Inc. ~c~'1efi t r, 0: T",/"' :)..,+0 __ ... '-' • _ .. '-:J ~_ 
Top 1°1 1° 5009 1597 31.9 118 2.3 29.6 
1 5'< 
- IV 2291 642 28.0 126 5.5 Z2.5 
5-10% 1623 484 29.8 9,8 6.0 23.8 
10-20% 1289 352 27.3 117 9.0 18.3 
20-50~6 956 246 25.7 126 13.2 12.5 
50-75% 667 169 25.3 134 20.1 5.2 
75-100~~ 314- 94 29.9 190 60 .. 5 "7 -- 6 -)0. 
Note: j\verage Family IncoI!l8, = 1643 
S O" -'-''''...c> 0 "'I r<l r.rk -'" d ,.. q Pe t e-v> ~ T_y:c nIne -:01"'.4 "-~ "'-'. ~. 'v_r::!_ d..l':' '.J ...... ~. ; ...... u, -- ...,-~- -
..... It" N • 
'·'pa hO ,-·e1"'e8 /. _ _..J..""" -- x~ der:::'ved 
V 8.nd VIII. 
• 
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The Perc en t 8P'8 
. 
of' ~ i\T 1) -I- 1 ~ .J. J... • _'-'_o_c...;;..e_s .... r- .:.s,;:.:~;,....:t-:::O~:'l 
Defence using the pdjusted t;::n: r-=-te 
as the deter~innnt of the burden shQri~~, 
Bnd using "the U.K. defeYl8e burc_en P..8 -9. si::anc8Tc1 
C,ountry 
U ("l , • .:> • .l~' 
, 
Cenada. 
U.K. 
Belgiurl 
Norv'Iay 
France 
Denmc.rk 
Gerna.YJ.y 
lJeth8rlands 
Italy 
Greece 
PortuGal 
Turkey 
1953 1958 
Adjusted Required A.l ~ d _~ • t~~ , I 
(1) 
29.1 
27.8 
.24.5 
24.8 
24.3 
25.0 
24.3 
.19.4 
16.1 
7.9 
-20.1 
-23.2 
-26.9 
Defence Tsx 
Burden R2.te 
(2 ) 
13.4 
12.8 
11.3 
11.4 
11.2 
11.5 
11.2 
8.9 
7.4 
3.6 
-9.3 
-10.7 
--12.4 
(:5 ) 
28.6 
2'7 r I • Co 
25.3 
2~-. 6 
24.5 
24.3 
. 
24.2 
24.4 
18.8 
11.9 
-1.6 
.-23.4 
-3C.0 
Derived from Tables 1 4.2 
- 369 -
d Reg 
Burr:en :?.c·te 
8.8 
8.5 
7.8 
7.6 
7.6 
7.5 
7 • 5-
7.5 
::; Q-
./ . '-' 
3.7 
-0.5 
-7.2 
-9.2 
(5 ) 
26.8 
2 1'" '7 '.). , 
17.1 
25.8 
26.8 
25.5 
26.5 
25.3 
12.3 
7.9 
-9 c::; . ./ 
-3:1.4 
d 
:teq 
(6) 
7.8 
7.8 
5.0 
'7 r: 
j .:; 
7.8 
7.5 
7.7 
'1 '1 j • j 
7.4 
2.3 
'J (") 
-L.,,-
m !"?L; 4.51 
..L ... -~'~ • 
10..10 C'") t ion s to :0 (; fen c e by N .t, • ,(1 ~ O_.~C~O~l..;,:;.lY".:..:l. -==-;:" - -:,-::"':..:::e~s 
usinF the U.K. defence burde~ 
c 
asa standard, 195~ 
Reguired Actual r,nlJ J...L • ...L. 
Defence Defence TT'" l ... ) %b. 
Burden BU1"den 
Country (1 ) (2) (3) 
Norvra.y 11.2 5.6 2.7 
U • S • A. 13.4 14.8 333.2 
Canada 12.8 9.0 22.6 
Germany 8.9 4.9 30.4 
D en:r:1 ark 11.2 3.7 3.5 
Belgium 11.4 5·3 7.5 
/ 
Fr2nce 11.5 11.0 36.9 
Netherlands 7.4 6.2 . 5.6 
U.K. 11.3 1 1 -. --,-.J 41.2 
Italy 3.6 4.6 16.8 
Greece -9.3 6.1 1.5 
Portugal ·10.7 4.6 1.5 
Turkey -12.4 5.4 3.6 
nefe-'1'''~ .4. ... ....., '-
:=cr;~~/"\~_ • 
US J.,.,., eo:' • 
(4) 
149 
49321 
2032 
1490 
128 
396 
4064 
3,15 
4656 
773 
9) 
69 
196 
." " .r) d Dei'. l.1.. '':-'''' .... , 
:::: ~= -:) e r: d • 
in He< "- ...) 1[". 
(5 ) 
299 
4A655 
2890 
2706 
387 
852 
Lt? LP, 
t • I -
L1r11 
4'-r:: ,.. C!J0 
605 
-138 
-161 
-449 
Source: eols. (2) and (4-), I.I.S.J. (1965) 
( 
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, 
using the U.K. defence burden 
as a. st Dnd Etrd, 1953 
Required ~f">+u pI G~;? Defer-lce ReC' d ::::e:~ • .t1.v v _,,-/# 
-
b 
Defence Defence US .ib .. =:~~;' en (l • =}~T'enO • 
"'-
Burden Burden US %~. in ~·r{ ,j" : I. ~. 
Country (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) 
Norway 7.6 4.0 4.0 160 305 
U.S.A. 8.8 10.9 455.0 49591 40037 
Canada 8.5 6.0 33.9 1356 2881 
Germa!1y 7.5 3.4 r:;7 9 ./ I • 1968 43,11 
Denmark 7.5 3e3 5 () .'-' 11."4 ...... 0 373 
BelgiuTI 7.6 ~7 Q ) . ./ 10.5 408 795 
Frence 7.5 7.9 49.6 39111 37J8 
Netherlands 5.8 5.0 . 9.5 473 5/~ 8 
U.K. 7.8 7.8 64.8 5053 5053 
Italy 3.7 4.3 29.3 1262 1086 
Greece -0.5 5.8 :3 1 .~ l Q ') l __ - -16 
Portugal -7.2 4.5 2.1 96 _, ~ r' ..L..." 
Tur}:ey -9.2 '4 ~ . .,. 5.3 2?;Q .,...., -488 
Sources: Cols. (2) and (4), I.I.S.S. (l966); 
Col. (3) U .2·J. Statisticcl Ye2.I'book~ 19(.9. 
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l' .ABLE 4.611 
@..loc8tions to Defence by :~ . .'~. T. o. Countries 
using the U.K. defence burden 
2.S 8 standard, 1977 
Reg,uired !~ctu8l Gr"J: ~efenr;e 
, 
Defence 1)e -F" en C c us rj, i? ~_r T. e 1" d ~ ...... .L. ...... ....... t.J 0 • 
--'-- ,L'-' . .J..l.. • 
--
-Burden Burden US ,it. 
Country (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (l1. ) 
Norvl8.y 7.8 3.1 34.2 1.1 
U Cf • 
• u • A. 7.8 6.0 1874·.4 104.3 
Canada 7.8 1.8 197.1 3.3 
Germany 7.7 3.4 501.0 1 7 ~ -'- • .l. 
Denmark 7.7 2.5 41.0 1.1 
Belgium 7.5 3 .. 4 74.4 2.5 
France 7.5 3.6 387.1 13.7 
Netherlands 7.4 3.6 9.9.4 -3.7 
U.K. 5.0 5.0 247.1 12.4 
Italy 3.6 2.4- 194.4 4.7 
-
G~eece 2.3 5.0 25.9 1.3 
Portugal -2.B 3.3 IB.1 0.5 
Turkey -9.2 5.7 46.5 2.6 
Source: I.I.S.S, (1978) 
• 
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.~ 
?e,~ '_L '" -) -.-" -../ t.., j~ • 
+ 
L'v-·'CYlG -I4'~'-' __ ' •• 
T'T~ 2'8. 'J -.) 
(5 ) 
2.7 
146.2 
15.4 
38.6 
3.2 
5.6 
29.0 
7.~ 
12.4 
7.0 
0, 6. oJ. 
-0.5 
-4.3 
1. Smith, Adam. (1776): 'In I:;lOuir,:" i'1-:o ""u' he '~a""""Y>e 
... t.I.... ~..L"""...J LA.. ...... 
and C a us e s 0 f the ~1'lre ~ 1 +.h f lIT t· ,~ ~- 0 ~a lons ( ~ook V, 
ch. 1. 
2. Sombart, ~:7erner (1913): 'Krieg UYla Kapit2,lisllius', 
pp. 4-6, 77, lfunich, 1913. 
3. Nef, J.U. (1950): '~estern Civilisation 3i~ce 
the Renaissance, Harper Edition, i'~evv York, 1963. 
4. C1al}ham, J.R. (1936): 'The Economic Deve1opn:ent 
of FrancE; and Germany 1815-1914', pp. 1-5, C2.~1brj.d[:e 
University Press, London, 1936. 
5. Einzig, P. (1934): 'The Economics of Re2T7.a:1ent', 
pp. 137-140, Kegcn P8.ul, Lond.on, 1934. 
6. Keynes, J.U. (1936): 'The General TheoT':'- (If 
Employment, Interest and :,':on;ey', pp. 129-130, 
Macmillan, IJondon, 1960 . edition. 
7. U.N. (1962): 'Econo:lic and Soci81 ConseCluer:.ces of 
DisarmaDent', Report of the 3ecret~.ry General, 
Reprinted in 'Diss.rm~:?JJel1t, Its Politics 2Jld :Scorl0r:lics', 
Ed. r.:elman, S., .; .... ':lerican. AC3.::le[~y of .:xts, =Te?T York, 
1962. 
8. U.N. (1972): 'Econonic a.l1d Social Consequen~es of 
~ . 
the .Arms Race and T:Tili ta.ry Expendi tures', Report 
of the Secretar~ General, U.N. ~ew York, 1972 • 
• 9 •. U.N. (1977): ':Scono:ric and 30ci2.1 ':Jonse~luences of 
the _.1.rms Race', Docu?Tle:;lt :'/32/88, U.E., :;e','i Yor1:::, J-977. 
10. Turkey is assumed to be a less developed country, 
al though the r:.'orld Development ?.epo~ts cate;orisc 
it as 'middle-income' pnd so~e ~riters refer to it 
as 'peripheral-capitalist:. 
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